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GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


BY 

GEORGE  MADISON  PRIEST 

PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY 


GINN  AND  COMPANY 


BOSTON  •  NEW  YORK  •  CHICAGO  •  LONDON 


COPYRIGHT,  1914,  1915,  BY  GEORGE  MADISON  PRIEST 

ALL  RIGHTS  RESERVED 


5I5-2 


gEfte  gtfreiueiim  ffircgg 


GINN  AND  COMPANY  •  PRO¬ 
PRIETORS  •  BOSTON  •  U.S.A. 


TO 

MY  SISTER 

R.  P.  I. 


PREFACE 


The  rise  of  modern  Germany  has  long  attracted  the 
interest  of  American  readers,  but  interest  has  often  been 
baffled  by  the  complexities  of  German  state  and  national 
life  and  by  the  mass  of  detail  which  historians  have  in¬ 
cluded  in  their  accounts  of  Germany.  Many  Americans  de¬ 
sire,  I  believe,  an  introduction  to  German  history.  I  have 
attempted  to  meet  this  desire  by  choosing  the  most  inter¬ 
esting  period  —  from  the  accessions  of  Maria  Theresa  and 
Frederick  the  Great  in  1740  down  to  recent  times  —  and 
presenting  only  the  most  important  events  of  this  period. 

Both  for  facts  and  for  ideas  I  am  indebted  to  German 
as  well  as  English  printed  sources  and  to  numerous  Prince¬ 
ton  friends  and  colleagues.  More  particular  gratitude  has 
been  richly  merited  by  Professor  Sidney  B.  Fay  of  Smith 
College,  who  read  the  manuscript  of  the  whole  book  with 
exceeding  care  and  offered  many  acute  observations  and 
suggestions.  To  John  Haughton  Coney  I  can  no  longer 
voice  acknowledgment  of  the  stimulus  which  his  counsel 
always  gave,  for  he  is  gone,  and  Princeton  and  American 
historical  science  have  lost  one  of  their  noblest  spirits. 

GEORGE  M.  PRIEST 

Princeton  University 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

I.  Germany  as  it  was  in  1740 .  1 


The  Holy  Roman  Empire  ;  its  origins  and  political  con¬ 
ditions ;  the  election  of  the  emperor;  Austria  and  other 
important  states  of  the  Empire ;  the  foundations  of  Prus¬ 
sia ;  German  social  and  intellectual  life  around  1740 

II.  The  Wars  of  Maria  Theresa  and  Frederick  the  Great, 

1740-1763  . 10 

The  causes  and  course  of  the  Silesian  Wars  and  the  War 
of  the  Austrian  Succession;  results  of  the  wars  of  1740- 
1748;  the  beginning  of  the  Seven  Years’  War;  the  course 
of  the  war  and  its  significance  in  German  life 

III.  Frederick  and  Germany  in  Time  of  Peace,  1763-1786  23 

Frederick’s  most  important  acts  in  the  government  of  Prus¬ 
sia  ;  his  attitude  toward  his  people  and  toward  German 
thought  and  literature ;  conditions  in  Austria  and  other 
German  states ;  religious  and  philosophical  thought ;  the 
rise  of  classical  German  literature ;  the  first  Partition  of 
Poland;  the  War  of  the  Bavarian  Succession  ;  the  Fiirsten- 
bund ;  Frederick  the  Great’s  ideals  and  achievements 

IV.  The  Decline  of  Germany  to  the  Treaty  of  Lun£ville, 

1786-1801  . 35 

Frederick  William  II  of  Prussia ;  the  second  and  third  Par¬ 
titions  of  Poland  ;  the  French  Revolution  and  its  first  effects 
in  Germany  ;  the  Peace  of  Basel ;  the  campaign  of  1796  and 
the  Treaty  of  Campo  Formio;  the  campaign  of  1799-1800 
and  the  Treaty  of  Luneville  with  its  results;  the  popular 
indifference  to  political  affairs 

V.  The  Degradation  of  Germany,  1801-1808  . 46 

French  aggressions  in  Germany;  the  campaign  of  1805, 
Austerlitz,  and  the  Treaty  of  Pressburg ;  the  rise  of  the 
vii 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

Rhine  Confederation,  and  the  fall  of  the  Holy  Roman  Em¬ 
pire  ;  Napoleon’s  isolation  of  Prussia;  the  Battle  of  Jena 
and  the  Peace  of  Tilsit;  Napoleon  in  control  of  Germany 

VI.  The  Regeneration  of  Germany,  1S0S-1S13  ....  55 

Reforms  in  the  Prussian  state  and  army ;  regenerating 
forces  in  Prussian  public  life ;  Austrian  and  other  insur¬ 
rections  against  Napoleon ;  the  war  between  Russia  and 
France  in  1812;  the  Prussian  uprising;  Prussia’s  part  in 
the  War  of  Liberation 

VII.  The  War  of  Liberation,  1813-1815 . .66 

The  first  months  of  the  war ;  the  engagements  around 
Dresden ;  the  Battle  of  Leipsic  ;  the  defeat  of  Napoleon 
and  his  banishment  to  Elba ;  his  return  and  reign  of  a 
hundred  days;  the  Battle  of  Waterloo;  benefits  to  Ger¬ 
many  from  the  Napoleonic  era 

VIII.  The  German  Confederation  and  the  Period  of  Re¬ 
action,  1815-1848 . 76 

The  Congress  of  Vienna,  the  Final  Act,  and  the  Federal 
Act ;  the  Holy  Alliance ;  constitutional  government  in 
minor  German  states  ;  reaction  in  Austria  and  Prussia ;  the 
Carlsbad  Resolutions;  insurrections  after  1830;  the  Zoll- 
verein  ;  a  change  of  rulers  in  Austria  and  Prussia ;  affairs 
in  other  states ;  intellectual  life  in  the  period  of  reaction 

IX.  The  Popular  Struggle  for  Constitutional  Liberty 

and  National  Unity,  1848-1863 . 91 

The  March  Revolutions  of  1848;  the  Frankfort  Parlia¬ 
ment;  rebellion  and  reaction  in  Austria  andfother  states; 
the  failures  and  successes  of  1848  and  1849  !  the  Prussian 
constitution ;  the  rising  struggle  between  Austria  and 
Prussia  for  preeminence  in  Germany ;  the  popular  desire 
for  national  unity  ;  the  conflict  between  the  states ;  the 
accession  of  William  I  in  Prussia;  the  reorganization  of 
the  Prussian  army  and  the  constitutional  conflict ;  the  ap¬ 
pointment  of  Bismarck  as  prime  minister  of  Prussia 

X.  The  P'ounding  of  the  German  Empire,  1863-1871  .  .  107 
The  trouble  in  Schleswig  and  Holstein ;  its  issuance  in 
war  between  Austria  and  Prussia;  the  establishment  of 


CONTENTS 


IX 


CHAPTER  PAGE 

the  North  German  Federation  ;  the  origins  and  causes  of 
the  Franco-German  War;  the  establishment  and  constitu¬ 
tion  of  the  German  Empire ;  Bismarck  the  founder  of  the 
Empire ;  the  significance  of  his  methods,  and  the  place 
of  the  new  Empire  in  European  politics 

XI.  The  German  Empire  to  the  Fall  of  Bismarck, 

1871-1890 . 124 

International  affairs  :  the  Triple  Alliance.  National  affairs  : 
theKulturkampf ;  industrial  life  ;  the  centralization  of  gov¬ 
ernment  ;  the  rise  of  the  Social-Democrats  ;  parliamentary 
life  ;  the  expansion  of  the  army  ;  the  acquisition  of  colonies  ; 
intellectual  life.  State  affairs :  Prussia,  Alsace-Lorraine, 
Bavaria,  and  Brunswick.  William  I ;  the  accessions  of 
Frederick  III  and  William  II,  and  the  fall  of  Bismarck 

XII.  Germany  under  William  II,  1890-1914  . 146 

National  affairs  :  agriculture  and  industrialism  ;  the  con¬ 
flict  between  them ;  effects  of  industrial  prosperity  on 
German  life  and  character ;  the  growth  of  the  army  and 
navy  ;  reasons  for  Germany’s  armaments ;  imperial  legis¬ 
lation  and  other  unifying  factors  in  German  life;  parlia¬ 
mentary  conditions  ;  the  Social-Democrats  ;  the  democratic 
movement  in  Germany  ;  colonial  acquisitions.  State  affairs  : 
Prussia,  Saxony,  Baden,  Wiirtemberg,  Bavaria,  Brunswick, 
and  Alsace-Lorraine.  Intellectual  life.  William  II.  Inter¬ 
national  affairs:  German  imperialism  and  Pan-Germanism  ; 
Morocco;  the  immediate  causes  of  war;  recent  German 
diplomacy  ;  the  blame  for  the  war 

CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE  OF  THE  MOST  IMPORTANT 


EVENTS  IN  GERMAN  HISTORY  SINCE  1740  ....  xiii 

STATES  COMPOSING  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE . 185 

GENEALOGIES  OF  LEADING  GERMAN  RULERS . 186 

A  SELECTED  BIBLIOGRAPHY  OF  ENGLISH  BOOKS  ON 

GERMAN  HISTORY . 188 

INDEX . 191 


LIST  OF  MAPS 

PAGE 


I.  GERMANY  IN  1740  I 

II.  GERMANY  FROM  1815  TO  1866  .  77 

III.  GERMANY  AFTER  THE  ESTABLISHMENT  OF  THE  EMPIRE 

IN  1871 . 125 

IV.  TERRITORIES  OF  GREAT  BRITAIN,  UNITED  STATES,  AND 

GERMANY . I4I 


XI 


A  CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE  OF  THE  MOST 
IMPORTANT  EVENTS  IN  GERMAN  HISTORY 
SINCE  1740 


1740.  Germany,  or  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  composed  of  3 1 8  states,  is  a 
federation  of  great  age,  but  it  is  approaching  disintegration  because 
it  lacks  a  strongly  centralized  government  and  unifying  leadership. 

1740-1748.  Charles  VI,  Archduke  of  Austria  and  head  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire,  dies  in  1740  without  a  male  heir,  leaving  the  suc¬ 
cession  of  his  daughter  Maria  Theresa  in  doubt.  Frederick  II  (the 
Great),  who  has  just  (1740)  become  the  king  of  Prussia,  disputes 
Maria  Theresa’s  succession  to  lands  in  Silesia  and  wins  almost  all  of 
Silesia  by  conquest,  1740-1742  and  1744-1745.  Bavaria,  Saxony, 
France,  and  other  states  also  contest  the  succession  of  Maria 
Theresa  — in  the  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession,  1741-1748  —  but 
gain  no  territory  permanently.  The  elector  of  Bavaria  becomes  the 
head  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  in  1742  as  Charles  VII,  but  dies 
in  1745,  and  the  husband  of  Maria  Theresa  succeeds  him  as 
Francis  I.  The  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession  ends  with  the 
Peace  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  which  secures  to  Maria  Theresa  the 
possession  of  all  her  father’s  realms  except  Silesia. 

1756-1763.  Frederick  hears  that  Austria,  France,  and  Russia,  resent¬ 
ful  of  his  success,  are  plotting  to  seize  and  dismember  Prussia;  he 
therefore  tries  to  checkmate  his  enemies  by  forcing  hostilities.  The 
Seven  Years’  War  follows,  leaving,  by  the  Peace  of  Hubertusburg, 
the  boundaries  of  each  contestant’s  domains  just  as  they  were  before. 

1765.  Francis  I  is  succeeded  by  his  son  Joseph  II  (1765-1790)  in 
Austria  and  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  but  Maria  Theresa  retains 
control  until  her  death  in  1780. 

1772, 1793, 1 795-  Poland  is  partitioned  among  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria. 

1786.  Frederick  the  Great  dies  after  a  reign  of  enlightened  despotism, 
leaving  Prussia  thoroughly  organized,  equipped  with  a  large  stand¬ 
ing  army,  and  recognized  as  a  power  of  the  first  class. 

1789.  The  French  Revolution  and  its  overthrow  of  absolutism  lead  to 
the  intermeddling  of  Austria  and  Prussia  in  French  affairs  (1792), 
to  the  downfall  of  the  French  monarchy,  and  to  the  campaign  of 
the  First  Coalition  against  France  (1793). 

xiii 


XIV 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


1795.  Prussia,  in  the  demoralizing  reign  of  Frederick  William  IT  (1786- 
1797),  deserts  its  allies  by  signing  the  Peace  of  Basel  whh  France. 

1801.  Austria,  under  Leopold  II  (1790-1792)  and  Francis  II  (1792-1835), 
continues  the  struggle  against  France,  but  is  forced  in  its  own  name 
and  in  that  of  the  Holy  Roman  Fmp’re  ,  to  me  Treaty  of  Campo 
Formio  (1797)  and,  after  the  defeat  of  the  Second  Coalition  by 
Napoleon  Bonaparte,  to  the  Treaty  of  Luneville  (1801),  which  cedes 
to  France  the  whole  of  the  west  bank  of  the  Rhine.  The  Treaty  of 
Luneville  also  causes,  by  a  process  of  consolidation,  a  great  re¬ 
duction  in  the  number  of  states  in  the  Holy  Roman  Empire. 

1805.  The  war  of  the  Third  Coalition  ends  in  the  Treaty  of  Pressburg 
and  in  the  formation  (1806)  of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine 
through  the  union  of  Baden,  Bavaria,  Wiirtemberg,  and  thirteen 
lesser  German  states  under  the  protectorate  of  Napoleon. 

1806.  The  Holy  Roman  Empire  is  formally  dissolved  by  the  abdication  of 
Francis  ;  henceforth  he  is  known  as  Francis  I,  Emperor  of  Austria. 

1806-1807.  Napoleon  completes  his  domination  of  Germany  by  warring 
against  Prussia,  which  is  now  under  the  timid  Frederick  William  III 
(1797-1840)  and  is  feebly  supported  in  the  so-called  Fourth  Coali¬ 
tion.  Napoleon  forces  Prussia,  in  the  Peace  of  Tilsit,  to  cede  half 
its  territory. 

1809.  Austria  rises  against  Napoleon  for  the  fourth  time,  but  is  again 
defeated. 

J&12.  Napoleon  conducts  a  disastrous  campaign  against  Russia,  losing 
nearly  half  a  million  men. 

1813.  Prussia,  regenerated  by  internal  reforms  and  encouraged  by 
Napoleon’s  calamities  in  1812,  leads  the  way,  in  the  War  of  Libera¬ 
tion,  to  a  national  uprising  against  Napoleon.  Prussia,  Austria, 
states  of  the  Rhine  Confederation,  and  Russia — the  Fifth  Coalition 
—  defeat  Napoleon  decisively  in  the  Battle  of  Leipsic. 

18x5.  England  and  Germany  overthrow  Napoleon  finally  in  the  Battle 
of  Waterloo.  The  Congress  of  Vienna  reconstructs  the  map  of 
Europe  and  constitutes  the  German  Confederation  out  of  thirty- 
eight  loosely  federated  German  states  with  Austria  as  permanent 
president. 

1815-1848.  The  German  Confederation  does  not  fulfil  the  popular 
desire  for  national  unity,  and  the  rulers  of  individual  states  fail 
to  establish  a  permanent  form  of  representative  constitutional  gov¬ 
ernment.  Many  rulers,  prompted  by  Metternich,  the  prime  minister 
of  Austria,  revert  to  practices  of  eighteenth-century  absolutism, 
in  order  to  crush  the  political  aspirations  of  their  people.  The 


EVENTS  IN  GERMAN  HISTORY 


xv 


accession  of  Ferdinand  I  (1835-1848)  in  Austria  and  of  Frederick 
William  IV(i840-i857)  in  Prussia  does  not  alter  the  situation. 

1834.  The  Zollverein,  established  by  Prussia,  binds  many  German  states 
together  in  commercial  opportunities  and,  by  thus  nationalizing 
German  life,  is  the  first  step  toward  national  German  unity. 

1848-185"^  The  Revolution  in  France,  overthrowing  the  monarchy 
and  establishing  a  republic,  starts  insurrections  all  over  Germany, 
whereby  the  people  secure  many  concessions  from  their  rulers.  A 
national  parliament,  elected  by  popular  suffrage,  assembles  in 
Frankfort-on-the-Main  and  offers  the  title  of  "  Emperor  of  Ger¬ 
many  ”  to  Frederick  William  IV,  but  he  refuses  to  accept  a  crown 
from  the  people.  Monarchists  regain  the  control  of  Austria  — 
where  Francis  Joseph  succeeded  in  1848  —  insurrections  in  other 
states  are  checked,  almost  all  the  concessions  to  the  people  are 
withdrawn,  and  the  German  Confederation  lasts  on  as  before.  The 
one  conspicuous  gain  of  all  the  insurrections  is  the  constitution 
granted  to  the  people  of  Prussia. 

1850.  The  rivalry  of  Austria  and  Prussia  for  preeminence  in  Germany 
advances  into  the  foreground,  when  Prussia  tries  to  gather  all  the 
German  states  except  Austria  into  a  union  which  shall  accept 
Prussia  as  its  leader.  Austrian  influence  breaks  up  the  Prussian 
union  before  it  becomes  formidable. 

1850-1860.  The  relations  between  Austria  and  Prussia  grow  more  and 
more  tense.  Austria  loses  its  possessions  in  Italy  (1859),  but  it 
strengthens  its  position  in  Germany  by  establishing  constitutional 
government  in  its  remaining  provinces.  Meanwhile  William  I 
succeeds  (1857)  in  Prussia  and  begins  a  thorough  reorganiza¬ 
tion  of  the  army  although  the  Prussian  Legislature  refuses 
appropriations. 

1862.  Bismarck  is  appointed  Prime  Minister  of  Prussia.  Bismarck 
desires  national  unity,  not,  however,  as  a  consummation  of  the  will 
of  the  people,  but  as  the  achievement  and  gift  of  the  king  of  Prussia. 
He  also  believes  that  in  order  to  compass  German  unity  all  connec¬ 
tion  between  Austria  and  other  German  states  must  be  broken. 

1864.  Contrary  to  the  will  of  the  German  people,  Bismarck  forces  a 
war  upon  Denmark,  which  results  in  the  cession  of  the  duchies 
of  Schleswig  and  Holstein  to  Prussia  and  Austria. 

1866.  Bismarck  irritates  Austria  ;  Austria  retaliates  by  breaking  a  con¬ 
vention  with  Prussia  concerning  Schleswig  and  Holstein  and  there¬ 
by  gives  Bismarck  a  casus  belli.  Though  supported  by  only  a  few 
of  the  other  German  states,  Prussia  enters  upon  the  Austro-Prussian 


XVI 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


War,  and,  with  its  reorganized  army,  defeats  Austria  and  its  many 
German  allies  in  less  than  seven  weeks.  By  the  Peace  of  Prague, 
Austria  is  excluded  from  all  political  union  with  Germany.  Prussia 
forms  under  its  presidency  the  North  German  Federation,  consist¬ 
ing  of  the  twenty-two  states  north  of  the  Main.  Thus  German  unity 
is  established,  and  modern  Germany  is  made,  though  it  is  not  yet 
complete.  The  South  German  states  enter  into  an  offensive  and 
defensive  alliance  with  Prussia. 

1870-1871.  France  sees  its  commanding  position  on  the  Continent 
threatened  by  a  new  rival ;  Bismarck  expects  war  on  this  account, 
and  he  desires  war  as  a  means  of  welding  the  South  German  states 
together  with  those  of  the  north.  When  France  assumes  an  un¬ 
reasonable  attitude  toward  Prussia,  Bismarck  forces  France  to  stand 
its  ground,  and  the  Franco-German  War  ensues.  By  the  Peace  of 
Frankfort  (May  1871),  France  gives  up  Alsace  and  a  large  part 
of  Lorraine.  Meanwhile  the  South  German  states  have  joined  the 
Federation,  and  the  German  Empire  has  been  proclaimed  (January 
1871),  with  the  king  of  Prussia  as  hereditary  German  Emperor. 

1879.  A  Dual  Alliance  between  Germany  and  Austria  is  formed,  which 
is  expanded  into  the  Triple  Alliance  by  the  inclusion  of  Italy  in 
1882,  and  formally  published  in  1888. 

1880-1890.  -Germany  acquires  colonies  in  the  South  Seas  and  in  Africa. 
William  I  dies  (1888)  and  is  succeeded  by  his  son  Frederick  III, 
who  reigns  only  ninety-nine  days.  Frederick  is  succeeded  in  June 
1888  by  his  son  William  II.  Bismarck  is  dismissed  from  the 
chancellorship  in  March  1890. 

1890-1914.  Germany  enters  upon  a  period  which  is  marked  by  vast 
industrial  expansion  and  increase  of  material  prosperity,  by  the 
enlargement  of  the  standing  army,  by  the  creation  of  a  navy,  by 
the  growth  of  political  consciousness  among  the  people  and  of 
demands  on  their  part  for  a  larger  share  in  their  own  government. 
At  the  same  time  Germany  seeks  more  and  more  vigorously  an 
outlet  for  its  energy;  England  fears  Germany’s  commercial  com¬ 
petition  as  well  as  its  aggressive  tendencies ;  France  remembers 
the  loss  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine  and  fears  its  eclipse  as  a  power 
of  the  first  class ;  Russia  nurtures  Pan-Slavism  and  seeks  to  close 
the  door  to  Germany’s  expansion  toward  the  Near  East.  On  the 
one  hand  the  Triple  Alliance  has  long  been  standing  ;  on  the  other 
rises  the  Triple  Entente  of  Russia,  France,  and  England.  Trouble 
in  the  Balkans  at  last  relieves  the  tension  by  plunging  Europe  into 
war  in  August  1914. 


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SCALE  OF  MILES 


1  Boundary  of  Germany  _ _ 

Territories  of  Brandenburg  ip  ni 

Line  of  Hoheuzollern  :|  .  | 

Territories  of  Austrian  - , 

Hapsburgs 

Ecclesiastical  Territories  I 
Chief  Imperial  Free  Cities 

Many  minor  states,  ecclesiastical  and 
lay,  and  free  towns  are  necessarily 
i_ omitted.  , 


lice 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


CHAPTER  I 

GERMANY  AS  IT  WAS  IN  1740 

The  German  Empire  of  1740  was  established  on  1.  Antecedent 
Christmas  Day  800  when  the  Pope  placed  the  imperial  German  Em1' 
crown  on  the  head  of  Charlemagne  in  Rome.  From  that  pire  of  1740 
time  until  far  down  the  Middle  Ages  the  Empire  stood 
forth  as  the  great  power  in  western  Europe.  Conjointly 
with  the  Papacy  it  was  the  acknowledged  head  of  Chris¬ 
tendom.  But  the  Empire  comprised  many  different  racial 
elements  which  could  not  be  coalesced.  A  political  unit 
in  name,  the  Empire  was  never  one  in  spirit.  In  the  cen¬ 
turies  which  followed  Charlemagne  various  emperors  tried 
to  mold  the  imperial  provinces  into  an  organic  whole  — 

Otto  the  Great  (936-973)  succeeded  in  part — but  all 
were  ultimately  defeated  either  by  intrigues  of  powerful 
nobles  or  by  divergence  of  material  interests.  Luther 
created  a  feeling  of  national  unity  by  means  of  his 
Translation  of  the  Bible  (1534),  as  Germans  realized 
in  it  the  possession  of  a  mother-tongue  common  to  them 
all.  But  the  religious  differences  of  the  Reformation 
ranged  German  states  against  each  other  in  bitter  par¬ 
tisanship,  and  the  ravages  of  the  Thirty  Years’  War 
(1618-1648),  the  culmination  of  this  hostility,  added 
unparalleled  want  and  misery  to  spiritual  discord  that 
could  not  be  reconciled.  The  Treaty  of  Westphalia, 


1 


2 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


2.  The  title, 
area,  and 
population  of 
the  Empire 


which  concluded  the  Thirty  Years’  War,  left  the  states 
of  Germany  as  disunited  as  they  ever  were.  Provisions 
of  this  treaty  were  still  regulating  affairs  of  the  German 
Empire  in  1740. 

For  many  years  Germany  had  borne  the  official  title 
of  "  The  Holy  Roman  Empire  of  the  German  Nation  ”  ; 
"  Holy  ”  in  order  to  mark  the  secular  state  as  divinely 
appointed  and  as  a  counterpart  to  "  the  Holy  Catholic 
Church  ”  ;  "  Roman  ”  because  the  German  Empire  was 
conceived  as  a  continuation  of  the  ancient  Roman  Em¬ 
pire  ;  "of  the  German  Nation  ”  because  the  head  of  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire  was  the  chosen  leader  of  the  German 
peoples.  In  the  following  pages,  until  the  dissolution  of 
the  Holy  Roman  Empire  in  1806,  the  terms  "Germany,” 
"  the  German  Empire,”  and  "  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  ” 
will  be  used,  in  accordance  with  the  custom  of  the  eight¬ 
eenth  century,  as  synonyms  of  each  other.  In  1740 
Germany  included  Austria  as  well  and  thus  embraced  a 
territory  which  nearly  doubled  the  area  occupied  by  the 
German  Empire  of  recent  decades.  In  round  terms, 
"^Germany  included  four  hundred  and  fifty  thousand,  square 
miles  of  land,  or  equaled  that  portion  of  the  United  States 
which  lies  east  of  the  Mississippi  River  and  north  of  Ten¬ 
nessee  and  North  Carolina.  The  exact  number  of  people 
in  this  great  territory  is  not  known,  but  it  was  probably 
between  twenty-five  and  thirty  millions. 

The  Holy  Roman  Empire  consisted  in  1740  of  three 

Each  of  these  states  enjoyed 
full  territorial  sovereignty  and  the  right  to  form  alliances 
with  any  other  states  or  with  foreign  powers  on  condition 
that  such  alliances  should  not  be  injurious  to  the  emperor 
or  to  the  Empire.  Each  state  might  have  an  army  of  its 
own,  coin  its  own  money,  and  regulate  its  own  tolls  and 


3.  The  politi- 
of  the  Empire  hundred  and  eighteen  states 


GERMANY  AS  IT  WAS  IN  1740 


3 


customs-houses.  Thus,  as  the  heads  of  the  large  majority 
of  the  states  were  absolute  monarchs  by  hereditary  right, 
each  ruling  prince  in  1 740  exercised  absolute  sovereignty 
in  his  own  dominions  and  felt  himself  attached  to  the  Em¬ 
pire  chiefly  by  tradition  and  sentiment.  The  Imperial  Diet 
might  make  laws  for  the  Empire  and  declare  war  and  con¬ 
clude  treaties  in  the  name  of  Germany.  But  the  decisions 
of  the  Diet  were  dependent  upon  a  unanimity  that  could 
rarely  be  attained,  and  the  Diet  had  no  efficient  means  of 
enforcing  decrees  which  it  might  pass.  The  practical  diffi¬ 
culties  of  this  situation  blocked  progressive  legislation  hope¬ 
lessly.  The  sessions  of  the  Diet  had  therefore  degenerated 
into  long  and  solemn  discussions  of  very  frivolous  matters; 
for  example,  which  of  two  duchies  should  vote  first,  and 
whether  the  envoys  of  princes  should  sit  on  chairs  of  red 
or  green  cloth.  In  the  seventies  of  the  eighteenth  century 
the  Imperial  Court  of  Law  at  Wetzlar  faced  a  docket  of 
sixty  thousand  undecided  lawsuits.  Thus,  through  the  im¬ 
potence  of  the  central  government  and  through  the  guar¬ 
anteed  petty  sovereignty  of  the  states,  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire  of  the  eighteenth  century  failed  completely  to  give 
its  subjects  a  sense  of  national  unity  and  a  large  national 
life.  As  it  was  then  constituted,  it  was  hastening  inevitably 
toward  final  disintegration.  Thoughtful  people  realized 
this  failure  even  then  and  foresaw  the  coming  collapse. 

Goethe  in  his  young  manhood  was  only  expressing  the 
sentiment  of  the  age  when  he  put  into  the  mouth  of  a 
student  in  Fajist:  "The  poor  old  Holy  Roman  realm,  how 
does  it  hold  together  ?  ” 

The  states  of  the  Empire  varied  greatly  in  extent  and  4.  The  size  of 
in  the  character  of  their  government.  The  hereditary  the  Empire 
lands  of  the  archduke  of  Austria  composed  about  half  of  b0e{  ££*£ 
the  Empire  ;  a  few  of  the  remaining  three  hundred  and  government 


4 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


5.  The  elec¬ 
tion  of  the 
emperor 


seventeen  states  barely  surpassed  the  burgraviate  of  Rein- 
eck,  which,  it  seems,  could  boast  of  only  one  castle  and 
twelve  subjects.  Nevertheless  a  state  might  enjoy  the 
rank  of  a  kingdom  or  a  duchy  or  a  county ;  it  might  be 
a  free  imperial  city ;  it  might  be  ruled  over  by  an  arch¬ 
bishop  or  an  abbot  or  a  prior.  The  actual  government 
ranged  from  the  unblushing  tyranny  of  sundry  princes  to 
the  semi-republicanism  of  free  cities  ;  in  many  free  cities 
the  government  was  determined  by  limited  suffrage  and 
popular  representation  in  legislative  assemblies.  Little  mon¬ 
archies  were  very  prone  to  copy  the  court  of  Louis  XIV ; 
regardless  of  the  inordinate  taxation  which  it  entailed, 
they  vied  with  each  other  in  setting  up  weak  and  foolish 
imitations  of  the  court  of  Versailles.  The  heads  of  other 
states  were  meanwhile  striving  to  bind  up  the  wounds  of 
the  Thirty  Years’  War  and  thus  to  provide  a  reasonable 
amount  of  comfort  and  prosperity  for  their  subjects  ;  for 
many  years  after  1648  the  restoration  of  conditions  before 
the  war  marked  the  acme  of  any  ruler’s  hopes,  but  few 
achieved  even  this  by  1 740.  Even  state  loyalty  and  state 
patriotism  found  little  nourishment  for  growth  when  the 
memory  of  recent  disasters  was  still  vivid  and  the  knowl¬ 
edge  of  a  distant  and  more  glorious  past  had  been  obliter¬ 
ated  by  the  intervening  years.  One  reads  but  little  of  open 
strife  between  the  states  from  1648  to  1740,  but  boundary 
disputes,  jealousy,  and  suspicion  perpetuated  the  apartness 
of  one  state  from  another.  Individual  states  were  frankly 
determined  not  to  sacrifice  their  own  interests  for  those 
of  all  the  states  combined,  thus  giving  a  final  emphasis  to 
the  lack  of  cohesion  throughout  the  Holy  Roman  Empire. 

The  supreme  head  of  all  these  three  hundred  and 
eighteen  states  was  chosen  by  the  majority  of  certain 
leading  princes  of  the  Empire.  Originally  there  were 


GERMANY  AS  IT  WAS  IN  1740 


5 


seven  of  these  princely  electors,  but  by  1740  the  num¬ 
ber  had  been  increased  to  nine.  Three  were  the  German 
archbishops  of  the  Roman  Catholic  Church  at  Mainz, 
Trier,  and  Cologne  ;  six  were  the  secular  rulers  of  Bo¬ 
hemia,  Saxony,  Prussia,  the  Palatinate  of  the  Rhine, 
Bavaria,  and  Hanover.  Theoretically  these  electors  met 
after  the  death  of  each  emperor  and  chose  without  fear 
or  favor  the  new  head  of  the  Empire.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  their  choice  was  predetermined,  as  each  emperor 
before  his  death  secured  the  promise  of  the  various 
electors  to  vote  for  a  successor  who  had  already  been 
selected  by  the  emperor  himself.  In  every  case  for  three 
hundred  years  preceding  1 740,  the  emperor,  and  the  elec¬ 
toral  college  after  him,  had  chosen  a  member  of  the 
reigning  emperor’s  own  family  as  his  successor. 

For  three  centuries  the  ruling  house  of  Austria,  the 
Hapsburg  family,  had  furnished  the  emperor  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire.  As  the  possessions  of  the  archduchy 
of  Austria  equaled  all  the  rest  of  the  Empire  put  to¬ 
gether,  the  leadership  and  the  predominating  influence 
of  Austria  were  well  founded.  But  the  Austrian  posses¬ 
sions  were  widely  scattered  ;  many  of  them  lay  entirely 
outside  of  the  boundaries  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire ; 
and  they  were  very  heterogeneous  in  character.  Besides 
the  German-speaking  inhabitants  of  Austria  proper,  the 
Hapsburg  family  ruled  over  the  Czechs  of  Bohemia 
and  the  Magyars  of  Hungary,  over  the  Rumanians  in 
Transylvania,  over  the  Italians  of  provinces  scattered  all 
the  way  from  Milan  to  Naples,  and  over  the  Flemings 
of  Belgium ;  in  1 740  Belgium  was  known  as  the  Aus¬ 
trian  Netherlands.  Austria  proved  its  claim  to  rank  among 
the  first  powers  of  Europe,  if  in  no  other  way,  by  hold¬ 
ing  together  these  variegated  possessions  ;  but  in  order  to 


6.  Austria 
the  leading 
state  of  the 
Empire 


6 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


7.  Other 

important 

states 


achieve  this,  the  Hapsburgs  sacrificed  their  opportunities 
and  their  obligations  as  heads  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire. 
Pursuing  the  selfish  dynastic  policy  of  their  family,  they 
devoted  all  their  attention  to  their  own  hereditary  posses¬ 
sions  and  gave  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  not  a  single 
emperor  who  labored  earnestly  for  the  unification  and 
progress  of  the  Empire. 

Through  age  as  well  as  through  honorable  achievements 
many  states  besides  Austria  were  widely  known  through¬ 
out  Germany  and  Europe  and  figured  conspicuously  in 
the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries.  Among  these 
were  Bavaria,  just  west  of  Austria  proper  in  South  Ger¬ 
many,  and  the  electorate  of  Saxony  in  central  Germany, 
directly  north  of  the  Austrian  possession  of  Bohemia.  In 
1740  the  duke  of  Bavaria  hoped  at  the  death  of  the  arch¬ 
duke  of  Austria  to  succeed  to  the  Austrian  dominions  by 
inheritance  through  an  elder  female  branch  of  the  Haps¬ 
burgs.  The  duke,  or  as  he  was  more  generally  called,  the 
elector  of  Saxony  cherished  similar  hopes  and  for  the  same 
reason.  His  position  in  Germany  was  further  strengthened 
by  the  fact  that  he  had  been  elected  by  the  Palish  diet  as 
head  of  its  kingdom.  The  duchy  of  Wiirtemberg,  west  of 
Bavaria,  and  the  margraviate  of  Baden,  west  of  Wurtem- 
berg,  were  also  important  states.  In  North  Germany  the 
duchy,  or  electorate,  of  Hanover  loomed  large,  in  great 
part  because  its  head  was  also  king  of  England  from  1714 
to  1837.  For  many  years  Hanover  aspired  to  play  among 
the  states  of  North  Germany  the  leading  role  which  Austria 
played  in  the  south.  These  aspirations  were  destined,  how¬ 
ever,  to  be  blighted  by  Hanover’s  next-door  neighbor  to 
the  east,  the  kingdom  of  Prussia. 

The  growth  of  Prussia  under  the  Hohenzollern  family 
forms  one  of  the  most  important  chapters  in  modern 


GERMANY  AS  IT  WAS  IN  1740 


7 


European  history.  The  original  home  of  the  Hohenzol- 
lerns  lay  in  the  former  South  German  duchy  of  Swabia, 
but  as  early  as  the  twelfth  century  a  scion  of  the  family 
went  to  Nuremberg  and  there  secured  for  himself  and  his 
descendants  the  position  of  burgrave,  or  "count  of  the 
city.”  In  1415,  however,  in  return  for  financial  assistance 
of  three  years  before,  the  reigning  emperor  conferred  the 
Mark  of  Brandenburg  together  with  its  electoral  vote  upon 
the  burgrave  Frederick  of  Hohenzollern.  Originally  one 
of  the  border  provinces  of  the  Empire  —  hence  its  name, 
"  Mark,”  or  "  march  ”  —  the  Mark  of  Brandenburg  lay  in 
northern  Germany ;  in  1415  it  embraced  about  ten  thou¬ 
sand  square  miles,  approximately  equal  to  Massachusetts 
and  Rhode  Island  combined,  with  Berlin  near  the  center. 
In  the  hands  of  Frederick  and  his  heirs,  the  electorate  of 
Brandenburg  became  one  of  the  most  flourishing  of  all 
the  North  German  principalities.  At  the  time  of  the 
Reformation,  Albert,  a  member  of  a  subordinate  branch  of 
the  Hohenzollern  family,  was  the  chosen  Grand  Master 
of  the  Knights  of  the  Teutonic  Order.  He  became  a 
Protestant,  dissolved  the  Order  in  1525,  and  received  in 
fief  of  the  king  of  Poland  a  part  of  the  old  territories  of 
the  Order,  namely,  the  duchy  of  East  Prussia;  this  is 
now  the  extreme  northeastern  province  of  the  kingdom  of 
Prussia.  In  1618  the  duchy  fell  by  inheritance  to  the 
elector  of  Brandenburg,  and  in  1657  its  permanent  inde¬ 
pendence  of  Poland  was  secured. 

Frederick  William  (reigned  1640-1688),  "the  Great 
Elector  ”  of  Brandenburg,  laid  the  foundations  of  the 
modern  house  of  Hohenzollern.  He  built  up  a  strongly 
centralized  government ;  he  developed  agriculture  and 
trade  so  that  his  people  became  comparatively  wealthy ; 
and  he  created  a  strong  standing  army.  In  the  reign  of 


8.  Origins  of 
the  Hohen- 
zollerns  and 
of  Prussia 


9.  The 
founders  of 
the  kingdom, 
of  Prussia 


8 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


10.  Social 
conditions 
around  1740 


his  son  and  successor  Frederick  (1688-1713),  the  electo¬ 
rate  of  Brandenburg  was  merged,  by  imperial  sanction, 
into  the  Kingdom  of  Prussia  ;  with  the  title  of  Frederick  I 
the  new  king  assumed  the  royal  crown  amid  great  splendor 
on  January  18,  1701  in  the  city  of  Konigsberg.  The 
royal  treasure  which  Frederick  depleted  in  order  to  ac¬ 
quire  and  embellish  his  new  dignity  was  restored  and 
enlarged  by  his  frugal  son  Frederick  William  I  (1713- 
1740).  The  army  grew  to  a  host  of  80,000  thoroughly 
drilled  soldiers,  and  the  centralized  government  of  the 
Great  Elector  was  converted  into  an  absolute  monarchy. 
These  bequests  of  Frederick  William  I  to  his  son  paved 
the  way  for  a  series  of  startling  events  which  began  in  1 740. 

The  life  of  the  German  people  embodied  the  unhappy 
effects  of  existing  political  conditions,  and  at  the  same 
time  it  contained  the  germs  of  a  new  being.  The  Thirty 
Years’  War  took  from  the  German  people  all  initiative 
and  enterprise  for  many  years ;  it  gave  them  a  craving 
for  continued  peace,  for  law  and  order  at  any  price.  Men 
found  it  comparatively  easy  therefore  in  the  absence  of  war 
to  realize  a  measurable  degree  of  happiness.  They  paid 
the  bills  of  extravagant  courts  without  much  grumbling, 
and  were  satisfied  with  the  large  or  small  crumbs  of  good 
government  which  fell  from  their  rulers’  tables.  The 
peasants  suffered  most.  Burdened  by  taxation  and  required 
to  perform  fixed  services  for  their  landlords,  they  were 
bound  to  the  soil  and  passed  from  one  owner  of  an  estate 
to  another  along  with  plows  and  other  farming  imple¬ 
ments.  Traces  of  medieval  conditions  also  clung  to  many 
towns.  Few  were  lighted  at  night ;  few  boasted  any  paved 
streets ;  many  were  still  enclosed  by  old  walls  and  ram¬ 
parts  ;  communication  between  them  still  depended  upon 
more  or  less  infrequent  and  unreliable  stagecoaches. 


GERMANY  AS  IT  WAS  IN  1740 


9 


For  a  century  and  more  German  life  had  contained  n.inteiiec- 
no  impulse  to  the  creation  of  an  honorable  literature.  tual  hfe 
In  1740  Germans  read  chiefly  the  literature  of  other 
nations,  France  and  England  particularly ;  weak  imita¬ 
tions  of  Defoe’s  Robitison  Crusoe  and  the  Spectator  of 
Addison  and  Steele  were  read  with  especial  delight.  Ger¬ 
man  architecture  and  sculpture  had  produced  memora¬ 
ble  works,  for  example,  the  Zwinger  at  Dresden,  but  these 
works  without  exception  also  show  the  deep  influence  of 
foreign  models.  Only  music  had  maintained  independence 
and  originality.  Like  the  German  hymn,  the  one  great 
achievement  of  German  literature  in  two  hundred  years, 
music  had  sprung  directly  from  the  high  spiritual  fervor  of 
the  Reformation  and  the  heart-rending  tribulations  of  the 
Thirty  Years’  War;  it  had  found  immortal  form  in  the 
works  of  Bach  and  Flandel.  Thus,  purely  intellectual  vitality 
was  at  a  low  ebb  in  1 740  ;  but  two  great  forces  had  begun 
to  leaven  German  life  and  thought.  The  "  pietistic  move¬ 
ment  ”  was  turning  men  away  from  blind  adherence  to 
dogmatic  doctrines  which  had  been  set  up  by  the  Church ; 
it  was  teaching  men  that  true  Christianity  sprang  only  from 
a  close  prayerful  relation  to  a  personal  God  ;  pietism  was 
thus  reviving  ardent  feeling  and  it  was  spurring  imagination. 
Rationalism  likewise  protested  against  adherence  to  tradi¬ 
tional  dogma.  It  differed  from  pietism  in  subjecting  all 
theories  and  all  phenomena  of  life  to  the  test  of  reason. 

Both  forces  made  for  independence  ;  rationalism  made  for 
intellectual  vigor  and  liberty  as  well.  The  history  of  German 
literature  in  the  eighteenth  century  presents  not  a  single 
author  of  great  repute  whose  early  life  was  void  of  pietistic 
influences.  German  philosophy  and  German  science  of 
the  nineteenth  century  could  hardly  have  come  into  being 
wifhout  rationalism  as  a  forbear. 


CHAPTER  II 


12.  The 
death  of 
Charles  VI 
and  its  effect 


THE  WARS  OF  MARIA  THERESA  AND  FREDERICK 
THE  GREAT 

1740-1763 

Charles  VI,  head  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  and 
archduke  of  Austria,  died  in  October  1740.  Throughout 
many  years  Charles  had  feared  that  at  his  death  his  lack 
of  male  issue  would  induce  various  rulers  to  seize  a  part  of 
the  Hapsburg  possessions.  He  had  therefore  spared  no 
efforts  to  secure  the  promises  of  the  most  important  Euro¬ 
pean  nations  and  German  states  that  they  would  permit  his 
daughter  Maria  Theresa  (born  1 7 1 7)  to  inherit  her  father’s 
dominions  unimpaired.  Many  nations  and  states  had  given 
their  promise  ;  but,  in  view  of  the  treacherous  course  which 
international  politics  of  the  eighteenth  century  often  followed, 
no  one  was  sure  that  any  of  these  promises  would  be  kept. 
The  news  of  the  death  of  Charles  VI  sounded  in  the  ears 
of  Europe  like  the  curtain  bell  of  a  long-awaited  drama. 
.Every  one  knew  that  the  stage  was  set ;  whether  for 
tragedy  or  serio-comedy  no  one  could  foretell.  All  doubt 
soon  vanished.  Bavaria  at  once  reasserted  its  claims  to  all 
the  Austrian  possessions  and  to  the  succession  as  head  of 
the  Empire  ;  Saxony  followed  suit ;  France  manifested  its 
desire  for  the  Austrian  Netherlands.  But  Maria  Theresa’s 
most  fateful  enemy  came  from  the  kingdom  of  Prussia. 
With  speed  and  energy  he  came  and  struck  before  any 
other  claimant  mobilized  his  army. 

IO 


THE  WARS  OF  1740-1763  II 

Prussia’s  claim  to  Austrian  territory  went  back  to  the 
year  1537.  By  a  treaty  made  at  that  time  the  Hohenzol- 
lerns  of  Brandenburg  and  a  ducal  house  of  Silesia  agreed 
that  on  failure  of  issue  on  either  side  the  other  should 
inherit  the  lands  of  the  decedent.  Such  treaties  were 
frequently  made ;  but  the  emperor  of  that  time,  who  was 
also  king  of  Bohemia,  refused  to  acknowledge  this  one 
because  the  Silesian  house  had  become  the  voluntary  vassal 
of  the  Bohemian  Crown  two  centuries  before.  When  the 
ducal  house  did  fail  of  issue  in  1675,  the  emperor  seized 
the  Silesian  lands.  At  the  same  time,  however,  he  gave 
the  Hohenzollerns  a  compensation  in  the  form  of  other 
land  and  thus  lent  a  semblance  of  legality  to  the  Hohen- 
zollern  claim.  This  compensatory  land  which  Austria  had 
given  to  the  Great  Elector,  Austria  next  took  back  from 
the  Great  Elector’s  son  Frederick  E  From  that  time  on 
the  Hohenzollern  claim,  though  never  renounced,  lay 
dormant  until  the  death  of  Charles  VI,  five  months  after 
Frederick  II  (born  1712)  had  become  king  of  Prussia. 
Frederick  saw  in  Charles’s  death  an  opportunity  to  reassert 
and  to  secure  the  Hohenzollern  claim  ;  he  proceeded  at 
once  to  realize  it.  This  determination  on  the  part  of 
Frederick  cannot  be  wholly  condemned,  as  custom  and 
usage  were  on  the  side  of  the  Hohenzollerns  when  the 
original  treaty  was  made  ;  this  custom  and  usage  furnished 
the  basis  on  which  Frederick  defended  his  act  in  a  later 
writing.  But  in  Frederick’s  own  time  public  opinion  was 
already  giving  more  weight  to  the  dependent  relation  be¬ 
tween  the  Silesian  ducal  house  and  Bohemia.  In  the 
eighteenth  century  and  ever  since,  Frederick’s  act  has 
more  and  more  appeared  like  an  attempt  to  impose  six¬ 
teenth-century  conceptions  of  law  and  of  the  right  of  might 
on  an  age  of  higher  standards.  Few  people  outside  of 


13.  Prussia’s 
claim  to 
Silesia 


12 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


14.  The  First 
Silesian  War 
and  the  War 
of  the  Aus¬ 
trian  Suc¬ 
cession 


Prussia  have  ever  believed  that  Frederick’s  course  was 
thoroughly  justified  or  that  he  was  actuated  solely  by  a 
desire  for  justice.  Indeed,  Frederick  himself  gives  author¬ 
ity  to  this  view.  In  his  Memoirs  he  says  with  convincing 
audacity  that  he  seized  the  opportunity  of  1740  as  "a 
means  of  acquiring  reputation  and  of  increasing  the  power 
of  the  state.” 

In  November  1740  Frederick  offered  to  assist  Maria 
Theresa  to  the  undisputed  possession  of  her  father’s  throne 
and  dominions  if  she  would  give  him  a  part  of  Silesia,  but 
she  refused  the  offer.  In  December  Frederick  invaded 
Silesia  with  an  army  of  22,000  men.  With  the  exception 
of  three  fortresses  the  whole  province  surrendered  to  him 
before  February  1741.  A  decisive  Prussian  victory  over 
Austrian  veterans  in  April  paved  the  way  to  an  alliance 
two  months  later  between  Prussia  and  France.  In  Novem¬ 
ber  Frederick  joined  the  general  coalition  of  Bavaria, 
Saxony,  many  lesser  German  states,  Sweden,  France, 
Spain,  and  Sardinia  against  Austria  and  its  allies  :  Eng¬ 
land,  Holland,  and  Russia.  Frederick’s  fight  for  Silesia 
thus  became  a  part  of  the  War  of  the  Austrian  Succession. 
An  army  of  Bavarians  and  French  marched  victoriously 
through  a  part  of  Austria  and  after  uniting  with  Saxon 
forces  took  Prague.  Here  the  elector  of  Bavaria  was 
crowned  king  of  Bohemia;  a  month  later,  January  1742, 
he  was  chosen  emperor  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  under 
the  title  of  Charles  VII.  Another  victory  of  the  Prussians 
over  the  Austrians  determined  Austria  to  dispose  of  the 
enemy  at  its  flank  by  making  peace  with  him.  The  result¬ 
ing  Treaty  of  Breslau  (June  1742)  gave  Frederick  Silesia ; 
but  he  deserted  his  allies  to  achieve  it.  As  Maria  Theresa 
could  now  turn  with  far  greater  effect  against  her  remain¬ 
ing  enemies,  she  succeeded  in  wrenching  Bohemia  from 


THE  WARS  OF  1740-1763 


13 


them  before  the  end  of  the  year,  and  in  May  1743  she  was 
crowned  queen  of  Bohemia.  In  June  the  energetic  cooper¬ 
ation  of  English,  Hanoverian,  and  Austrian  troops  resulted 
in  a  brilliant  victory  over  the  combined  French  and  Bavarian 
armies.  Saxony  and  Sardinia  went  over  to  the  side  of  Austria 
a  few  months  later.  Austria’s  star  was  in  the  ascendant. 

As  Austria  gathered  strength,  Frederick  doubted  more 
and  more  the  permanence  of  his  hold  on  Silesia.  In 
June  1 744,  therefore,  he  made  a  new  alliance  with  France  ; 
in  August,  under  the  pretense  of  assisting  the  emperor, 
Charles  VII,  he  opened  the  Second  Silesian  War.  He 
captured  Prague  in  September,  but  the  French  left  him 
in  the  lurch,  and  he  was  forced  to  retire  into  Silesia  for 
the  winter.  Partly  through  indolence,  partly  through  insuf¬ 
ficient  money  and  men,  the  new  emperor  had  never  been 
able  to  help  himself,  much  less  P'rederick.  From  the 
Prussian  point  of  view  it  was  an  irony  of  fate  when 
Charles  VII  died  in  January  1745.  The  ground  of 
Frederick’s  contention  was  cut  from  under  his  feet.  In 
the  very  same  month  Austria,  Saxony,  England,  and 
Holland  formed  the  Quadruple  Alliance  for  the  purpose 
of  dividing  Prussia  among  themselves.  After  concluding 
a  peace  with  the  new  elector  of  Bavaria,  Maria  Theresa 
sent  (May  1745)  an  army  of  Austrians  and  Saxons  over 
the  Riesengebirge  into  Silesia  to  crush  P'rederick.  Fured 
on  by  his  seeming  torpor,  they  penetrated  into  the  heart 
of  Silesia.  At  Hohenfriedberg,  on  a  June  morning  soon 
after  dawn,  Frederick  fell  upon  them  with  bewildering 
fury  and  success.  A  single  regiment  of  1  500  cavalrymen 
brought  in  2500  prisoners  and  66  standards;  the  Aus¬ 
trians  and  Saxons  lost  more  than  four  times  as  many  men 
as  the  Prussians.  Frederick  hoped  for  peace,  but  Maria 
Theresa  was  by  no  means  defeated  in  spirit.  In  September 


15.  The 
Second 
Silesian  War 


14 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


16.  The  end 
of  the  War  of 
the  Austrian 
Succession 


her  confidence  increased  when  her  husband,  formerly 
duke  of  Lorraine  and  now  grand  duke  of  Tuscany,  was 
elected  emperor  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  as  Francis  I. 
A  plan  was  soon  evolved  for  the  invasion  of  Prussia  by 
three  Austrian  and  Saxon  armies.  But  as  they  were  ad¬ 
vancing  certain  of  success,  Frederick  charged  and  routed 
them  (November  1745).  Three  weeks  later  a  victory  of 
one  of  his  generals  opened  the  way  for  Frederick  to  the 
capital  of  Saxony.  In  Dresden,  on  Christmas  Day,  a  peace 
was  signed  whereby,  in  return  for  the  confirmation  of  his 
possession  of  Silesia,  Frederick  acknowledged  Francis  I 
as  emperor. 

With  the  Peace  of  Dresden  tranquillity  returned  to  the 
German  Empire.  But  Austria  was  forced  to  continue  its 
struggle  with  France  and  Spain  in  order  to  maintain  pos¬ 
session  of  its  provinces  lying  without  the  Empire.  In  1 746 
the  chief  engagements  were  in  Italy,  in  1747  in  the 
Austrian  Netherlands  ;  both  campaigns  went  against  Aus¬ 
tria,  though  it  was  assisted  in  the  one  by  Sardinia  and  in 
the  other  by  England.  At  last,  in  1748,  Austria  entered 
into  an  alliance  with  Russia,  and  England  hired  a  Russian 
army.  When  this  fresh  force  crossed  Germany  in  the 
summer  of  1748  on  its  way  to  the  chief  scene  of  conflict, 
along  the  Rhine,  France  decided  to  conclude  peace.  The 
articles  which  now  closed  the  War  of  the  Austrian  Suc¬ 
cession  were  signed  in  October  1748  at  Aix-la-Chapelle. 
By  this  peace  Austria  again  confirmed  Frederick’s  pos¬ 
session  of  Silesia  and  it  also  relinquished  three  Italian 
provinces,  but  it  regained  the  Netherlands,  which  France 
had  seized  during  the  war.  Austria  thus  lost  heavily,  but 
the  chief  principle  for  which  it  had  contended,  the  succes¬ 
sion  of  Maria  Theresa  in  Austria  and  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire,  was  permanently  established. 


THE  WARS  OF  1740-1763 


15 


When  Frederick  returned  home  from  the  Silesian  Wars, 
he  was  already  greeted  by  his  exultant  subjects  as  Frederick 
"  the  Great.”  To  the  heritage  from  the  Great  Elector  and 
Frederick  William  I  —  a  full  treasury,  a  large  army,  and 
a  well-centralized  government —  Frederick  had  added  sur¬ 
passing  strategic  ability  in  war  and  the  magic  inspiration 
of  a  born  leader  of  men.  By  these  means  he  had  acquired 
v  a  province  of  a  million  and  a  quarter  inhabitants  and  six¬ 
teen  thousand  square  miles,  that  is,  in  area  more  than 
Rhode  Island,  Connecticut,  and  Massachusetts  combined ; 
he  had  won  the  devotion  of  his  people ;  and  he  had  made 
a  name  for  himself  throughout  Europe  in  two  brief  cam¬ 
paigns.  But  the  very  brilliance  of  his  triumph  and  his 
unholy  consummation  of  it  through  repeated  desertion  of 
sworn  allies  left  him  exposed  to  the  sore  jealousy  of  Aus¬ 
tria  and  the  distrust  of  all  Europe.  On  the  other  hand, 
Austria’s  prestige  as  the  leading  and  most  powerful  state 
of  the  Empire  had  been  openly  questioned  by  Bavaria, 
Saxony,  and  Prussia.  Though  Bavaria  and  Saxony  had 
failed  of  their  purpose,  a  large  Austrian  province  had 
passed  into  the  hands  of  Prussia.  On  this  account  Aus¬ 
trian  jealousy  of  Prussia  now  struck  its  roots  deep.  From 
this  jealousy  and  from  the  obvious  rivalry  which  thus  be¬ 
gan  between  Austria  and  Prussia  sprang  many  events  in 
the  history  of  Germany  far  down  into  the  nineteenth 
century. 

In  years  of  peace  Frederick  devoted  himself  to  the  de¬ 
velopment  of  his  state  with  a  zeal  that  has  rarely  been  sur¬ 
passed,  but  in  the  decade  after  the  close  of  the  Second 
Silesian  War  he  was  quickened  more  and  more  in  his 
activity  by  an  increasing  sense  of  the  dangers  which  threat¬ 
ened  him  from  abroad.  Knowing  that  in  case  of  war  he 
would  have  to  depend  mainly  upon  the  resources  of  his 


17.  Results 
ot  the  wars 
of  1740-1748 


18.  The  rise 
of  a  coalition 
against 
Frederick 


19.  Frederick 
assisted  by 
England 


1 6  GERMANY  SINCE  1740 

own  country,  he  gave  to  trade  and  agriculture  every  incen¬ 
tive  at  his  command,  replenished  his  treasury,  and  nearly 
doubled  his  standing  army,  now  a  body  of  150,000  men. 
Maria  Theresa  meanwhile  instituted  reforms  in  her  army, 
but  she  sought  strength  chiefly  through  alliances  with 
foreign  powers.  She  was  by  no  means  reconciled  to  the 
loss  of  Silesia  —  it  is  told  of  her  that  she  could  not  see  a 
Silesian  without  tears  —  and  time  and  resentment  were 
bringing  her  powerful  friends.  The  ancient  hostility  be¬ 
tween  Austria  and  France  was  bridged  over ;  Frederick’s 
biting  epigrams  against  the  mistress  of  Louis  XV,  Madame 
de  Pompadour,  clinched  the  Austrian-French  alliance.  The 
empress  of  Russia,  Elizabeth,  whose  notorious  life  had 
been  sharply  ridiculed  by  Frederick,  likewise  shared  Maria 
Theresa’s  hatred  of  the  "upstart”  rival.  Swedeij  was 
ready  to  enter  an  alliance  against  Prussia,  as  it  desired  to 
regain  the  Baltic  port  Stettin  and  thus  secure  a  foothold 
on  the  Continent.  Lastly,  almost  every  state  of  the  Ger¬ 
man  Empire  eventually  took  active  part  against  Prussia 
either  through  jealousy  of  its  successes  or  on  account  of 
the  traditional  prestige  of  Austria  as  head  of  the  Em¬ 
pire.  Speaking  in  round  numbers,  the  allies  commanded 
full  500,000  troops  ;  Frederick  mustered  about  200,000. 

George  II  of  England,  who  was  also  elector  of  Hanover, 
feared  that  Frederick  would  seize  his  Hanoverian  posses¬ 
sions  west  of  Prussia.  But  war  broke  out  just  then  between 
P'rance  and  England  in  America,  the  French  and  Indian 
War.  If  France  transferred  the  scene  of  conflict  to  Europe, 
it  would  naturally,  with  the  aid  of  the  Austrian  Netherlands 
as  a  base  of  operations,  attack  Hanover.  George’s  fear 
of  this  drove  him  to  an  alliance  with  Frederick.  For 
several  years  England  gave  Prussia  an  annual  subsidy  of 

1 50,000;  its  troops  also  assisted  Frederick  indirectly 


THE  WARS  OF  1740-1763 


17 


at  certain  crises  by  keeping  the  French  occupied  in  and 
west  of  Hanover;  but  Frederick  fought  his  own  battles 
without  any  aid  from  English  troops,  and  he  sent  many 
of  his  soldiers  to  assist  England  in  driving  and  keep¬ 
ing  the  French  out  of  Hanover.  In  1756  Frederick  re¬ 
ceived  proof  of  the  existence  of  a  coalition  consisting  of 
Austria,  Russia,  and  France,  whose  purpose  was  the  dis¬ 
memberment  of  Prussia.  When  Maria  Theresa  evaded 
and  then  repulsed  his  inquiries  about  the  reasons  for  her 
increasing  armament,  he  resolved  to  anticipate  his  enemies 
and  to  strike  first  and  hard. 

In  August  1756  Frederick  led  70,000  men  into  Saxony  20.  The 
and  thus  began  the  Seven  Years’  War.  Saxony  was  cap-  the'seven°f 
tured  in  a  few  weeks  and  converted  into  winter  quarters  ^rs’  War’ 
for  the  Prussian  troops.  In  the  following  spring  Frederick 
entered  Bohemia  and  fought  the  first  big  fight  of  the 
war  near  Prague  in  May  1757.  Here  Frederick’s  troops 
crossed  a  broad  stretch  of  marshy  meadows  under  the  fire 
of  the  Austrian  guns  on  the  heights  above,  stormed  the 
fortifications,  and  drove  the  Austrians  into  Prague.  Fred¬ 
erick  and  his  men  reaped  the  moral  benefit  of  a  great 
victory,  but  they  lost  nearly  a  fifth,  1 2,000,  of  their  com¬ 
rades.  A  month  later  Frederick  was  badly  beaten  by  the 
advancing  Austrian  reenforcements,  and  the  siege  of 
Prague  had  to  be  abandoned.  During  the  summer  of 
1757  the  Russians  overran  East  Prussia,  the  Swedes 
landed  in  Pomerania,  and  P'rance  seized  Hanover.  The 
triumph  of  the  coalition  seemed  certain.  In  October 
Frederick  heard  that  the  hostile  states  of  the  Empire  The  Battle  of 
had  formed  a  large  army,  and  that  this  army  was  march-  November 
ing  north  to  join  the  French.  Fearing  that  their  juncture  1757 
would  mean  the  loss  of  his  capital,  Berlin,  Frederick 
headed  for  Leipsic  at  full  speed  to  prevent  the  union. 


21.  The 
Battle  of 
Leuthen, 
December 
1757 


18  GERMANY  SINCE  1740 

All  Europe  looked  upon  him  as  ruined.  But  early  in 
November  1757,  at  Rossbach,  Frederick  achieved  one  of 
those  sudden,  utterly  unexpected  victories  which  made 
him  the  wonder  of  his  age.  He  failed  to  avert  the  union 
of  the  French  troops  and  the  army  of  the  Empire,  but 
when  the  allies  were  marching  in  a  long  thin  line  with 
the  purpose  of  surrounding  the  Prussians,  Frederick  threw 
his  troops  upon  them  like  a  thunderbolt.  In  an  hour  and 
a  half,  against  odds  of  more  than  two  to  one,  he  put  the 
whole  army  of  the  allies  to  flight.  He  lost  less  than 
600  men  ;  his  opponents  lost  nearly  8000.  The  armies 
of  the  allies  scattered  all  over  Germany. 

The  Austrians  now  engaged  Frederick’s  still  more  seri¬ 
ous  attention.  They  had  captured  Breslau,  the  capital  of 
Silesia,  and  Frederick  had  to  dislodge  them  or  yield  his 
most  treasured  possession.  In  twelve  days  he  led  his 
troops  one  hundred  and  seventy  miles  through  difficult 
country.  On  the  fifth  of  December  1757,  just  a  month 
after  Rossbach,  Frederick  with  an  army  of  33,000  men 
met  the  Austrian  army  of  82,000  at  Leuthen  in  Silesia. 
Here  he  used  his  famous  "oblique”  attack;  that  is,  he 
marched  his  troops  obliquely  to  the  enemy’s  left  so  that 
his  right  wing  might  half  encircle  the  Austrian  left  and 
drive  it  back  upon  the  center  and  right.  The  Austrian 
ranks  crumpled  up  under  the  terrific  charge,  first  the  left, 
and  then  the  center ;  the  town  of  Leuthen  was  seized  by 
the  Prussians,  and  a  cavalry  charge  decided  the  battle. 
The  Austrians  left  10,000  men  on  the  field;  21,000  of 
them  were  taken  prisoners.  The  Prussians  lost  5500. 
Napoleon  called  the  Battle  of  Leuthen  "a  masterpiece” 
and  said  that  it  alone  would  have  been  sufficient  to  make 
Frederick  immortal.  Within  a  month,  under  different 
conditions  both  in  the  character  of  the  country  and  in 


THE  WARS  OF  1740-1763 


19 


the  style  of  attack,  with  desperate  odds  against  him  in 
both  cases,  Frederick  had  crushed  both  the  French  and 
Austrian  armies,  two  of  the  most  renowned  armies  of 
the  time.  He  had  cleared  the  country  south  of  Berlin  of 
the  enemy,  and  he  had  again  made  good  his  claim  to 
Silesia. 

In  the  campaign  of  1758  Frederick’s  ally,  Prince  Fer¬ 
dinand  of  Brunswick,  drove  the  French  out  of  Hanover 
and  across  the  Rhine,  and  Frederick  defeated  the  Russians 
who  had  ventured  too  near  Berlin.  He  was  beaten  by  the 
Austrians,  but  he  prevented  them  from  gaining  any  bene¬ 
fits  from  their  victory.  Unluckily  for  Frederick,  combined 
action  on  the  part  of  his  enemies,  hitherto  not  realized, 
was  accomplished  in  1759.  The  Russians  and  Austrians 
joined  forces,  about  90,000  in  all,  at  Kunersdorf,  fifty  miles 
east  of  Berlin,  in  August  1759,  and  Frederick  tempted 
fortune  by  attacking  them  with  50,000  men.  The  night 
closed  down,  after  six  hours  of  fighting,  on  the  greatest 
calamity  Frederick  had  ever  experienced.  He  left  nearly 
half  his  army  on  the  battlefield.  For  a  time  Frederick 
himself  gave  up  all  hope.  But  the  allies  failed  to  press 
their  advantage,  partly  through  sluggishness,  partly  through 
petty  jealousy  of  each  other.  Silesia  was  lost  to  Frederick, 
and  1759  ended  with  only  the  one  ray  of  hope  which  came 
from  a  substantial  victory  over  the  French  by  the  duke  of 
Brunswick  aided  by  English  troops.  In  1760,  however, 
Frederick  regained  Silesia  after  a  victory  against  odds  of 
more  than  two  to  one.  In  the  autumn  of  the  same  year 
he  heard  that  the  Austrians  were  establishing  winter 
quarters  at  Torgau  in  Saxony.  Unwilling  to  leave  them 
ensconced  so  near  his  own  frontier,  he  resolved  in  early 
November  to  attack  the  Austrians  and  drive  them  out  of 
Saxony.  The  Battle  of  Torgau,  fought  partly  in  the  dark 


22.  The 
campaigns  of 
1758-1760 


The  Battle  of 
Kunersdorf, 
August  1759 


The  Battle  of 
Torgau , 
November 
1760 


20 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


23-  The  tides 
of  fortune  in 
the  last  years 
of  the  war 


of  evening,  was  a  frightful  hand-to-hand  slaughter,  the 
bloodiest  of  the  whole  war.  With  his  44,000  men  Fred¬ 
erick  drove  65,000  Austrians  out  of  Torgau  and  Saxony, 
but  he  lost  nearly  a  third  of  his  army.  Both  he  and  his 
enemy  were  paralyzed  by  the  struggle. 

From  this  time  on  Frederick’s  resources  were  so  far 
exhausted  that  he  could  do  little  but  rest  on  the  defensive. 
England  had  discontinued  its  subsidy,  and  his  own  sources 
of  revenue  were  drying  up.  He  had  left  a  large  majority 
of  his  original  army  on  the  battlefields  of  the  preceding 
years,  and  though  he  still  managed  to  keep  an  army  to¬ 
gether,  the  want  of  military  training  for  many  of  his  men 
greatly  diminished  the  average  efficiency.  In  1761  Austria 
recaptured  Saxony  ;  Russia  took  half  of  Pomerania ;  the 
two  together  seized  half  of  Silesia.  P'rederick  was  cut  off 
from  home  and  lay  encamped  in  southern  Silesia.  But 
by  a  rare  combination  of  favoring  circumstances  the  tide 
suddenly  turned.  Early  in  January  1762  Elizabeth  of 
Russia  died  and  her  successor,  Peter  III,  from  of  old 
an  ardent  admirer  of  the  Prussian  king,  at  once  offered 
Frederick  peace,  giving  back  all  the  Prussian  territory 
which  Russia  had  conquered.  The  withdrawal  of  Russia 
soon  led  to  the  withdrawal  of  Sweden,  leaving  Austria 
and  other  states  of  the  Empire  and  France  in  arms 
against  Prussia.  France,  however,  was  prostrate  from 
its  war  with  England ;  it  remembered,  moreover,  its  ill- 
starred  campaigns  in  North  Germany  and  did  not  fight 
Prussian  troops  again.  Toward  the  end  of  1762  the 
Prussians  defeated  the  Austrians  and  an  army  of  the 
Empire,  afterwards  making  raids  into  South  Germany, 
levying  contributions,  and  implanting  in  the  southern 
states  a  great  desire  for  peace.  Bavaria,  the  Palatinate, 
and  other  southern  states  declared  their  neutrality  in 


THE  WARS  OF  1740-1763 


21 


December  and  in  January  1763;  the  dissolution  of  the 
army  of  the  Empire  followed  at  once. 

On  February  15,  1763  Austria,  Saxony,  and  Prussia 
signed  the  Peace  of  Hubertusburg,  and  the  Seven  Years’ 
War  was  ended.  The  Peace  confirmed  the  treaties  of  the 
First  and  Second  Silesian  Wars,  thus  ceding  Silesia  per¬ 
manently  to  Prussia.  Frederick  promised  in  return  to  cast 
his  electoral  vote  in  favor  of  Joseph,  son  of  Maria  Theresa 
and  Francis  I,  when  Francis  died.  The  war  wrought  no 
political  changes.  Austria  remained  at  the  head  of  the 
German  Empire ;  Prussia,  Saxony,  Bavaria,  and  all  the 
other  German  principalities  remained  secondary  states  of 
the  Empire.  Further,  not  a  boundary  stone  of  any  province 
was  shifted.  Nor,  in  spite  of  great  loss  of  life  and  material 
welfare,  had  any  state  of  the  Empire,  not  even  Prussia, 
suffered  disastrously  from  the  war.  Before  many  years  had 
passed,  every  physical  trace  of  the  war  had  been  obliterated. 

The  lasting  significance  of  the  Seven  Years’  War  lies 
in  its  profound  effect  on  German  national  consciousness, 
on  the  German  sense  of  unity.  Before  the  war  the  disin¬ 
tegrating  character  of  the  Empire  had  loosened  all  but  offi¬ 
cially  any  close  relations  between  different  states.  For  many 
years  no  strong  leader  had  appeared  in  Austria  or  else¬ 
where  ;  men  felt  themselves  not  German,  but  Bavarian,  or 
Saxon,  or  Prussian,  as  the  case  might  be.  But  Frederick’s 
victories  were  not  only  Prussian  ;  they  were  also  German. 
He  had  beaten  soundly  France  and  Russia  as  well  as 
Austria.  He  had  established  the  claim  of  an  ignored  Ger¬ 
man  province  to  rank  with  great  powers.  The  full  fight¬ 
ing  force  of  all  his  enemies  was  never  concentrated  against 
Frederick,  but  with  a  population  of  5,000,000  and  but 
little  aid  from  abroad  he  had  maintained  all  of  his  pos¬ 
sessions  against  attacks  of  states  and  nations  whose  total 


24.  The  end 
of  the  Seven 
Years’  War, 
1763 


25.  The  sig¬ 
nificance  of 
the  Seven 
Years’  War 
in  German 
life 


22 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


population  approximated  90,000,000.  The  people  of  differ¬ 
ent  states  might  be  jealous  of  this  brilliant  success  and  rise 
of  Prussia,  but  they  were  enthusiastic  admirers  of  Frederick. 
He  was  a  German  national  hero.  Pride  in  his  achieve¬ 
ments  united  countless  Germans  in  spirit  and  gave  new 
impulse  to  a  sense  of  German  national  life.  It  also  created 
desire  and  resolution  to  emulate  Frederick’s  triumphs  in 
war  in  other  fields  of  activity.  For  example,  the  classical 
period  of  German  literature  is  sometimes  dated  as  begin¬ 
ning  in  the  year  of  Frederick’s  accession,  in  1740 ;  some¬ 
times  the  date  is  given  as  1 748  ;  but  very  nearly  all  of 
the  great  products  of  classical  German  literature  appeared 
after  the  Seven  Years’  War,  some  of  them  under  its 
immediate  spell. 


CHAPTER  III 


FREDERICK  AND  GERMANY  IN  TIME  OF  PEACE 

1 7  63— 1 786 

As  soon  as  the  Peace  of  Hubertusburg  was  signed, 
Frederick  plunged  again,  as  if  refreshed  from  a  long  holi¬ 
day,  into  the  work  for  the  internal  development  of  Prussia 
which  the  war  had  nullified  or  held  in  check.  In  the 
decade  of  peace  before  the  Seven  Years’  War  Frederick 
had  begun  to  drain  outlying  swampy  districts  and  bring 
them  closer  to  the  heart  of  his  kingdom  by  arteries  of 
canals  ;  this  work  he  now  continued,  and  to  these  fertile  dis¬ 
tricts,  which  were  no  longer  too  remote,  he  attracted  many 
thousand  new  settlers.  Besides  remitting  the  taxes  for  a 
time  in  some  of  his  provinces,  he  distributed  cavalry  horses 
and  large  quantities  of  seed  among  the  peasants,  thus  re¬ 
storing  and  advancing  agriculture.  New  industries  were 
established  and,  together  with  those  already  existing,  were 
developed  with  great  rapidity ;  the  cloth  mills  in  Silesia, 
silk  factories,  glassworks,  foundries,  and  other  industries 
engaged  a  considerable  portion  of  Frederick’s  thought  and 
care  for  many  years.  The  prohibitive  duty  which  Frederick 
put  on  foreign  imports  protected  and  fostered  home  indus¬ 
tries  and  caused  a  rapid  improvement  in  home  products, 
though  the  system  which  he  employed  in  collecting  taxes 
galled  his  people  by  its  unnecessary  vigilance.  Through 
miserly  frugality  in  government  as  in  his  private  life  —  he 
spent  only  one  sixth  of  his  income  —  Frederick  was  able 

z3 


26.  Freder¬ 
ick’s  most 
important 
acts  of  gov¬ 
ernment  in 
time  of  peace 


24 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


27.  Freder¬ 
ick’s  atti¬ 
tude  toward 
government 
and  toward 
his  people  : 
its  weakness 
and  its  effect 


to  give  large  sums  to  needy  communities,  to  increase  his 
standing  army  to  186,000  men,  and  to  leave  a  well-filled 
treasury  at  his  death.  Morally  and  intellectually  the  most 
bracing  reforms  of  Frederick’s  reign  were  his  revised 
administration  of  justice  and  his  proclamations  of  religious 
tolerance  and  freedom  of  speech.  At  his  behest  the  courts 
no  longer  regarded  class  distinctions  but  rendered  deci¬ 
sions  to  noble  and  peasant  alike  ;  Frederick  thus  strength¬ 
ened  immeasurably  his  people’s  faith  in  the  rewards  of 
honest,  upright  living.  "  Every  man,”  he  said  in  his  pic¬ 
turesque  idiom,  "  is  to  go  to  heaven  in  his  own  way,”  and 
"  newspapers,  if  they  are  to  be  interesting,  must  not  be 
interfered  with.”  By  unshackling  spiritual  and  intellectual 
life  Frederick  gave  play  to  forces  which  ultimately  estab¬ 
lished  the  moral  and  intellectual  standards  of  Prussia  and 
Germany.  During  Frederick’s  reign  the  population  of 
Prussia  increased  from  three  and  a  half  to  five  and  a  half 
millions,  and  the  area  by  more  than  two  thirds,  so  that  in 
1786  Prussia  comprised  nearly  sixty-five  thousand  square 
miles,  about  the  area  of  New  England.  By  applying  his 
methods  of  administration  and  his  reforms  with  but  few 
alterations  to  all  his  provinces  Frederick  welded  Prussia 
into  a  unified  and  fairly  homogeneous  realm. 

Frederick  believed  and  personified  both  his  maxims  : 
"The  king  is  the  first  servant  of  the  state”  and  "The 
people  are  not  there  for  the  sake  of  the  rulers  but  the 
rulers  for  the  sake  of  the  people.”  With  astounding  at¬ 
tention  to  detail  he  watched  the  course  of  his  administration 
in  every  province  of  his  kingdom  every  year.  He  worked 
hard  from  eight  to  ten  hours  every  day  ;  in  a  single  period 
of  six  years  he  made  twelve  thousand  royal  decisions. 
Frederick  thus  displayed  a  sense  of  duty  which  his  people 
could  not  fail  to  see  and  could  not  forget.  True  to 


IN  A  TIME  OF  PEACE 


25 


Hohenzollern  tradition  he  distrusted  the  intelligence  and 
the  reliability  of  the  common  people.  He  therefore  deliber¬ 
ately  trained  his  subjects  to  expect  everything  governmen¬ 
tal  to  be  done  for  them,  nothing  by  them  ;  he  rejected  their 
political  cooperation  and  postponed  indefinitely  their  train¬ 
ing  and  education  in  state  affairs.  Frederick  regarded  the 
nobles  as  the  strongest  pillar  of  the  state,  but  from  them 
too  he  sought  and  desired  little  governmental  aid.  Even 
the  chief  ministers  were  hardly  more  than  secretaries  to 
Frederick,  and  the  crown  prince  himself  was  not  associated 
with  the  king  in  the  government.  In  short,  throughout 
Frederick’s  reign,  in  matters  of  common  polity  Frederick 
was  Prussia.  The  state  depended  upon  him  alone,  upon 
his  life  and  health.  When  he  died,  the  Prussian  world 
seemed  to  stand  still ;  men  knew  not  what  might  come. 
But  through  his  achievements  in  war  and  peace  Prussia 
had  crystallized  into  a  compact  German  state  and  repre¬ 
sented  to  Germans  at  large  a  lofty  ideal.  Here  was  to  be 
found  the  orderly  unified  life  which  other  German  states, 
not  to  speak  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  had  failed  to 
establish. 

Although  Frederick’s  edict  granting  Prussia  freedom 
of  speech  gave  a  mighty  impulse  to  the  development  of 
German  intellectual  life,  and  although  his  brilliant  deeds 
in  war  and  his  commanding  personality  brought  down  a 
new  fire  to  German  poetry,  the  great  king  himself  was 
always  skeptical  of  any  notable  achievement  of  German 
intellect  or  German  imagination.  Frederick  considered  his 
mother-tongue  a  language  of  boors  ;  he  is  said  to  have 
spoken  it  badly,  and  he  certainly  wrote  it  abominably. 
FI  is  schemes  for  the  education  of  his  people  were  the 
most  rudimentary  and  the  least  effective  of  all  his  reforms. 
He  gave  encouragement  to  not  a  single  German  author 


28.  Freder¬ 
ick’s  indif¬ 
ference  to¬ 
ward  German 
thought  and 
German 
literature 


26 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


29.  Austria 
in  peace 
under  Maria 
Theresa  and 
Joseph  XI 


and  was  not  averse  from  chilling  the  enthusiasm  of  more 
than  one.  Nor  did  he  take  part  in  his  people’s  specula¬ 
tive  thinking  or  share  in  their  religious  faith.  He  was  an 
agnostic  and  aided  the  Church  only  because  he  considered 
its  influence  morally  elevating.  Frederick’s  indifference  to 
all  these  phases  of  the  life  of  his  people  is  explained  by 
the  fact  that  his  intellectual  and  literary  bent  became  fixed 
in  his  youth  and  young  manhood,  when  German  thinkers 
were  few  and  German  letters  offered  no  satisfaction  to  a 
refined  taste  for  literature.  In  those  early  years  Frederick 
became  imbued  with  the  culture  of  France  and  adopted 
permanently  French  standards  of  thought  and  literary  art. 
He  read  and  spoke  the  foreign  language  habitually ;  his 
many  works  in  prose  and  verse  are  all  in  French.  When 
he  reorganized  the  Berlin  Academy  of  Sciences,  he  called 
chiefly  French  scholars  and  literary  men  to  Berlin,  among 
others  Voltaire.  Under  their  influence  Frederick’s  own 
intellectual  life  touched  a  wide  range  of  subjects  and  in¬ 
terests  ;  this  appeared  especially  in  the  table  talk  in  the 
palace  Sans  Souci  at  Potsdam,  where  he  used  to  gather  con¬ 
genial  spirits  about  him  in  the  evening.  But  it  remains  a 
pity  that  Frederick  had  so  few  German  intimates  and  that 
he  did  not  share  in  and  further  the  German  thought  and 
German  literature  which  added  so  much  luster  to  his  age. 

The  emperor  Francis  I  died  in  1765  and  was  succeeded 
both  in  Austria  and  as  head  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire 
by  his  son  Joseph  II  (1765-1790).  The  change  of  ruler 
caused  hardly  more  than  a  ripple  anywhere,  for  Maria 
Theresa  was  still  enjoying  the  advantage  of  her  beauty  and 
her  personality,  and  until  her  death  in  1 780  she  continued 
to  have  the  last  word  in  Austrian  politics.  Joseph  II  more¬ 
over  shared  the  controlling  ambition  of  his  mother’s  life, 
to  unify  the  widely  divergent  nationalities  subject  to  the 


IN  A  TIME  OF  PEACE 


27 


rule  of  the  Hapsburgs.  Each  hoped  that  after  thus  re¬ 
storing  and  enhancing  Austria’s  prestige  they  might  reunify 
the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  but  their  labors  began  and  ended 
in  their  own  hereditary  possessions.  Maria  Theresa  be¬ 
lieved  with  all  her  heart  in  the  theory  of  absolute  monarchy  ; 
she  therefore  granted  political  and  social  reforms  —  in 
education,  trade,  religious  toleration,  and  the  condition  of 
the  peasants  —  only  in  so  far  as  they  might  not  weaken  the 
authority  of  the  central  government.  Cautious  even  to 
the  point  of  appearing  semi-medieval  in  an  age  of  enlight¬ 
enment,  she  was  yet  spurred  on  by  a  profound  sense  of 
duty  to  the  welfare  of  her  people.  This  conflict  within 
herself,  between  ambition  and  caution,  hampered  Maria 
Theresa  throughout  her  reign  and  robbed  her  of  much  of 
the  achievement  and  the  glory  which  nature,  it  seems,  had 
put  within  her  reach.  Joseph  II  inherited  his  mother’s 
ambition  for  Austria  and  he  was  eager  to  rival  the  example 
of  Frederick  of  Prussia,  whom  he  admired  greatly.  But  he 
was  afflicted  by  a  hasty  judgment  and  by  feverish  energy, 
"  generally  taking  the  second  step  before  he  had  taken  the 
first.”  He  was  consequently  checkmated  again  and  again 
in  his  dealings  with  other  German  states  and  with  foreign 
powers.  In  his  own  realm  he  alienated  many  of  his  people 
and  expended  much  of  his  energy  in  attempting  to  retrieve 
past  mistakes.  When  he  abolished  serfdom  in  his  domin¬ 
ions  and  secured  civil  rights  and  freedom  of  worship  to  all 
Austrian  Protestants,  he  set  up  the  two  greatest  memorials 
of  his  reign. 

In  Bavaria,  Wiirtemberg,  and  other  states  of  Germany 
phases  of  incompetent  or  wicked  government  still  lingered. 
Whether  the  burdens  were  imposed  by  priests  or  by  lux¬ 
urious,  tyrannical  rulers,  a  large  part  of  the  common  people 
remained  impoverished,  bound  in  serfdom,  illiterate.  Men 


30.  Con¬ 
ditions  in 
other  German 
states 


28 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


were  hired  out  as  mercenary  soldiers  to  fight  the  battles 
of  other  nations,  as  the  Hessians  and  Wiirtembergers  in 
America,  merely  in  order  that  their  hereditary  lords  might 
live  in  greater  affluence  ;  men  were  thrust  into  prison  with¬ 
out  trial  on  charges  which  only  despots  prefer.  Many  fam¬ 
ilies  left  Bavaria  and  other  states  to  find  homes  in  Hungary 
and  Russia  and  even  crossed  the  sea  to  America.  Never¬ 
theless  the  enlightenment  of  the  age  found  political  appli¬ 
cation  in  many  parts  of  Germany.  Reforms  were  instituted, 
analogous  to  those  of  Prussia,  in  the  duchies  of  Brunswick 
and  Saxe-Weimar,  in  the  electorate  of  Saxony,  in  the  eccle¬ 
siastical  electorates  of  Mainz  and  Trier,  and  elsewhere. 
Progress  was  slow  in  all  these  states,  as  none  of  their  rulers 
found  the  broad  and  deep  foundations  awaiting  them  such 
as  the  ancestors  of  Frederick  the  Great  had  laid  in  Prussia. 
But  in  numerous  states  the  administration  of  justice  was 
improved  ;  class  distinctions  were  mitigated  ;  the  burdens 
of  the  peasantry  were  lightened  ;  institutions  of  learning 
were  built  up.  The  duke  of  Brunswick  gathered  together 
some  of  the  best  intellects  of  Germany ;  Carl  August  of 
Saxe-Weimar  made  his  little  capital  Weimar  "  the  Athens 
of  Germany  ”  by  providing  a  congenial  residence  there  for 
leading  German  men  of  letters.  The  people  of  such  states 
as  these  responded  joyously  to  the  liberal  ideas  and  to  the 
enlightened  practices  of  their  rulers.  A  large  measure  of 
contentment  and  of  state  pride  entered  into  the  lives  of  the 
common  people.  Indeed  the  prosperity  and  the  growing 
local  patriotism  of  individual  states  threatened  the  complete 
dissolution  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  as  a  political 
unit.  This  threat  was  stayed  by  the  unifying  influence 
of  various  phases  of  German  intellectual  and  spiritual  life 
no  less  than  by  the  memory  of  recent  achievements  in 
German  history. 


IN  A  TIME  OF  PEACE 


29 


The  pietistic  movement  touched  many  parts  of  Germany 
and  served  as  a  bond  between  people  of  widely  separated 
states.  Starting  in  opposition  to  the  creed-bound  self- 
righteous  theology  of  the  seventeenth-century  Protestant 
Church,  pietism  made  religion  a  close  personal  relation  be¬ 
tween  the  individual  and  his  God  ;  it  established  perma¬ 
nently  the  sanctity  of  individual  religious  belief.  Through 
pietism  the  heart  with  its  feeling  supplanted  the  intellect 
in  matters  of  Christian  faith.  By  the  middle  of  the  eight¬ 
eenth  century,  however,  the  tender  devout  meditation  of 
the  early  pietists  had  developed  into  a  highly  emotional 
egoism,  and  pietism  had  therewith  lost  its  power  to  gain 
new  apostles ;  it  lingered  on  thenceforth  as  a  controlling 
factor  chiefly  in  the  lives  of  the  older  generation.  The  in¬ 
dividualism  of  the  pietists  was  paralleled  and  superseded 
in  the  lives  of  the  younger  generation  by  the  individualistic 
spirit  of  rationalism.  Men  turned  now  to  a  personal  inves¬ 
tigation  of  all  the  phenomena  of  life  according  to  the  dic¬ 
tates  and  powers  of  the  individual  reason  ;  men  set  out  to 
believe  only  those  things  which  reason  could  prove  to  be 
true.  Rationalism  in  theory  and  in  application  absorbed 
for  years  many  of  the  best  minds  all  over  Germany ; 
in  popularized  versions  it  also  found  a  reception  in  the 
middle  classes  and  even  among  peasants.  German  ration¬ 
alists  continued  to  believe  in  God,  free  will,  and  immor¬ 
tality  ;  they  did  not  deny  even  divine  revelation.  Thus 
they  were  cautious,  but  they  were  also  fearless,  and  they 
inculcated  a  spirit  of  unafraid  investigation  which  gave 
modern  Germany  its  intellectual  freedom.  As  rationalism 
approached  its  climax  as  a  philosophical  theory,  the  emo¬ 
tional  side  of  pietism  reappeared  in  the  form  of  sentimen¬ 
talism.  People  wept  at  parting  and  meeting,  however  brief 
the  separation  ;  they  wept  copiously  over  the  heroes  and 


31.  Religious 
and  philo¬ 
sophical  life 
of  the  time 


30 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


32.  The  rise 
of  classical 
German 
literature 


heroines  of  fiction  and  over  scenes  in  nature.  It  was  the 
work  of  Immanuel  Kant  (1724-1804)  to  check  sentimen¬ 
talism,  to  correct  the  extravagant  claims  of  rationalism, 
and  to  construct  for  German  life  a  foundation  of  rational 
morality.  Kant  showed  that  there  are  ideas  which  men 
believe  and  yet  cannot  prove,  for  example,  the  soul,  the 
world,  and  God  ;  Kant  thus  revealed  limits  beyond  which 
human  knowledge  and  human  reason  cannot  go.  Man 
must  use  free  will,  he  said  further,  not  in  the  service  of 
capricious  individualism,  but  as  a  means  with  which  he 
satisfies  a  sense  of  personal  responsibility.  The  principle 
of  doing  good  to  others  that  others  may  do  good  to  us 
Kant  put  aside  as  base  and  unworthy  ;  he  bade  men  obey, 
without  asking  unanswerable  questions,  the  unconditional 
command  of  duty,  the  categorical  imperative.  Do  good 
because  it  is  right  to  do  good.  In  the  noble  idealism  of 
this  rational  morality  lies  the  ultimate  source  of  the  most 
strengthening  German  thought  and  German  poetry  since 
Kant’s  own  day. 

The  classical  era  of  German  literature  began  about  1750. 
Its  first  great  product,  the  melodious  poetry  of  Klopstock 
(1724-1803),  gave  final  expression  to  the  glowing  devo¬ 
tion  of  German  pietists,  to  their  rapturous  contemplation 
of  the  works  of  the  Almighty,  and  to  their  sweeping  flights 
of  imagination.  Klopstock,  first  of  all  German  poets,  dared 
to  cast  aside  the  rules  and  regulations  of  poetic  technique 
and  to  give  free  rein  to  his  heart  and  to  his  imagination. 
Lessing  (1729-1781)  created  modern  German  drama  by 
writing  its  first  great  exemplar,  but  he  furthered  German 
letters  far  more  by  his  literary  criticisms  and  theories.  A 
scholar  in  many  fields,  Lessing  spurred  German  intelli¬ 
gence  along  many  lines  ;  his  rationalistic  observations  on 
religion  and  religious  tolerance,  reenforced  by  illustration 


IN  A  TIME  OF  PEACE 


31 


of  his  views  in  literary  form,  clarified  German  thought  and 
ennobled  German  life.  Herder  (1744-1803),  likewise  a 
philosophical  critic  of  literature  and  life,  first  interpreted 
history  as  a  continuous  organic  growth  ;  in  each  nation’s 
own  history  and  tradition  he  saw  the  foundation  on  which 
it  should  build  its  modern  culture.  By  exalting  the  native 
and  national,  and  also  by  extolling  personal  feeling  as  the 
wellspring  of  great  literature,  Herder  became  the  father 
of  German  Romanticism.  Thus  he  influenced  German 
letters  well  down  into  the  nineteenth  century,  but  before 
he  was  thirty  years  old,  he  had  kindled  the  genius  of  Ger¬ 
many’s  greatest  poet,  Goethe  (1749-1832).  Rooted  in 
German  tradition,  imaginative,  restlessly  inquiring,  Goethe 
experienced  within  himself  the  impulses  and  forces  of  the 
age  and  gave  them,  in  poetry  and  in  the  novel,  consum¬ 
mate  literary  form.  At  the  age  of  twenty-five  he  stood  in 
the  forefront  of  German  literature  ;  there  he  has  remained 
ever  since.  Schiller  (1759-1805),  even  more  than  Goethea 
product  of  the  eighteenth  century,  summed  up  the  lessons 
and  the  needs  of  his  age,  and  in  his  dramas  and  poetry 
showed  his  countrymen  a  way  to  spiritual  regeneration. 
No  other  German  poet  has  laid  a  more  immediate,  stronger 
hold  on  the  imagination  of  his  people  than  Schiller ;  no 
other  has  inspired  them  in  times  of  political  dejection  with 
such  lofty  idealism.  Through  the  thought  and  the  work 
of  these  philosophers  and  poets  and  their  less  famous  com¬ 
rades,  the  intellectual  life  of  Germany  in  the  eighteenth 
century  was  rich  and  fruitful  beyond  the  most  ambitious 
dreams  of  former  years.  After  centuries  of  feeble  endeavor 
German  literature  burst  forth  into  full  flower  within  a  single 
generation. 

A  short  time  after  the  close  of  the  Seven  Years’  War 
the  growing  influence  of  Russia  in  Poland  led  Frederick 


32 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


33.  The 
(First)  Parti¬ 
tion  of 
Poland,  1772 


34.  The  War 
of  the 
Bavarian 
Succession, 
1778-1779 


the  Great  to  suspect  that  Russia  intended  to  seize  the 
Polish  kingdom.  Poland  at  that  time  was  in  a  constant 
state  of  anarchy.  The  king,  Stanislaus  Poniatowski,  whom 
the  Polish  nobles  had  elected  to  his  office  at  Russia’s  bid¬ 
ding  in  the  place  of  the  hereditary  elector  of  Saxony,  was 
a  phantom  ruler.  The  Polish  constitution  vested  the  power 
of  the  realm  in  the  Diet,  which  was  made  up  of  nobles 
exclusively.  But  the  veto  of  a  single  noble  could  block 
legislation  in  the  Diet,  and  out  of  the  conflicting  interests 
of  various  nobles  arose  factions  which  made  bitter  feuds 
on  each  other  in  and  out  of  the  Diet.  The  three  powers, 
Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia,  now  stepped  in,  alleging  that 
the  anarchic  condition  of  Poland  was  demoralizing  their 
people  in  adjacent  territories.  In  1772  they  agreed  upon 
the  terms  of  the  (First)  Partition  of  Poland  and  divided 
among  themselves  nearly  one  third  of  the  kingdom.  Russia 
acquired  half  the  booty,  and  Prussia  only  one  sixth,  but 
Prussia’s  acquisition  of  sixteen  thousand  square  miles  filled 
up  a  dangerous  gap  in  Frederick’s  dominions  between 
Brandenburg  and  East  Prussia.  It  is  true  that  many  of 
the  Poles  now  under  new  rulers,  especially  those  in  Prus¬ 
sian  Poland  under  Frederick  the  Great,  benefited  greatly 
by  the  change.  But  one  of  the  powers,  Russia,  had 
fomented  the  social  discord  in  Poland  with  the  deliberate 
intent  of  ultimate  seizure,  and  all  three  aggrandized  them¬ 
selves  at  the  expense  of  a  friendly  defenseless  nation. 
Their  seizure  of  Polish  territory  was  nothing  less  than 
highway  robbery. 

On  the  death  of  the  childless  elector  of  Bavaria  in 
December  1777,  Joseph  II  laid  ill-founded  claim  to  the 
inheritance,  and  proceeded  to  add  Bavaria  to  Austria. 
Frederick  the  Great  was  much  opposed  to  an  increase  in 
Austrian  territory,  and  knowing  that  Saxony,  which  had 


IN  A  TIME  OF  PEACE 


33 


a  claim  to  Bavaria,  would  assist  him  against  Austria,  he 
determined  "  to  humble  Austrian  ambition  once  for  all.” 
When  Frederick  declared  in  favor  of  the  next  Bavarian 
heir,  the  head  of  a  collateral  branch  of  the  Wittelsbach 
family,  the  War  of  the  Bavarian  Succession  broke  out. 
No  memorable  battle,  no  evidence  of  unusual  military 
ability,  marks  the  history  of  the  war.  Frederick  himself 
presents  an  uninteresting  figure ;  he  shows  no  longer 
either  his  former  amazing  resourcefulness  or  his  power 
to  strike  a  swift  decisive  blow.  The  war  consisted  almost 
entirely  of  skirmishes  and  maneuvers  in  northern  Bohemia 
to  obtain  provisions  and  to  keep  the  enemy  from  obtain¬ 
ing  them.  Hence  it  is  sometimes  called  "  the  Potato 
War.”  Peace  was  signed  in  May  1779.  Bavaria  passed 
to  the  next  Bavarian  heir  with  the  proviso  that  at  his 
death  it  should  go  unimpaired  to  his  heir-presumptive ; 
Saxony  received  a  settlement  of  its  claim  in  money ;  and 
Austria  acquired  a  small  stretch  of  country  adjacent  to  its 
territory.  Prussia  had  strengthened  its  position  in  Germany 
by  giving  its  apparently  disinterested  aid  to  two  German 
states  in  a  struggle  to  maintain  their  rights  against  Austria. 
But  as  subsequent  events  revealed,  in  securing  the  guaran¬ 
tee  of  Russia  and  France  to  the  peace  the  door  was  opened 
to  foreign  intrusion  in  German  affairs. 

In  the  last  ten  years  of  his  reign  Joseph  II  allowed  his 
ambition  for  Austria  to  lead  him  more  and  more  into 
projects  for  Austrian  aggrandizement  at  the  expense  of 
other  German  states  and  into  seeking  the  aid  of  Russia 
and  France.  The  stability  of  the  Holy  Roman  PImpire 
was  thus  threatened  on  three  sides.  At  this  point  Prussia 
became  the  leader  of  a  group  of  German  states  for  the  first 
time  in  history.  In  July  1785  Frederick  the  Great  formed 
with  the  electors  of  Saxony  and  Hanover  the  "  League  of 


35.  The 
Fiirstenbund 


34 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


36.  A  sum¬ 
mary  of 
Frederick  the 
Great’s  life 
and  achieve¬ 
ments 


German  Princes,”  or  Deutscher  Fiirstenbund.  The  league 
merely  agreed  to  defend  and  preserve,  in  word  and  if 
necessary  in  deed,  all  the  states  of  the  Empire  as  they  then 
existed.  The  league  was  thus  intended  not  to  reform  but 
to  safeguard  conservatively  the  old  existing  order.  Many 
German  rulers  in  the  north  and  the  south,  Catholic  and 
Protestant,  gladly  joined  the  league.  It  soon  forced  Joseph 
to  abandon  his  projects,  it  curbed  the  influence  of  Russia 
and  France,  and  it  assured  the  continued  existence  of  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire. 

The  establishment  of  the  Fiirstenbund  just  a  year  be¬ 
fore  his  death  illustrates  conveniently  and  aptly  the  great 
net  result  of  Frederick’s  life  and  reign.  It  revealed  Prussia 
as  no  longer  a  third-rate  power  but  as  the  successful  rival 
of  Austria  in  German  affairs  and  as  the  peer  of  any  nation 
in  Europe.  The  goal  of  Frederick’s  whole  activity  was 
reached.  The  path  which  led  to  it  had  been  long  and 
devious.  In  the  aggrandizement  of  Prussia  Frederick  had 
repudiated  ethical  considerations  with  shocking  easiness. 
He  had  ruled  his  people  with  benevolent  but  often  stifling 
despotism.  He  had  foregone  the  sunshine  of  declining 
years,  the  affection  and  sympathy  of  life-long  friendships, 
and  had  become  the  lonely  "  hermit  of  Sans  Souci.”  But 
he  had  forged  a  state  which  could  survive  the  blows  of 
even  the  nineteenth  century.  He  had  given  to  Prussians 
and  Germans  an  ideal  of  statehood  which  afforded  initial 
inspiration  to  the  state  and  national  life  of  the  German 
Empire  of  the  most  recent  decades. 


CHAPTER  IV 


THE  DECLINE  OF  GERMANY  TO  THE  TREATY  OF 
LUNEVILLE 

i 786-1801 

The  two  decades  which  followed  the  death  of  Frederick 
the  Great  form  the  most  humiliating  chapter  in  the  his¬ 
tory  of  Prussia.  Rarely  has  a  nation  risen  so  high  to  fall 
so  low,  or  passed  so  abruptly  from  the  most  brilliant  to  the 
weakest  of  its  rulers.  Within  a  score  of  years  Prussia 
sank,  as  the  weakness  and  blindness  of  its  rulers  deserved, 
to  the  rank  of  a  third-rate  power.  Frederick’s  nephew 
and  successor,  Frederick  William  II  (1786-1797),  showed 
good  impulses  to  wise  government  as  well  as  insight  into 
the  needs  of  his  country.  He  reduced  customs  duties  ;  he 
encouraged  education  ;  he  finished  the  codification  of  Prus¬ 
sian  common  law  which  Frederick  the  Great  had  started. 
But  for  the  most  part  he  gave  a  free  rein  throughout  his 
life  to  his  passions  and  fancies.  His  mistresses  wielded  a 
profound  and  vicious  influence  over  him  until  his  death, 
and  religious  fanatics  made  him  one  of  their  kind.  In 
accordance  with  the  superstitious  custom  of  the  age  he 
spent  much  time  in  calling  up  the  spirits  of  the  dead  ;  he 
made  the  grave  mistake  of  attempting  to  force  outlived 
church  doctrines  on  the  clergy.  In  his  foreign  diplomacy 
he  blundered  again  and  again  ;  he  did  not  grasp  the  great 
possibilities  of  the  Fiirstenbund  and  allowed  the  "  league 
of  princes  ”  to  fall  to  pieces  only  a  few  years  after  the 

35 


37.  Frederick 
William  II 
and  his  reign 


36 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


death  of  its  founder.  To  these  faults  Frederick  William 
added  that  of  such  reckless  extravagance  in  government 
that  the  savings  of  his  predecessor  were  soon  dissipated 
and  large  public  debts  were  incurred.  The  morale  of  the 
army  also  began  to  decline,  partly  through  the  officers’ 
pride  in  a  distant  past,  partly  through  the  humiliation  of 
the  soldiers  with  the  whip  and  other  antiquated  methods 
of  discipline.  It  was  inevitable  that  the  people  at  large 
should  fall  victims  to  the  moral  corrosion  of  the  time  ;  the 
sensuality  at  court  was  duplicated  in  the  immorality  of  all 
classes  of  society.  Prussian  society  from  top  to  bottom  has 
never  been  so  depraved  as  during  the  first  two  decades 
after  the  death  of  Frederick  the  Great. 

38.  Frederick  In  1 787  Frederick  William  sent  troops  into  Holland  to 
foreign  assist  his  brother-in-law,  the  stadtholder,  in  suppressing  a 
civil  rebellion.  He  refused,  however,  to  accept  any  indem¬ 
nity  for  the  expenses  of  the  campaign,  thereby  exhausting 
a  large  part  of  the  treasure  left  by  Frederick  the  Great. 
The  success  of  the  expedition,  moreover,  was  so  immediate 
that  the  Prussian  troops  returned  home  more  convinced 
than  ever  of  their  invincibility.  Frederick  William  at¬ 
tempted  in  1789  and  1790  to  intervene  in  the  war  of 
Russia  and  Austria  against  Turkey,  hoping  to  acquire  the 
Polish  cities  of  Dantzic  and  Thorn  in  return  for  his  labors, 
but  Leopold  II  (1790-1792),  the  brother  and  successor  of 
Joseph  II,  frustrated  Frederick  William’s  scheme  by  imme¬ 
diately  consenting  to  peace  on  condition  that  the  political 
situation  be  restored  to  its  status  before  the  war.  Frederick 
William  gained  nothing.  On  the  other  hand,  he  spent  large 
sums  of  money  during  the  negotiations  and,  as  if  exem¬ 
plifying  the  blundering  character  of  his  diplomacy,  he 
gave  the  death-blow  to  the  Fiirstenbund  by  neglecting  to 
force  its  recognition  by  Austria. 


THE  DECLINE  OF  GERMANY 


37 


In  1792  Russian  troops  invaded  Poland,  and  Prussia, 
again  fearful  lest  Russia  should  seize  the  whole  Polish 
kingdom,  hastily  occupied  the  western  part  of  it.  The  two 
powers  agreed  readily  enough,  however,  in  1793  upon  a 
Second  Partition  of  Poland.  By  this  treaty  Prussia  obtained 
twenty-two  thousand  square  miles  of  territory  with  over  a 
million  inhabitants,  which  included  the  province  of  Posen 
and  the  cities  of  Dantzic  and  Thorn  ;  Russia  acquired  four 
times  as  much  territory  as  Prussia.  In  the  very  next  year 
Kosciusko  led  one  more  Polish  revolt,  but  Prussia  restored 
order  almost  single-handed.  Prussia,  Russia,  and  Austria 
at  length  declared  in  January  1795  that  the  only  way  to 
keep  the  peace  in  Poland  was  for  them  to  divide  what  was 
left.  In  this  Third  Partition  Prussia  received  the  old  capi¬ 
tal  Warsaw  and  several  districts  along  the  Prussian  eastern 
frontier,  in  all  about  twenty-one  thousand  square  miles  and 
a  million  inhabitants.  Austria’s  share  was  approximately  the 
same  in  size.  Russia  got  about  twice  as  much  as  either. 

These  two  partitions  of  Poland  were  accomplished  so 
easily  because  the  nations  of  Europe  had  become  absorbed 
in  the  course  of  the  French  Revolution.  In  1789,  when 
the  extravagances  of  its  kings  and  the  mismanagement  of 
its  ministers  had  brought  France  to  the  verge  of  bank¬ 
ruptcy,  the  French  king,  Louis  XVI,  called  the  legisla¬ 
tive  body,  the  Estates-General,  together  to  relieve  the 
financial  peril  and  to  enact  general  reforms.  The  Estates- 
General,  which  was  transformed  after  six  weeks  into  the 
National  Assembly,  went,  however,  much  further  than 
Louis  expected.  The  nobles  and  clergy  were  dispossessed 
of  their  estates  and  ancient  privileges,  and  a  constitutional 
monarchy  was  proclaimed  which  was  founded  on  the  doc¬ 
trines  of  the  political  equality  of  all  men  and  the  right  of 
self-government.  The  promulgation  and  adoption  of  these 


39.  The 
Second  and 
Third  Parti¬ 
tions  of 
Poland 


40.  The 

French 

Revolution 


38 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


41.  Its  effect 
in  Germany 


doctrines  were  due  in  a  measure  to  the  influence  of  the 
American  Revolution ;  the  constitution  of  the  United 
States,  which  is  wholly  based  on  the  principle  of  popular 
sovereignty,  had  gone  into  effect  on  March  4,  1789.  As 
early  as  the  summer  of  1789  many  French  nobles  left  their 
homes  and  began  in  foreign  countries  to  plan  a  restoration 
of  the  former  absolute  monarchy.  Louis  XVI  and  his 
wife  Marie  Antoinette,  a  sister  of  Leopold  II  of  Austria, 
were  soon  suspected  of  intriguing  with  the  runaway  nobles 
and  with  foreign  rulers.  This  suspicion  and  the  opposi¬ 
tion  of  the  clergy  and  its  adherents  produced  two  bitterly 
hostile  factions  :  the  clerico-royalists  who  desired  a  revival 
of  the  old  regime,  and  the  constitutionalists  who  were 
rapidly  going  over  to  republicanism. 

The  effect  which  the  French  agitation  produced  in  the 
states  of  Germany  varied  greatly.  Many  leading  spirits, 
Klopstock,  Kant,  and  others,  greeted  the  outbreak  of  the 
Revolution  with  great  joy  and  hope,  but  their  enthusiasm 
was  quenched  by  the  rising  tide  of  opposition  to  the  mon¬ 
archy  and  by  the  bloody  excesses  of  the  Paris  mob.  Klop¬ 
stock  first  lauded  and  then  lamented  the  Revolution  ;  he 
is  said  to  have  dressed  in  mourning  when  Mirabeau,  the 
champion  of  popular  rights  and  of  the  French  monarchy, 
died.  In  the  better  regulated  German  states,  such  as 
Austria  and  Prussia,  the  French  Revolution  made  hardly 
any  impression  upon  the  common  people.  The  events  in 
France  did  stir  the  people  of  states  which  had  suffered  from 
oppressive  taxes  and  from  class  legislation,  and  the  loose 
bond  which  united  these  states  with  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire  could  not  restrain  the  joy  of  the  people  over  the 
triumph  of  the  Rights  of  Man.  Their  rulers  therefore 
became  fearful  for  their  thrones,  and  even  Austria  and 
Prussia  grew  anxious  to  preserve  the  French  monarchy. 


THE  DECLINE  OF  GERMANY 


39 


Austria  felt  an  additional  spur  to  intervention  from  the 
fact  that  a  daughter  of  the  Hapsburgs  was  the  wife  of  the 
Bourbon  king  of  France.  In  August  1791  Leopold  and 
Frederick  William  formally  declared  the  hope  that  other 
monarchs  would  soon  unite  with  them  to  restore  Louis  XVI 
to  all  his  rights  and  privileges ;  in  the  meantime  Austria 
and  Prussia  would  prepare  for  war.  France  replied  to  this 
intermeddling  with  the  demand  that  the  bands  of  intrigu¬ 
ing  French  nobles  in  Germany  be  dispersed  by  March  1, 
1792.  As  neither  Leopold  nor  his  son  and  successor, 
Francis  II  (1792-1835),  observed  the  French  ultimatum, 
France  declared  war  on  Austria  in  April.  Thus  began  the 
long  inevitable  conflict  between  the  new  order  of  things 
in  France  and  the  old  conservative  order  in  the  rest  of 
Europe. 

In  spite  of  the  turbulent  conditions  at  home,  France 
mustered  an  army  of  750,000  men,  and  when  the  Prussian 
generalissimo,  Duke  Charles  of  Brunswick,  threatened 
(July  1792)  the  utter  destruction  of  Paris  if  King  Louis 
suffered  the  least  violence,  French  honor  and  French  valor 
rallied  superbly  to  the  defense  of  the  insulted  nation.  The 
Prussian  army  advanced  within  one  hundred  miles  of  the 
French  capital,  but  there  the  French  blocked  them,  and 
disease,  hunger,  and  constant  rains  forced  them  to  retreat ; 
Goethe  took  part  in  this  campaign  and  retreat  with  Duke 
Carl  August  of  Saxe- Weimar  and  later  wrote  a  vivid  de¬ 
scription  of  it  under  the  title  The  Campaign  in  France 
in  After  the  Prussians  had  withdrawn,  the  French 

turned  against  the  Austrians  in  the  Austrian  Netherlands 
and  defeated  them  decisively.  Before  the  end  of  the  year 
the  French  had  carried  the  war  into  Germany  and  cap¬ 
tured  several  cities  along  the  Rhine,  including  Mainz,  which 
gladly  turned  from  its  incompetent  elector  and  opened  its 


42.  The 
campaign  in 
France  in  179a 


40 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


43.  The 
campaign  of 
1793,  the 
First  Coali¬ 
tion 


44.  The 
Peace  of 
Basel,  1795 


arms  to  the  liberty-loving  French.  The  campaign  of  1792 
was  a  colossal  blunder.  The  allies  made  no  lasting  con¬ 
quest,  and  the  duke  of  Brunswick’s  manifesto  only  has¬ 
tened  the  downfall  of  the  French  monarchy.  In  September 
1792  the  French  Convention,  which  had  taken  the  place  of 
the  National  and  Legislative  Assemblies,  declared  France 
a  republic. 

The  following  January  (1793)  Louis  XVI  was  con¬ 
demned  as  a  traitor  to  his  country  and  beheaded.  '  Eng¬ 
land  gave  the  French  minister  his  passports  immediately, 
and  on  February  1  France  declared  war  against  England 
and  Holland.  During  the  year  these  powers  were  joined 
in  the  so-called  First  Coalition  by  Spain,  Sardinia,  and 
almost  all  the  states  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  includ¬ 
ing  the  allies  of  1792,  Austria  and  Prussia.  Within  a  few 
months  the  Prussians  recaptured  Mainz  and  won  three 
battles,  and  the  Austrians  regained  their  hold  on  the 
Netherlands.  But  the  revolutionary  enthusiasm  of  the 
French  was  rising  higher  and  higher.  They  defeated 
the  English  and  Austrians  later  in  the  year  and  again 
forced  the  Prussians  to  retreat.  As  the  allies  were  further 
afflicted  by  dissension  among  themselves,  the  campaign 
of  1793  ended  wholly  to  the  advantage  of  the  French. 

In  the  spring  of  1794  Austria  achieved  further  suc¬ 
cesses  in  the  Netherlands,  but  the  French  occupied  Brussels 
in  July,  and  soon  after  they  held  the  whole  province  and 
a  part  of  Holland.  Francis  II  now  resolved  to  abandon 
the  Netherlands  and  look  for  compensation  in  a  final  par¬ 
tition  of  Poland.  The  Prussians  fought  successfully  in  the 
Rhine  country,  but  Frederick  William  was  very  much  more 
solicitous  about  his  share  of  Poland  than  he  was  about  the 
fate  of  the  lesser  states  of  Germany.  He  therefore  with¬ 
drew  across  the  Rhine,  leaving  nearly  the  whole  west  bank 


THE  DECLINE  OF  GERMANY 


41 


of  the  river  to  France,  and  began  secret  negotiations  with 
the  Republic.  These  negotiations  were  concluded  in  April 
1 79  5  by  the  Peace  of  Basel,  in  which  Prussia  ceded  to 
France  its  possessions  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Rhine  on 
condition  that  Prussia  should  be  compensated  on  the  east 
bank  when  F'rance  should  make  peace  with  the  Empire ; 
meanwhile  Prussia  should  remain  neutral.  Thus,  for  its 
own  personal  gain,  Prussia  broke  faith  with  Austria  and 
the  Empire  by  making  itself  an  inactive  ally  of  their  ene¬ 
mies.  Excepting  the  friendship  of  a  few  minor  states, 
Prussia  had  nothing  to  expect  but  bitter  resentment  from 
all  its  German  kin.  Two  decades  of  disreputable  isolation 
were  in  store  for  Prussia  before  it  regained  its  national 
honor. 

The  French  Republic  sent  three  armies  against  Austria 
and  the  Empire  in  1796.  Two  of  these  armies  invaded 
Germany  directly,  expecting  to  be  joined  in  Austria  by  the 
third,  which  was  to  enter  the  Empire  by  way  of  Italy.  The 
two  armies  in  Germany  accomplished  nothing.  Archduke 
Charles,  brother  of  Emperor  F'rancis,  first  drove  the  more 
northern  army  back  across  the  Rhine  in  the  spring,  and 
in  the  late  summer  he  prevented  the  juncture  of  its  rem¬ 
nants  with  two  armies  in  southern  Germany ;  he  then  put 
one  of  these  into  headlong  flight  across  the  Rhine  and 
nullified  the  efforts  of  the  other.  The  command  of  the 
French  army  in  Italy  was  given  to  Napoleon  Bonaparte, 
then  twenty-seven  years  old.  Napoleon  had  already  dis¬ 
tinguished  himself  in  F'rance  by  tactics  and  force  which 
he  had  shown  in  assisting  to  preserve  the  stability  of  the 
Republic,  but  he  was  soon  to  be  famous  all  over  Europe. 
He  entered  Milan  (May  1796)  hardly  a  month  after  the 
campaign  began,  captured  Verona,  and  laid  siege  to  Mantua, 
which  at  last  surrendered  in  January  1797,  leaving  him  in 


45.  The 
campaign  of 
1796,  in  Ger¬ 
many  and 
Italy 


42 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


46.  The 
Treaty  of 
Campo  For- 
mio,  1797 


47.  The 
campaign  of 
the  Second 
Coalition, 
1799-1800 


complete  control  of  northern  Italy.  In  the  following  spring 
Archduke  Charles  was  sent  against  Napoleon,  but  he  could 
not  check  the  onward  sweep  of  the  French.  Napoleon 
advanced  to  within  eighty  miles  of  Vienna.  At  this  point 
the  Austrian  commander  sued  for  a  truce,  which  was  fol¬ 
lowed  in  October  1797  by  the  Treaty  of  Campo  Formio. 

Austria  gave  up  by  this  treaty  a  large  part  of  its  pos¬ 
sessions  in  northern  Italy  and  ceded  its  former  holdings 
in  the  Netherlands  to  France.  In  the  first  draft  of  the 
agreement  the  integrity  of  the  German  Empire  was  guaran¬ 
teed.  At  Campo  Formio,  however,  Austria  secretly  agreed 
to  France’s  occupation  of  the  west  bank  of  the  Rhine,  pro¬ 
vided  that  Austria  receive  the  Archbishopric  of  Salzburg 
and  a  part  of  Bavaria,  and  provided  that  Prussia  obtain  no 
new  territory.  The  French  thereupon  occupied  nearly  all 
the  west  bank  of  the  Rhine  and  organized  their  new  pos¬ 
sessions  as  integral  parts  of  the  Republic.  The  smaller 
states  of  Germany,  terrified  enough  by  the  very  name  of 
France,  offered  of  course  no  resistance.  They  could  not 
dream  of  coping  with  France  in  their  own  might  and  they 
had  been  abandoned  to  their  fate  by  the  two  powers  from 
whom  they  might  have  expected  to  receive  support.  Prussia 
had  sacrificed  them  in  the  Peace  of  Basel  to  its  own  inter¬ 
ests,  and  for  similar  dynastic  reasons  Austria,  the  head  of 
the  Empire,  delivered  them  into  the  hands  of  the  national 
enemy  in  the  Treaty  of  Campo  Formio. 

While  Napoleon  was  invading  Egypt  in  1798  and  win¬ 
ning  new  triumphs  at  the  Battles  of  the  Pyramids  and  at 
Cairo,  the  struggle  against  France  was  continued,  or  re¬ 
sumed,  by  the  formation  of  the  Second  Coalition.  This 
group  of  allies  included  England,  Russia,  Austria,  Sicily, 
and  Turkey.  Prussia,  which  had  now  entered  upon  the 
long  eventful  reign  of  Frederick  William  III  (1797-1840), 


THE  DECLINE  OF  GERMANY 


43 


the  son  of  Frederick  William  II,  remained  true  to  the 
Peace  of  Basel.  Austria  defeated  the  French  in  South 
Germany  in  March  1 799,  and  Russia  and  Austria  together 
smothered  the  "  daughter  republics  ”  which  Napoleon  had 
created  in  northern  Italy,  but  discord  and  suspicion  arose 
among  the  allies,  and  the  Russian  troops  were  recalled. 
In  November  1 799  Napoleon  overthrew  the  existing  gov¬ 
ernment  of  France,  the  Directory,  and  forced  his  election 
as  First  Consul  of  the  Republic ;  his  power  now  was  more 
dictatorial  and  absolute  than  that  of  any  other  ruler  in 
Europe.  When  Austria  and  England  rejected  his  hollow 
offers  of  peace,  Napoleon  prepared  to  reconquer  northern 
Italy.  He  took  Milan  almost  without  a  struggle,  and  at 
Marengo  (June  1800),  with  the  aid  of  reenforcements,  he 
turned  a  defeat  into  victory.  North  Italy  was  again  under 
French  control.  Austria,  defeated  at  Marengo  and  defeated 
at  Hohenlinden  in  Bavaria  (December  1800)  by  another 
French  army,  could  carry  on  the  war  no  longer  and  agreed 
to  peace  in  its  own  name  and  in  that  of  the  German  Empire. 
The  Treaty  of  Luneville  followed  in  February  1801. 

While  confirming  in  general  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of 
Campo  Formio,  the  Treaty  of  Luneville  declared  further 
that  the  Rhine  should  form  the  boundary  between  France 
and  Germany — France  thus  obtained  twenty-eight  thou¬ 
sand  square  miles  of  German  territory  and  three  and  a 
half  million  German  inhabitants  —  and  that  hereditary 
princes  who  lost  territory  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Rhine 
should  receive  an  indemnity  within  the  Empire,  that  is,  to 
the  east  of  the  river.  The  only  land  "  within  the  Empire,” 
however,  which  did  not  belong  to  hereditary  rulers,  con¬ 
sisted  of  the  free  cities  and  the  estates  of  the  Church. 
This  was  the  indemnity  which  a  commission  of  German 
princes  seized  and  distributed  in  1803.  In  the  scramble 


48.  The 
Treaty  of 
Luneville, 
1801 


44 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


49.  The 
ultimate 
results  of  the 
Treaty  of 
LunSville 


for  inches  of  territory  all  the  dispossessed  princes  turned 
to  Paris  for  favor  and  aid  ;  it  is  said  that  some  caressed 
the  poodle  of  Napoleon’s  prime  minister  Talleyrand,  and 
others  played  "  Drop  the  handkerchief  ”  with  Talleyrand’s 
little  niece,  for  the  sake  of  an  additional  swamp  or  bit  of 
woodland.  Forty-five  of  the  fifty-one  free  cities  were  robbed 
of  their  independence  and  incorporated  in  various  states ; 
all  the  ecclesiastical  states  except  the  electorate  of  Mainz 
were  secularized,  that  is,  turned  over  to  lay  rulers.  One 
hundred  and  twelve  sovereign  and  independent  states  were 
disposed  of  east  of  the  Rhine,  while  nearly  one  hundred 
others  had  gone  to  France  when  the  French  seized  the 
west  bank  of  the  river.  Prussia  received  to  the  east  of  the 
Rhine  nearly  five  times  as  much  in  area  and  population  as 
it  had  lost  on  the  west,  but  Napoleon  was  zealous  in  build¬ 
ing  up  Bavaria,  W iirtemberg,  and  especially  Baden  as  buffer 
states  between  France  on  the  one  side  and  Austria  and 
Prussia  on  the  other.  The  electoral  dignity  was  conferred 
on  W iirtemberg,  Baden,  and  Hesse,  but  none  of  these 
states  ever  had  a  chance  to  vote  for  an  emperor  ;  Francis  II 
was  the  last  emperor  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire. 

The  lack  of  cohesion  among  the  states  of  the  Empire, 
the  lack  of  pride  and  even  of  consciousness  as  a  nation, 
simplified  the  process  of  reduction  immeasurably.  Each 
state  was  absorbed  in  its  own  affairs,  in  preserving  its 
borders  and  in  making  new  acquisitions  an  integral  part 
of  the  state.  The  wholesale  reduction  in  the  former  huge 
number  of  principalities  and  rulers  in  the  German  Empire 
smoothed  the  way  to  Napoleon’s  domination  of  Germany  ; 
this  was  of  course  the  original  impulse  to  the  move.  But 
the  final  effect  of  the  diminished  numbers  transcends  the 
limits  of  the  Napoleonic  era  by  many  years.  The  vast  im¬ 
portance  of  the  closer  consolidation  of  1803  lies  in  the 


THE  DECLINE  OF  GERMANY 


45 


fact  that  after  still  further  reduction  it  was  found  possible 
in  1870  and  1871  to  weld  the  new  German  Empire  out  of 
twenty-five  independent  states.  No  earthly  power  could 
have  consummated  this  with  the  three  hundred  and  eigh¬ 
teen  independent  German  states  of  the  eighteenth  century. 

The  common  people  of  the  individual  German  states 
showed  almost  complete  indifference  to  the  epoch-making 
political  changes.  The  eighteenth  century  had  given  the 
people  a  large  measure  of  peace  and  contentment  in  their 
social  life  ;  it  had  granted  them  liberty  to  develop  spiritually 
and  intellectually;  it  had  made  them  fairly  satisfied  with  the 
existing  order.  Enlightenment  and  participation  in  politi¬ 
cal  affairs,  which  the  eighteenth  century  had  not  generally 
bestowed,  the  people  did  not  sorely  miss  or  greatly  desire. 
Thus,  neither  the  French  Revolution  nor  the  sweeping 
changes  of  1803  caused  more  than  a  transitory  stirring  of 
popular  interest.  Philistine  and  philosopher  each  remained 
absorbed  in  his  handicraft  or  in  his  science.  Nor  was  his 
peace  of  mind  disturbed  by  any  literary  agitation.  The 
greatest  authors,  Goethe  and  Schiller,  had  been  caught  in 
a  current  of  classicism  or  of  idealistic  philosophy  which 
carried  them  away  for  a  time  from  life  and  people  about 
them.  The  Romantic  School,  which  arose  about  1800, 
deliberately  denied  contact  with  the  immediate  present  and 
began  a  study  of  the  German  past  which  could  bear  fruit 
only  after  a  lapse  of  time.  Some  of  the  greatest  works 
of  German  literature,  Schiller’s  master  dramas,  many  of 
Goethe’s  poems,  and  the  most  famous  writings  of  the 
Romantic  School,  were  produced  in  the  years  of  Germany’s 
swiftest  disintegration  (1797-1806),  but  with  few  excep¬ 
tions  these  works  lack  all  direct  connection  with  political 
events  of  the  years  in  which  they  arose. 


50.  Popular 
indifference 
to  political 
affairs 


CHAPTER  V 


51.  French 
aggressions 
in  Germany, 
and  the  rec¬ 
ognition  of 
Napoleon  as 
emperor 


THE  DEGRADATION  OF  GERMANY 

1801-1808 

Germany  remained  at  peace  with  France  from  1801  to 
1805,  but  German  resentment,  which  was  already  stirring 
against  French  influence  in  German  affairs,  was  quickened 
more  and  more  by  French  acts  of  aggression.  In  May 
1803  a  French  army  suddenly  attacked  and  occupied 
Hanover  because  France  was  at  war  with  England  and 
the  king  of  England  was  elector  of  Hanover.  England 
could  not  come  to  the  relief  of  Hanover,  as  its  troops  were 
needed  at  home  to  ward  off  the  invasion  which  threatened 
the  British  Isles  from  France,  and  the  German  Empire 
offered  no  resistance  to  the  foreigner,  though  Hanover  as 
a  state  of  the  Empire  was  at  peace  with  France.  France 
therefore  took  possession,  as  if  permanently,  of  one  of 
the  largest  North  German  states,  where  it  reaped  a  large 
revenue  and  occupied  an  important  strategic  position.  In 
March  1804  a  French  troop  invaded  Baden,  seized  the 
Bourbon  duke  of  Enghien  on  a  charge  of  conspiracy 
against  the  French  Republic,  and  took  him  to  Vincennes, 
where  he  was  shot  in  the  castle  ditch.  Excitement  and 
anger  rose  high  in  Germany  at  this  violation  of  inter¬ 
national  comity,  but  again  the  Empire  made  no  protest. 
Two  months  later,  in  May  1804,  Napoleon  was  declared 
hereditary  emperor  of  the  French,  and  December  2  he 
crowned  himself  in  the  Cathedral  of  Notre-Dame  in  Paris. 

46 


THE  DEGRADATION  OF  GERMANY 


47 


Prussia,  Bavaria,  Saxony,  and  other  states  of  Germany 
recognized  the  new  dignity  of  Napoleon  as  individual 
political  bodies,  not  as  states  of  the  German  Empire. 
Indeed,  the  utter  impotence  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire 
as  a  factor  in  European  politics  was  long  since  obvious, 
and  Francis  II,  who  was  the  last  of  the  more  important 
German  rulers  to  offer  felicitations  to  Napoleon,  had 
already  (August  1804)  half  renounced  the  Empire  by 
assuming  the  title  of  Emperor  of  Austria  as  Francis  I. 

The  reluctance  of  Francis  to  acknowledge  Napoleon’s 
imperial  dignity  grew  out  of  his  dissatisfaction  with  pro¬ 
visions  of  the  Treaty  of  Luneville  and  with  those  of  sub¬ 
sequent,  less  famous  conventions.  By  1805,  when  England 
and  Russia  were  uniting  against  Napoleon,  Francis  was 
glad  to  join  them  in  the  Third  Coalition.  Alexander  I  of 
Russia  went  to  Potsdam  to  win  over  Frederick  William 
too;  at  the  tomb  of  Frederick  the  Great  the  two  monarchs 
pledged  their  friendship  to  each  other ;  but  Frederick 
William  soon  hesitated  again  and  took  no  part  in  the  war. 
The  Austrian  army  of  50,000  men  which  entered  Bavaria 
to  check  Wtirtemberg  and  Baden,  friends  and  allies  of  the 
French,  was  outmaneuvered  and  surrounded  by  the  French 
200,000  strong  and  forced  to  surrender  in  October.  The 
French  now  marched  down  the  Danube  to  Vienna  and 
northward  from  the  capital  to  the  village  of  Austerlitz. 
There  the  decisive  "battle  of  the  three  emperors,”  Napo¬ 
leon  against  Francis  of  Austria  and  Alexander  of  Russia, 
was  fought  December  2.  The  allies  were  routed ;  in  the 
panic  of  flight  many  hundreds  of  the  fugitives  plunged  to 
their  death  in  the  icy  waters  of  a  lake.  Austria  never  forgot 
the  humiliation  of  the  treaty  which  followed  at  Pressburg 
(December  1805),  for  it  thereby  lost  twenty-eight  thousand 
square  miles  of  territory,  including  Venice  and  Tyrol,  and 

A  d 


52.  The 
campaign  of 
the  Third 
Coalition, 
1805 


48 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


53.  The 
Rhine  Con¬ 
federation 


54-  The  dis¬ 
solution  of 
the  Holy 
Roman  Em¬ 
pire,  1806 


three  million  inhabitants.  Francis  was  compelled  to  ac¬ 
knowledge  the  dukes  of  Bavaria  and  Wiirtemberg  as  kings. 
At  Pressburg,  or  soon  after,  all  Europe  was  forced  to  see 
and  permit  Napoleon’s  bestowal  of  a  kingdom  here  and  a 
duchy  there  upon  one  or  another  of  his  brothers  or  generals. 

In  minor  articles  of  the  Treaty  of  Pressburg  Napoleon 
had  favored  various  states  of  the  Empire  by  raising  them 
to  new  dignities  and  by  granting  them  additional  territory. 
A  few  months  later  the  time  was  ripe  for  severing  their 
connection  with  the  Empire  and  uniting  them  under  his 
protectorate  in  a  new  league;  Napoleon  purposed  to  coun¬ 
terbalance  in  this  way  the  influence  which  the  two  most 
conspicuous  German  states,  Austria  and  Prussia,  continued 
to  exert  in  German  affairs.  August  i,  1806,  Bavaria, 
Wurtemberg,  Baden,  and  thirteen  lesser  states  formally 
withdrew  from  the  Empire  on  the  ground  that  the  Empire 
no  longer  afforded  them  any  protection,  and  announced 
their  union  in  a  "  Confederation  of  the  Rhine.”  This  new 
little  Germany  was  afterwards  enlarged  by  the  admission 
of  other  German  states.  Completely  under  Napoleon’s 
domination,  this  French  Germany  served  him  as  a  power¬ 
ful  instrument  in  clinching  and  maintaining  his  hold  on 
the  affairs  of  German  people. 

An  ancient  institution  received  its  death-blow  when  the 
original  sixteen  states  of  the  Rhine  Confederation  withdrew 
from  the  Holy  Roman  Empire ;  it  was  a  gratuitous  fling 
on  the  part  of  Napoleon  when  he  declared  on  the  same 
day  that  he  no  longer  recognized  the  Empire’s  existence. 
Less  than  a  week  (August  6,  1806)  after  the  announce¬ 
ment  of  the  Rhine  Confederation,  Francis  II  abdicated  the 
imperial  office.  After  a  life  of  a  thousand  years,  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire,  the  Empire  founded  by  Charlemagne,  died 
an  unlamented  death  of  inanition. 


THE  DEGRADATION  OF  GERMANY 


49 


During  all  these  events  Prussia  had  observed  a  strict 
neutrality,  chiefly  because  Frederick  William  III  (born 
1770,  king  1797-1840)  was  not  the  man  to  take  ener¬ 
getic  action.  Though  beloved  of  his  people  for  his  sim¬ 
plicity  of  manner  and  for  his  goodness  of  heart,  he  was 
narrow-minded  and  shy  and  utterly  incapable  of  making 
a  decision.  He  never  rose  to  a  great  emergency  through 
his  own  strength.  In  calamity  he  was, sustained  by  the 
indomitable  courage  of  his  wife  Queen  Louise,  a  princess 
of  Mecklenburg ;  even  to-day  Queen  Louise,  the  most  at¬ 
tractive  feminine  figure  in  German  history,  is  an  idol  of 
the  German  people.  In  spite  of  the  wholesome  example  of 
family  life  in  the  royal  palace,  Berlin  and  the  court  circle 
were  still  permeated  by  the  sensuality  and  extravagance 
of  Frederick  William  II’s  reign.  The  reforms  in  finance 
and  education  which  Frederick  William  III  attempted  to 
establish  were  checked  by  a  lack  of  cohesion  among  dif¬ 
ferent  departments  of  state  and  by  the  lack  of  effective 
leadership.  The  army  of  1 30,000  men  was  a  splendid 
sight,  but  the  soldiers  had  been  cowed  by  brutal  discipline 
and  they  were  inexperienced  in  war.  The  leading  officers 
were  giandsires  who  in  many  cases  had  served  in  the  Seven 
Years’  War  forty  years  before  and  who  boasted  now  of 
victories  in  which  they  had  played  a  very  small  part. 

Frederick  William  had  been  very  much  irritated  in  1805 
by  an  unceremonious  march  of  French  troops  through 
Prussian  territory,  and  in  accordance  with  his  mental  habit 
he  had  very  nearly,  but  not  quite,  gone  over  to  the  allies. 
Directly  after  Austerlitz  Napoleon  offered  Hanover  to  him 
as  the  reward  of  an  alliance  with  France.  The  acceptance 
of  Hanover,  once  a  possession  of  the  king  of  England, 
meant  a  break  with  England,  but  Frederick  William  did 
not  have  the  courage  to  offend  Napoleon.  The  gift  was 


55.  Prussia 
in  1806 


56.  Napo¬ 
leon’s  isola¬ 
tion  of 
Prussia 


5o 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


accepted.  The  isolation  of  Prussia  from  all  its  natural 
friends  and  allies,  which  had  begun  with  the  Peace  of 
Basel,  was  now  complete ;  in  case  of  war  Prussia  could 
cherish  no  hope  of  securing  any  real  assistance.  Its  sub¬ 
missive  acceptance  of  Hanover  had  also  won  only  the  con¬ 
tempt  of  Napoleon.  In  the  very  next  summer  (1806)  he 
seized  scattered  western  possessions  of  Prussia  and  incor¬ 
porated  them  in  states  of  the  Rhine  Confederation.  At  the 
same  time  he  began  negotiations  with  England  concerning 
a  restitution  of  Hanover  to  its  former  ruler  as  if  he  had 
never  mentioned  Hanover  to  Frederick  William.  Napo¬ 
leon’s  obvious  purpose  was  to  humiliate  Prussia  in  the  eyes 
of  the  world  and  to  force  it  to  declare  war.  The  Prussian 
people  were  willing  for  war,  many  of  the  army  were  eager 
for  it.  Officers  whetted  their  swords  outside  the  French 
embassy  in  Berlin ;  soldiers  went  to  performances  of  Schil¬ 
ler’s  Wallenstein  and  joined  in  the  chorus,  "Up,  comrades, 
up!  to  horse,  to  horse!”  No  one  realized  Prussia’s  unfit¬ 
ness  to  offer  serious  resistance  to  Napoleon,  but  every  one 
knew  that  the  nation’s  wounded  pride  called  for  redress. 
57.  The  Early  in  the  autumn  Frederick  William  demanded  that 

jena, ^October  Napoleon  withdraw  his  troops  from  central  and  southern 
1806  Germany  where  they  had  been  recuperating  since  early 

spring.  Napoleon  quietly  mobilized  his  forces,  200,000 
strong,  at  Bamberg  and  marched  northward,  declaring  war 
October  7.  Prussia  formed  an  alliance  that  is  sometimes 
called  the  Fourth  Coalition,  but  it  consisted  only  of  Prussia, 
Saxony,  and  Saxe- Weimar.  Under  Duke  Charles  of 
Brunswick,  now  seventy-one  years  old,  1  50,000  men  gath¬ 
ered  together ;  half  encamped  at  Weimar  and  half  on 
the  high  plateau  back  of  Jena.  On  the  misty  morning  of 
October  14,  when  the  Prussians  had  no  idea  of  the  num¬ 
bers  facing  them  —  Frederick  William’s  sense  of  honor 


THE  DEGRADATION  OF  GERMANY  5 1 

would  not  permit  him  to  sanction  the  use  of  spies  —  the 
French  suddenly  began  an  attack  on  two  sides,  and  by 
four  o’clock  in  the  afternoon  sent  their  enemy  flying  in 
wild  confusion  toward  Weimar.  On  the  same  day  a  con¬ 
siderable  part  of  the  Prussian  army  was  fighting  a  French 
corps  at  Auerstadt,  twelve  miles  down  the  Saale  River 
from  Jena.  With  far  superior  numbers,  the  Prussians  at¬ 
tacked  slowly  and  at  random  ;  the  duke  of  Brunswick  fell 
mortally  wounded ;  and  General  Bliicher’s  gallant  cavalry 
charge  availed  nothing.  As  at  Jena  the  Prussians  fled 
madly.  In  a  single  day  the  Prussian  army  was  shattered. 
It  was  shattered  because  it  was  equipped  with  obsolete 
firearms,  because  it  was  poorly  fed,  and  because  it  was 
wretchedly  conducted.  Again  and  again  in  the  charges  at 
Jena  it  was  locally  outnumbered,  whereas  good  generalship 
could  and  would  have  presented  a  force  far  superior  to  that 
of  Napoleon.  The  new  order  could  not  have  triumphed 
more  signally  over  the  old  than  it  did  on  the  field  of 
Jena. 

While  the  Prussian  troops  scattered  over  the  north,  the 
French  marched  straight  to  Berlin.  Napoleon  entered  the 
capital  October  27  and  sent  the  chariot  of  triumph  from 
the  Brandenburg  Gate  and  Frederick  the  Great’s  sword  to 
Paris  as  trophies.  One  by  one  the  fortresses  in  Prussia 
continued  to  fall :  Spandau  without  a  shot,  Stettin  to  only 
800  French  cavalrymen,  Ciistrin  as  readily,  and  Magde¬ 
burg  with  24,000  men  and  an  abundance  of  provisions 
and  ammunition  to  a  F'rench  army  of  10,000  which  had 
no  siege  artillery.  Colberg  and  Graudenz  achieved  fame 
by  holding  out  through  countless  hardships  till  peace 
was  made ;  the  commandant  of  Graudenz  replied  to  the 
French  assertion  that  there  was  no  king  of  Prussia  any 
longer,  "  Well,  then,  I  am  King  of  Graudenz.”  Bliicher, 


58.  The  col¬ 
lapse  of 
Prussia 


52 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


59.  The 
Peace  of 
Tilsit,  1807 


one  of  the  last  of  all  the  Prussian  officers  to  yield,  was 
cornered  near  Liibeck,  where  he  fought  like  a  tiger ; 
he  wrung  permission  from  the  French  to  say  in  his  sur¬ 
render,  "  I  capitulate  because  I  have  no  bread  and  no 
ammunition  left.”  Frederick  William  and  Queen  Louise 
fled  to  Konigsberg,  where  they  were  destined  to  live  in 
semi-exile  until  the  end  of  1809. 

Napoleon  advanced  during  the  winter  to  Warsaw  and 
nearly  to  the  Russian  frontier.  In  the  spring  of  1807  Alex¬ 
ander  visited  Frederick  William  and  swore  that  neither  of 
them  should  fall  alone,  but  the  decisive  French  victory 
over  the  Russians  and  Prussians  at  Friedland  (June  1807) 
changed  his  mind.  Alexander  formed  an  alliance  with 
Napoleon  and  accepted  a  part  of  Prussian  Poland,  which 
Napoleon  pressed  upon  him  to  make  trouble  between  Alex¬ 
ander  and  Frederick  William.  Prussia  signed  the  Peace  of 
Tilsit  with  France  July  9.  In  spite  of  the  humiliating  per¬ 
sonal  petition  of  Queen  Louise,  Prussia  was  forced  to  cede 
half  its  territory  and  half  its  population.  All  that  lay  west 
of  the  river  Elbe,  including  Hanover,  and  all  of  Prussian 
Poland  were  given  up.  Napoleon  declared  that  he  left  the 
remaining  half  of  Prussia  to  Frederick  William  only  "  out 
of  consideration  for  his  ally  the  ruler  of  all  the  Russias,” 
though  his  real  purpose  was  to  have  a  buffer  state  between 
Russia  and  France.  A  large  part  of  Prussian  Poland  was 
transformed  into  the  grand-duchy  of  Warsaw  under  the 
elector  of  Saxony,  whom  Napoleon  made  a  king.  The 
French  soldiers  did  not  evacuate  Prussia  until  Novem¬ 
ber  1808,  and  in  the  meantime  they  had  extorted  over 
$100,000,000  from  their  helpless  victim.  Directly  after 
the  Peace  of  Tilsit  Napoleon  united  the  former  western 
possessions  of  Prussia  with  Hesse-Cassel  and  Brunswick, 
whose  rulers  he  had  dispossessed,  and  called  the  whole 


THE  DEGRADATION  OF  GERMANY 


53 


the  kingdom  of  Westphalia;  Napoleon’s  brother  Jerome 
was  made  king  of  this  new  realm  with  his  residence  at 
Cassel. 

Napoleon  was  now  in  complete  control  of  Germany. 
Austria  and  Prussia  had  been  crushed  and  virtually  all  of 
the  other  states  were  members  of  the  Rhine  Confedera¬ 
tion.  It  must  be  said  that  the  conditions  of  life  in  many 
states  of  the  Confederation  were  improved  during  the 
French  protectorate.  For  example,  the  Code  Napoleon 
with  its  superior  adjustment  of  civil  rights  was  introduced 
into  various  states,  where  it  was  used  in  a  modified  form 
for  many  years.  Even  to-day  Germans  in  the  Rhine  coun¬ 
try  cherish  the  name  of  the  Corsican,  perhaps  because  he 
made  their  ancestors’  duke  a  grand-duke,  or  because  he 
manifested  a  particular  interest  in  the  affairs  of  their  state. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  pride  of  many  Germans  was  galled 
by  their  subjection  to  one  who  had  come  from  abroad  as 
a  friend  and  who  stayed  as  a  tyrant ;  only  one  of  many 
instances  of  petty  tyranny  was  the  execution  of  Palm,  a 
Nuremberg  bookdealer,  for  publishing  and  disseminating 
a  pamphlet  entitled  Germany  in  its  Deep  Abasement.  In 
November  1806  Napoleon  had  issued  from  Berlin  a  decree 
declaring  the  British  Isles  in  a  state  of  blockade  and  forbid¬ 
ding  all  commerce  with  them.  The  aim  of  this  so-called 
"  Continental  System,”  to  ruin  English  commerce  by  clos¬ 
ing  European  ports  to  English  merchant  vessels,  was  not 
attained  ;  England  found  other  markets  for  its  wares.  The 
Continental  System  did,  however,  deprive  Germany  and 
neighboring  countries  of  many  of  the  comforts  and  neces¬ 
sities  of  life,  and  it  rapidly  intensified  feeling  against 
Napoleon  during  the  six  years  of  its  enforcement.  In 
September  and  October  1808  Napoleon  signalized  his 
control  over  Germany  by  presiding  with  great  pomp  and 


60.  Napo¬ 
leon  in  con¬ 
trol  of 
Germany 


54 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


display  over  a  congress  of  German  princes  at  Erfurt.  Here 
the  two  greatest  men  of  the  century  met  — Napoleon  and 
Goethe.  In  October  Napoleon  led  a  train  of  German 
princes  on  a  rabbit  hunt  over  the  battlefield  of  Jena. 
Though  prompted  to  this  act  by  fondness  for  startling  dis¬ 
play  rather  than  by  brutal  malice,  Napoleon  could  hardly 
have  expressed  with  more  stinging  point  his  absolute 
domination  of  Germany. 


CHAPTER  VI 


THE  REGENERATION  OF  GERMANY 

1808-1813 

The  regeneration  of  Germany  began  in  Prussia,  the 
state  which  had  fallen  lowest  and  suffered  most.  By  a 
stroke  of  rare  good  fortune  Frederick  William  could  com¬ 
mand  the  services  of  Baron  Stein,  the  greatest  German 
statesman  of  the  time,  and  in  October  1807  Frederick 
William  put  the  reorganization  of  Prussia  into  Stein’s 
hands.  Through  public  economy  and  through  the  sale  of 
royal  domains  Stein  assisted  in  satisfying  the  extortionate 
demands  of  the  French,  a  notable  work  in  itself.  A  series 
of  practical  reforms,  which  he  introduced,  laid  a  new  foun¬ 
dation  for  Prussian  public  life.  Stein  freed  the  peasant 
from  hereditary  subjection  to  a  landlord  and  gave  him  the 
possibility  of  earning  a  piece  of  land  of  his  own  as  well  as 
the  choice  of  his  employment ;  Stein  thus  liquidated  the 
last  vestige  of  serfdom  and  of  feudalism  in  Prussia.  By 
releasing  the  cities  from  their  former  Government  officials 
and  permitting  them,  with  a  few  restrictions,  to  govern 
.themselves,  Stein  liberated  urban  life  from  the  bureaucratic 
methods  of  the  eighteenth  century  and  began  the  education 
of  the  people  in  political  affairs.  Stein  thus  struck  the  most 
binding  fetters  of  Prussian  society  and  stirred  the  initiative 
and  the  development  of  the  free  self-conscious  will  of  his 
countrymen.  His  ultimate  goal  was  an  intelligent  harmoni¬ 
ous  cooperation  of  Government  and  people,  and  if  he  had 

55 


61.  Stein’s 
reforms  in 
the  Prussian 
state 


56 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


62.  Scharn- 
horst’s  re¬ 
forms  in  the 
army 


established  a  legislative  body  representative  of  the  whole 
kingdom,  as  he  desired  to  do,  he  would  have  made  Prussia 
even  then  a  constitutional  monarchy.  But  a  letter  from 
Stein  in  which  he  expressed  the  hope  of  a  speedy  uprising 
against  France  was  intercepted  by  French  agents ;  Napoleon 
pressed  his  dismissal,  and  in  November  1808  Frederick 
William  reluctantly  let  him  go.  Stein’s  immediate  suc¬ 
cessor  was  soon  followed  by  Hardenberg,  who  favored  and 
advanced  Stein’s  reforms. 

Stein’s  reorganization  of  the  state  was  paralleled  in  the 
army  by  the  work  of  Scharnhorst,  who  was  appointed  min¬ 
ister  of  war  in  1807.  Scharnhorst  abolished  flogging  and 
other  outlived  forms  of  discipline,  thus  raising  the  soldiers’ 
self-respect ;  he  also  provided  the  troops  with  modern  fire¬ 
arms  and  drilled  them  for  war  instead  of  for  parade.  Napo¬ 
leon  had  fixed  the  maximum  number  of  the  Prussian  army 
at  42,000 ;  but  while  the  number  remained  the  same, 
Scharnhorst  changed  the  individuals  from  time  to  time  and 
eventually  secured  a  military  force  nearly  four  times  as  large 
as  Napoleon’s  limit.  Those  who  had  been  drilled  constituted 
the  Landwehr ,  or  "national  defense,”  and  as  they  scattered 
among  the  whole  population,  they  strengthened  in  private 
life  the  martial  spirit  of  the  people  at  large.  Scharnhorst 
was  ably  assisted  by  his  officers,  especially  by  Bliicher, 
Gneisenau,  and  Yorck.  Gneisenau  excelled  in  planning 
campaigns  and  battles ;  Yorck,  a  man  of  great  natural 
reserve,  was  famous  for  his  resoluteness  and  tenacity ; 
Bliicher  was  the  man  of  action,  the  most  picturesque  fig¬ 
ure  of  the  time.  Bliicher  had  served  in  the  Seven  Years’ 
War,  still  under  twenty  years  of  age,  first  in  the  Swedish 
army  and  later  as  a  Prussian  soldier.  After  the  Battle  of 
Jena  he  was  stationed  in  Pomerania  ;  it  is  said  that  he  was 
seized  at  times  by  such  fury  at  the  insults  to  Prussia,  he 


THE  REGENERATION  OF  GERMANY 


57 


would  charge  at  the  flies  on  the  wall  with  his  drawn  sword, 
crying  "  Napoleon  !  ”  Uncouth  in  manners  and  speech,  at 
times  a  slave  to  gambling,  he  was  idolized  by  the  soldiers 
who  nicknamed  him  "  Marshal  Forward.” 

In  the  winter  of  1807-1808  in  the  Berlin  Academy, 
with  French  spies  in  his  audience  and  the  sound  of  French 
boots  and  drums  outside  on  Unter  den  Linden,  the  philoso¬ 
pher  Fichte  delivered  his  Addresses  to  the  German  Nation. 
With  far-reaching  eloquence  Fichte  extolled  love  of  country 
as  the  most  powerful  incentive  to  human  life  and  progress. 
He  denounced  the  plea  that  success  was  not  endangered  if 
one  man  did  not  participate  ;  to  the  contrary,  in  the  spirit 
of  Kant,  he  preached  a  gospel  of  individual  responsibility, 
stern  self-discipline,  and  unwavering  rational  morality.  The 
effect  of  Fichte’s  teachings  was  so  immediate  and  so  pro¬ 
found  throughout  Prussia  that  Napoleon  said  afterward  that 
he  was  defeated  by  "  German  ideologists,”  Fichte  and  his 
kind  ;  but  at  the  time  of  the  Addresses  Napoleon  did  not 
fear  "the  professor”  any  more  than  he  feared  Scharn- 
horst’s  constant  drilling.  Fichte’s  lectures  on  patriotism 
were  reenforced  by  performances  of  Schiller’s  Maid  of 
Orleans  and  William  Tell.  As  the  soldiers  were  stirred 
to  emulate  the  martial  spirit  of  Wallenstein,  the  whole 
kingdom  was  awakened  by  the  Maid  and  Tell  to  a  new 
love  of  country  and  to  a  new  sense  of  national  honor.  In 
1809  the  University  of  Berlin  was  established  and  in  the 
following  year  was  opened  to  over  four  hundred  students  ; 
here  in  the  Prussian  capital  young  men  of  intellect  and 
character  gathered  in  order  to  learn  at  first  hand  the  new 
spirit  of  the  time.  Also  in  Berlin  the  founder  of  gymnastic 
exercises  in  Germany,  "  Father  ”  Jahn,  gathered  young 
men  and  boys  about  him  to  develop  them  physically  for 
the  coming  struggle.  The  Tugendbund,  or  “  league  of 


63.  Other  re¬ 
generating 
forces  in 
Prussia 


58 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


64.  War  be¬ 
tween  Aus¬ 
tria  and 
France,  1809 


virtue,”  which  was  formed  in  Konigsberg  in  1808,  pur¬ 
posed  to  develop  German,  and  especially  Prussian,  intel¬ 
lectual  and  moral  strength,  but  all  its  members  knew  that 
its  ultimate  aim  was  a  triumph  over  Napoleon.  Its  life  was 
brief,  however,  as  the  French  exaggerated  its  influence,  and 
at  Napoleon’s  behest  it  was  formally  dissolved  by  Frederick 
William  in  1810.  In  addition  to  all  these  forces  in  Prussian 
life  there  was  also  that  of  the  fortunes  of  the  royal  family. 
Prussian  love  for  Frederick  William  and  Queen  Louise 
was  stung  to  the  quick  by  Napoleon’s  ridicule  of  the  royal 
pair  and  by  their  troubled  residence  in  Konigsberg.  The 
death  of  the  queen  in  1810,  after  a  long  and  painful  illness, 
was  like  a  call  to  arms.  But  it  was  not  until  three  years 
later  that  memory  of  her  played  its  part  in  the  liberation 
of  Prussia. 

Soon  after  the  Battle  of  Austerlitz  Austria  began  to  re¬ 
organize  and  enlarge  its  army,  and  by  1 808  it  could  muster 
500,000  well-trained  soldiers.  When  the  war  in  Spain  was 
going  against  Napoleon  in  1808,  hope  sprang  up  in  Austria 
and  all  Germany  that  here  too  he  might  be  defeated.  But 
Napoleon  regained  the  upper  hand  in  the  Spanish  Penin¬ 
sula,  and  Austria,  which  had  gone  too  far  to  evade  a  con¬ 
flict,  found  itself  alone  ;  Prussia  would  not  enter  a  coalition 
without  Russia,  and  the  Rhine  Confederation  was  faithful 
to  its  "  Protector.”  Nevertheless,  inspired  by  the  patriotism 
of  the  people,  the  Austrian  Government  did  not  hesitate  to 
declare  war  (April  1809) ;  the  thrilling  orders  to  the  army 
were  perhaps  written  by  the  poet  Friedrich  Schlegel. 
The  archduke  Charles  advanced  into  Bavaria,  but  he  moved 
slowly  and  gave  Napoleon  time  to  return  from  Spain  and 
gather  fresh  forces.  In  five  days  Napoleon  won  four  en¬ 
gagements  near  Ratisbon  —  he  referred  to  these  actions 
later  as  the  greatest  achievements  of  his  life — and  entered 


THE  REGENERATION  OF  GERMANY 


59 


Vienna  in  less  than  a  month  after  war  was  declared.  An¬ 
other  Austrian  army,  however,  approached  from  Italy  and 
administered  to  Napoleon  at  Aspern,  not  far  from  Vienna, 
the  first  complete  defeat  he  experienced.  All  Germany 
exulted  over  the  victory,  but  not  for  long,  as  Napoleon 
evened  the  score  at  Wagram  (July  1809).  When  Austria 
could  still  find  no  allies,  it  gave  up  and  signed  the  Treaty 
of  Vienna,  whereby  it  sacrificed  all  its  possessions  on  the 
Adriatic  and  all  of  Galicia.  Austria  had  now  been  beaten 
by  Napoleon  for  the  fourth  time.  Its  reforms  had  not 
availed  in  a  crisis,  and  under  the  guidance  of  Metternich, 
a  figure  of  tremendous  importance  in  later  years,  Austria 
swung  back  into  the  ruts  of  conservatism.  When  Napoleon 
was  married  (April  1810)  to  Marie  Louise,  daughter  of  the 
emperor  of  Austria  and  grand-niece  of  Marie  Antoinette, 
peace  seemed  to  be  guaranteed  on  the  Continent  indefi¬ 
nitely.  Viewing  the  marriage  in  this  light,  the  patriots  of 
Germany  saw  their  dream  of  freedom  vanish  overnight. 

The  courageous  stand  which  the  Tyrolese  mountaineers 
made  against  the  French  in  1809  was  a  part  of  the  war 
between  Austria  and  France.  Tyrol  had  been  a  possession 
of  Austria  for  hundreds  of  years,  but  it  had  been  ceded  to 
Bavaria  in  1805.  Ever  since  that  time  the  Tyrolese  had 
been  chafing  under  the  forced  allegiance  to  an  unwelcome 
ruler,  and  under  military  conscription  and  other  innovations 
which  had  come  to  them  from  France  by  way  of  Bavaria. 
All  through  the  spring  and  summer  of  1809,  even  after 
Austria  had  been  forced  to  a  truce,  the  Tyrolese  fought 
on  for  the  right  to  resume  the  old  bonds  with  Austria. 
Andreas  Hofer  and  his  associates  in  command,  former 
innkeepers,  hunters,  shepherds,  and  priests,  led  as  plucky 
a  fight  as  the  world  has  ever  seen.  But  finally,  when  Aus¬ 
tria  had  signed  the  Treaty  of  Vienna,  which  left  Tyrol  to 


65.  Insur¬ 
rections 
against 
Napoleon  in 
Tyrol  and  in 
North 
Germany 


66.  Discon¬ 
tent  in  the 
states  of  the 
Rhine  Con¬ 
federation 


6o  GERMANY  SINCE  1740 

Bavaria,  Napoleon  sent  a  host  of  50,000  up  into  the  moun¬ 
tains  and  overwhelmed  Hofer’s  handful  of  men.  Hofer 
was  captured  and  shot,  a  prisoner  of  war,  in  the  fortifica¬ 
tions  of  Mantua  in  February  1810.  Tyrol  was  at  peace. 
In  North  Germany  an  insurrection  was  started  in  1809 
against  the  kingdom  of  Westphalia ;  Major  Schill  also 
marched  out  from  Berlin  with  a  few  hundred  men,  ex¬ 
pecting  to  stir  up  all  North  Germany  against  the  French  ; 
another  troop,  not  much  larger  than  Schill’s,  fought  desper¬ 
ately  with  French  soldiers  in  the  neighborhood  of  Bruns¬ 
wick.  But  all  these  enterprises  were  as  futile  as  the  struggle 
of  the  Tyrolese.  Schill  fell  in  a  hand-to-hand  fight  in 
Stralsund,  and  the  Brunswick  troop  was  forced  to  flee 
from  Germany. 

Meanwhile  discontent  was  brewing  in  the  Rhine  Confed¬ 
eration.  Many  members  of  the  union  complained  bitterly 
of  broken  French  promises  or  of  petty  French  tyrannies. 
Bavaria  under  a  generous  king  and  an  able  prime  minister 
had  shaken  off  many  of  the  evils  of  its  past ;  reforms  in 
the  administration  of  justice  and  in  the  common  law  had 
been  attended  by  a  determined  effort  to  subordinate  the 
church  to  the  state.  But  in  the  war  against  Austria,  Bavaria 
had  borne  the  brunt  of  the  campaign  and  had  not  received 
a  satisfying  compensation.  In  Baden  a  wise  and  gentle 
absolutism  had  improved  conditions  in  church  and  school, 
but  it  was  constantly  hampered  by  French  interference. 
Wiirtemberg  had  reverted  to  the  unenlightened  despotism 
from  which  it  had  suffered  in  the  eighteenth  century ;  its 
people  feared  their  king  as  an  enemy  of  the  state.  All 
these  and  other  members  of  the  Rhine  Confederation 
complained  of  higher  and  higher  taxes  for  French  wars, 
of  severer  conscription,  of  rigid  censorship,  and,  worst  of 
all,  of  the  Continental  System.  Napoleon  was  moreover 


THE  REGENERATION  OF  GERMANY 


6 1 


altering  boundaries  of  countries  with  bewildering  sudden¬ 
ness  and  frequency  and  converting  into  French  possessions 
more  and  more  of  Germany,  for  example,  Frankfort-on-the- 
Main  and  the  duchy  of  Oldenburg.  The  years  1810  and 
1 8 1 1  were  barren  of  open  struggles  against  the  French, 
but  German  people,  and,  foremost  among  them,  those  in 
Prussia,  were  advancing  to  a  day  of  reckoning. 

The  waning  of  the  friendship  between  France  and  Rus¬ 
sia  was  to  lead  indirectly  to  the  conflict.  Alexander  grad¬ 
ually  saw  that  Napoleon  would  never  consent  to  Russia’s 
designs  on  Turkey  ;  he  resented  the  dethronement  of  his 
relative,  the  duke  of  Oldenburg ;  he  was  embittered  by 
Napoleon’s  slighting  of  his  sister  in  favor  of  Marie  Louise  ; 
and,  more  intensely  than  anything  else,  he  felt  for  his 
country  the  hardships  and  the  obstacles  of  the  Continental 
System.  War  between  the  two  emperors  was  inevitable. 
The  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  was  of  course  with  Napo¬ 
leon  ;  it  did  not  dare  to  withhold  its  aid.  And  Metternich 
ranged  Austria  and  30,000  soldiers  on  the  side  of  France. 
In  Prussia  the  patriotic  party  hoped  long  for  an  alliance 
with  Russia,  but  the  Government  yielded  to  Napoleon’s 
demands ;  Prussia  must  furnish  him  20,000  soldiers  and 
support  the  French  army  on  its  march  through  Prussian 
territory. 

Early  in  June  1812  Napoleon  mustered  his  "Grand 
Army  ’’  of  half  a  million  men  in  East  Prussia  and  crossed 
the  boundary  into  Russia.  For  months  the  enemy  could  not 
be  brought  to  a  stand.  They  simply  retreated  and  drew 
Napoleon  farther  and  farther  into  their  devastated  country, 
where  he  lost  tens  of  thousands  through  heat,  starvation, 
and  disease.  It  was  September  7  before  the  Russians  gave 
battle  at  Borodino.  The  French  won,  though  at  a  cost  of 
28,000  men,  and  Napoleon  entered  Moscow  a  week  later. 


67.  The 
approach  of 
war  between 
France  and 
Russia 


68.  Napole¬ 
on’s  cam¬ 
paign  in 
Russia,  1812 


62 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


69.  The 
"treason  ” 
of  Yorck 


But  he  found  a  capital  burning  to  ashes  at  the  hands  of  its 
own  citizens.  When  he  had  vainly  waited  a  month  for 
Alexander’s  reply  to  his  proposals  of  peace,  he  was  forced 
by  the  condition  of  his  army,  the  scarcity  of  supplies,  and 
the  approach  of  winter  to  begin  the  most  calamitous  retreat 
ever  known.  Starving  and  harassed  by  the  Russian  army 
along  the  way,  the  hundred  thousand  able-bodied  men  who 
left  Moscow  dwindled  in  twenty-three  days  to  30,000 ; 
20,000  of  these  were  lost  in  crossing  the  river  Beresina 
(November  26-29,  1 8 1 2),  partly  through  their  own  disorder 
and  confusion,  partly  through  the  attacks  of  the  Russian 
troops.  It  is  said  that  of  the  Grand  Army  125,000  men 
were  lost  in  battle;  132,000  died  on  the  march;  and 
190,000  were  captured  by  the  Russians.  Only  1200  men 
entered  Germany  in  military  order.  After  the  disaster 
at  the  Beresina,  Napoleon  deserted  the  remnant  of  his 
army  and  under  an  assumed  name  drove  at  full  speed,  via 
Warsaw  and  Dresden  (December  13),  back  to  Paris. 

During  all  these  months  the  Prussian  contingent  under 
Yorck  had  taken  very  little  part  in  the  campaign,  and 
Yorck  was  frequently  urged  by  the  Russians  to  desert 
Napoleon  and  join  them.  On  the  retreat  from  Russia 
Yorck  allowed  his  men  to  be  surrounded  by  the  Russians. 
He  then  broke  his  allegiance  to  Napoleon  and  made  a 
convention  with  the  Russians  (Tauroggen,  December  30, 
1812),  whereby  he  and  his  men  were  to  be  neutral  until 
the  king  should  accept  or  reject  the  convention.  Frederick 
William  again  yielded  to  French  influence  and  formally 
dismissed  Yorck  for  treason,  but  the  Russians  prevented 
the  delivery  of  the  official  notification  of  dismissal.  The 
treason  of  Yorck  and  his  men  remained  an  accomplished 
fact.  German  patriots  everywhere  heard  the  news  of  the 
bold  deed  with  delight,  for  they  knew  that  Yorck  and  his 


THE  REGENERATION  OF  GERMANY  63 


men  had  struck  a  first  blow  for  the  liberation  of  Germany. 
The  messenger  who  brought  the  notification  of  Yorck’s 
dismissal  continued  to  Petrograd  on  the  second  part  of 
his  mission,  which  was  to  offer  Alexander  an  alliance  with 
Prussia  as  soon  as  he  should  cross  the  Vistula. 

Toward  the  end  of  December  1812  the  news  of  the 
collapse  of  the  Grand  Army  began  to  spread  all  over  Ger¬ 
many.  Napoleon  was  no  longer  invincible.  Germany’s 
opportunity  had  come.  Frederick  William  still  felt  bound 
by  his  treaty  with  France,  but  even  he  could  not  check  the 
tide  of  resolute  patriotism  that  swept  over  Prussia.  Baron 
Stein  returned  from  his  exile  in  Russia  eager  to  hasten 
the  certain  uprising  of  the  people  and  eager  to  give  it  a 
German  character,  a  stamp  of  German  nationality  ;  for  he 
saw  that  the  independence  not  of  Prussia  alone  but  of 
all  Germany  might  now  be  restored.  In  January  1813 
Frederick  William  fled  from  the  French  pressure  in  Ber¬ 
lin  and  went  to  Breslau  where  he  would  be  nearer  Russia 
and  Austria.  Events  of  great  import  followed  thick  and 
fast.  On  February  3  there  appeared,  over  Hardenberg’s 
name  but  really  from  the  king,  a  proclamation  declaring 
the  state  in  danger  and  calling  for  a  volunteer  corps  of 
chasseurs.  The  former  friendship  and  alliance  between 
Alexander  and  Frederick  William  was  renewed  at  Kalisz 
on  February  28.  Ten  days  later,  on  Queen  Louise’s  birth¬ 
day,  Frederick  William  founded  the  Order  of  the  Iron 
Cross  as  an  incentive  to  acts  of  bravery.  Prussia  declared 
war  on  France  March  16.  And  the  very  next  day  Frederick 
William  issued  his  most  famous  proclamation :  To  My 
People.  In  this  epoch-making  document  he  called  upon  his 
subjects  in  all  his  provinces,  the  people  of  Brandenburg, 
Prussia,  Silesia,  and  Pomerania,  to  remember  the  heroism 
of  the  Tyrolese  and  to  prepare  for  a  last  decisive  struggle 


70.  Frederick 
William  calls 
Prussia  to 
arms,  Feb¬ 
ruary  1813 


64 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


71.  The 
response  of 
the  Prussian 
people 


72.  The  part 
of  Prussia  in 
the  War  of 
Liberation 


for  their  existence,  independence,  and  prosperity.  Fred¬ 
erick  William  further  gave  permission  for  the  formation 
of  volunteer  corps  which  might  include  non-Prussians.  In 
a  proclamation  of  March  25  the  note  was  loudly  sounded 
that  the  restoration  of  a  constitution  for  all  Germany,  of 
free  untrammeled  life  and  spirit,  was  the  issue ;  German 
princes  who  refused  their  support  were  to  be  crushed  by 
public  opinion  and,  if  necessary,  subjected  by  arms. 

Frederick  William  did  not  appeal  to  his  people  in  vain. 
Out  of  a  population  of  five  millions  there  came  forth  an 
army  of  271,000,  or  one  out  of  eighteen.  Nine  thousand 
volunteers  were  enrolled  in  Berlin  in  three  days.  Offices 
were  deserted  ;  universities  closed  their  doors ;  as  Arndt 
says,  "  Mere  boys  left  their  schools  eager  to  bear  arms  and 
reciting  hymns  of  Tyrtaeus  and  verses  from  Klopstock’s 
Hermann  s  Battle .”  From  the  rich  and  poor  there  poured 
forth  a  flood  of  contributions  to  the  funds  of  war.  Precious 
heirlooms  were  sold  to  raise  money ;  women  contributed 
their  gold  wedding  rings  ;  it  was  later  considered  a  dis¬ 
grace  if  a  family  still  owned  any  silverware.  To  the  people 
at  large  it  was  a  holy  war,  a  crusade,  and  in  this  spirit  it 
was  sung  by  poets  of  the  time :  by  Theodor  Korner,  a 
member  of  Lutzow’s  volunteer  "  free  corps,”  who  found 
his  death  (August  1813)  on  the  battlefield  at  the  age  of 
twenty-two ;  by  Arndt,  a  rugged  fire-eater  already  well 
seasoned  by  a  strenuous  life  ;  and  by  Schenkendorf,  who 
fought  through  the  war  with  only  one  arm.  The  volume, 
intensity,  and  thrilling  power  of  the  war-songs  of  this 
period  in  German  history  have  never  been  surpassed  by 
any  nation. 

Korner  sang  truly,  "  In  the  north  breaks  the  dawn  of 
freedom.”  Many  young  men  like  Korner  himself  went 
from  other  states  of  Germany  to  be  enrolled  in  Prussian 


THE  REGENERATION  OF  GERMANY  65 


volunteer  corps ;  Stein  too  was  not  a  Prussian  by  birth, 
nor  was  Scharnhorst  or  Blucher  or  Gneisenau  or  P'ichte. 
Through  the  cooperation  of  thousands  of  individuals  from 
other  states  the  uprising  assumed  a  national  character,  but 
hardly  a  German  state  except  Prussia  was  ready  to  throw 
down  the  gauntlet  to  Napoleon.  The  rulers  of  other  states 
were  still  bound  to  him  in  fear  or  in  favor ;  some  of  them 
had  to  be  dragged  into  the  war ;  and  the  patient  masses 
were  willing  to  await  a  sign  from  their  rulers  or  a  sign 
from  heaven  in  the  shape  of  a  Prussian  victory.  From 
Prussia  came  the  initiative  to  the  war  and  the  enterprise ; 
thence  came  the  first  German  sinews  of  the  war.  The 
spirit  and  the  tone  of  the  actual  conflict  of  1813  were  like¬ 
wise  Prussian  to  the  core.  Consciously  or  unconsciously 
these  Germans  were  impelled  by  Kant’s  gospel  of  moral 
duty.  Each  of  them  owed  it  to  his  country  and  to  him¬ 
self  to  right  the  wrong  of  bondage  to  a  foreigner.  When 
toward  the  end  of  the  war  the  states  of  the  Rhine  Con¬ 
federation  allied  themselves  with  Prussia,  the  hour  of 
Napoleon’s  overthrow  had  already  struck.  Prussia  had 
already  borne  the  chief  strain  and  stress  of  the  conflict. 
To  Prussia  therefore  belongs  of  right  the  chief  honor 
and  glory  of  the  German  War  of  Liberation. 


CHAPTER  VII 


73.  The 
beginnings  of 
the  war 


THE  WAR  OF  LIBERATION 

1813-1815 

The  German  struggle  for  liberty  began  in  March  1813 
with  a  series  of  conflicts  between  Russians  and  French  for 
the  possession  of  Hamburg.  The  city  was  regained  for 
Germany,  though  only  for  a  few  weeks,  and  during  that 
time  the  allies  made  no  attempt  to  break  up  the  kingdom 
of  Westphalia  and,  by  pushing  the  war  on  to  the  Rhine,  to 
intimidate  and  shatter  the  Rhine  Confederation.  Instead, 
they  moved  leisurely  from  Silesia  into  Saxony,  taking  the 
capital  Dresden  on  April  22,  for  King  Frederick  Augustus 
of  Saxony,  like  other  princes  of  the  Rhine  Confederation, 
had  remained  true  to  Napoleon.  In  the  meantime  the 
French  Senate  had  voted  a  new  conscription  of  350,000 
men,  and  by  the  middle  of  April  Napoleon  was  in  the 
heart  of  Germany  with  a  considerable  part  of  these  troops. 
On  May  2  the  allies,  with  96,000  men,  attacked  him  at 
Fiitzen,  when  he  was  leading  1 20,000  men  to  Leipsic.  It 
was  a  stubborn,  bloody  fight  on  both  sides,  ending  with¬ 
out  a  decisive  result.  But  Alexander  persuaded  Frederick 
William  not  to  resume  the  attack  as  planned  but  to  retreat. 
The  moral  weight  of  a  first  victory  was  thus  given  to  Napo¬ 
leon  ;  his  renown,  which  entailed  the  continued  loyalty  of 
the  Rhine  Confederation,  again  seemed  secure  through¬ 
out  Europe.  Napoleon  now  proceeded  to  Dresden,  which 
he  took  and  made  his  headquarters  without  opposition 

66 


THE  WAR  OF  LIBERATION 


67 


from  the  allies.  On  May  20  and  21,  with  a  large  advan¬ 
tage  in  numbers,  he  won  a  fierce  battle  at  Bautzen  from  an 
army  of  Prussians  and  Russians.  Napoleon’s  losses  both  at 
Liitzen  and  at  Bautzen  had  been  very  heavy,  however,  while 
the  persistent  valor  of  the  allies,  especially  of  the  Prussians, 
had  strengthened  their  prestige  and  their  numbers. 

Early  in  June  Napoleon  sought  and  gained  a  truce  in 
order  to  have  a  chance  to  win  new  allies.  His  attempt 
with  Russia  failed.  Austria  was  more  favorably  disposed. 
The  patriotic  enthusiasm  of  Austria  in  1809  was  dead, 
and  Francis  I,  Napoleon’s  father-in-law  and  a  genuine 
Hapsburg  in  his  unchangeable  loyalty  to  the  theory  of 
absolute  monarchy,  quailed  before  the  power  of  the  masses 
which  had  already  been  displayed  in  Prussia.  Metternich 
desired,  however,  to  use  Austria’s  neutrality  as  a  lever  for 
the  gain  of  his  country.  Austria,  therefore,  as  a  mediator, 
asked  that  Napoleon  restore  a  large  part  of  the  conquests 
which  he  had  made  in  Germany  since  1806.  Napoleon 
dared  not  show  any  weakness  by  making  concessions,  and 
repulsed  the  proposal.  A  later  conference  between  Napoleon 
and  Metternich  proved  just  as  fruitless,  and  two  days  after 
(August  12)  Austria  declared  war  on  France.  As  long  as 
the  truce  had  continued,  a  great  fear  had  oppressed  the 
people  of  Germany  lest  too  lenient  terms  be  offered  to 
Napoleon  and  his  acceptance  of  them  only  half  relax  his 
grip  on  Germany.  In  the  night  of  the  tenth  and  eleventh 
of  August  the  light  of  bonfires  on  the  mountain  tops 
blazed  the  good  tidings  over  the  Riesengebirge  down  to  the 
soldiers  in  Silesia.  Negotiations  were  past,  Austria  was  won 
over,  and  war  was  to  begin  again.  A  great  wave  of  relief 
and  joy  rolled  through  the  allies’  camps  in  that  memorable 
night,  and  German  patriots  everywhere  were  thrilled  with 
new  confidence  and  resolution. 


74.  Napoleon 
tries  to  win 
allies 


68 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


75.  The  Fifth 
Coalition  and 
its  plan  of 
action 


76.  The 
Battle  of 
Grossbeeren, 
August  23, 
1813 


The  Battle 
on  the  Katz- 
bach, 

August  26, 
1813 


The  Fifth  Coalition  consisted  chiefly  of  Russia,  Prussia, 
and  Austria ;  the  Swedish  contingent  and  the  part  which 
it  played  in  the  war  were  relatively  small,  and  the  troops 
which  England  sent  against  the  French  fought  almost 
exclusively  in  Spain  under  Wellington.  The  allies  in 
Germany  divided  their  forces  into  the  Army  of  the 
North,  150,000  strong,  under  Bernadotte,  Crown  Prince 
of  Sweden  ;  the  Army  of  Silesia,  99,000,  under  Bliicher ; 
and  the  Army  of  Bohemia,  220,000,  under  the  three  mon- 
archs  with  the  Austrian  Schwarzenberg  as  commander- 
in-chief.  This  armed  host  of  469,000  formed  a  great 
semicircle  around  Napoleon’s  336,000  at  Dresden.  Ac¬ 
cording  to  the  original  plan,  the  Army  of  Bohemia  was 
to  march  on  Dresden  from  the  south  and  the  other  armies 
were  to  close  in ;  if  Napoleon,  however,  should  make  the 
first  move  against  one  or  another  of  the  armies,  the  other 
two  were  to  attack  his  rear. 

Napoleon  first  sent  a  large  force  against  the  Army  of 
the  North  with  the  purpose  of  capturing  the  Prussian  capi¬ 
tal.  Bernadotte,  as  usual,  was  timid  and  dilatory,  but  Biilow 
and  his  Prussians,  a  part  of  Bernadotte’s  army,  forced  the 
issue  and  saved  Berlin  by  defeating  the  French  and  turn¬ 
ing  them  back  at  Grossbeeren,  a  Berlin  suburb ;  in  this 
fight  the  Landwehr,  Scharnhorst’s  creation,  first  proved 
its  sterling  worth  to  the  nation.  A  few  days  after  Gross¬ 
beeren  the  Prussians  were  again  victorious  not  far  from 
Magdeburg.  But  the  greatest  glory  of  these  early  engage¬ 
ments  was  won  by  the  Army  of  Silesia  under  "  Marshal 
Forward  ”  at  the  Battle  on  the  Katzbach  (August  26),  be¬ 
tween  Dresden  and  Breslau.  There,  near  the  junction  of 
two  swollen  streams,  the  Katzbach  and  the  "  raging  Neisse,” 
amid  torrents  of  rain,  Bliicher  and  his  Prussians  and  Rus¬ 
sians  threw  themselves  on  the  French  with  crushing  force. 


THE  WAR  OF  LIBERATION 


69 


In  a  fierce  hand-to-hand  fight  with  swords,  bayonets,  and 
musket  butts,  the  French  were  hurled  back  from  a  plateau 
down  into  the  roaring  streams.  Many  were  drowned,  many 
others  were  trampled  to  death  in  the  mud,  and  no  less 
than  18,000  prisoners  were  taken  by  the  allies. 

The  very  same  day,  however,  the  Army  of  Bohemia 
had  attacked  Dresden,  and  on  the  twenty-seventh  it  was 
pushed  back  into  the  mountains  to  the  south  with  a  loss 
of  30,000  men.  The  allies’  confidence  in  themselves  was 
shaken  by  this  blow,  but  a  French  corps  in  pursuit  of 
them  was  surrounded  and  wiped  out  through  the  bravery 
of  General  Kleist  and  his  men,  and  a  few  days  later  (Sep¬ 
tember  6)  Billow  and  the  Landwehr  again  defeated  the 
French,  at  Dennewitz,  forty  miles  south  of  Berlin,  with 
odds  of  three  to  two  against  them.  Napoleon  was  losing 
command  of  the  situation,  and  the  record  of  his  engage¬ 
ments  threatened  ruin  to  him.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
allies’  score  of  five  victories  and  one  defeat  strengthened 
the  morale  of  their  armies  immeasurably ;  it  made  the 
partisans  of  the  allies  still  more  eager  for  Napoleon’s  fall ; 
and  at  the  same  time  it  was  rapidly  undermining  the  con¬ 
fidence  and  loyalty  of  Napoleon’s  supporters,  especially  of 
the  Germans  from  the  states  of  the  Rhine  Confederation. 
On  October  7  Bavaria  deserted  him. 

In  the  early  days  of  October  1813  the  allies  began  to 
close  in  around  Dresden,  and  Napoleon  saw  the  imminent 
danger  of  being  cut  off  from  France  by  a  far  larger  force. 
He  therefore  retired  toward  Leipsic,  where  he  hoped  to 
meet  and  repulse  once  more  the  Army  of  Bohemia,  though 
he  knew  that  Bernadotte  and  Bliicher  were  not  far  away. 
There  gathered  now  about  Leipsic  a  host  never  equalled 
before  that  time  :  on  Napoleon’s  side  French,  Portuguese, 
Spaniards,  Italians,  and  Germans  from  the  Confederation 


77.  The 
effect  of  the 
allies’  vic¬ 
tories 


78.  The 
armies 
gather  about 
Leipsic 


7o 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


79.  The 
Battle  of 
Leipsic, 
October  16-19, 
1813.  The 
first  and 
second  days 


80.  The  third 
and  fourth 
days 


of  the  Rhine,  about  180,000  in  all,  against  300,000  Prus¬ 
sians,  Austrians,  other  Germans,  and  Russians,  besides 
Cossacks  and  Calmucks,  Swedes  and  Magyars.  The 
Germans  call  the  battle  the  Volkerschlacht,  or  "  Battle 
of  the  Nations.” 

The  conflict  began  October  16,  a  Saturday.  With  an 
advantage  of  100,000  to  60,000  —  other  troops  not  hav¬ 
ing  arrived  or  being  held  in  reserve  —  Napoleon  attacked 
the  allies,  Russians,  Prussians,  and  Austrians,  on  the  south 
of  the  city ;  but  his  enemy  fought  stubbornly,  and  as  Na¬ 
poleon’s  expected  reenforcements  failed  him,  the  result 
was  a  draw.  These  reenforcements  were  held  in  check  by 
Yorck,  and  by  the  end  of  the  day  they  were  vanquished. 
Thus  the  first  day  ended  with  one  defeat  and  without  any 
victory  for  Napoleon.  The  next  day,  Sunday,  was  quiet. 
The  allies  were  bringing  on  more  and  more  troops,  and 
Bliicher  came  close  to  Leipsic  on  the  northeast,  but  there 
was  no  battle.  Napoleon  tried  to  draw  Austria  away  from 
the  allies,  even  offering  to  accept  the  conditions  which  he 
had  rejected,  but  Francis  would  give  the  French  ambassador 
no  answer. 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  eighteenth,  the  thunder  of 
cannon  announced  the  resumption  of  the  battle.  Bliicher 
and  Bernadotte  drew  nearer  and  nearer  to  Leipsic  from 
the  north  and  east,  and  the  allies’  armies  to  the  south  and 
west  gradually  closed  in.  Village  after  village  was  taken 
near  Probstheida,  a  village  itself  to  the  south  of  Leipsic 
and  the  buckle  of  the  great  belt  of  troops  which  Napoleon 
had  thrown  around  the  city.  Now  the  Saxons  and  Wiir- 
tembergers  in  the  midst  of  the  fight  went  over  to  the  allies, 
some  of  them  without  their  leaders.  At  length,  when  night 
had  fallen,  Napoleon  gave  up  Probstheida  and  retired  to 
Leipsic  beaten.  Before  morning  his  troops  had  begun 


THE  WAR  OF  LIBERATION  7 1 

their  retreat  in  the  moonlight  along  the  road  to  Erfurt, 
which  had  been  left  open  to  them.  Poles  and  Germans 
remained  in  Leipsic  to  cover  their  retreat.  Soon  after  dawn 
of  the  nineteenth  the  allies  drew  in  close  about  the  city 
and  began  the  final  attack.  Napoleon  himself  left  about 
ten  o’clock,  and  before  noon  the  allies  were  pouring  in 
through  the  city  gates.  Over  30,000  men  were  captured 
within  the  walls.  On  the  "corpse-encumbered”  field  of 
Leipsic  Napoleon  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  more  than 
50,000  men  ;  the  allies  lost  over  40,000.  Napoleon  fled 
toward  France  at  full  speed.  A  force  of  Bavarians  and 
Austrians  tried  to  check  his  flight  at  I  lanau,  but  Napoleon 
cut  his  way  through  them  and  crossed  the  Rhine  for  the 
last  time  at  Mainz  on  November  2. 

During  the  following  weeks  and  months  the  towns  and 
fortresses  occupied  by  the  French  fell  one  by  one  into  the 
hands  of  the  allies.  The  kingdom  of  Westphalia  was 
broken  up,  the  dukes  of  Oldenburg  and  Brunswick  came 
home  again,  and,  last  of  all,  Hamburg  was  retaken  in 
May  1814.  The  Confederation  of  the  Rhine  fell  to  pieces 
of  itself.  Soon  after  Leipsic  the  allies  met  in  Frankfort- 
on-the-Main  to  discuss  their  next  move.  They  offered 
peace  to  Napoleon’s  ambassador  on  condition  that  France 
be  limited  to  its  "  natural  boundaries,”  the  Rhine,  the  Alps, 
and  the  Pyrenees.  But  Napoleon  insisted  on  having  Hol¬ 
land  and  Italy  too.  At  the  urgence  of  Bliicher  and  Stein, 
the  allies  decided  to  cross  the  Rhine  and  invade  France, 
"  not  in  order  to  persecute  the  French  people  and  seize 
their  country,  but  to  overthrow  Napoleon.” 

Bliicher  crossed  the  Rhine  between  Mainz  and  Coblenz 
on  the  eve  of  the  new  year,  1814,  and  advanced  up  the 
Moselle  toward  northern  France.  Schwarzenberg,  with 
his  Austrians  and  many  soldiers  from  the  states  of  the 


81.  The 
French  ex¬ 
pelled  from 
Germany 


Proposals  of 
peace 


82.  The 
allies  carry 
the  war  into 
France 


72 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


83.  Napoleon 
returns  from 
Elba 


Rhine  Confederation,  was  marching  to  the  south  of  Bliicher, 
and  Bernadotte  on  his  north.  The  advance  of  the  allies  was 
at  times  careless  and  disorderly,  so  that  Napoleon  was  able 
to  win  a  series  of  brilliant  victories,  but  he  rejected  offers 
of  peace,  and  the  allies  regained  the  upper  hand.  Alexander 
and  Frederick  William  entered  Paris  March  31,  1814,  at 
the  head  of  36,000  soldiers.  Napoleon  was  forced  to  sur¬ 
render  all  claims  to  the  French  throne  and  to  retire  to  the 
island  of  Elba,  the  sovereignty  of  which  was  guaranteed  to 
him  by  the  allies.  Louis  XVIII,  the  brother  of  Louis  XVI, 
was  established  as  hereditary  king,  in  accordance  with  the 
(First)  Peace  of  Paris,  which  was  signed  on  May  30,  1814. 

In  September  1814  representatives  of  the  allies  met  in 
the  Congress  of  Vienna  to  discuss  the  state  of  European 
affairs  and  to  redistribute  European  territory.  After  pro¬ 
longed  and  often  bitter  debate,  a  tolerable  adjustment  of 
all  differences  was  in  sight  when  the  startling  news  reached 
Vienna  that  Napoleon  had  landed  on  the  French  coast 
(March  1,  1815).  For  a  time  the  discussions  of  the  Con¬ 
gress  were  hushed  and  the  powers  allied  themselves  once 
more  against "  the  enemy  of  the  public  peace,”  in  spite  of 
Napoleon’s  assertion  that  he  merely  wanted  to  rule  over 
France  as  it  was  in  1792.  The  P'rench  army  went  over 
to  Napoleon  at  once.  After  a  twenty  days’  triumphal  march 
Napoleon  once  more  entered  Paris  and  began  his  reign  of 
a  hundred  days.  Louis  XVIII  fled  to  the  Netherlands. 
Within  two  months  Napoleon  collected  an  army  of  about 
130,000  veterans,  and,  intending  to  reestablish  his  old 
prestige  by  a  speedy  and  glorious  victory,  he  hastened 
northward  toward  the  enemy.  The  duke  of  Wellington 
was  encamped  in  the  neighborhood  of  Brussels  with  an 
army  of  160,000  men  whom  he  had  drawn  from  Eng¬ 
land,  the  Netherlands,  Hanover,  and  Brunswick  ;  Bliicher 


THE  WAR  OF  LIBERATION 


73 


with  80,000  Prussians  was  at  Ligny,  between  Napoleon  and 
Wellington.  On  June  16  Napoleon  attacked  Bliicher  with 
an  equal  force  and  defeated  him  so  decisively  that  Napoleon 
thought  Bliicher  would  retreat  toward  the  Rhine.  Welling¬ 
ton  more  than  held  his  own  that  day  at  Ouatre-Bras  against 
a  smaller  French  army. 

By  the  evening  of  the  following  day,  a  Saturday,  with 
large  reserve  forces  not  far  away,  Wellington  and  67,000 
troops  stood  ready  for  battle  near  the  village  of  Waterloo  ; 
Napoleon  with  72,000  was  near  a  farm  called  Belle  Alli¬ 
ance,  from  which  the  Germans  name  the  battle.  The 
French  were  far  superior  in  cavalry  and  artillery,  but  Bliicher 
had  promised  Wellington  to  have  his  beaten  army  ready 
for  another  battle  on  the  second  day  after  its  defeat  and 
to  bring  a  fresh  corps  of  Billow’s  with  him.  Napoleon  post¬ 
poned  the  beginning  of  the  battle  until  nearly  noon  of  Sun¬ 
day,  June  18,  in  order  to  give  the  ground  a  chance  to  dry 
out  and  to  ensure  a  better  footing  for  his  cavalry  charges, 
but  the  delay  also  gave  Bliicher  time  to  overcome  tremen¬ 
dous  difficulties  in  getting  his  men,  horses,  and  cannon 
through  mud  that  often  rose  to  the  hubs.  At  noon,  amid 
the  thunder  of  a  furious  cannonade,  the  French  on  foot 
and  horse  charged  the  English  lines,  but  the  close  squares 
held  tight.  Another  furious  charge  captured  an  outpost 
village  and  shook  the  English  left  wing.  Wellington,  with 
his  watch  in  his  hand,  was  heard  to  say,  "  Bliicher  —  or 
night!”  But  just  at  this  crucial  moment  —  it  was  about 
half  past  four  —  the  first  of  Bliicher ’s  men  appeared  at 
Napoleon’s  right  flank  and  at  once  began  an  attack.  In 
a  desperate  attempt  to  crush  the  English  before  all  the 
Prussians  arrived,  Napoleon  drew  his  troops  together  into 
a  massive  column,  but  the  distracting  Prussians  on  Napo¬ 
leon’s  right  gave  Wellington  a  chance  to  consolidate  his 


84.  The 
Battle  of 
Waterloo, 
June  18,  1815 


74 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


85.  Napoleon 
banished  to 
St.  Helena 


The  Second 
Peace  of 
Paris, 
November 
1815 


86.  Benefits 
to  Germany 
from  the 
Napoleonic 
era 


forces  too,  and  the  third  charge  shattered  against  the 
English.  The  Prussians,  who  had  now  arrived  in  force, 
seized  the  village  on  which  the  French  had  been  resting, 
and  soon  after  eight  in  the  evening  the  French  scattered 
in  a  panic.  The  Prussians  pursued  them  far  into  the  night. 

The  three  days’  campaign  in  Belgium  cost  more  than 
60,000  lives  in  all,  but  it  ended  Napoleon’s  power  forever. 
P'our  days  after  Waterloo,  Napoleon  resigned  the  crown  a 
second  time  in  Paris,  and  when  the  allies  entered  the 
French  capital  July  7,  he  had  already  hurried  on  farther 
to  the  west  of  France.  There  Napoleon  surrendered  him¬ 
self  to  the  British  Government  and  claimed  its  protection ; 
like  Themistocles,  he  said,  he  was  seating  himself  at  the 
hearth  of  a  former  enemy.  But  England  could  not  treat 
with  him  alone.  The  allies  together  signed  a  convention 
on  August  2  by  which  he  was  banished  forever  to  the  island 
of  St.  Helena.  Here  he  lived  from  his  arrival  in  October 
1815  until  his  death  in  May  1821  ;  his  body  was  removed 
to  Paris  in  1840.  The  Second  Peace  of  Paris,  which  was 
signed  in  November  1815,  restored  Louis  XVIII  to  the 
throne  and  deprived  France  of  its  possessions  in  Italy  and 
of  several  towns  west  of  the  Rhine,  but  left  it  Alsace  and 
Lorraine  in  spite  of  the  loud  complaints  of  the  Germans ; 
Russia  and  England  were  not  willing  that  Germany  should 
include  Alsace  and  Lorraine  as  it  had  until  far  down  in  the 
seventeenth  century. 

The  German  people  owe  a  large  debt  of  gratitude  to  the 
Napoleonic  era,  for  it  conferred  and  induced  benefits  which 
have  been  of  enormous  value  to  the  states  of  Germany. 
West  and  east  of  the  Rhine  it  secured  many  of  the  noblest 
purposes  of  the  French  Revolution,  such  as  taxation  accord¬ 
ing  to  means  and  the  abolishment  of  class  privileges.  Above 
all,  it  brought  to  flower  the  idea  of  popular  civil  liberty  which 


THE  WAR  OF  LIBERATION 


75 


had  gradually  been  taking  form  in  the  eighteenth  century. 
Like  the  people  of  France,  Germans  paid  the  fearful  exac¬ 
tions  of  Napoleon,  because  the  firmness  of  his  rule  ensured 
to  them  the  continuance  of  the  heritage  of  the  Revolution. 
But  his  petrifying  tyranny  threatened  to  rob  them  utterly 
of  the  most  precious  legacy  of  all,  civil  liberty  and  national 
independence.  Confronted  by  this  issue  they  turned  against 
him  and  against  the  nation  which  had  given  them  the  su¬ 
preme  idea  of  the  age.  They  turned  in  order  to  save  the 
idea.  In  the  act  of  rescue,  in  the  War  of  Liberation,  the 
German  people  first  realized  their  power  ;  the  war  discov¬ 
ered  them  to  themselves.  Conscious  of  their  strength  and 
fitness,  they  now  began  the  great  struggle  of  the  nineteenth 
century  for  constitutional  representative  government  and 
for  national  union  and  independence. 


CHAPTER  VIII 


87.  The  chief 
results  of 
the  Congress 
of  Vienna. 
The  Final  Act 


THE  GERMAN  CONFEDERATION  AND  THE  PERIOD 
OF  REACTION 

1815-1848 

As  far  as  Germany  is  concerned,  the  chief  results  of 
the  Congress  of  Vienna  are  embraced  in  two  acts  of  prime 
constructive  importance,  the  Federal  Act,  which  created  a 
semblance  of  German  national  life,  and  the  Final  Act, 
which  reset  the  boundaries  of  the  states  of  Europe.  The 
two  acts  appeared  on  June  8  and  9,  1815,  respectively, 
before  the  Battle  of  Waterloo.  By  the  terms  of  the  Final 
Act,  Prussia  surrendered  former  Polish  possessions  to  Rus¬ 
sia,  retaining  of  these  only  the  province  of  Posen,  and 
in  return  for  this  sacrifice  received  about  half  of  Saxony ; 
Prussia  also  obtained  former  holdings  in  Westphalia  and 
several  small  districts  in  the  Rhine  country  and  on  the 
shore  of  the  Baltic  Sea.  A  kingdom  of  ten  million  inhabit¬ 
ants,  Prussia  now  included  one  hundred  and  twenty-two 
thousand  square  miles,  that  is,  a  little  more  than  the  com¬ 
bined  area  of  New  England,  New  York,  and  New  Jersey. 
Austria  obtained  Tyrol  once  more  besides  Lombardy  and 
Venice.  In  compensation  for  Tyrol,  Bavaria  received  a  dis¬ 
trict  on  the  west  bank  of  the  Rhine  and  the  grand-duchy 
of  Wurzburg.  Bavaria,  Wiirtemberg,  and  Saxony  retained 
the  rank  of  kingdoms  to  which  Napoleon  had  elevated  them. 
Hanover  was  raised  to  the.  same  rank  and  enlarged  by  the 
acquisition  of  various  towns  in  North  Germany  and  territory 

76 


THE  GERMAN  CONFEDERATION 


77 


which  extended  it  to  the  North  Sea,  where  it  controlled  the 
mouths  of  the  Weser  and  Elbe  rivers.  Thus  four  new  Ger¬ 
man  kingdoms  were  formally  established,  which,  together 
with  several  lesser  grand-duchies  and  duchies,  composed 
a  group  of  so-called  "middle”  states.  Each  of  these  states 
had  a  lofty  sense  of  its  own  importance,  and  during  the 
following  decades  each  of  them  fostered  a  spirit  of  exclu¬ 
sive  devotion  to  state  interests  which  was  fatal  in  its  effects 
on  German  unity.  On  the  other  hand,  the  "middle”  states 
were  still  overshadowed  by  the  "great”  states,  Austria  and 
Prussia,  both  in  territory  and  in  the  strength  which  Austria 
and  Prussia  had  recently  displayed.  Austria,  however,  with 
its  Italian  provinces  and  its  kingdom  of  Hungary,  lay  within 
Germany  only  to  the  extent  of  one  third  of  its  possessions. 
Austria  continued  therefore,  as  in  years  past,  to  appear 
more  a  European  than  a  German  power.  Prussia  was  much 
smaller  by  the  terms  of  the  Final  Act  than  it  had  been  in 
1806  and  not  even  so  large  as  in  1792.  It  lay  open  to 
Russia  on  the  east,  and  it  was  separated  from  France  on 
the  west  only  by  a  low  range  of  mountains  ;  it  was  divided 
in  two  parts  by  jealous  states  such  as  Hanover.  But  Prus¬ 
sia  was  thoroughly  German,  and  in  the  last  decades  its 
leaders  had  learned  both  the  need  of  unifying  the  kingdom 
and  the  identity  of  Prussian  and  German  interests. 

The  momentous  beginning  which  the  Treaty  of  Eune- 
ville  effected  in  the  reduction  of  the  number  of  German 
states  was  continued  at  Vienna.  The  territorial  changes, 
which  now  were  made,  entailed  the  obliteration  of  sundry 
independent  principalities,  so  that  the  number  of  German 
states  was  reduced  in  1815  to  thirty-eight.  These  formed 
the  "  German  Confederation,”  with  Austria  as  permanent 
president ;  they  signed  the  new  constitution,  the  Federal 
Act,  on  June  8,  1815.  The  power  to  make  war  and 


88.  The 
Federal  Act, 
constituting 
the  German 
Confederation 


78 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


conclude  treaties  was  reserved  for  the  Federal  Diet,  but  each 
state’s  boundaries  and  independence  in  affairs  at  home  were 
rigidly  guaranteed  by  the  new  constitution.  The  jealous, 
particularistic  spirit  which  prompted  the  smaller  states  to 
insist  upon  this  provision  forced  further  concessions  which 
bound  the  hands  of  the  Confederation  securely  from  the 
start.  The  votes  in  the  Diet  were  so  distributed  that  the 
smaller  states,  with  one  sixth  of  the  total  population,  could 
out-vote  by  nearly  two  to  one  the  seven  larger  states,  with 
the  remaining  five  sixths  of  the  people.  To  clinch  this 
and  other  absurd  covenants,  the  proviso  was  added  that  no 
changes  or  innovations  in  the  laws  or  in  the  organization  of 
the  union  could  be  made  without  the  unanimous  consent  of 
the  Diet.  Thus,  in  actual  practice,  the  Confederation  could 
adopt  no  positive  constructive  measures ;  it  was  susceptible 
of  no  evolution.  Austria,  the  leading  state,  made  no  serious 
attempt  to  win  and  to  consolidate  the  allegiance  of  other 
states ;  the  Diet,  which  met  at  Frankfort-on-the-Main, 
never  attained  to  any  real  significance ;  and  the  army  of 
the  Confederation  was  never  properly  organized.  As  in 
the  United  States  from  1783  to  1789,  the  lack  of  central 
authority  and  power  and  the  divergence  of  state  interests 
made  this  German  union  a  federation  in  name  only.  At 
best  the  German  Confederation  was  a  makeshift  union 
which  had  arisen,  not  out  of  mutual  inclination,  but  in  order 
to  afford  the  semblance  of  a  union  which  would  stay  for¬ 
eign  intervention  in  German  affairs.  Nevertheless,  for  a 
whole  generation  after  the  establishment  of  the  Confedera¬ 
tion  public  peace  was  maintained  within  the  borders  of 
Germany.  For  thirty-three  years  there  was  not  a  battle  nor 
a  skirmish  on  German  soil.  Thrift  and  industry  could 
again  reap  their  rewards.  After  the  years  leading  up  to 
1813  and  1815  the  boon  of  peace  was  not  to  be  despised. 


THE  GERMAN  CONFEDERATION 


79 


The  spirit  of  liberalism,  created  by  the  French  Revolution 
and  carried  to  every  corner  of  Europe  by  the  Napoleonic 
regime,  saw  its  existence  menaced  soon  after  1815  by  an 
alliance  of  the  most  powerful  monarchs  of  Europe.  In 
September  1815  Russia,  Austria,  and  Prussia,  repre¬ 
sentatives  of  the  Greek,  the  Roman  Catholic,  and  the 
Protestant  Churches,  set  a  seal  upon  their  labors  at  the 
Congress  of  Vienna  by  forming  the  "  Holy  Alliance.” 
In  the  document  proclaiming  their  act  the  three  powers 
avowed  their  intention  to  observe  Christian  principles  in 
their  relations  to  their  subjects  and  to  each  other.  With 
the  exception  of  the  Pope  and  the  Sultan  all  the  reigning 
monarchs  of  Europe  were  invited  to  join  the  Alliance,  and 
in  the  course  of  time  all  accepted  the  invitation  except  the 
prince-regent  of  England,  who  was  deterred  by  constitu¬ 
tional  considerations.  The  Holy  Alliance  was  probably 
never  intended  for  political  purposes,  but  the  three  original 
signatories  soon  attempted  to  stamp  out  liberalism  wherever 
they  found  it.  The  Alliance  thus  acquired  the  reputation 
of  being  a  society  for  the  promotion  of  absolute  monarchies, 
and  it  was  bitterly  cursed  by  champions  of  constitutional 
government. 

The  Federal  Act,  which  constituted  the  Confederation 
(June  8,  1815),  declared  that  "a  constitution  based  upon 
the  system  of  estates,”  that  is,  representative,  law-making 
bodies,  "should  be  established  in  all  the  states  of  the  union,” 
and  that  "there  should  be  assemblies  of  the  estates  in  every 
state.”  A  few  enlightened  rulers  gladly  fell  into  line  with 
these  promises.  In  Saxe-Weimar,  which  had  been  elevated 
into  a  grand-duchy  at  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  Carl  August 
gave  constitutional  rights  to  his  people  as  early  as  1816. 
Other  "  middle  ”  states,  Baden,  Bavaria,  Hanover,  Hesse- 
Cassel,  and  Wiirtemberg,  became  constitutional  monarchies 


89.  The  Holy 
Alliance 


90.  The 
promises  of 
constitu¬ 
tional  gov¬ 
ernment 


So 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


91.  The  be¬ 
ginnings  of 
reaction  in 
Austria 


by  1820.  In  fact,  under  the  influence  of  France,  numerous 
German  states  had  long  since  broken  with  the  feudalistic 
past  and  had  legally  recognized  principles  of  the  French 
Revolution,  for  example,  proportionate  taxation  and  equal 
rights  before  the  law.  Rulers  of  these  states  were  conse¬ 
quently  ready  enough  to  grant  constitutions.  In  the  present 
situation  of  Germany,  however,  they  feared  the  formation 
of  a  strongly  centralized,  national  government  which  would 
rob  them  of  sovereign  privileges.  They  hastened  therefore 
to  grant  constitutions  in  order  to  satisfy  their  people  and 
to  promote  among  them  a  local  contentment.  Common 
features  of  the  constitutions  which  they  granted  were  popu¬ 
lar  representation  in  legislative  assemblies  to  be  established 
in  each  state,  equality  of  all  men  before  the  law,  and  free¬ 
dom  of  religion.  If  all  the  ruling  members  of  the  German 
Confederation  had  followed  the  example  set  in  these  states 
and  fulfilled  the  definite  promises  to  which  they  had  attached 
their  signatures,  Germany  would  have  been  spared  much 
bloodshed  and  tribulation. 

Austria  and  Prussia,  champions  of  an  ultra-conservative 
policy,  were  responsible  for  the  bitterness  of  the  struggle 
for  constitutional  government  which  arose  in  many  states 
of  the  Confederation.  Metternich  saw  that  Austria  could 
best  preserve  its  empire  of  conglomerated  states  if  it  con¬ 
tinued  as  an  absolute  monarchy.  He  therefore  determined 
that  in  Austria  a  constitution  should  be  withheld,  and  lib¬ 
eralism  should  be  crushed  wherever  it  raised  its  head.  This 
was  the  policy  of  reaction  which  has  given  a  name  to  this 
period  of  German  history.  Metternich  saw  only  one  enemy, 
Revolution,  which  was,  as  he  said,  "  the  disease  which  must 
be  cured,  the  volcano  which  must  be  extinguished,  the  gan¬ 
grene  which  must  be  burned  out  with  the  hot  iron.”  His 
whole  policy  was  "  Preserve  the  existing.”  For  a  few  years 


THE  GERMAN  CONFEDERATION  8 1 

it  was  easy  to  do  this  and  to  forget  the  irksome  promises 
of  the  Federal  Act,  as  no  immediate  popular  demand  for 
constitutional  rights  came  forth.  The  campaign  of  1809 
ended  so-depressingly  for  Austria  that  the  War  of  Libera¬ 
tion  did  not  lay  a  strong  hold  on  the  life  and  imagination 
of  the  Austrians  at  large.  Nor  had  Austria  played  a  sig¬ 
nificant  role  in  the  literary  and  intellectual  awakening  that 
had  been  stirring  other  parts  of  Germany  since  1750.  It 
had  produced  no  great  poets  and  no  great  philosophers. 
As  long  as  Austrian  national  spirit  was  at  so  low  an  ebb, 
Metternich  could  ”  preserve  the  existing.” 

In  Prussia  the  dawn  of  a  new  constitutional  era  seemed 
at  hand.  Here  lovers  of  liberty  could  enumerate  material 
and  intellectual  achievements  of  Prussia  in  the  eighteenth 
century,  brilliant  successes  of  recent  years,  the  earnest  de¬ 
sire  of  a  people  that  had  proved  its  worth,  and  the  pres¬ 
ence  of  able  statesmen  like  Stein  and  Wilhelm  von 
Humboldt.  P'rederick  William,  moreover,  had  not  only 
taken  part  in  the  promises  of  the  Federal  Act ;  he  had 
also  issued  a  decree  in  May  1815,  stating  that  a  Prussian 
national  assembly  representative  of  the  people  should  sit 
in  Berlin.  It  was  a  golden  opportunity  for  Prussia  to  take 
the  lead  in  German  affairs  as  it  had  done  in  the  recent 
war  ;  by  granting  a  constitution  at  once,  to  set  an  example 
to  all  Germany  ;  and  to  enter  thus  upon  a  path  which  might 
end  in  German  national  unity.  Other  urgent  measures  in¬ 
deed  were  pressing  in  upon  Frederick  William.  He  was 
eager  to  make  the  acquisitions  of  1815  an  integral  part 
of  his  kingdom,  as  he  ultimately  succeeded  in  doing.  He 
transformed  the  laws  and  methods  governing  education 
with  such  efficiency  that  the  proportion  of  illiterates  in 
Prussia  to-day  is  less  than  one  half  of  one  per  cent ;  it  is 
about  seven  per  cent  in  the  United  States  and  fifty-eight 


92.  Condi¬ 
tions  in 
Prussia 


82 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


93.  Out¬ 
breaks  in 
behalf  of  rep¬ 
resentative 
government 


per  cent  in  Spain.  Frederick  William  also  conducted  an 
economical  administration  and  reorganized  the  Prussian 
system  of  finances.  But  in  regard  to  a  constitution,  the 
paramount  idea  of  the  age,  P'rederick  William  only  showed 
once  more  that  he  was  temperamentally  incapable  of  rising 
to  a  great  emergency.  Unwilling  to  break  his  promises,  he 
yet  hesitated  and  considered  and  sought  further  advice. 
Irritated  by  the  pressure  of  his  advisers,  he  responded 
angrily  that  he  would  decide  when  the  right  moment  had 
come.  He  was  as  far  as  usual  from  energetic  decision  and 
action  when  events  happened  which  drew  Austria  and  Prus¬ 
sia  closer  together  and  made  the  Prussian  king  a  pliant 
follower  of  Metternich’s  policy. 

The  first  symptoms  of  reaction  in  Austria  and  Prussia 
caused  great  disappointment  all  over  Germany,  especially 
in  the  universities  where  many  gathered  who  had  fought 
in  the  recent  war  and  who  had  absorbed  unconsciously 
many  of  the  ideas  of  the  French  Revolution.  An  extreme 
radical  element  was  not  lacking,  but  righteous  discontent 
over  unfulfilled  promises  and  glowing  desire  for  constitu¬ 
tional  liberty  and  German  unity  stirred  university  circles 
as  they  stirred  no  other  assemblies  of  German  men.  In 
1815  a  student  society,  the  Burs chens chaft,  had  been 
founded  at  the  University  of  Jena  with  Christian  and 
patriotic  purposes.  In  October  1817,  when  the  three  hun¬ 
dredth  anniversary  of  the  Reformation  and  the  fourth  anni¬ 
versary  of  the  Battle  of  Leipsic  were  being  commemo¬ 
rated  at  Eisenach,  a  band  of  Jena  students,  members  of 
the  Burschenschaft,  burned  a  heap  of  pasteboard  which 
represented  certain  well-known  reactionary  books ;  copies 
of  the  books  themselves  were  too  expensive.  In  March 
1819  Karl  Sand,  a  Jena  student  of  theology,  stabbed  the 
German  author  Kotzebue  to  death  in  Mannheim,  because 


THE  GERMAN  CONFEDERATION 


83 


Kotzebue  was  publishing  derisive  attacks  upon  the  liberals 
and  was  suspected  of  being  a  Russian  spy.  The  forces 
of  reaction,  grossly  exaggerating  the  significance  of  the 
Eisenach  prank  and  strengthened  by  the  accession  of  many 
liberals  who  abhorred  Sand’s  fanatical  deed,  now  combined 
and  came  out  into  the  open  with  the  determination  to 
throttle  liberalism  once  for  all. 

In  September  1819  Metternich  drew  ministers  of  va¬ 
rious  states  together  in  conference  at  Carlsbad  and  induced 
them  to  adopt  "the  Carlsbad  Resolutions.”  This  docu¬ 
ment  abolished  the  Burschenschaft  in  Jena  and  similar 
societies  in  other  institutions,  placed  all  the  universities 
under  strict  supervision,  and  took  away  the  freedom  of 
the  press  throughout  the  Confederation.  A  commission 
was  appointed  to  watch  and  prosecute  revolutionary  acts 
and  gatherings.  Various  states,  notably  Wurtemberg  and 
Bavaria,  jealous  of  the  state  rights  guaranteed  by  the 
Federal  Act,  were  opposed  to  the  Carlsbad  Resolutions, 
but  Prussia,  like  Austria,  espoused  them  unreservedly,  and 
they  were  pushed  through  the  Federal  Diet.  The  promul¬ 
gation  of  the  new  measures  was  followed,  at  least  on  the- 
surface  of  events,  by  a  period  of  political  stagnation.  The 
rulers  of  Germany  made  no  further  recognition  of  popular 
rights ;  in  some  states,  such  as  Baden,  they  proceeded  to 
ignore  the  constitutions  which  they  had  granted.  The 
people  of  Germany,  enraged  by  the  despotism  of  Carlsbad 
but  cowed  by  persecutions,  relapsed  into  a  condition  of 
ineffective  fermentation  ;  the  soaring  idealism  of  the  War 
of  Fiberation  sank  into  a  bitter  pessimism,  which  left  an 
indelible  stamp  upon  much  of  the  German  thought  and 
German  spirit  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Men  who  had 
served  their  country  conspicuously  asked  for  a  redemption  of 
pledges  and  met  with  petty  persecution.  Even  Baron  Stein 


94.  The 
Carlsbad  Res¬ 
olutions  and 
their  effect 


84 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


95.  The 
influence  in 
Germany  of 
the  July  Rev¬ 
olution  in 
France 


did  not  escape  surveillance  ;  Arndt  was  dismissed  from 
his  professorship  at  Bonn.  The  clouds  which  overhung 
Germany  were  relieved  only  by  the  spread  of  liberal 
ideas  in  England  and  by  the  Greek  struggle  for  freedom 
from  Turkey  ;  the  Philhellenism  expressed  by  Muller  and 
other  German  poets  in  their  praise  of  Greek  courage  was 
a  convenient  cloak  for  encouragement  and  exhortation  to 
Germans.  *' 

In  1830,  when  the  July  Revolution  in  France  over¬ 
threw  the  Bourbon  monarchy  and  put  the  Orleanist  Louis 
Philippe  on  the  throne  as  the  head  of  a  liberal  govern¬ 
ment,  hope  arose  in  Germany  that  this  breeze  from  the 
west  might  also  clear  the  German  atmosphere.  The  peo¬ 
ple  of  Brunswick  and  Saxony  and  Hesse-Cassel  forced 
their  rulers  to  establish  constitutional  governments ;  at  a 
gathering  in  Hambach  (May  1832),  a  village  in  the  Bava¬ 
rian  Rhine  country,  extreme  revolutionists  even  advocated 
the  establishment  of  a  republican  form  of  government ; 
but  these  and  other  less  inflammatory  radicals  were  soon 
checked.  Some  states,  especially  those,  such  as  Wurtem- 
berg,  which  had  already  received  tolerable  constitutions, 
remained  calm  throughout.  Nevertheless,  after  a  series  of 
ministerial  conferences  (July  1832  to  January  1834),  Met- 
ternich  prevailed  upon  the  Federal  Diet  to  enlarge  the  scope 
of  the  Carlsbad  Resolutions.  The  states  of  the  Confedera¬ 
tion  were  bound,  at  the  call  of  any  sovereign,  to  protect 
him  against  revolutionary  acts  of  his  people  ;  legislation  in 
the  different  states  was  to  be  supervised ;  political  socie¬ 
ties,  public  meetings,  and  revolutionary  badges  were  for¬ 
bidden. ^Fritz  Reuter,  the  poet,  was  only  one  of  those  who 
suffered  cruelly  from  an  infraction  of  these  laws.  The  only 
charge  ever  brought  against  Reuter  was  that  as  a  student 
at  Jena  he  had  worn  the  black,  red,  and  gold  colors  of  the 


THE  GERMAN  CONFEDERATION 


85 


abolished  Burschenschaft.  Yet  he  was  sentenced  to  death 
for  "  treason  ”  and  was  actually  imprisoned  for  seven  years. 

By  such  measures  as  these  the  spirit  of  reaction  triumphed 
once  more  in  Germany,  and  the  spasm  brought  on  by  the 
July  Revolution  subsided. 

Despite  the  varying  political  conditions  within  the  dif-  96.  The 
ferent  states  and  the  divergent,  particularistic  relations  be-  ^formation 
tween  the  states,  a  definite  step  toward  the  unification  of 
Germany  was  taken  even  during  the  period  of  reaction. 

This  was  the  establishment  of  the  Zollverein,  or  "  customs 
union,”  under  the  auspices  of  Prussia.  Travel  and,  above 
all,  commercial  progress  in  Germany  were  impeded  intol¬ 
erably  by  the  customs  restrictions  throughout  the  country, 
for  the  states  had  customs-houses  not  only  on  their  main 
borders  but  also  for  all  their  scattered  bits  of  territory ; 
within  Prussia  alone  thirteen  states  owned,  or  even  con¬ 
sisted  exclusively  of,  stretches  of  land,  known  as  enclaves, 
which  were  entirely  surrounded  by  Prussian  territory.  As 
early  as  1 8 1 8  Prussia  abolished  tolls  on  transit  through  the 
kingdom  and,  soon  after,  it  forced  the  enclaves  within  its 
borders  to  join  with  it  in  a  system  of  internal  free  trade. 

Other  states  gradually  realized  the  advantages  of  such  a 
union.  In  March  1833  Prussia  was  joined  by  Bavaria 
and  Wiirtemberg,  which  had  entered  into  a  similar  agree¬ 
ment  with  each  other,  and  before  the  end  of  the  same 
year  a  third  union  of  states  in  central  Germany,  originally 
formed  to  offset  the  Prussian  union  in  the  immediate  in¬ 
terest  of  the  smaller  central  states,  joined  the  Prussian 
Zollverein.  With  this  accession  all  the  members  of  the  Con¬ 
federation,  except  Austria,  Hanover,  and  a  few  lesser  states, 
were  in  the  union  ;  Austria  held  out  through  considera¬ 
tion  for  its  possessions  outside  of  Germany,  and  the  other 
states  declined  to  join,  chiefly,  through  jealousy  of  Prussia. 


86 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


97.  Its 
influence 


98.  A  change 
of  ruler  in 
Austria 


At  midnight  of  the  eve  of  the  new  year  1834  the  toll- 
gates  fell  between  the  states  of  the  Zollverein,  and  with 
the  toll-gates  the  barriers  of  trade.  From  the  Alps  to 
the  Baltic  a  market  was  opened  to  products  of  German 
skill.  The  prosperity  of  the  working  classes  leaped  for¬ 
ward  ;  the  beginnings  of  modern  industrial  Germany  were 
made.  After  1835  the  introduction  of  railways  between 
the  states  and  of  steamships  in  the  merchant  navy  further 
accelerated  the  impetus  which  industries  and  trade  had 
gained  from  the  Zollverein.  The  cities  grew  with  unprece¬ 
dented  rapidity.  Conscious  of  the  memorable  fact  that 
this  new  material  prosperity  was  due  to  the  leadership  of 
Prussia,  Germans  began  to  look  toward  Berlin  rather  than 
Vienna  as  the  capital  of  the  nation.  The  possibility  of  a 
union  of  German  states  which  would  not  include  Austria 
now  first  dawned  upon  the  German  horizon.  Above  all, 
the  Zollverein  revealed  the  natural  bonds  of  unity  between 
Germans  in  a  form  so  substantial  that  none  could  fail  to 
mark  its  effect  or  note  its  significance.  It  nationalized 
German  life.  More  than  any  other  event  or  factor  of  the 
time  it  made  for  a  sense  of  German  unity  that  could 
survive  the  most  disrupting  influences  of  the  nineteenth 
century. 

In  the  meantime  Francis  I  of  Austria  had  died  (1835) 
after  a  reign  of  forty-three  years.  He  had  held  the  posses¬ 
sions  of  the  Hapsburgs  together,  and  he  had  won  the 
affection  of  his  people,  who  called  him  "  our  good  Kaiser 
Franz,”  but  Francis  never  saw,  or  he  shut  his  eyes  to,  the 
light  of  the  new  era  which  had  broken  over  Europe.  To 
the  end  of  his  days  he  was  determined  to  suffer  no  encroach¬ 
ment  on  the  divine  right  of  his  rule.  To  that  end  he  and 
Metternich  built  up  a  ponderous  machine  which  was  fore¬ 
doomed  to  break  down  as  soon  as  one  of  its  main  parts 


THE  GERMAN  CONFEDERATION 


87 


failed.  This  contingency  happened  in  the  reign  of  Francis’s 
son  and  successor,  Ferdinand  I  (1835-1848).  A  victim 
of  epilepsy  in  his  youth  and  of  intermittent  insanity  in  his 
manhood,  Ferdinand  made  no  pretense  at  ruling.  In  his 
time  Austria  was  ruled  by  a  "conference  of  state’’  con¬ 
sisting  of  several  archdukes  and  ministers ;  the  chief  of 
these  was  Metternich,  whose  theories  of  government  were 
susceptible  of  no  change. 

In  Prussia  too  a  reign  of  forty-three  years  ended  when  99.  The  ac- 
Frederick  William  III  died  in  1840.  The  late  king’s  son,  Frederick 
Frederick  William  IV,  was  said  to  believe  in  representative 
government  and  to  desire  German  national  unity.  He  was  1840 
therefore  welcomed  to  the  throne  as  a  saviour.  In  the  very 
year  of  his  accession  Frederick  William  had  a  chance  to 
prove  himself.  German  national  feeling  was  running  high 
at  that  time  in  resentment  against  the  demand  of  various 
French  writers  that  the  whole  of  the  west  bank  of  the  Rhine 
should  be  ceded  to  France.  The  universal  popular  appeal 
that  rose  for  national  unity  and  strength  in  order  to  keep 
out  the  foreigner  stirred  Frederick  William  deeply.  He 
therefore  insisted  both  at  Vienna  and  at  Petrograd  on  a 
reconstruction  of  the  German  Confederation,  but  he  was 
opposed  by  Metternich  and  the  Czar  in  1840  and  he  was 
permanently  discouraged  by  a  second  rebuff  from  the  same 
quarters  in  1845.  Meanwhile  he  had  changed  his  mind 
about  representative  government.  In  1847  he  summoned 
a  united  Diet  of  Prussia  consisting  of  the  members  of  the 
assemblies  in  the  various  provinces,  but  he  at  once  marked 
his  conception  of  the  Diet’s  status  by  calling  it  an  "  adviser  ’’ 
to  the  crown,  not  a  law-maker.  He  had,  in  fact,  really  sum¬ 
moned  it  far  more  out  of  his  romantic  fondness  for  the 
picturesque  than  out  of  conviction  for  liberal  ideas.  True 
to  Hohenzollern  belief  in  the  divine  right  of  kings,  he 


88 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


100.  Events 
and  condi¬ 
tions  in 
German 
"  middle  ” 
states 


said  in  his  opening  address  that  no  "  sheet  of  paper,”  in 
other  words  a  constitution,  should  ever  thrust  itself  between 
the  Lord  God  and  his  country.  The  Diet  soon  refused  to 
approve  two  royal  propositions  on  the  ground  that  no  rights 
had  been  granted  and  guaranteed  to  its  members.  It  broke 
up,  therefore,  after  ten  weeks  without  having  accomplished 
any  positive  results. 

The  popular  discontent  and  unrest  which  prevailed  in 
Austria  and  Prussia  was  also  rife  in  German  "  middle  ” 
and  "little”  states.  Wiirtemberg  was  less  affected  by 
political  agitations  than  many  other  states,  as  its  people 
remained  fairly  satisfied  with  the  constitution  of  1819.  In 
Baden,  French  radicalism,  which  continued  to  find  easy 
access,  often  roused  the  people  to  revolutionary  outbreaks 
and  demands.  The  grand-duke,  a  liberal-minded  ruler, 
was  disposed  to  satisfy  many  of  these  demands ;  but  the 
Federal  Diet  bound  his  hands,  and  Baden  made  little  prog¬ 
ress  toward  a  permanent  reorganization  of  its  affairs. 
The  constitutional  gain  in  Saxony  was  nullified  in  the 
early  forties  by  the  appointment  of  a  reactionary  ministry. 
Louis  I  (1825-1848)  of  Bavaria  presided  for  years  over 
a  model  constitutional  monarchy ;  his  patronage  of  arts 
and  sciences  transformed  Munich  into  one  of  the  most 
attractive  cities  of  Europe.  But  revolutionary  acts  of  the 
thirties  and  forties  terrified  him  ;  he  first  yielded  to  the 
Jesuits  and  endorsed  their  repression  of  Protestants  and 
liberals  ;  and  then  he  turned  to  the  Protestants  for  support. 
A  riot,  which  threatened  the  stability  of  the  government, 
took  place  in  1847.  In  Hanover,  when  the  English  crown 
was  inherited  (1837)  by  a  woman,  Queen  Victoria,  the 
connection  between  England  and  Hanover  was  broken, 
and  an  extreme  reactionary  monarchist  succeeded  to  the 
Hanoverian  throne,  Duke  Ernest  Augustus  of  Cumberland. 


THE  GERMAN  CONFEDERATION 


89 


The  new  constitution  of  1838,  a  revised  and  improved 
version  of  that  of  1819,  was  at  once  overthrown,  and 
a  majority  of  the  Federal  Diet  sanctioned  and  approved 
this  shameless  muzzling  of  the  popular  will.  Thus,  when 
1848  arrived,  Germany  was  standing  on  the  edge  of  a 
volcano.  Only  a  slight  impulse  was  needed  to  plunge  the 
whole  country  into  a  caldron  of  revolution. 

However  few  political  rights  the  German  people  gained 
before  1848,  they  strengthened  in  many  ways  their  claim 
to  citizenship  in  the  world.  During  these  years  Goethe 
completed  Faust,  the  profoundest  imaginative  work  of 
modern  times.  Under  the  spell  of  Romanticism,  Uhland 
and  Eichendorff,  Heine  and  others,  produced  a  series  of 
lyric  poems  which  are  unsurpassed  in  the  literature  of 
any  other  nation.  By  1830,  however,  the  literary  tide  had 
turned.  Romantic  indifference  to  modern  life  gave  way 
to  a  new  realism  which  culminated  about  1850  in  Hebbel’s 
plays  and  Ludwig’s  stories.  Also  within  these  two  decades 
men  famous  in  German  literature  dealt  directly  with  exist¬ 
ing  political  conditions.  A  small  group  of  young  men  who 
were  soon  classed  together  under  the  name  of  "Young 
Germany’’  —  Heine,  Borne,  Gutzkow,  and  others  — 
expressed  in  literary  form  the  prevailing  discontent  with 
reactionary  political  measures.  Their  newspaper  articles, 
poems,  and  other  writings  were  intended  to  force  the 
establishment  of  a  liberal  form  of  government  in  all  the 
German  states.  But  they  succeeded  only  in  having  the  ban 
put  on  their  "  immoral  ’’  writings  and  either  in  suffering 
imprisonment  like  Gutzkow  or  in  being  virtually  exiled  as 
were  Heine  and  Borne  in  Paris.  Similar  punishment  was 
meted  out  to  Hoffmann  von  Fallersleben  and  F'reiligrath, 
"  political  poets  ’’  of  the  forties,  both  of  whom  wrote  bitter 
revolutionary  lyrics.  Becker’s  poem  in  answer  to  the 


101.  German 
literature  in 
the  period  of 
reaction 


90 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


102.  German 
philosophy, 
fine  arts,  and 
music  in  the 
first  half  of 
the  nine¬ 
teenth 
century 


French  demands  of  1840,  They  shall  not  have  the  free 
and  German  Rhine,  resounded  all  over  Germany ;  The 
Watch  on  the  Rhine  by  Schneckenburger  was  inspired  by 
the  same  excitement,  but  it  did  not  become  a  national 
hymn  until  thirty  years  later. 

Germany  also  produced  a  brilliant  series  of  philosophers 
and  scientists  in  the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century. 
Schleiermacher,  the  great  synthesist  of  modern  times, 
attempted  to  reconcile  philosophy  and  science  with  religion 
and  theology.  Hegel  founded  a  new  German  idealism,  no 
longer,  however,  on  the  culture  of  the  individual  as  preached 
by  Kant  and  Fichte,  but  on  the  subordination  of  the  indi¬ 
vidual  to  the  whole  and  on  collectivistic  endeavor  in  the 
advancement  of  humanity.  The  history  of  science  boasts 
such  names  as  Niebuhr  and  Ranke  and  Savigny  in  history, 
Alexander  von  Humboldt  in  the  natural  sciences,  and  the 
Grimm  brothers  in  philology.  Architecture  and  sculpture 
progressed  in  their  sense  of  proportion  and  in  execution, 
but  they  displayed  little  originality.  At  the  same  time  that 
the  completion  of  the  Gothic  cathedral  at  Cologne  and  the 
restoration  of  Romanesque  Spires  were  taken  in  hand, 
there  arose  the  Classical  edifices  of  Schinkel  in  Berlin  and 
Klenze  in  Munich,  and  the  hardly  less  Classical  statues  of 
Schadow  and  Rauch.  The  supreme  German  achievement 
of  these  years,  perhaps  the  greatest  contribution  Germany 
has  ever  made  to  the  world,  was  in  the  realm  of  music  — 
in  the  lyric  song  of  Schubert,  in  the  romantic  opera  of 
Weber,  and  in  the  symphony  of  Beethoven,  the  profound- 
est  of  all  musicians.  Through  the  work  of  these  and  other 
composers  Germany  won  its  unquestioned  preeminence  in 
the  world’s  most  catholic  art. 


CHAPTER  IX 


THE  POPULAR  STRUGGLE  FOR  CONSTITUTIONAL  LIBERTY 
AND  NATIONAL  UNITY 

1848-1863 

In  February  1848  the  people  of  Paris  drove  Louis 
Philippe  from  the  throne  because  he  would  not  grant  uni¬ 
versal  suffrage,  and  proclaimed  a  new  (Second)  Republic. 
As  the  sparks  from  Paris  fell,  the  states  of  Germany  burst 
into  flame.  Liberals,  radicals,  and  revolutionists  of  every 
degree  joined  as  if  by  preconcerted  signal  in  rebellions 
which  shook  the  states  of  Germany  to  their  foundations. 
Germany  rang  with  familiar  phrases  :  freedom  of  the  press, 
trial  by  jury,  and,  above  all,  representative  constitutional  gov¬ 
ernment  and  national  unity.  By  the  middle  of  March  not 
a  state  remained  unaffected  by  the  clamor.  Revolutionists 
captured  cities  and  held  them  for  weeks  and  even  months  ; 
Metternich  fell  as  early  as  March  13,  and  Ferdinand  I 
fled  from  Vienna ;  Louis  I  of  Bavaria  was  forced  to  abdi¬ 
cate  in  favor  of  his  son  Maximilian  II.  To  appease  the 
crowd,  many  rulers  hurriedly  granted  constitutions  em¬ 
bodying  the  reforms  demanded,  and  selected  "  March  ” 
cabinets  consisting  of  members  of  the  liberal  parties  who 
were  to  institute  the  reforms ;  every  ruler  was  forced  to 
make  concessions. 

Frederick  William  IV  of  Prussia  responded  to  the  cry 
of  the  time  by  summoning  the  Diet  of  the  kingdom  to 
assemble  on  April  2,  thus  tacitly  pledging  constitutional 

91 


103.  The 
outbreak  of 
the  French 
Revolution  of 
1848  and  its 
effect  in 
Germany 


104.  Events 
in  Prussia 


92 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


105.  The 
Frankfort 
Parliament 
and  its  con¬ 
stituent 
elements 


government  in  Prussia.  At  the  same  time  he  promised  to 
cooperate  in  so  revising  the  constitution  of  the  German 
Confederation  that  German  national  unity  might  be  estab¬ 
lished.  But  the  very  day  (March  18)  these  announcements 
were  made,  when  soldiers  were  restraining  the  over-jubilant 
mob  in  Berlin,  two  accidental,  fateful  shots  resounded.  No 
one  was  wounded,  but  with  the  cry  of  "  Treason  !  Ven¬ 
geance  !  ’  ’  the  mob  threw  itself  into  a  fight  with  the  soldiers 
which  cost  many  lives.  To  stop  the  fighting  the  king 
ordered  the  withdrawal  of  the  troops  from  the  city,  and 
the  mob  ruled  for  a  day  and  a  half.  The  king’s  brother 
William,  the  heir  to  the  throne  and  a  man  with  a  brilliant 
destiny  before  him,  was  suspected  of  having  prompted  the 
first  shots ;  already  hated  by  the  people  as  the  putative 
head  of  the  reactionary  party  in  Prussia,  he  was  forced  to 
flee  in  disguise  to  England.  On  March  2 1  the  king  rode 
in  state  through  Berlin  and  halted  in  several  places  where 
he  avowed  his  desire  for  Germany’s  freedom  and  unity ; 
the  evening  of  the  same  day  he  asked  in  a  proclamation 
for  the  confidence  of  the  people  and  declared  that  the  in¬ 
terests  of  Prussia  would  thenceforth  be  merged  in  those 
of  Germany.  The  Diet  assembled  two  months  later  and  be¬ 
gan  to  discuss  the  preliminaries  of  a  constitution,  but  after 
months  of  wrangling,  in  which  the  Diet  thoroughly  dis¬ 
credited  itself,  Frederick  William  took  matters  into  his 
own  hands.  He  dissolved  the  Diet  (December  1848)  and 
issued  a  constitution. 

Early  in  March  1 848  the  Diet  of  the  German  Confeder¬ 
ation,  greatly  excited  by  recent  events  and  hastily  unfurling 
the  black,  red,  and  gold  of  the  abolished  Burschenschaft, 
decreed  the  choice  of  a  German  Parliament  by  the  direct 
vote  of  the  people.  On  the  eighteenth  of  May  1848  this 
Parliament  assembled  in  Frankfort-on-the-Main.  It  came 


STRUGGLE  FOR  CONSTITUTIONAL  LIBERTY  93 


from  near  and  far,  from  northernmost  Hanover  and  Aus¬ 
trian  Tyrol,  from  the  Bavarian  Palatinate  and  easternmost 
Prussia,  and  proceeded  to  its  first  deliberations  amid  the 
pealing  of  bells  and  the  thunder  of  cannon.  Some  of  the 
wisest  men  in  Germany  took  part  in  the  debates,  including 
Arndt,  Jacob  Grimm,  Uhland,  the  historians  Gervinus  and 
Raumer,  and  the  theologian  Dollinger.  Conscious  of  their 
prestige  and  with  enthusiasm  for  their  mission,  these  men 
set  about  the  task  of  composing  a  constitution  for  all 
Germany  and  thus  creating  a  new  united  nation.  Many 
of  the  ideas  evolved  and  expounded  at  Frankfort  furnished 
the  basis  of  later  German  law,  but  as  the  debates  pro¬ 
gressed,  the  fundamental  weaknesses  of  the  Parliament 
and  the  obstacles  to  its  success  became  more  and  more 
apparent.  The  gulf  between  the  north  and  south,  between 
the  aims  and  demands  of  conflicting  parties,  yawned  ever 
wider.  To  bridge  this  gulf  these  men  labored  in  vain. 
They  were  theoretical  idealists  in  a  situation  that  demanded 
practical  politicians. 

In  spite  of  its  inherent  faults  the  Frankfort  Parliament 
succeeded  (March  1849),  albeit  by  very  scant  majorities, 
in  adopting  a  German  national  constitution  and  in  electing 
Frederick  William  of  Prussia  "  Emperor  of  the  Germans.” 
By  these  acts  the  Parliament  declared  that  the  salvation 
of  Germany  lay  in  the  establishment  of  an  empire  with 
the  king  of  Prussia  at  the  head  ;  this  empire  was  to  be 
composed  of  parts  equal  in  area  and  power.  It  redounds 
to  the  everlasting  credit  of  the  Frankfort  Parliament  that 
it  rose  to  this  declaration.  In  its  conception  of  an  empire 
headed  by  the  king  of  Prussia  the  Parliament  anticipated  by 
twenty  years  and  more  the  historical  solution  of  the  prob¬ 
lem  of  Germany  ;  it  fixed  the  goal  of  a  large  part  of  the  Ger¬ 
man  people  from  this  time  forth.  But  Frederick  William 


106.  The 
results  of  the 
Parliament 


94 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


107.  The 
turmoil  in 
Austria 


declined  the  honor.  He  would  not  reduce  Prussia  to  an 
equality  with  other  states  by  yielding  a  jot  of  Prussia’s 
territory  or  of  Prussia’s  authority.  He  replied  to  the  offer 
of  the  crown  as  a  proud  adherent  of  legitimist  principles. 
The  crown  which  the  Parliament  offered  must  be  bestowed, 
he  said,  with  the  unanimous  agreement  of  German  rulers  ; 
the  new  imperial  constitution  must  also  be  ratified  in  the 
several  states.  As  it  was  certain  that  loyalty  to  Austrian 
leadership  would  deter  many  German  rulers  from  ratify¬ 
ing  the  Parliament’s  actions,  Frederick  William’s  reply 
checkmated  the  effort  of  that  body  to  solve  the  problem  of 
the  age.  Without  the  cooperation  of  the  heads  of  the 
German  states,  the  Parliament’s  work  went  for  naught. 
When  hot-headed  radicals,  dissatisfied  at  Frankfort,  stirred 
up  fresh  insurrections  in  Saxony  and  Baden  and  elsewhere, 
the  conservative  and  reactionary  elements  reassumed  con¬ 
trol.  Within  a  month  most  of  the  representatives  at  Frank¬ 
fort  had  been  called  home,  and  the  Parliament  died  an 
ignominious  death  in  May  1849. 

During  1848  and  1849  the  Austrian  monarchy  went 
through  a  crucial  period  in  its  history.  Simultaneous  re¬ 
volts  in  the  Italian  possessions  of  the  Hapsburgs,  in 
Hungary,  and  in  Austria  proper  threatened  to  rend  the 
monarchy  asunder  into  its  constituent  parts.  The  result 
hung  in  the  balance  through  many  months  of  bitter 
struggle.  In  Vienna  a  constitution  was  granted  as  early 
as  April  1848,  but  it  soon  proved  unsatisfactory.  Students 
and  day-laborers  captured  the  capital  and  controlled  it  until 
October.  Then  the  city  was  retaken  and  the  uprising  was 
cruelly  crushed.  In  Italy  a  decisive  victory  of  Austrian 
troops  in  July  1848  checked  the  struggle  for  liberty. 
When  the  Italians  revolted  again  in  the  spring  of  1849, 
they  were  subdued  once  more,  and  peace,  which  now 


STRUGGLE  FOR  CONSTITUTIONAL  LIBERTY  95 


seemed  permanent,  was  made  in  August.  The  Hunga¬ 
rian  struggle  for  independence,  led  by  Louis  Kossuth  and 
aided  by  Italians  from  Austria’s  possessions  in  the  penin¬ 
sula,  bore  greater  promise  of  triumph.  In  April  1849  the 
Austrians  were  entirely  driven  out  of  Hungary,  and  the 
young  republic  had  200,000  men  in  arms.  But  Russia 
came  with  a  huge  army  to  Austria’s  assistance  and  smoth¬ 
ered  the  revolt.  Meanwhile,  in  December  1848,  Ferdi¬ 
nand  had  ended  his  hollow  rule  and  abdicated  in  favor  of 
his  eighteen-year-old  nephew,  Francis  Joseph,  who  still 
(1915)  occupies  the  throne.  In  March  1849  Francis 
Joseph  approved  a  new  constitution  which  granted  a  few 
popular  rights,  but  with  the  increasing  triumphs  over  the 
revolutionists  the  forces  of  reaction  secured  the  whip  hand 
again.  Constitutional  rights  were  nullified  one  by  one,  and 
before  the  end  of  1851  Austria  was  again  the  absolute 
monarchy  of  Metternich’s  time. 

As  in  Austrian  possessions,  the  turmoil  continued  in 
many  states  of  Germany  far  down  into  1849.  The  king 
of  Saxony  fled  (May  1849)  from  the  revolutionists  in 
Dresden  and  regained  his  capital  only  with  the  aid  of 
Prussian  troops.  The  same  means  was  used  to  pacify  the 
Bavarian  Palatinate  and  to  prevent  an  uprising  of  the 
people  of  Wiirtemberg.  The  grand-duke  of  Baden  was 
driven  from  his  capital  Carlsruhe  by  revolutionists  who 
purposed  to  convert  Baden  into  a  republic.  Here  the  fight 
was  longer,  but  under  Prince  William  of  Prussia,  who  had 
returned  from  England,  Prussian  soldiers  restored  the  old 
regime.  With  the  restoration  of  order  in  Baden  the  de¬ 
feat  of  the  popular  movement  throughout  Germany  was 
complete.  The  spirit  of  reaction  surged  back  over  the 
states  triumphant  once  more.  The  liberal  March  cabinets 
vanished  and  with  them  the  March  concessions.  The 


108.  The 
suppression 
of  tevolts  in 
other  states 
and  the 
return  of 
reaction 


96 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


109.  The 
popular  fail¬ 
ures  and  suc¬ 
cesses  of  1848 
and  1849 


dream  of  constitutional  liberty  took  flight,  it  seemed,  for¬ 
ever.  Through  persecutions  which  followed  the  return  of 
reaction  Germany  lost  some  of  its  best  blood.  Able  men, 
Carl  Schurz  and  many  others,  left  Germany,  either  to 
escape  the  penalty  for  rebellion  or  to  seek  liberty  in  other 
lands.  In  America,  true  to  their  German  ideals  of  unity 
and  liberty,  many  of  these  men  were  potent  factors  in  pre¬ 
serving  the  Union  and  in  emancipating  the  negro;  they 
made  themselves  an  integral  element  of  a  nation  which 
owes  in  part  to  them  its  idealism  and  social  stability. 

The  German  people  of  1850  thought  they  had  labored 
in  vain.  Divided  according  to  state  lines  into  isolated  re¬ 
bellions,  the  popular  movement  was  crushed  here  and 
there  in  turn.  Not  a  state  produced  a  leader  who  could 
bind  together  and  direct  effectively  the  discontented  ele¬ 
ments  of  the  time ;  the  struggles  for  state  constitutions 
resulted,  therefore,  only  in  the  transitory  successes  of  mob 
violence.  Nor  did  a  popular  national  leader  appear.  The 
insurrections  of  1848  and  1849  never  assumed  any  sem¬ 
blance  of  a  cumulative  national  uprising ;  they  did  not 
seem  to  advance  German  national  unity  at  all.  Burdened 
by  a  sense  of  this  double  failure,  German  people  of  1850 
to  1855  sank  back  farther  than  ever  into  hopeless,  inactive 
pessimism.  Nevertheless  the  popular  gains  of  1848  and 
1849  appear  to  a  later  generation  distinct  and  substantial. 
In  the  conflict  of  arms  and  ideas  the  German  people  arrived 
at  an  unprecedented  understanding  of  the  principles  for 
which  they  were  contending ;  they  formulated  precisely 
their  political  ambitions.  The  Frankfort  Parliament  re¬ 
vealed  to  them,  moreover,  a  vision  of  national  unity  and 
the  path  by  which  unity  might  be  attained.  However  dark 
were  the  years  which  followed,  this  vision  never  wholly 
faded.  The  German  people  never  reverted,  nor  could  they 


STRUGGLE  FOR  CONSTITUTIONAL  LIBERTY  97 


revert,  to  the  adolescent  confusion  of  ideas  and  aims  which 
characterizes  the  decades  preceding  1848.  Besides  bestow¬ 
ing  these  spiritual  gains,  the  struggles  of  the  recent  past 
exhibited  one  state,  Prussia,  which  could  withstand  the 
terrific  blows  of  the  time  at  home  and  abroad.  Prussia 
not  only  soon  restored  order  within  its  own  kingdom  ;  it 
was  also  able  to  lend  vital  assistance  to  the  rulers  of  other 
German  states.  It  appeared  in  February  1850  as  the 
leader  of  a  new  era  in  German  political  life  when  P'red- 
erick  William  yielded  to  the  wishes  of  his  people  and 
granted  a  new  and  permanent  constitution.  This  docu¬ 
ment,  the  most  conspicuous  tangible  gain  of  1848  and 
1849,  furnished  in  considerable  measure  the  prototype  of 
new  constitutions  granted  later  by  other  German  rulers. 

The  Prussian  constitution  of  1850  contained  in  the  main 
the  provisions  which  govern  Prussia  to-day.  It  guarantees 
the  equality  of  all  men  before  the  law,  trial  by  jury,  freedom 
of  religion,  freedom  of  speech  and  of  the  press,  and  the 
right  of  peaceable  assembly.  The  king  appoints  and  dis¬ 
misses  his  ministers  ;  they  are  responsible  to  him  and  not 
to  the  Diet,  or,  to  use  the  American  term,  the  Legislature. 
The  king  and  the  two  houses  of  the  Legislature  have  equal 
rights  in  the  making  of  laws.  But  he  may  adjourn  the  Legis¬ 
lature  for  thirty  days,  and  if  he  thinks  a  newly  chosen  body 
of  law-makers  will  prove  more  amenable  than  the  one  in 
session,  he  may  dissolve  the  existing  Legislature.  Besides 
all  these  rights  the  king  also  enjoys  that  of  unconditional 
veto.  It  is  possible,  therefore,  for  him  to  avert  all  distaste¬ 
ful  legislation.  The  upper  house  of  the  Legislature,  the 
House  of  Lords,  consists  of  hereditary  nobles,  peers 
selected  by  the  king,  and  representatives  of  the  universi¬ 
ties  and  chief  towns.  The  lower  house,  the  House  of 
Deputies,  is  made  up  of  representatives  of  the  people. 


110.  The 
Prussian  con¬ 
stitution 


98 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


Three-class 

suffrage 


111.  The 
first  clash 
between  Aus¬ 
tria  and 
Prussia  for 
preeminence 
in  Germany 


Every  male  Prussian,  over  twenty-four  years  old,  may 
vote  for  the  electors  who  choose  the  members  of  the 
House  of  Deputies.  But  the  richest  men  who  pay  one 
third  of  the  taxes  of  a  given  district  form  a  group  and 
choose  one  third  of  the  district’s  electors ;  the  taxpayers 
next  in  wealth  likewise  form  a  group  and  choose  one 
third ;  while  the  remainder  of  the  people  choose  the  last 
third  of  the  electors.  Thus  it  is  possible  that  one  rich 
man,  if  he  pay  a  third  of  the  taxes,  has  as  much  power 
in  electing  a  district’s  representatives  as  all  the  working¬ 
men  combined.  As  men  of  education  normally  belong  to 
the  second  class  of  taxpayers,  the  Prussian  constitution 
entrusts  the  welfare  of  the  lower  classes  to  the  wisdom 
and  good  will  of  the  rich  and  educated.  Wide  difference 
of  opinion  in  regard  to  the  discharge  of  this  trust  has  led 
to  many  loud  but  ineffective  demands  for  a  reform  of  the 
suffrage  laws.  In  the  light  of  the  twentieth  century  the 
Prussian  constitution  presents  very  distinct  traces  of  Fred¬ 
erick  William’s  medieval  absolutism  and  a  very  imperfect 
realization  of  liberal  ideals.  Nevertheless  the  establishment 
of  Prussian  constitutional  government  marked  the  dawn 
of  a  new  day  in  German  political  life.  It  overthrew  in  a 
leading  German  state  the  principle  of  absolutism  in  favor 
of  that  of  constitutional  monarchy;  it  established  the  prin¬ 
ciple  of  cooperative  personal  responsibility  in  public  affairs. 

The  German  leadership  which  Prussia  had  assumed  in 
constitutional  affairs  and  which  had  been  ascribed  to  Prussia 
by  the  Frankfort  Parliament  was  emphasized  by  Frederick 
William  in  his  "league  of  three  kings.”  In  May  1849, 
less  than  a  month  after  he  had  declined  the  crown  offered 
by  the  deputation  from  Frankfort,  Frederick  William  united 
the  kings  of  Hanover  and  Saxony  with  himself  in  a  league 
which  was  to  serve  as  a  magnet  for  all  the  other  German 


STRUGGLE  FOR  CONSTITUTIONAL  LIBERTY  99 


states  except  Austria ;  thus,  through  the  agreement  of 
rulers,  Frederick  William  tried  to  establish  the  national 
unity  which  the  Parliament  had  desired  as  the  expression 
of  the  will  of  the  people.  Agreeing  upon  a  roughly  out¬ 
lined  constitution,  the  three  original  members  of  the  league 
succeeded  within  a  few  months  in  securing  the  adherence 
of  eighteen  other  states.  A  parliament  was  then  summoned 
to  meet  in  Erfurt  in  March  1850  and  construct  a  perma¬ 
nent  constitution.  But  before  it  assembled,  defections  had 
begun.  The  desire  for  national  unity  had  been  too  much 
weakened  by  recent  blows  to  overcome  the  particularistic 
demands  of  individual  states,  and  Austria,  as  it  regained 
strength  at  home,  opposed  more  and  more  openly  a  scheme 
which  would  shatter  its  influence  in  Germany.  The  Erfurt 
Parliament  adjourned  in  April  never  to  meet  again,  though 
Prussia  clung  to  its  belief  in  the  vitality  of  the  union.  As 
if  nothing  had  happened,  Austria  invited  all  the  members 
of  the  German  Confederation  to  send  delegates  to  a  Diet 
to  be  held  at  Frankfort-on-the-Main  in  May.  A  large 
majority  of  the  states  followed  this  invitation.  Thus  the 
most  momentous  German  problem  of  the  nineteenth  cen¬ 
tury,  the  dualism  of  Austria  and  Prussia  or  the  struggle 
between  these  two  powers  for  the  hegemony  of  Germany, 
thrust  itself  into  the  foreground  of  national  life  and  de¬ 
manded  solution.  This  was  the  outcome  of  the  rivalry 
between  Prussia  and  Austria  which  Frederick  the  Great 
had  initiated,  however  unconsciously,  a  hundred  years  be¬ 
fore.  Since  Frederick’s  time  many  historical  events  had 
sprung  from  this  rivalry,  but  it  was  not  until  1850  that 
rivalry  became  an  open  struggle  for  preeminence.  After 
the  events  of  1850  the  struggle  between  these  two  states 
formed  the  backbone  of  German  history  until  the  question 
was  settled  in  1866. 


IOO 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


112.  An  Aus¬ 
trian  defeat 
of  Prussia  in 
diplomacy 


113.  Failures 
of  Austria’s 
foreign  and 
domestic 
policies 


A  crisis  arose  in  the  relations  between  Austria  and 
Prussia  while  the  restored  Diet  of  the  German  Confeder¬ 
ation  was  still  in  session  (September  1850).  The  elector 
of  Hesse-Cassel,  who  had  thrown  his  land  into  turmoil  by 
overriding  its  constitution,  fled  to  Frankfort,  where,  in  spite 
of  the  fact  that  his  electorate  was  a  member  of  the  Prussian 
union,  he  called  upon  the  Diet  for  aid  against  his  sub¬ 
jects.  True  to  its  traditions,  Austria  backed  the  reaction¬ 
ary  elector ;  Prussia  opposed  him  because  he  had  ignored 
his  obligations  to  the  union.  In  November  the  Prussian 
and  Austrian  armies  stood  face  to  face  in  Hesse  ;  war  was 
imminent ;  but  the  only  life  claimed  by  the  few  shots  ex¬ 
changed  was  that  of  one  gray  horse.  Before  the  end  of  the 
month  a  meeting  of  the  prime  ministers  of  Prussia  and 
Austria  was  held  at  Olmiitz,  and  the  Prussian  yielded  every 
point  of  disagreement.  Prussia  gave  up  its  plan  of  forming 
a  union  ;  Prussian  troops  evacuated  Hesse  and  Baden ; 
and  Hesse  was  handed  over  to  its  reactionary  elector. 
Austrian  influence  was  again  supreme  in  Germany.  Prussia 
was  defeated  as  utterly  as  at  Jena  and  without  the  conso¬ 
lation  of  having  made  an  honorable  stand. 

Strengthened  by  its  triumph  at  Olmiitz,  Austria  at¬ 
tempted  to  force  a  place  in  the  Zollverein  for  itself  and 
all  its  heterogeneous  provinces,  but  the  determination  of 
Prussia  and  other  states  to  safeguard  the  German  character 
of  the  customs-union  frustrated  Austria’s  plans.  In  April 
1853  the  Zollverein  as  already  constituted  was  renewed 
for  a  term  of  twelve  years.  During  the  Crimean  War  (1853- 
1856)  Prussia  remained  neutral  and  preserved  its  friendly 
relations  with  all  the  combatants.  Austria  never  actively 
engaged  in  the  conflict,  but  in  1856  it  made  a  feint  at 
joining  England  and  France  in  their  alliance  with  Turkey, 
and  Russia  was  compelled  to  sue  for  peace.  Austria  won 


STRUGGLE  FOR  CONSTITUTIONAL  LIBERTY  IOI 


no  friends  in  western  Europe,  for  its  negotiations  were 
always  hesitating,  and  it  incurred  the  enmity  of  Russia  by 
refusing  a  return  of  Russia’s  decisive  aid  in  the  rebellion 
of  Hungary  in  1849.  The  friendship  between  Austria  and 
Russia,  dating  from  the  formation  of  the  Holy  Alliance 
in  1815  and  often  reenforced  in  the  conflicts  between  re¬ 
action  and  liberalism,  was  a  closed  chapter  in  European 
politics.  Austria  was  isolated.  Hardly  more  successful 
than  its  foreign  policy  was  the  method  of  government 
which  Austria  was  employing  at  home.  Much  was  said  of 
reforms  and  popular  benefits,  but  the  vanity  of  these  asser¬ 
tions  was  soon  made  manifest.  In  1859  Austria  fell  into 
war  with  its  Italian  provinces  and  after  only  ten  weeks  lost 
all  its  possessions  in  the  peninsula  except  Venice ;  Italy 
now  established  its  kingdom  and  crowned  Victor  Emmanuel 
in  March  1861.  Austria  rose  from  its  defeat,  however, 
potentially  stronger  than  before,  for  it  had  learned  much. 
It  cast  aside  at  once  its  long-cherished  policy  of  reaction 
and  prepared  to  establish  a  more  liberal  form  of  govern¬ 
ment.  After  a  year  of  preliminaries  a  permanent  consti¬ 
tutional  era  began  in  Austria  proper  in  i860,  and  seven 
years  later  in  Hungary.  Fleeting  concessions  of  1848 
were  embodied  in  these  new  constitutions.  Austria  thereby 
regained  support  in  many  German  states. 

Though  blighted  by  events  of  1 849  and  the  early  fifties, 
the  popular  desire  for  national  German  unity  regained  its 
vigor  before  a  decade  had  passed.  Idealists  raised  the  cry 
as  before  and  they  were  now  aided  by  the  swelling  forces 
of  industrial  life,  by  merchants  and  manufacturers,  who 
saw  foreign  markets  closed  to  them  through  the  impotence 
of  the  German  Confederation.  The  desire  for  national 
unity  was  fostered  and  disseminated  by  many  agencies, 
especially  by  gatherings  of  lawyers,  scholars,  and  business 


114.  The  re¬ 
newal  of  the 
popular  de¬ 
sire  for  na¬ 
tional  unity 


102 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


115.  The 
discord  be¬ 
tween  Ger¬ 
man  states 


men.  Gymnastic  contests,  music  festivals,  and  fairs  as¬ 
sembled  huge  crowds,  often  from  long  distances,  thus 
affording  the  people  of  different  states  an  opportunity  to 
understand  each  other  better  and  promoting  the  desire  for 
unity.  Newspapers  and  periodicals  increased  with  great 
rapidity ;  patriotic  pamphlets  were  circulated  broadcast. 
Freytag’s  prose  essays,  Pictures  of  Germany  in  Past  Times, 
and  the  poetry  of  Scheffel,  Reuter,  and  others  bear  lasting 
testimony  to  the  wave  of  longing  for  national  unity  which 
swept  over  Germany  in  the  fifties.  In  1859,  just  as  con¬ 
stitutional  government  was  being  permanently  established 
in  Austria  and  other  German  states,  the  centennial  cele¬ 
bration  of  the  birth  of  Schiller,  Germany’s  great  apostle 
of  political  freedom,  caught  up  the  whole  country  in  a 
flood-tide  of  national  enthusiasm.  Thrilled  by  Schiller’s 
idealism  and  by  his  lessons  of  peace  and  concord  Germany, 
for  a  moment,  was  a  unit. 

The  question  of  German  unity  was,  however,  not  solved 
at  this  happy  juncture,  in  part  because  numerous  rulers, 
those  of  Bavaria,  Hanover,  Saxony,  and  other  states,  were 
still  opposed  on  principle  to  any  surrender  of  sovereign 
rights,  in  part  because  they  differed  irreconcilably  in  regard 
to  the  form  and  leadership  of  a  united  Germany.  The 
whole  country,  including  both  rulers  and  people,  was  di¬ 
vided  into  two  camps  :  that  which  desired  a  "  little  Ger¬ 
many  ”  with  Prussia  at  the  head,  and  that  which  favored 
a  "great  Germany”  with  Austria  as  the  leader.  States 
which  had  desired  to  ally  the  German  Confederation  with 
Austria  against  Italy  and  had  been  held  back  by  Prussia’s 
persistent  neutrality  turned  to  Austria  as  the  traditional 
leader  of  Germany,  and  with  all  the  more  warmth  when 
they  saw  the  dawn  of  Austria’s  constitutional  era.  Other 
states  saw  in  the  inclusion  of  Austria  with  its  burden  of 


STRUGGLE  FOR  CONSTITUTIONAL  LIBERTY  103 


varying  nationalities  the  erection  of  an  edifice  foredoomed 
to  fall  of  its  own  top-heaviness.  The  efforts  for  the  new 
thus  failed  through  the  conflict  of  ideals.  Nor  were  vari¬ 
ous  attempts  to  utilize  the  old  attended  by  more  success. 
The  German  Confederation  could  not  be  rehabilitated 
because  no  scheme  that  was  proposed  enlisted  general 
cooperation. 

In  October  1857  Frederick  William  IV  fell  ill  and 
was  succeeded  by  his  brother,  William  I,  who  was  first 
regent  and  afterwards  (from  January  1861)  king.  A  son 
of  Frederick  William  III  and  Queen  Louise,  William  was 
almost  sixty-four  years  old  at  his  accession  ;  he  could  recall 
events  which  preceded  the  triumph  at  Leipsic  and  even 
the  disaster  at  Jena.  He  had  won  the  order  of  the  Iron 
Cross  in  1814  and  entered  Paris  with  the  allies  of  the 
Fifth  Coalition.  Permeated  with  Prussian  and  Hohen- 
zollern  traditions,  he  believed  as  fixedly  as  any  of  his 
ancestors  in  a  strongly  centralized  government ;  he  was 
also  devoutly  convinced  that  Prussia  was  destined  to  reunite 
Germany.  Though  slow  of  thought  and  unimaginative, 
he  soon  revealed  a  positiveness  of  action  and  a  tenacity  of 
purpose  which  set  him  at  an  opposite  pole  from  Frederick 
William  IV.  Under  William’s  guidance  Prussia  took  and 
maintained  its  position  of  neutrality  during  Austria’s  war 
in  Italy,  despite  the  resentment  of  Austria  and  other  Ger¬ 
man  states.  In  1863,  contrary  to  the  wishes  of  Austria 
and  its  friends,  Prussia  induced  the  Diet  of  the  Confed¬ 
eration  to  intervene  in  Hesse-Cassel ;  the  Diet  compelled 
the  elector  to  discard  the  constitution  which  he  had  forced 
upon  his  people  in  i860  and  to  follow  the  more  liberal 
Hessian  constitution  of  1831. 

A  soldier  from  his  youth,  William  I  considered  the  army 
the  mainstay  of  the  Government  and  the  foundation  of 


116.  The  ac¬ 
cession  of 
William  I  in 
Prussia 


104 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


117.  The 
reorganiza¬ 
tion  of  the 
Prussian 
army 


118.  The 

constitutional 

conflict 


Prussia’s  hopes  for  the  future.  After  the  events  of  1859 
he  believed  more  and  more  that  a  clash  with  Austria  was 
inevitable.  He  therefore  began  a  thorough  reorganization 
of  the  Prussian  army.  The  period  of  three  years’  active 
service  remained  the  same,  but  the  number  of  new  recruits 
every  year  was  raised  on  the  basis  of  the  increased  popu¬ 
lation  from  40,000  to  63,000,  thus  enlarging  the  army  by 
half  as  many  more,  or  establishing  for  time  of  peace,  in¬ 
cluding  both  officers  and  troops,  a  host  of  213,000  men. 
At  the  same  time,  the  period  of  service  in  the  first  reserve 
was  lengthened  from  two  to  four  years,  which  increased 
enormously  the  number  of  troops  at  command  as  soon  as 
war  might  be  declared.  The  Landwehr,  or  second  reserve, 
entailed  a  further  liability  to  service  for  nine  more  years. 
Thus,  for  sixteen  years,  approximately  from  his  twentieth 
to  his  thirty-sixth  year,  a  Prussian  was  liable  to  service  in 
the  army.  The  intent  and  effect  of  this  system  was  to  put 
the  burden  of  war  upon  young  men,  and  to  spare  men  of 
middle  age  and  over  for  the  conduct  of  business  and  the 
care  of  the  families  of  the  land.  In  actual  practice  the 
system  proved  so  effective  that  it  remained  unchanged  for 
over  thirty  years. 

The  necessary  appropriations  for  the  army  were  granted 
at  first,  but  in  1861  the  House  of  Deputies  refused  to 
sanction  the  outlay  again  and  thus  entered  upon  a  long 
struggle  with  the  king.  This  struggle,  known  as  "  the 
constitutional  conflict,”  revolved  about  the  question  of  the 
king’s  right  under  the  constitution  to  make  outlays  not 
sanctioned  by  the  House  of  Deputies.  Early  in  the  con¬ 
flict  various  factions  in  the  House  consolidated  in  two 
political  parties,  forbears  of  parties  in  the  Reichstag  of  to¬ 
day  :  the  Conservatives,  chiefly  members  of  the  lesser  no¬ 
bility,  who  supported  the  Government,  and  the  Progressives, 


STRUGGLE  FOR  CONSTITUTIONAL  LIBERTY  105 


representatives  of  the  middle  and  lower  classes,  who  op¬ 
posed  the  outlays.  But  the  Progressives  outnumbered  the 
Conservatives  by  four  to  one,  and  there  was  never  doubt  of 
the  position  which  the  House  would  take  on  any  phase  of 
the  constitutional  conflict.  The  opposition  of  the  House, 
which  was  bitter  from  the  start,  became  intense  in  October 
1861,  when  at  his  formal  coronation  William  proclaimed 
the  divine  origin  of  his  crown  and  told  the  Legislature 
that  it  had  been  called  together  as  an  adviser  of  the  crown  ; 
this  threat  at  the  constitution  alarmed  many  patriots  at 
home  and  many  friends  of  Prussia  in  other  states. 

In  the  critical  situation  which  followed,  William,  instead 
of  following  his  inclination  to  abdicate,  made  (September 
1862)  Otto  von  Bismarck  his  prime  minister.  Bismarck 
was  thoroughly  conversant  with  European  politics  through 
his  experience  as  ambassador  to  Russia  and  to  1'rance ;  he 
believed  as  earnestly  as  William  himself  in  a  strongly 
centralized  monarchy ;  and  he  clearly  foresaw  both  the 
conflict  with  Austria  and  the  necessity  of  eliminating  Aus¬ 
tria  from  Germany  in  order  to  achieve  German  unity. 
Bismarck  therefore  cordially  approved  the  reorganization 
of  the  army.  He  proceeded  to  carry  it  on  without  appro¬ 
priations,  confident  that  the  end  would  justify  the  means 
and  that  an  indemnity  would  then  be  forthcoming.  Bis¬ 
marck  could  not  reveal  the  basic  reason  for  the  new  army 
measures ;  if  he  did,  Austria  would  have  all  the  rest  of 
Europe  on  its  side,  and  the  idealists  in  the  Prussian  Legis¬ 
lature,  who  foresaw  a  unification  of  Germany  through  rea¬ 
son  and  persuasion,  would  oppose  the  army  policy  all  the 
more  bitterly.  In  1863  Bismarck  went  so  far  as  to  suspend 
the  freedom  of  the  press  in  order  to  protect  the  Govern¬ 
ment  from  attacks.  War  between  Austria  and  Prussia  was 
imminent  in  1863  when  Bismarck  openly  advised  the 


119.  The 
appointment 
of  Bismarck 
as  prime 
minister 


106  GERMANY  SINCE  1740 

Austrian  minister  to  transfer  the  seat  of  Austrian  power 
to  Hungary,  outside  of  Germany  ;  and  again  when  it  was 
widely  known  that  Austria  was  stirring  up  other  German 
states  against  Prussia.  These  war  clouds  vanished,  but  the 
question  of  Austrian  or  Prussian  supremacy  in  Germany 
was  hastening  to  its  solution. 


CHAPTER  X 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE 

1863-187 1 

The  last  act  of  the  struggle  between  Austria  and  Prussia 
for  the  hegemony  of  Germany  began  in  1864,  when  long¬ 
standing  trouble  in  the  duchies  of  Schleswig  and  Holstein 
again  became  acute.  Schleswig  was  a  province  of  Denmark ; 
Holstein  was  "personally”  united  with  Denmark  in  so  far 
as  its  reigning  duke  was  also  the  Danish  king,  but  it  was 
independent  of  the  Danish  kingdom  —  just  as  Hanover 
was  of  England  —  and  it  was  a  member  of  the  German 
Confederation.  At  the  same  time,  Schleswig  and  Holstein 
were  connected  with  each  other  by  ancient  law  of  the  two 
duchies,  which  stated  that  Schleswig  and  Holstein  were 
"  indissolubly  united.”  On  the  principle  of  this  union 
Denmark,  supported  by  the  Danes  who  formed  one  third 
of  the  population  of  Schleswig,  wished  to  make  both  duchies 
Danish  provinces.  On  the  same  principle  the  remaining  two 
thirds  of  the  people  of  Schleswig,  who  were  German,  and 
all  Holstein,  which  was  inhabited  by  Germans  exclusively, 
desired  complete  independence  of  Denmark  and  alliance 
with  Germany.  In  the  course  of  the  nineteenth  century, 
when  the  approaching  extinction  of  the  male  line  of  the 
Danish  royal  family  forecast  the  succession  of  a  female 
branch,  whereas  Holstein  by  its  law  must  go  to  the  nearest 
male  heir,  the  Germans  of  the  two  duchies  saw  a  chance  to 
realize  their  desire  of  union  with  the  German  Confederation. 


120.  The 
trouble  in 
Schleswig 
and  Holstein 
down  to  1863 


107 


121.  Events 
of  1863 


108  GERMANY  SINCE  1740 

They  fought  for  their  independence  with  great  pluck  in 
1848  and  1849  and  1850,  but  European  powers  intervened 
and  decided  in  the  London  Protocol  of  1852  that  both  the 
duchies  should  be  united  with  Denmark  and  be  handed 
down  with  the  Danish  crown.  The  people  of  the  duchies 
were  bitterly  dissatisfied  and  so  were  the  people  of  Germany. 

In  1863,  when  the  new  king  of  Denmark  treated 
Schleswig  as  a  Danish  province  and  entirely  discon¬ 
nected  from  Holstein,  the  Diet  of  the  German  Confed¬ 
eration  fell  into  line  with  popular  feeling.  After  declaring 
itself  in  favor  of  the  male  succession  in  Holstein  and  the 
"  indissoluble  union  ”  of  the  two  duchies,  the  Diet  sent 
troops  into  Holstein  "  pending  the  settlement  of  the  suc¬ 
cession.”  England  and  Russia  protested  vigorously  against 
this  violation  of  the  London  Protocol,  and  Bismarck  there¬ 
fore  feared  the  execution  of  the  Protocol  and  the  frustration 
of  his  own  plans.  Bismarck  intended  from  the  beginning 
to  annex  the  two  duchies  to  Prussia,  and  thus  by  a  single 
stroke  to  enlarge  Prussia  and  also  to  prevent  the  establish¬ 
ment  of  a  state  which  might  impair  Prussia’s  influence 
in  North  Germany.  He  therefore  at  once  joined  with 
Austria  in  urging  the  German  Confederation  to  demand 
that  Denmark  observe  the  united  destiny  of  the  duchies 
as  provided  in  the  London  Protocol.  When  the  Diet  natu¬ 
rally  refused  to  rescind  its  action,  Bismarck  considered 
himself  free  from  any  fealty  to  the  acts  of  the  Diet. 
Austria  and  Prussia  now  announced  that  they  would 
proceed  as  independent  European  powers. 

In  January  1864  Austria  and  Prussia  issued  an  ulti¬ 
matum  to  Denmark  to  observe  the  London  Protocol,  and 
when  the  Danish  Government  gave  an  evasive  reply,  they 
started  45,000  Austrian  and  Prussian  soldiers  toward  the 
frontier  with  the  demand  that  Denmark  evacuate  Schleswig. 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  109 


Denmark  was  powerless  against  this  combined  force.  The 
allies  secured  one  victory  after  another,  on  land  and  sea, 
and  Denmark  was  obliged  to  sign  a  peace  (October  1864) 
which  relinquished  the  two  duchies  to  the  rulers  of  Austria 
and  Prussia  jointly.  In  the  following  year  (August  1865) 
the  two  powers  agreed  at  Gastein  that  Prussia  should  govern 
Schleswig,  and  Austria  Holstein.  The  claims  of  the  male 
heir  of  Holstein  were  thus  ignored,  to  the  disappointment 
of  the  greater  part  of  the  German  Confederation  and  also 
contrary  to  the  real  wishes  of  Austria,  since  Austria  realized 
now  the  difficulties  of  administering  so  remote  a  province 
and  desired  at  heart  to  be  relieved  of  Holstein  altogether. 
While  Austria  was  chafing  under  its  burden,  Bismarck 
negotiated  a  commercial  treaty  between  Italy  and  the 
Zollverein,  which  involved  the  recognition  of  the  Italian 
kingdom  in  direct  opposition  to  Austria’s  bearing  toward 
Italy.  Austria  replied  by  giving  a  free  rein  in  Holstein  to 
the  movement  which  favored  the  male  heir’s  accession  to 
both  duchies.  Thus,  backed  by  German  popular  sentiment, 
Austria  put  an  end  to  the  Gastein  convention  and  to  ami¬ 
cable  relations  with  Prussia.  The  settlement  of  affairs  in 
Schleswig  and  Holstein  thus  became  a  German  national 
problem  and  merged  into  the  Austro-Prussian  struggle  for 
preeminence.  As  Bismarck  desired  and  intended,  it  pre¬ 
cipitated  the  solution  of  this  question  ;  it  proved  to  be  the 
first  step  toward  the  foundation  of  the  German  Empire. 
On  June  14,  1866,  at  the  proposal  of  Austria,  the  Diet 
of  the  Confederation  voted  in  favor  of  mobilizing  the  troops 
of  the  allied  states  for  a  war  against  Prussia.  Prussia  with¬ 
drew  from  the  Confederation  at  once.  When  it  severed 
connection  with  its  allies,  Prussia  proposed  the  formation 
of  a  German  federation  which  would  exclude  Austria  and 
accept  Prussia  as  its  head. 


122.  The 
trend  of 
events  in 
Schleswig 
and  Holstein 
to  war  be¬ 
tween  Aus¬ 
tria  and 
Prussia 


I IO 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


Bismarck  had  already  (April  1866)  negotiated  a  secret 
agreement  between  Italy  and  Prussia,  in  which  Italy,  with  a 
view  to  wresting  Venice  from  Austria,  promised  to  cooperate 
with  Prussia  in  case  of  a  war  between  Austria  and  Prussia. 
Napoleon  III,  who  had  succeeded  in  establishing  (1852) 
an  empire  in  France  with  himself  at  its  head,  also  assured 
Bismarck  that  France  would  not  intervene.  Other  Euro¬ 
pean  powers  followed  the  example  of  French  neutrality, 
either  because  they  felt  no  decisive  preferential  friendship 
for  Austria  or  for  Prussia,  or  because  they  were  sufficiently 
engaged  with  affairs  at  home.  In  the  states  of  Germany 
the  skies  looked  dark  for  Prussia.  Bismarck  had  deeply 
offended  public  opinion  by  his  dealings  with  Schleswig 
and  Holstein,  and  the  constitutional  conflict  in  Prussia  had 
undermined  confidence  in  the  wisdom  and  the  stability  of 
the  Prussian  Government.  To  be  sure,  the  internal  affairs 
of  Austria  as  well  as  those  of  other  states  were  no  healthier 
than  those  of  Prussia,  but  Austria  had  swept  into  line  with 
popular  sentiment  toward  the  succession  of  the  male  heir 
in  Holstein,  and  Austria  continued  to  enjoy  the  advantage 
of  traditional  leadership.  Prussia’s  proposal  of  a  new  fed¬ 
eration  excluding  Austria  awoke  therefore  but  a  feeble 
response.  A  few  small  North  German  states  followed 
Prussia,  but  all  the  larger  states  stood  by  Austria.  With 
the  forces  of  the  allies  gathering  about  it  Austria  reckoned 
on  a  host  of  800,000  men.  Bismarck  knew,  however,  that 
Prussia  was  not  unprepared.  Through  the  work  of  Roon, 
a  man  of  extraordinary  executive  ability,  the  Prussian  army 
had  been  vastly  strengthened  in  efficiency  as  well  as  in 
numbers  by  the  system  established  in  recent  years.  The 
consolidating  effect  of  universal  service  in  the  army  could 
also  be  relied  upon.  This  appeared  indeed  at  once,  even 
before  the  first  clash  of  arms.  When  the  country  saw  rich 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  ill 

and  poor,  high  and  low,  called  forth  and  lining  up  in  the 
ranks  of  the  army,  all  thought  of  the  constitutional  con¬ 
flict  vanished.  To  the  chagrin  of  Austria  and  its  allies, 
Prussia  rose  as  one  man  and  threw  itself  heart  and  soul 
into  the  war. 

On  June  15,  1866  Prussia  ordered  Hanover,  Saxony, 
and  Hesse-Cassel  to  cease  their  preparations  for  war  and 
accept  Prussia’s  plan  of  reform  or  forfeit  their  independ¬ 
ence.  All  three  states  refused  to  obey,  and  on  June  16 
Prussian  troops  entered  each  of  the  states,  thus  beginning 
the  war.  The  masterly  plans  of  Prussia’s  military  strate¬ 
gist  Moltke  were  now  executed  with  scarcely  a  hitch.  The 
army  of  Hanover  surrendered  June  28  after  a  rapid  suc¬ 
cession  of  defeats,  and  within  the  same  time  the  armies  of 
Saxony  and  Hesse  had  retreated  to  the  south  to  join  the 
Austrian  troops  and  their  South  German  allies.  The  main 
Prussian  army  of  300,000  men  entered  Bohemia  the  last 
of  June  far  better  armed  and  supplied  than  the  250,000 
men  of  the  enemy.  Day  by  day  the  Prussians  advanced 
still  farther ;  day  by  day  they  won  another  and  another 
victory.  On  July  3  their  successes  culminated  in  the  Battle 
of  Koniggratz,  or  Sadowa,  where  the  crown  prince  of 
Prussia,  as  Bliicher  at  Waterloo,  brought  up  his  reenforce¬ 
ments  and  gave  the  enemy  the  death-blow.  After  a  cam¬ 
paign  of  only  three  weeks  the  war  was  virtually  at  an 
end,  though  the  Prussians  marched  on  to  the  outskirts  of 
Vienna.  The  Prussian  army  in  central  Germany  was 
almost  as  uniformly  successful.  It  gradually  pushed  the 
Bavarians,  Wiirtembergers,  Hessians,  and  other  allies 
farther  and  farther  toward  the  south,  and  on  July  16 
William  of  Prussia  was  informed  that  the  country  north 
of  the  Main  lay  at  his  Majesty’s  feet.  The  Italians  failed 
in  their  assaults  on  Austria’s  possessions  in  Italy,  but 


124.  The 
war  between 
Austria  and 
Prussia,  1866 


I  12 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


125.  The 
terms  of  the 
Peace  of 
Prague  and 
the  estab¬ 
lishment  of 
the  North 
German 
Federation 


Austria  was  ready  for  the  armistice  of  July  26,  which 
was  converted  a  month  later  into  the  definitive  Peace 
of  Prague. 

By  the  terms  of  the  Peace  of  Prague  (August  23,  1866) 
Austria  withdrew  from  all  political  union  with  Germany, 
yielded  Venice  to  Italy,  and  paid  Prussia  a  war  indemnity 
of  $15,000,000.  These  were  the  terms  which  Bismarck 
with  shrewd  foresight  induced  his  king  to  make ;  by  fore¬ 
going  a  greater  humiliation  of  Austria,  Bismarck  was 
paving  the  way  to  an  early  reconciliation,  and  he  was  avoid¬ 
ing  the  resentment  of  German  friends  of  Austria.  Like 
Austria,  the  South  German  states,  Baden,  Bavaria,  and 
Wiirtemberg,  were  also  required  to  pay  only  a  small  war 
indemnity  ;  the  surrender  of  a  few  square  miles  of  Bavarian 
territory  was  the  only  loss  of  land  which  any  of  them  suf¬ 
fered.  All  three  states  retained  their  independence  and 
continued  their  membership  in  the  Zollverein.  Prussia 
took  possession  of  six  more  or  less  recalcitrant  states 
—  Schleswig-Holstein,  Hanover,  Hesse-Cassel,  Hesse- 
Homburg,  Nassau,  and  Frankfort  —  and  incorporated 
them  in  Prussian  territory.  Together  with  the  twenty-one 
other  states  north  of  the  Main,  Prussia  formed  the  North 
German  Federation.  The  constitution  of  this  new  union, 
proclaimed  April  17,  1867,  was  largely  that  of  the  German 
Empire,  which  was  established  four  years  later  ;  this  con¬ 
stitution  will  presently  be  outlined.  Jealous  of  their  liberties 
as  independent  states,  Baden,  Bavaria,  and  Wiirtemberg 
remained  aloof  from  the  Federation,  but  Prussia’s  treat¬ 
ment  of  these  states  at  the  close  of  the  war  had  weakened 
their  hostility,  and  the  advantages  of  an  alliance  had  been 
patent.  As  early  as  August  1 866,  therefore,  all  three  states 
entered  into  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  Prussia 
by  which  all  territories  were  guaranteed ;  in  case  of  war 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  1 13 


against  a  non-German  country  the  South  German  states 
were  to  place  their  troops  under  Prussian  command. 

The  joy  in  Prussia  over  the  outcome  of  the  war  was 
unbounded.  The  reorganization  of  the  army  was  over¬ 
whelmingly  justified  ;  a  large  majority  of  the  Progressives 
in  the  House  of  Deputies  eagerly  joined  hands  with  a 
large  majority  of  the  Conservatives  in  voting  all  the  army 
appropriations  which  the  House  had  denied  ;  the  king 
granted  a  blanket  amnesty  for  all  political  offenses ;  and 
Bismarck  was  the  idol  of  the  hour.  All  Germany  rejoiced 
in  certain  definite  results  of  the  recent  conflict.  The  war 
of  1 866  solved  the  most  vital  German  problem  of  the  age, 
the  dualism  of  Austria  and  Prussia.  The  war  proved  the 
superiority  of  Prussia  in  state  organization  and  administra¬ 
tion,  in  diplomacy,  and  in  might.  Prussia’s  right  to  su¬ 
premacy  was  established ;  the  exclusion  of  Austria  from 
Germany  by  the  terms  of  peace  left  Prussia  the  undisputed 
leader  of  German  states.  The  formation  of  the  North 
German  Federation  was  an  outward  expression  of  this 
most  significant  result  of  the  war.  The  Federation,  how¬ 
ever,  went  a  step  farther.  It  realized  the  German  popular 
dream  of  the  century,  unity.  After  decades  of  agitation, 
hope,  and  failure,  unity  among  German  states  was  a  fact. 
On  the  ruins  of  the  makeshift  German  Confederation  stood 
a  union  which  was  virtually  the  German  Empire  of  1871. 
Germany,  as  it  has  been  constituted  in  recent  decades, 
was  made  by  the  events  of  1 866  —  though  it  was  not 
yet  complete. 

The  swift  success  of  Bismarck’s  diplomacy  and  Prussia’s 
army  startled  the  nations  of  Europe.  Anxiety  and  fear 
soon  arose  in  various  quarters,  lest  the  great  military  power 
which  had  suddenly  appeared  in  the  heart  of  Europe 
might  enter  upon  an  era  of  conquest  and  aggrandizement. 


126.  The 
supremacy  of 
Prussia  and 
the  realiza¬ 
tion  of  Ger¬ 
man  unity 


l / 


127.  Anxiety 
and  dissatis¬ 
faction  in 
France 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


128.  Bis¬ 
marck’s  at¬ 
titude  toward 
a  war  with 
France 


114 

Apprehension  was  felt  especially  by  Switzerland  and  the 
Netherlands,  but  in  France  other  more  fateful  elements 
entered  into  the  situation.  France  was  no  longer  dominat¬ 
ing  European  politics  as  during  the  Crimean  War  and  in 
the  Italian  revolt  of  1859.  It  had  been  forced  by  a  threat 
of  the  United  States  to  withdraw  from  Mexico.  It  had 
also  been  rebuffed  as  a  mediator  of  peace  in  the  conflict 
of  1866.  France  had  not  gained  a  foot  of  territory  in  the 
Peace  of  Prague  as  it  hoped,  and  it  was  chagrined  by  the 
growing  prestige  of  a  people  who  had  oeen  held  in  eclipse 
for  a  century.  Besides  anxiety  concerning  Prussia,  irrita¬ 
tion  arose  in  France  against  the  weakness  of  the  home 
Government.  Napoleon  and  his  ministers  were  bitterly 
denounced ;  it  was  thought  that  the  stability  of  the  Empire 
was  threatened.  In  these  trying  circumstances  friends  of 
the  Government  desired  a  martial  victory  more  and  more 
as  the  readiest  means  of  preserving  the  Empire,  and 
Napoleon  threw  in  his  lot  with  this  party  of  war. 

These  conditions  in  France  were  known  by  Bismarck  in 
all  detail.  Bismarck  also  saw  that  conditions  in  Germany 
were  favorable  for  war,  if  indeed  they  did  not  even  demand 
it.  In  the  Diet  of  the  North  German  Federation  numerous 
members  of  the  Conservative  party,  who  favored  the  new 
federal  system  more  than  their  former  comrades,  had 
established  a  new  party,  the  Free  Conservatives  (later  called 
the  German  Imperial  Party),  and  more  moderate,  more 
practical  Progressives  had  likewise  broken  away  from  old 
associates  and  formed  the  National  Liberal  party;  but  Bis¬ 
marck  knew  that  in  case  of  war  with  France  these  party 
differences  would  vanish  and  the  Diet  would  give  him  un¬ 
divided  support.  Bismarck  did,  however,  greatly  fear  the 
leanings  of  South  German  states,  especially  of  Bavaria, 
toward  France,  and  he  was  determined  that  these  states 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  115 

should  be  bound  to  the  North  German  Federation  and 
Germany  thus  be  made  complete.  Within  very  few  years 
he  became  convinced  that  this  could  be  done  only  by  the 
blood  of  a  war  in  which  the  South  German  states  would 
have  to  fight  with  Germany  against  France.  Bismarck  be¬ 
lieved  that  a  war  with  France  was  inevitable.  He  was 
therefore  ready  to  make  capital  out  of  the  first  chance 
that  France  offered. 

In  1870  Spain  offered  its  crown  to  a  distant  Hohenzol- 
lern  relative  of  the  king  of  Prussia.  At  the  advice  of  Bis¬ 
marck,  William  as  the  head  of  the  Hohenzollern  family 
approved  a  favorable  consideration  of  the  offer.  The  crown 
was  accepted,  but  when  strong  French  opposition  declared 
that  Prussia  was  using  this  means  to  acquire  influence  in 
Spain,  the  acceptance  was  withdrawn.  In  France  the  possi¬ 
ble  accession  of  a  Hohenzollern  to  the  Spanish  throne  con¬ 
cerned  only  the  members  of  the  party  in  power,  who  feared 
their  downfall  if  they  betrayed  any  sign  of  weakness ;  they 
therefore  became  much  agitated  over  the  Spanish  offer  and 
used  the  incident  as  a  means  to  strengthen  their  position. 
In  Prussia  the  matter  concerned  only  the  ruling  family  and 
that  indirectly,  and  the  state  not  at  all.  The  incident  was 
thus  in  no  sense  national,  and  it  therefore  seemed  closed 
by  the  withdrawal  of  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy.  The 
French  war  party,  however,  was  carried  away  by  excite¬ 
ment  and  declared  itself  not  satisfied.  In  the  name  of 
France  it  demanded  (July  1870)  that  King  William  should 
promise  for  all  time  to  refuse  his  support  to  the  Hohen¬ 
zollern  candidacy  for  the  crown  of  Spain.  This  demand 
was  refused.  Before  wiser  counsels  could  prevail  in  France, 
Bismarck  deliberately  set  fire  to  German  popular  sentiment 
by  publishing  a  telegram  from  King  William  in  a  form  so 
abbreviated  that  France  appeared  as  the  aggressor  and 


129.  The 
Immediate 
cause  of  the 
Franco- 
German  War 


1/ 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


1 1 6 


130.  Prepa¬ 
rations  for 
war 


131.  The 
Franco- 
German  War 
to  the  fall  of 
Sedan 


J 


Germany  as  the  object  of  French  insults.  France  was  thus 
forced  to  maintain  the  position  it  had  taken  and  the 
deadlock  led  to  France’s  declaration  of  war  (July  19). 

France  hoped  and  thought  that  many  of  the  German 
states,  especially  those  which  had  once  formed  the  Con¬ 
federation  of  the  Rhine,  might  join  the  French  or  at  least 
remain  neutral,  but  the  national  resentment  which  Bismarck 
had  aroused  united  all  the  states  of  Germany  as  they  had 
never  been  united  before.  On  the  day  that  France  declared 
war  the  Diet  of  the  North  German  Federation  placed  all  the 
troops  of  the  Federation  at  Prussia’s  disposal.  Within  a  week 
the  South  German  states  voted  by  large  majorities  to  stand 
by  their  alliance  of  1 866.  Germany  was  a  unit.  The  war  was 
thus  not  merely  between  France  and  Prussia;  it  was  Franco- 
German.  Besides  the  Prussian  force  of  350,000  men  King 
William  and  Moltke  could  count  on  200,000  more.  France 
had  hardly  3  50,000  men  in  arms.  Through  the  foresight  of 
Moltke  and  Roon,  Germany  enjoyed  the  further  immense 
advantage  of  an  equipment  down  to  the  last  buckle,  of  a 
staff  of  generals  who  had  proved  their  ability  very  re¬ 
cently,  and  of  a  plan  of  action  which  promised  to  move  like 
clock-work.  On  the  second  of  August,  450,000  Germans 
were  beyond  the  Rhine,  extending  in  three  main  divisions 
from  Coblenz  to  the  region  opposite  Carlsruhe ;  thus  they 
planned  to  meet  any  French  invasion  of  central  or  southern 
Germany.  One  hundred  thousand  more  were  on  their  way 
to  the  same  region,  and  provision  had  been  made  for  the 
protection  of  German  ports  on  the  North  and  Baltic  Seas. 

France  sent  two  armies  toward  Germany,  but  neither  of 
them  ever  saw  the  Rhine.  The  southern  army  was  routed 
north  of  Strassburg  by  the  southern  division  of  the  Ger¬ 
mans  ;  the  northern  army  was  defeated  by  the  German 
central  division.  The  two  French  armies  began  a  retreat, 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  117 


the  southern  army  moving  rapidly  toward  Chalons-sur- 
Mame,  the  northern  after  some  hesitation  going  by  way 
of  Metz  toward  Verdun.  While  portions  of  the  southern 
German  division  were  beginning  the  siege  of  Strassburg 
and  pursuing  the  enemy  toward  Chalons,  the  German  cen¬ 
tral  and  northern  divisions  proceeded  to  converge  at  a  point 
not  far  from  Metz.  The  northern  German  division  over¬ 
took  a  portion  of  the  northern  French  army  on  August  14 
and  delayed  their  retreat.  The  next  day,  while  the  French 
were  gathering  to  continue  their  march,  a  part  of  the  cen¬ 
tral  German  division  seized  one  of  the  three  roads  connect¬ 
ing  Metz  and  Verdun.  This  led  to  the  Battle  of  Vionville 
(August  16),  the  most  brilliant  of  the  German  victories  in 
this  neighborhood.  Against  odds  of  two  to  one  and,  for  a 
time,  of  nearly  four  to  one,  the  Germans  held  their  own 
and  stopped  the  retreat  of  the  French.  As  the  French 
took  up  a  new  position  west  of  Metz  on  the  following  day, 
instead  of  pushing  on  rapidly  along  the  other  two  roads  to 
Verdun,  the  Germans  gained  time  to  seize  both  these  roads 
and  to  unite  their  forces  for  a  final  conflict.  This,  the  Battle 
of  Gravelotte  (August  18),  lasted  all  day  and  cost  the  Ger¬ 
mans  19,000  men.  But  the  200,000  French  were  driven 
from  their  position,  and  in  the  gathering  twilight  they 
swarmed  back  into  the  fortress  of  Metz.  Here  they  were 
held  during  the  following  weeks  by  a  besieging  army  equal 
in  number  to  those  within  the  fortress.  The  remainder  of 
the  German  forces  started  at  once  against  the  French  army, 
which  was  said  to  be  at  Chalons.  But  it  had  been  decided 
at  Paris  to  send  the  Chalons  army  to  the  relief  of  Metz. 
Indeed,  the  southern  German  force,  sent  in  pursuit  of  the 
French,  had  found  Chalons  empty,  and  it  had  turned  to 
the  northeast,  still  in  pursuit.  On  August  3 1  the  French 
army  of  relief  found  itself  between  Germans  coming  from 


132.  The 
siege  of  Paris 
and  the  con¬ 
clusion  of 
peace 


1 1 8  GERMANY  SINCE  1740 

Metz  and  Germans  coming  from  Chalons.  The  Battle  of 
Sedan  followed  on  the  next  day.  With  the  fortress  of  Sedan 
at  their  backs  the  French  fought  heroically  from  four  in 
the  morning  until  three  in  the  afternoon,  but  they  were  sur¬ 
passed  in  numbers  and  in  generalship  here  as  at  Metz. 
The  Germans  completed  their  circle  around  Sedan  and 
forced  the  French  to  seek  refuge  in  the  fortress,  where  at 
six  o’clock  they  hoisted  the  white  flag.  Napoleon,  who  was 
with  this  army,  surrendered  with  100,000  men  on  Septem¬ 
ber  2.  It  seemed  that  with  the  surrender  of  the  ruler  of 
France  the  war  was  ended,  but  the  French  overthrew  their 
Empire  and  established  on  September  4  the  (Third)  French 
Republic.  After  defeating  the  Empire,  the  Germans  had 
now  to  reckon  with  a  new  French  Government. 

While  detached  corps  continued  to  lay  siege  to  Strass- 
burg  and  Metz,  the  main  German  army  pressed  on  toward 
Paris.  On  September  19  the  girdle  of  Germans  around 
the  French  capital,  though  thin,  was  complete.  A  long 
siege  followed.  For  weeks  the  Germans  had  no  effective 
means  of  bombardment,  nor  could  they  hope  to  take  the 
city  by  assault,  as  they  were  outnumbered  by  the  army  of 
defense  within  Paris  by  more  than  two  to  one.  Early  in 
October  a  member  of  the  new  French  Government  escaped 
from  Paris  in  a  balloon  and  began  to  assemble  armies  in  the 
south,  east,  and  north  of  France  to  relieve  Paris  and  to 
threaten  the  western  border  of  Germany.  But  on  Septem¬ 
ber  27  the  Germans  entered  Strassburg,  singing  The  Watch 
on  the  Rhine,  and  Metz  capitulated  October  27.  A  large 
force  was  thus  freed,  200,000  from  Metz  alone,  to  assist 
in  preventing  the  relief  of  Paris.  Nevertheless,  all  through 
the  autumn  and  down  into  January  the  fighting  continued 
in  a  great  semicircle,  with  Paris  as  the  focal  point.  Again 
and  again  attempts  were  made  from  within  Paris  to  break 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  1 19 


through  the  line  of  besiegers.  In  the  south  and  east  and 
at  Paris  the  French  achieved  temporary  successes ;  they 
were  ultimately  defeated,  in  part  by  the  enemy’s  excess  of 
numbers,  in  part  by  the  superiority  of  German  veterans 
over  the  untrained  forces  in  whom  France  had  to  place  its 
trust.  By  January  the  situation  in  Paris  grew  desperate. 
A  terrible  famine  was  added  to  incessant  bombardment 
and  lack  of  fuel.  An  unavoidable  armistice  was  signed 
January  28,  1871.  A  few  months  later  (May  10,  1871) 
this  armistice  was  converted  into  a  peace  at  Frankfort-on- 
the-Main.  France  ceded  Alsace  and  a  part  of  Lorraine  in¬ 
cluding  Metz — about  5500  square  miles  and  a  million  and 
a  half  inhabitants.  France  also  agreed  to  pay  within  three 
years  a  war  indemnity  of  $1,000,000,000. 

The  German  Empire,  a  government  which  did  not  exist 
when  the  war  began,  concluded  the  treaty  of  peace  with 
France.  Bismarck’s  vision  of  a  new  Germany  born  of  a 
consummate  union  of  Germans  against  a  foreign  foe  had 
been  realized.  During  the  first  months  of  the  war  one 
South  German  state  after  another  had  taken  steps  toward 
a  formal  alliance  with  the  North  German  Federation.  All 
signed  the  articles  of  union  by  November  25,  1870.  The 
rulers  of  all  the  German  states,  headed  by  the  king  of 
Bavaria,  then  requested  the  king  of  Prussia  to  assume  with 
the  title  of  "  German  Emperor  ”  the  hereditary  presidency 
of  the  whole  union.  Thus,  as  the  war  approached  its  tri¬ 
umphant  conclusion,  the  German  states  celebrated  the 
final  triumph  of  national  unity.  On  January  18,  1871,  to 
the  booming  of  the  cannon  in  the  siege  of  Paris,  in  the 
palace  at  Versailles  —  amid  the  most  gorgeous  memorials 
of  the  former  French  Empire  —  the  new  German  Empire 
was  formally  proclaimed  and  William  I  was  hailed  as 
German  Emperor. 


133.  The 
establish¬ 
ment  of  the 
German 
Empire 


120 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


134.  The 
constitution 
of  the  Em¬ 
pire.  The 
Bundesrat 


As  the  constitution  of  the  North  German  Federation 
was  constructed  with  a  view  to  the  ultimate  admission  of 
the  southern  states,  few  changes  were  necessary  to  make  it 
serve  the  new  Germany.  It  went  into  effect  for  the  Empire 
May  4,  1871.  The  head  of  the  Empire  is  called  "  German 
Emperor,”  not  "  President  ”  or  "  Emperor  of  Germany,”  as 
theoretically  not  he,  the  King  of  Prussia,  but  the  whole 
body  of  German  rulers  is  the  imperial  sovereign.  This  body 
is  personified  in  the  Bundesrat ,  or  "Federal  Council,”  which 
consists  of  representatives  of  the  twenty-two  rulers  of  the 
different  states,  delegates  of  the  three  free  cities,  Hamburg, 
Bremen,  and  Lubeck,and,  since  19 1 1 ,  representatives  of  the 
imperial  viceroy  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  sixty-one  members  in 
all.  Every  state  has  at  least  one  vote  in  the  Bundesrat,  but 
Prussia  has  seventeen  by  the  federal  agreement,  owing  to  its 
preponderating  size,  about  one  hundred  and  thirty-five  thou¬ 
sand  square  miles  and  nearly  forty  million  inhabitants,  or 
almost  two  thirds  of  the  whole  Empire  both  in  area  and 
population ;  by  private  agreement  Prussia  also  controls  the 
one  vote  of  the  principality  of  Waldeck.  The  members  of 
the  Bundesrat  vote  by  states  in  strict  accordance  with  in¬ 
structions  received  from  the  Governments  of  the  states. 
It  is  a  non-debating  body,  and  only  the  results,  not  the  pro¬ 
ceedings,  of  its  sessions  are  published ;  for  this  reason  dis¬ 
cussions  of  German  legislation  generally  do  not  mention  the 
Bundesrat  at  all.  |The  Bundesrat  enjoys  legislative,  execu¬ 
tive,  and  judicial  prerogatives.  It  must  sanction  bills  be¬ 
fore  they  can  become  law ;  it  regulates  the  conduct  of  the 
imperial  administration  and  appoints  many  officials ;  it  is  a 
court  of  last  resort  in  cases  where  a  state  court  is  accused 
of  a  denial  of  justice. 

The  Reichstag,  or  "  Imperial  Parliament,”  is  made  up 
of  three  hundred  and  ninety-seven  members,  elected  at 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  121 


first  for  a  term  of  three,  now  for  a  term  of  five,  years. 
One  representative  for  every  100,000  of  the  population 
as  it  was  in  1867  is  elected  by  men  over  twenty-five 
years  of  age ;  in  the  elections  to  the  Reichstag  all  mem¬ 
bers  are  chosen  throughout  the  Empire  on  the  one 
basis  of  population,  so  that  Prussia,  for  example,  uses 
one  system  of  election  to  its  Legislature  and  another  to 
the  Reichstag.  The  Reichstag  has  neither  executive  nor 
judicial  functions ;  it  is  designed  preeminently  as  a  forum 
for  the  expression  of  representative  public  opinion  on  cur¬ 
rent  legislation.  The  head  of  the  Empire,  the  emperor  as 
such,  has  limited  authority.  He  is  commander-in-chief  of 
the  army  and  navy ;  he  has  charge  of  foreign  diplomatic 
affairs  ;  he  appoints  and  dismisses  the  chancellor  and  other 
imperial  officials  not  appointed  by  the  Bundesrat.  He  may 
not  veto,  and  as  far  as  he  is  qualified  he  must  execute, 
any  law  passed  by  the  Reichstag  and  Bundesrat ;  he  may 
not  conclude  treaties  nor  declare  war  nor  dissolve  the 
Reichstag  without  the  consent  of  the  Bundesrat.  But  the 
emperor’s  imperial  functions  are  supplemented  by  his 
power  and  prerogatives  as  King  of  Prussia.  As  king,  with 
seventeen  votes,  he  can  veto  absolutely  any  constitutional 
amendment,  since  only  fourteen  votes  in  the  Bundesrat 
can  prevent  any  change  in  the  imperial  constitution.  As 
king  he  introduces  bills  into  the  Bundesrat  through  his 
prime  minister,  who  is  also  both  the  presiding  officer  of 
the  Bundesrat  and  the  imperial  chancellor,  and  as  king  he 
controls  outright  nearly  a  third  of  the  Bundesrat’s  votes ; 
in  actual  practice  he  nearly  always  controls  a  sufficient 
addendum  of  votes  from  lesser  states  to  hold  a  majority. 
In  view  of  the  wide  latitude  of  the  functions  which  the 
Bundesrat  enjoys,  the  range  of  the  power  of  the  King  of 
Prussia=German  Emperor  is  incalculable. 


135.  The 
Reichstag 
and  the 
emperor 


122 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


136.  Bis¬ 
marck  the 
founder  of 
the  German 
Empire 


137.  The 
significance 
of  the  found¬ 
ing  of  the 
German 
Empire 


The  ultimate  realization  of  German  unity  seems  an 
inevitable  product  of  an  age  which  brought  to  flower  the 
ideas  of  nationality  and  racial  unity ;  between  1 86o  and 
1865  alone,  Italy  founded  its  united  kingdom,  and  union 
ideals  triumphed  in  the  American  Civil  War.  That  Ger¬ 
man  national  unity  was  realized  as  early  as  1871,  however, 
was  due  to  Bismarck,  "the  Iron  Chancellor.”  Bismarck 
forced  the  first  step  toward  the  Empire,  the  war  with 
Denmark,  against  universal  popular  opposition  ;  Bismarck 
forced  the  second  step,  though  Prussia,  in  taking  it,  faced 
the  armed  resistance  of  Austria  and  almost  all  the  other 
German  states ;  Bismarck  was  largely  responsible  for  the 
Franco-German  War.  German  popular  imagination  con¬ 
ceives  Bismarck  truly  as  a  smith  who,  with  three  great 
blows  upon  his  anvil,  welded  the  modern  Empire.  In  sharp 
contrast  with  preceding  German  leaders  who  theorized  to 
their  destruction,  Bismarck  was  a  realist  and  dealt  with 
concrete  facts.  He  formulated  his  policies  and  purposes 
one  by  one  on  the  basis  of  things  as  they  were,  and  he 
exercised  an  amazing  dexterity  in  bringing  about  facts 
which  would  favor  his  purpose.  Imaginative  in  foresight, 
resourceful  and  not  meticulous  in  his  diplomacy,  Bismarck 
created  again  and  again  the  international  political  situation 
he  desired,  and  he  was  extraordinarily  able  in  extracting 
advantage  from  each  new  situation.  He  was  a  master  of 
realistic,  concrete  diplomacy. 

The  establishment  of  the  German  Empire  relaid  the 
foundations  of  German  life  and  of  the  relations  between  the 
powers  of  western  Europe.  A  long  and  painful  epoch  of 
German  national  prostration,  of  bitter  internal  conflicts,  and 
of  exposure  to  foreign  encroachment,  was  ended  with  the 
establishment  of  a  compact  constitutional  empire.  An  un¬ 
precedented  opportunity  was  thereby  given  to  the  German 


THE  FOUNDING  OF  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  123 


people  to  develop  their  capacities  and  to  fulfil  the  promise 
which  the  brilliant  rise  of  the  Empire  had  conveyed. 
The  Empire  had  arisen,  however,  not  as  the  idealists  had 
dreamed.  The  free  will  of  the  people,  the  feeling  of 
racial  unity  among  Germans,  the  reasonable  advantages 
of  national  unity  to  the  preservation  of  German  boundaries 
and  to  the  economic  development  of  German  states  — 
these  cardinal  principles  of  idealism  played  a  very  small 
part  in  the  founding  of  the  Empire.  The  Empire  was  the 
product  of  cold,  hard  realism,  of  sheer  force,  or,  as  Bis¬ 
marck  foretold,  of  "  blood  and  iron.”  The  German  peo¬ 
ple  realized  this  very  soon,  and  they  were  therefore  affected 
by  the  manner  in  which  the  Empire  was  founded  no  less 
than  by  the  event.  The  German  people  conceived  thereby 
a  faith  in  force,  a  veneration  of  power  and  might,  that  has 
directed  in  large  part  the  subsequent  course  of  German 
life  and  history.  They  lost  in  turn,  however,  the  sublimest 
inspiration  of  German  life  and  German  thought,  faith  in 
the  power  of  ideals,  faith  in  ideals  not  supported  by  might ; 
therein  lies  for  the  world  and  not  for  Germany  alone  the 
tragedy  of  the  events  leading  up  to  1871.  For  Europe 
the  establishment  of  the  German  Empire  signified,  first, 
the  removal  of  temptation  afforded  by  the  presence  of  a 
disorganized  nation  ;  it  restored  to  health  the  weakest  organ 
in  the  body  of  western  Europe.  The  ensuing  adjustment 
of  the  relations  of  Germany  to  the  rest  of  Europe  entailed 
a  general  readjustment  of  the  powers  to  each  other;  it 
entailed  a  proportionate  redistribution  of  prestige  and 
authority.  On  the  basis  of  the  mutual  understanding  and 
agreement  thus  tacitly  achieved,  a  balance  of  power  arose 
which  maintained  the  peace  of  Europe  for  forty-three 
years,  the  longest  period  of  peace  ever  known  among  the 
nations  of  western  Europe. 


CHAPTER  XI 


1: 

m 

fo 

tl 

E 


THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE  TO  THE  FALL  OF  BISMARCK 

187 1-1890 

138.  Prob-  The  first  years  of  the  new  Empire  were  beset  with  prob- 
new  Empire  lems  at  home  and  abroad.  At  home  Germany  had  to 
consolidate  its  different  parts ;  to  unify  its  financial  and 
economic  affairs ;  to  establish  common  codes  of  law  for 
all  the  states  ;  in  short,  to  transform  the  political  fact  of 
a  new  empire  into  the  living  organism  of  a  united  growing 
nation.  Abroad  Germany  had  to  secure  a  place  of  equality 
among  the  nations  of  Europe.  Here  the  task  was  difficult 
and  delicate.  In  the  first  place,  Germany  faced  the  scorn 
which  other  nations  had  felt  for  generations  toward  the 
disunited  "Germanies”  of  a  former  time  and  toward  Ger¬ 
many’s  long  incompetence  to  assimilate  modern  ideas  of 
nationality  and  representative  government.  In  the  second 
place,  other  nations  doubted  the  stability  of  the  new  Em¬ 
pire,  and  they  also  feared  that  the  goal  of  German  terri¬ 
torial  ambition  within  Europe  was  not  yet  reached.  The 
German  Empire  therefore  in  the  first  decades  of  its  exist¬ 
ence  had  to  allay  the  suspicion  and  secure  the  respect  of 
other  nations.  In  the  presentation  of  the  new  Empire’s 
history  at  home  and  abroad  it  will  be  well,  for  the  sake  of 
clarity,  to  discuss  in  turn  the  relations  of  Germany  with 
other  countries  ;  those  events  within  Germany  which  con¬ 
cerned  the  nation  as  a  whole  ;  and,  finally,  problems  which 
affected  chiefly  individual  German  states. 

124 


FROM  1871  TO  THE  FALL  OF  BISMARCK  125 


After  the  Franco-German  War  Germany’s  foreign  policy 
was  animated  and  directed  by  a  sincere  desire  for  peace. 
Germany  needed  peace  in  order  to  develop  its  national  life. 
Bismarck  therefore  indicated  Germany’s  pacific  intentions, 
first,  by  taking  steps  toward  a  cordial  understanding  with 
Russia,  Austria,  and  lesser  monarchies.  In  September 
1872  the  emperors  of  Russia  and  Austria  met  in  Berlin 
and  agreed  with  Emperor  William  to  an  informal  alliance 
"  without  written  obligations.”  A  year  later  Italy  mani¬ 
fested  a  desire  for  closer  relations  with  the  members  of 
the  union,  and  the  distrust  and  suspicion  of  Germany  which 
had  been  current  in  other  nations  —  the  Netherlands,  Bel¬ 
gium,  Sweden,  and  Switzerland  —  began  to  ebb.  By  draw¬ 
ing  Russia  and  other  powers  to  Germany  Bismarck,  as 
usual,  accomplished  more  than  one  purpose.  He  strength¬ 
ened  Germany’s  position  in  Europe  ;  he  forestalled  any 
possible  coalition  between  Erance  and  any  other  nation 
which  might  be  jealous  of  Germany’s  sudden  elevation ; 
and  he  made  it  impossible  for  France  to  venture  a  war  of 
revenge.  After  the  recent  conflict  the  relations  between 
Germany  and  France  were  none  too  pleasant  at  best,  and 
further  strain  was  put  upon  them  by  various  incidents  ;  for 
example,  by  the  intermeddling  of  a  German  ambassador 
in  French  affairs,  by  the  loud-voiced  sympathy  of  French 
Catholic  bishops  for  German  Catholics  who  were  under 
the  ban  of  Bismarck,  and  by  the  foolish  war  talk  of  Ger¬ 
man  army  officials.  However,  nothing  of  lasting  signifi¬ 
cance  in  German  foreign  affairs  happened  until  the  end 
of  the  seventies. 

At  a  congress  of  the  powers  in  Berlin  in  1878  Russia 
and  Austria  clashed  on  account  of  their  conflicting  inter¬ 
ests  in  the  Balkan  states.  Forced  to  choose  between  the 
two  powers,  Germany  sided  with  Austria  and  enabled  it  to 


139.  Inter¬ 
national  af¬ 
fairs.  From 
1871  to  1878 


140.  The 
Congress  of 
Berlin,  1878 


126 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


The  Triple 
Alliance 


141.  From 
1879  to  1890 


secure  the  right  to  administer  affairs  in  Bosnia  and  Herze¬ 
govina.  Russia  bitterly  resented  this  action  of  Germany. 
It  therefore  broke  the  friendship  which  had  existed  ever 
since  the  War  of  Liberation  and  assumed  an  attitude  of 
half-concealed  hostility.  While  Russia  was  entering  its 
first  complaints  of  Germany’s  "faithlessness,”  both  offi¬ 
cially  and  in  the  public  press,  Bismarck  proceeded  to  the 
most  important  act  of  his  later  career.  In  October  1879 
he  concluded  a  secret  written  alliance  between  Germany 
and  Austria  whereby  the  two  countries  bound  themselves 
to  a  common  defense  of  each  other  against  possible  attacks 
by  Russia.  Three  years  later  Germany  and  Austria  were 
joined  by  Italy  for  the  similar  purpose  of  common  defense 
against  France.  Thus  arose  the  Triple  Alliance,  a  defen¬ 
sive  league  based  primarily  upon  a  desire  for  peace  and 
the  first  step  toward  the  alignment  of  the  powers  of 
Europe  as  they  have  stood  in  recent  times.  The  existence 
of  the  Alliance  was  not  formally  announced  for  several 
years,  but  rumors  of  it  were  received  by  Europe  in  general 
with  approval.  Europe  saw  that  by  trebling  the  risks  of  a 
war  against  one  of  its  members  the  Alliance  might  be  a 
bulwark  of  peace.  In  the  eyes  of  Germany  the  Alliance 
guaranteed  peace.  And  it  ensured  for  Germany  a  role  in 
the  concert  of  Europe. 

Germany’s  relations  with  England  were  troubled  in  Bis¬ 
marck’s  time  only  by  a  dispute  (1884-1885)  concerning 
England’s  and  Germany’s  claims  to  territory  in  Africa. 
Agreement  was  soon  reached,  however ;  boundary  lines 
were  fixed  ;  and  England  bore  testimony  to  its  respect  for 
Bismarck  by  asking  repeatedly  for  his  advice  in  its  affairs 
in  Egypt.  Meanwhile,  with  a  view  of  restoring  Germany’s 
friendship  with  Russia,  Bismarck  concluded  a  secret  treaty 
(1884)  in  which  Germany  and  Russia  in  turn  promised 


FROM  1871  TO  THE  FALL  OF  BISMARCK  127 


neutrality  in  case  the  one  or  the  other  were  attacked  by 
a  third  power ;  thus  Germany  was  "  reinsured  ”  against 
war.  Nevertheless  Russia  did  not  forget  the  events  of 
1878.  Indeed,  in  spite  of  the  treaty,  which  continued  in 
effect  until  1890,  and  in  spite  of  Bismarck’s  friendly  atti¬ 
tude,  Russia  seemed  to  draw  nearer  and  nearer  to  another, 
more  cordial  alliance  with  France.  In  1884  and  1885 
Germany  and  France  were  united  against  England  in 
their  colonial  designs  in  Africa,  but  a  new  French  min¬ 
istry,  which  was  openly  hostile  to  Germany,  instituted 
(1886-1887)  reforms  in  the  French  army  which  were 
interpreted  as  a  direct  threat  at  Germany.  The  fever  of 
this  situation  was  soon  heightened  by  increasing  rumors 
of  a  Franco- Russian  alliance.  For  a  time,  Europe  quiv¬ 
ered  with  excitement.  But  all  the  agitation  resulted  chiefly 
in  the  renewal  of  the  Triple  Alliance  (1887)  and  in  the 
formal  publication  of  its  existence  (February  1888).  Dur¬ 
ing  the  two  remaining  years  of  his  chancellorship  Bis¬ 
marck  continued  his  efforts  to  restore  the  old  friendship 
with  Russia ;  as  he  thought,  not  without  effect.  At  any 
rate,  when  Bismarck  fell  in  March  1890,  Germany  had 
only  one  certain  enemy  in  Europe,  France.  With  all  the 
other  European  nations  Germany  was  on  friendly  terms ; 
with  two  it  enjoyed  the  benefits  of  an  alliance  which  had 
no  counterpart.  Germany  had  secured  a  peerage  among 
the  leading  powers  of  Europe. 

The  first  national  problem  which  arose  in  the  new  Em¬ 
pire  was  the  Kulturkampf,  or  "  struggle  in  behalf  of  civi¬ 
lization.”  When  the  Vatican  proclaimed  the  doctrine  of 
papal  infallibility  in  1870,  various  German  teachers  of 
Roman  Catholic  theology  refused  to  accept  the  decree  and 
yet  continued  in  their  offices  as  before.  The  German 
bishops  who  were  faithful  to  the  Pope  demanded  that  the 


142.  Na¬ 
tional  af¬ 
fairs.  The 
Kulturkampf 


128 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


143.  The  be¬ 
ginnings  of 
modern  Ger¬ 
man  indus¬ 
trial  life 


Government  remove  the  rebel  teachers  because  the  Church 
desired  their  removal.  As  this  was  the  same  as  saying  that 
the  secular  government  should  recognize  the  supremacy 
of  the  Pope,  it  precipitated  a  conflict  between  faithful 
Catholics  and  the  rulers  of  German  states  on  the  question 
of  the  preeminence  of  the  civil  government.  In  this  crisis 
the  Prussian,  Bavarian,  and  other  Legislatures  passed 
stringent  measures  against  the  Catholics,  the  "May  laws,” 
so  called  from  the  month  in  which  many  of  them  were 
adopted.  Protestants  as  well  as  Catholics  considered  many 
provisions  of  these  laws  too  extreme  ;  for  example,  exami¬ 
nations  by  the  Government  of  candidates  for  the  priest¬ 
hood,  and  the  establishment  of  a  lay  court  of  justice  for 
church  affairs.  The  chief  effect  of  these  and  other  meas¬ 
ures  was  to  arouse  powerful  opposition  and  to  consolidate 
the  Catholics  in  a  growing  political  party.  The  struggle 
ended  in  favor  of  the  Catholics.  In  1879  the  votes  of  the 
Catholics  were  indispensable  to  the  passage  of  new  meas¬ 
ures  before  the  Reichstag,  and  in  order  to  win  the  party’s 
support  Bismarck  caused  the  repeal  of  virtually  all  the 
May  laws.  This  change  of  front  won  the  votes  Bismarck 
desired,  but  it  did  not  break  up  the  Catholic  party,  or  the 
"  Centre  ”  as  it  is  called  from  the  location  of  its  seats  in 
the  Reichstag  chamber.  On  the  contrary,  the  party  of  the 
Centre  was  permanently  solidified  and  organized — through 
the  Kulturkampf  —  as  no  other  party  in  the  Empire. 

The  development  of  modern  German  industrial  life  be¬ 
gan  in  the  first  half  of  the  century.  Fostered  after  1830 
by  the  Zollverein,  German  industries  entered  upon  a  period 
of  rapid  growth  and  expansion  early  in  the  fifties.  Between 
1850  and  1870  many  credit  banks  were  founded  which 
financed  the  origin  and  establishment  of  industries  ;  over 
two  hundred  joint-stock  companies  were  established ;  the 


FROM  1871  TO  THE  FALL  OF  BISMARCK  1 29 


exports  of  wheat,  barley,  and  oats  exceeded  the  imports 
more  and  more,  while  the  revenues  of  the  Zollverein 
doubled  ;  mines  quadrupled  their  output ;  railways  increased 
their  mileage  sixfold.  From  1830  to  1870  the  territory 
which  has  made  up  the  German  Empire  advanced  in  the 
value  of  its  annual  foreign  commerce  from  $185,000,000 
to  $1,060,000,000.  In  the  early  seventies  the  rapid  pay¬ 
ments  on  the  French  war  indemnity  promised  at  first 
still  greater  prosperity ;  they  poured  a  vast  sum  of  money 
into  Germany,  which  found  its  way  into  the  hands  of  the 
people  at  large,  partly  through  the  redemption  of  govern¬ 
ment  securities,  partly  through  outlays  of  the  Government 
on  fortifications  and  other  public  works.  In  possession 
of  capital  people  now  clamored  for  more  opportunities 
of  investment  and  thereby  called  hundreds  of  new  joint- 
stock  companies  into  existence.  But  money  was  too  plen¬ 
tiful.  The  desire  to  invest  became  a  fever  of  speculation, 
and  the  stock  of  many  of  the  new  companies  was  worthless. 
The  crash  came  in  1873.  Banks,  railways,  manufactories 
failed  by  the  score  ;  thousands  of  people  lost  every  penny. 
Germany  recovered  very  slowly  from  the  panic.  The  Im¬ 
perial  Bank,  which  replaced  (1876)  the  Bank  of  Prussia, 
gradually  reestablished  the  former  value  of  the  depreciated 
currency  and  founded  new  systems  of  credit,  but  German 
industrialism  did  not  fully  regain  its  confidence  and  its 
impetus  until  the  eighties.  Then  it  began  the  phenomenal 
rise  of  recent  decades.  By  1890  the  I£mpire’s  foreign  com¬ 
merce  had  regained  the  ground  lost  in  the  seventies  and  ad¬ 
vanced  in  value  for  the  fiscal  year  to  nearly  $  1 ,900,000,000. 

The  centralization  of  power  in  the  hands  of  the  Impe¬ 
rial  Government,  a  dominating  factor  in  Bismarck’s  home 
policy,  was  furthered  and  emphasized  by  the  establishment 
of  the  Imperial  Bank,  by  the  adoption  of  a  single  standard 


144.  The 
centraliza¬ 
tion  of  gov¬ 
ernment 


130 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


The  intro¬ 
duction  of  a 
protective 
tariff 


of  coinage,  and  by  the  introduction  (1877)  of  the  same  sys¬ 
tem  of  law  courts  and  civil  and  criminal  procedure  in  all  the 
states.  But  in  accordance  with  the  constitution  of  the  Em¬ 
pire  the  expenses  of  the  Imperial  Government  were  borne 
at  first  by  proportionate  annual  contributions,  so-called  "ma- 
tricula,”  from  the  several  states  ;  the  Imperial  Government 
was  thus  a  beneficiary  of  the  various  states,  not  the  source 
of  all  blessings  as  Bismarck  desired.  As  a  means  of  rescue 
from  this  galling  financial  dependence  Bismarck  first  pro¬ 
posed  imperial  ownership  of  railways,  but  he  could  not  win 
the  favor  of  the  Bundesrat  for  this  proposition,  nor  was  he 
more  successful  when  he  suggested  an  imperial  tobacco 
monopoly.  At  last,  when  the  pressure  of  general  hard 
times  pushed  Bismarck  to  a  reduction  of  direct  taxes  and 
his  imperial  policy  at  the  same  time  continued  to  urge  an 
increase  of  public  revenues,  he  renounced  the  principle 
of  free  trade  and  came  out  in  favor  of  indirect  taxation  by 
means  of  a  protective  tariff.  With  the  aid  of  the  Centre 
Bismarck  put  a  protective  tariff  bill  through  the  Reichstag 
in  1879  and  succeeded  in  the  following  years  in  amplifying 
it.  The  new  duties  thus  imposed  on  foreign  manufactures 
restored  confidence  and  prosperity  to  German  industrial 
life.  Agriculture  was  protected  by  duties  on  farm  products. 
At  the  same  time  excise  taxes  and  a  high  duty  on  tobacco, 
sugar,  and  other  imports  were  established  for  the  support 
of  the  Imperial  Government.  The  states  continued  to  pay 
matricula,  but  it  was  agreed  that  the  annual  expenses  of  the 
Government  should  be  limited  to  $32,500,000  and  that  any 
excess  of  this  sum  obtained  through  the  new  measures 
should  be  divided  among  the  states.  On  several  occasions 
during  the  following  twenty  years  this  excess  surpassed 
the  matricula  by  several  million  dollars.  Thus  the  intro¬ 
duction  of  a  protective  tariff,  an  emergency  measure, 


FROM  1871  TO  THE  FALL  OF  BISMARCK  1 31 


steadied  German  industrial  life,  and  legislation  connected 
with  the  new  tariff  made  the  Imperial  Government,  at  least 
for  a  number  of  years,  financially  independent  of  the  indi¬ 
vidual  states.  The  central  Government  was  invested  with 
new  strength  and  the  Empire  was  further  unified. 

The  rise  of  the  modern  German  workingman  dates  back 
to  the  liberation  of  labor  through  the  abolishment  of  serf¬ 
dom,  but  the  workingman  did  not  begin  to  assert  himself 
until  the  third  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century,  when 
growing  capitalistic  enterprise  began  to  exert  more  and 
more  power  over  labor.  Then  came  the  panic  of  1873. 
The  poverty  and  suffering  which  it  induced  made  working¬ 
men  hopeless  of  the  existing  order  of  things  and  drove 
them  by  thousands  into  a  new  political  organization,  the 
Social-Democratic  party.  In  1876  the  Social-Democrats 
formulated  and  published  their  first  detailed  party  program, 
demanding  the  immediate  fulfilment  of  some  articles  of 
their  faith  and  setting  up  others  as  ideal  goals  of  the  future. 
After  attributing  their  suffering  to  the  accumulation  of 
wealth  in  the  hands  of  a  few,  the  Social-Democrats  pro¬ 
posed  the  ultimate  abolition  of  private  ownership  of  the 
sources  and  agents  of  production  —  for  example,  lands, 
mines,  canals,  and  railways  —  and  urged  the  establishment, 
with  the  aid  of  the  state,  of  cooperative  productive  associa¬ 
tions  controlled  by  the  workers  themselves  in  the  interest 
of  society  as  a  whole.  The  more  specific  articles  of  the 
Social-Democratic  program  comprised  the  obligatory  secret 
ballot  for  all  members  of  both  sexes  over  twenty  years  of 
age,  direct  legislation  and  trial  as  well  as  the  declara¬ 
tion  of  war  and  peace  by  the  people  themselves,  a  system 
of  militia  instead  of  a  paid  standing  army,  absolute  free¬ 
dom  of  the  press,  of  assembly,  and  of  religion,  unlimited 
liberty  in  forming  unions,  a  graduated  income  tax,  the 


145.  The 
rise  of  the 
Social- 
Democrats 


132 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


146.  Bis¬ 
marck’s  at¬ 
titude  toward 
the  Social- 
Democrats 
and  its  effect 


introduction  of  a  normal  working-day  with  the  reservation 
of  Sunday  as  a  day  of  rest,  the  protection  of  female  labor, 
and  the  prohibition  of  child  labor.  Many  of  these  demands 
were  just,  but  others  sounded  like  red  revolution  to  the 
Imperial  Government.  When  the  Social-Democratic  rep¬ 
resentatives  in  the  Reichstag  increased  in  1877  from  nine 
to  twelve  and  shots  were  fired  at  the  emperor  (May  1878) 
by  a  man  under  the  influence  of  Social-Democratic  ideas, 
the  Government  resolved  to  take  rigorous  action  against 
the  party.  At  first  it  seemed  that  the  Government  would 
be  defeated,  as  the  Reichstag  then  in  session  rejected  the 
bill  proposed.  But  the  Government  reaffirmed  its  purpose 
by  dissolving  the  Reichstag  at  once.  Ten  days  later  another 
attempt  was  made  on  the  emperor’s  life,  also  by  a  man  of 
Social-Democratic  leanings.  The  Reichstag  which  was 
now  (July  1878)  elected  adopted  the  Government’s  original 
proposal. 

In  October  1878  Bismarck  put  the  so-called  Law  of 
Exceptions  through  the  Reichstag,  thus  prohibiting  meet¬ 
ings  and  publications  which  purposed  "the  subversion  of 
the  social  order  ”  or  the  advancement  of  socialistic  tend¬ 
encies  which  might  endanger  the  public  peace.  Scores  of 
agitators  were  expelled  from  the  country ;  over  two  hun¬ 
dred  unions  were  disbanded ;  hundreds  of  publications 
were  suppressed.  The  Law  of  Exceptions  remained  in 
force  until  1890,  but  the  very  pressure  of  the  law  made 
a  compact  body  of  the  Social-Democrats  ;  in  the  elections 
of  1884  they  returned  twenty-four  representatives  to  the 
Reichstag,  or  just  twice  the  number  of  1877.  Meanwhile 
the  justness  of  many  Social-Democratic  demands  had 
forced  the  Government  to  enter  upon  an  era  of  legislation 
aimed  at  beneficent  social  reform.  In  1883  the  Reichstag 
passed  a  bill  insuring  workingmen  against  sickness,  in 


FROM  1871  TO  THE  FALL  OF  BISMARCK  133 


1884  one  against  accident.  In  1887  laws  were  adopted 
limiting  child  and  female  labor,  establishing  the  maximum 
number  of  working  hours,  and  setting  Sunday  apart  as  a 
day  of  rest.  In  1889  a  law  went  into  effect  which  insured 
workingmen  against  permanent  disablement  and  old  age. 
The  Social-Democrats  in  the  Reichstag  voted  against  all 
these  laws  on  the  ground  that  they  were  only  a  drop  in 
the  bucket.  This  negative  attitude  of  the  party  and  the 
initial  promise  of  the  new  legislation  reduced  the  Social- 
Democratic  representatives  to  eleven  in  the  elections  of 
1887.  But  the  insurance  laws  forced  the  workingman  to 
pay  an  appreciable  portion  of  his  wages  against  contin¬ 
gencies —  sickness  and  accident  —  which  in  many  cases 
never  arose,  and  they  robbed  him  of  his  independence 
and  freedom  of  choice  in  disposing  of  his  wages.  These 
features  of  the  new  laws  the  Social-Democrats  seized  upon 
at  once  and  used  in  reuniting  and  augmenting  the  party’s 
forces.  In  1 890  the  party  elected  thirty-five  representatives 
to  the  Reichstag. 

In  order  to  understand  the  course  of  events  in  the 
Reichstag  and  the  part  which  the  German  people  play  in 
political  life,  it  is  necessary  to  remember  various  provi¬ 
sions  of  the  constitution  of  the  Empire,  ^n  the  firsLplacc, 
the  constitution  gives  the  Bundesrat,  the  instructed  repre¬ 
sentatives  of  the  rulers  of  the  respective  states,  the  final 
decision  on  all  pending  legislation.  Bundesrat  Tn?ty 

vetemny  bill  passed  by  the  Reichstag,  the  assembly  which 
represents  the  will  oFtKe  people.  I  n  jRe  second  place,  the 
people,  that  is,  the  members  of  the  Reichstag,  have  no  con¬ 
trol  over  those  who  direct  the  policy  of  the  Government. 
The  emperor  reigns  by  right  of  heredity,  subject  to  none, 
and  ministers  of  state  are  responsible  to  the  emperor  alone 
as  he  appoints  and  dismisses  them  at  his  own  volition. 


147.  The 
limitations 
of  parliamen¬ 
tary  life  in 
Germany 


134 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


Thus  the  parliamentary  form  of  government,  in  which  the 
representative  popular  assembly  determines  the  character 
of  the  ministry  and  hence  the  policy  of  the  Government, 
does  not  exist  in  Germany.  The  only  weapon  which  the 
Reichstag  can  use  to  enforce  its  will  upon  the  Government 
is  the  rejection  of  bills  which  the  Government  proposes. 
But  in  such  a  case  the  emperor,  with  the  consent  of  the 
Bundesrat,  may  dissolve  the  Reichstag  on  the  chance  of 
securing  a  more  amenable  assembly  through  new  elec¬ 
tions.  History  has  proved  the  efficacy  of  this  provision. 
Each  of  the  four  dissolutions  of  the  Reichstag  has  been 
followed  by  the  election  of  an  assembly  which  passed  the 
bill  on  which  its  predecessor  was  wrecked.  Thus  the  politi¬ 
cal  will  of  the  German  people  is  directed  and  driven  by 
a  few,  who  compose  the  Government,  along  the  way  which 
the  Government  prescribes.  As  before  the  founding  of  the 
Empire,  the  accepted  theory  of  government  in  Germany 
is  still  that  of  one  which  is  imposed  from  above ;  only  to 
a  very  limited  degree  is  it  a  government  of  and  by  the 
people.  Furthermore  the  people  themselves  have  yielded 
much  of  their  potential  power  in  controlling  legislation  by 
dividing  and  subdividing  into  many  political  parties  ;  they 
have  long  since  forsaken  the  former  cleavage  along  state 
lines  and  divided  anew  along  the  lines  of  party  programs. 
The  Reichstag  has  always  consisted  of  representatives  of  at 
least  ten  political  parties :  the  Centre,  the  Social-Democrats, 
and,  as  in  the  Diet  of  the  North  German  Federation,  Con¬ 
servatives,  German  Imperialists,  National  Liberals,  and 
representatives  of  other  parties  too  weak  numerically  to 
require  specification.  As  a  result  of  this  manifold  division 
of  the  Reichstag  no  party  has  ever  gained  nearly  a  major¬ 
ity  of  the  votes  —  "the  party  in  power”  is  an  unknown 
quantity  in  German  parliamentary  life — and  legislation 


FROM  1871  TO  THE  FALL  OF  BISMARCK  135 


has  always  been  dependent  upon  a  combination  of  parties, 
in  some  cases,  of  as  many  as  five  or  six. 

During  the  first  years  of  the  Empire,  the  years  of  in¬ 
creasing  centralization,  Bismarck  was  constantly  opposed 
in  the  Reichstag  by  several  parties  :  by  the  Conservatives 
who  feared  that  centralization  would  obliterate  the  privi¬ 
leges  of  individual  monarchs ;  by  the  Centre  on  account 
of  the  Kulturkampf ;  and  by  lesser  parties  of  discontent, 
such  as  the  Social-Democrats.  The  Progressives  were 
sometimes  with  Bismarck,  sometimes  against  him ;  the 
German  Imperialists  were  generally  with  him.  Bismarck’s 
stronghold  lay  in  the  camp  of  the  National  Liberals.  Here 
were  one  hundred  and  fifty  of  the  three  hundred  and  ninety- 
seven  votes  in  the  Reichstag ;  here  were  men  of  conspicuous 
ability;  here  was  hearty  intelligent  cooperation  in  central¬ 
izing  and  strengthening  the  Imperial  Government.  The 
union  of  these  two  forces,  Bismarck  and  the  National  Lib¬ 
erals,  brought  on  the  golden  age  of  parliamentary  activity 
in  Germany ;  the  Reichstag  has  never  known  another  period 
in  which  debates  were  maintained  on  so  high  a  level,  nor 
one  in  which  so  much  sound,  enduring  legislation  was 
accomplished.  But  the  National  Liberals  differed  funda¬ 
mentally  from  Bismarck  in  their  political  ideals.  They  had 
indeed  voted  for  the  adoption  of  the  constitution,  but  only 
in  order  that  some  form  of  national  unity  might  be  achieved. 
They  believed  in  a  parliamentary  form  of  government. 
And  they  hoped  that  parliamentary  government  might 
come  through  a  gradual  transformation  from  within  by 
means  of  legislation.  But  Bismarck  was  centralizing  the 
government  in  order  to  increase  the  power  of  his  king  and 
emperor  ;  he  never  dreamed  of  submitting  the  Government 
to  the  control  of  the  Reichstag.  The  support  of  the 
National  Liberals  therefore  became  more  and  more  irksome 


148.  The 
chief  events 
in  the  Reichs¬ 
tag  from 
1871  to  1879 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


149.  The 
Reichstag 
from  1879  to 
i8go 


136 

to  Bismarck.  At  length  an  opportunity  came  to  break  their 
fetters  in  the  abandonment  of  free  trade,  a  principle  of  the 
liberal  program,  in  favor  of  a  protective  tariff.  When  the 
introduction  of  the  new  tariff  became  a  certainty,  a  large 
number  of  National  Liberals  immediately  broke  their  former 
ties  and  set  up  a  new  free-trade  party ;  this  wing  afterwards 
united  with  the  Progressives  and  formed  the  German  Free- 
thinking  Party.  In  the  next  elections  (1881)  the  National 
Liberal  representation  shrunk  to  forty-seven.  Bismarck 
was  free.  The  one  party  which  might  seriously  menace 
the  power  of  the  Government,  which  might  have  forced  the 
evolution  of  a  parliamentary  form  of  government,  was  per¬ 
manently  shattered.  The  King  of  Prussia=German  Em¬ 
peror  was  supreme  as  Bismarck  intended  that  he  should  be. 

The  Government  secured  its  independence  of  every 
party  at  the  cost  of  the  stable  effective  support  of  any 
party.  After  1879  the  Government  was  forced  to  gather 
a  majority  for  its  measures  before  the  Reichstag  by  dick¬ 
ering  with  several  parties,  by  effecting  compromises  be¬ 
tween  several  divergent  groups.  The  Conservatives  gave 
Bismarck  the  most  constant  support  which  he  enjoyed  ; 
they  had  been  won  over  by  the  protective  tariff,  because 
it  favored  the  agrarian  Conservatives,  a  considerable  por¬ 
tion  of  the  party.  The  German  Imperialists  and  the  re¬ 
maining  National  Liberals  also  were  generally  loyal  to  the 
Government.  The  Catholic  Centre,  on  the  other  hand, 
was  neither  a  faithful  friend  nor  an  unrelenting  enemy  of 
the  Government,  and  it  was  always  a  powerful  factor.  No 
other  party  rivaled  the  Centre  in  drawing  adherents  from 
all  the  strata  of  society  and  from  every  part  of  Germany. 
Being,  in  the  language  of  economists,  both  a  vertical  and 
a  horizontal  party,  the  Centre  remained  a  unit  because  it 
represented  all  classes  and  united  opposing  interests.  It 


FROM  1871  TO  THE  FALL  OF  BISMARCK  137 


voted  for  the  protective  tariff  out  of  consideration  for  the 
industrial  and  agrarian  classes  which  it  represented,  also 
for  the  social  reform  laws  in  order  to  hold  the  allegiance 
of  Catholic  workingmen,  but  it  opposed  any  increase  of 
taxes  for  the  army  or  for  colonial  expansion.  From  1878 
to  1887  the  Centre  held  the  balance  of  power,  because  its 
votes  added  to  those  of  the  Government’s  parties  or  to 
those  of  the  opposition  —  the  Free-thinking  Party,  the 
Social-Democrats,  and  lesser  parties  —  could  nearly  always 
pass  or  defeat  a  measure.  In  this  way  the  Centre  forced 
an  amendment  of  an  army  bill  of  1887  before  the  measure 
could  be  passed.  But  Bismarck  was  now  thoroughly  aroused. 
He  refused  to  accept  the  amendment,  and  the  Reichstag 
was  at  once  dissolved.  In  the  elections  which  followed,  Bis¬ 
marck  used  a  war  scare  of  the  time  with  such  effectiveness 
that  the  parties  favorable  to  the  Government  and  the  orig¬ 
inal  army  bill  —  the  Conservatives,  German  Imperialists, 
and  National  Liberals  —  secured  an  ample  majority  of  the 
members  of  the  Reichstag.  The  so-called  "  Cartel  ”  which 
these  three  parties  formed  gave  Bismarck  the  most  docile 
Reichstag  of  his  career.  But  the  Cartel  was  foreordained 
to  a  brief  existence.  Extreme  liberals  and  extreme  conserv¬ 
atives  could  not  agree  long.  The  Cartel  was  blasted  in  the 
elections  of  1890  when  the  German  Imperialists  and  the 
National  Liberals  lost  over  half  their  representatives. 
The  old  days  of  pulling  and  hauling  among  the  parties, 
with  the  Centre  as  the  deciding  factor,  were  come  again. 
This  was  the  situation  in  the  Reichstag  when  the  Iron 
Chancellor  resigned  his  office. 

The  expansion  of  the  imperial  army  began  almost  at 
once  after  the  close  of  the  Franco-German  War.  Incen¬ 
tives  to  this  expansion  were  readily  found.  The  army  was 
the  backbone  of  Prussia,  the  model  and  guaranty  of  orderly 


150.  The  ex¬ 
pansion  of 
the  army 


138 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


life  in  the  state  which  had  made  modern  Germany ;  the 
army  had  carved  out  the  new  Empire ;  a  great  imperial 
army  seemed  an  indispensable  measure  of  self-protection 
against  French  revengefulness  on  the  west  and  possible 
Russian  encroachment  on  the  east.  The  first  move  toward 
the  development  of  the  imperial  army  was  to  extend  the 
Prussian  military  system  throughout  the  Empire :  three 
years’  active  service,  four  years  in  the  first  reserve,  and 
nine  years  in  the  Landwehr,  or  second  reserve.  In  1874 
the  Government  proposed  that  one  per  cent  of  the  popu¬ 
lation  be  adopted  as  the  permanent  ratio  of  men  in  the 
standing  army,  but  the  Reichstag  refused  its  consent  be¬ 
cause  it  desired  to  have  at  least  an  occasional  voice  in 
determining  the  size  of  the  army.  A  compromise,  the 
"  Septennate,”  was  finally  effected  whereby  the  Govern¬ 
ment  secured  for  seven  years  the  ratio  and  the  number  of 
men,  401,659,  which  it  desired.  The  same  basis  of  compro¬ 
mise  was  employed  in  1880,  when  it  was  again  agreed  that 
for  seven  years  the  army  include  one  per  cent  of  the  popu¬ 
lation,  or  427,370  men.  Several  parties  in  the  Reichstag 
proposed  to  reduce  the  term  of  active  service  from  three 
to  two  years  in  accordance  with  a  growing  popular  demand, 
but  a  proposal  to  this  effect  was  defeated.  The  next  army 
bill  which  the  Government  submitted  (1887)  provided  for 
such  a  large  force  that  the  Reichstag  voted  to  grant  it  for 
only  three  years,  but  the  original  bill  was  ultimately  passed 
(1888)  —  468,409  men,  including  under-officers,  for  seven 
years.  It  was  further  agreed  (1888)  that  enrollment  in  the 
second  reserve  continue  until  a  man’s  thirty-ninth  year ; 
also  that  a  last  reserve,  the  Landsturm,  be  established  in¬ 
cluding  men  between  thirty-nine  and  forty-five  years  of 
age.  Thus  Germany  followed  Bismarck’s  advice  to  "  keep 
its  powder  dry  and  its  sword  sharp.” 


FROM  1871  TO  THE  FALL  OF  BISMARCK  139 


Many  Germans  took  part  in  the  explorations  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  especially  in  those  in  Africa,  but  for 
many  years  no  one  thought  of  taking  possession  of  any  of 
these  remote  districts  in  the  name  of  Germany.  In  1879 
a  German  Mercantile  Marine  Company  acquired  property 
in  the  Samoan  Islands  and  asked  the  Reichstag  to  guaran¬ 
tee  its  dividends.  The  Reichstag  refused  (April  1880). 
Public  opinion,  however,  had  seized  upon  the  idea  of  im¬ 
perial  colonial  possessions  and  soon  found  an  organ  in  the 
German  Colonial  Union,  which  was  formed  in  1882.  To 
this  new  pressure  the  Reichstag  yielded.  In  1884  large 
territories  were  taken  under  German  protection ;  in  Africa  : 
German  South-West  Africa,  Togoland,  and  Cameroon ; 
and  in  the  South  Seas  :  a  part  of  New  Guinea  and  a 
group  of  islands  in  the  New  Britain  Archipelago ;  these 
protectorates  in  the  South  Seas  were  later  rechristened 
as  Kaiser  Wilhelmsland  and  the  Bismarck  Archipelago. 
In  1885  a  similar  protectorate  was  established  over  the 
Marshall  Islands,  which  also  lie  in  the  South  Seas,  and 
over  German  East  Africa.  A  year  later  the  home  Gov¬ 
ernment  emphasized  its  close  relation  to  all  these  distant 
regions  by  subsidizing  steamers  which  plied  regularly  be¬ 
tween  them  and  Germany.  In  less  than  two  years  the 
Empire  had  practically  extended  its  dominion  over  a  total 
area  four  times  as  large  as  European  Germany.  At  first, 
however,  it  did  not  incorporate  them  in  the  Empire  but 
held  them  as  protectorates.  Two  companies  were  formed 
to  govern  them,  the  German  East  Africa  Company  and 
the  New  Guinea  Company.  An  attempt  was  thus  made 
to  reach  Bismarck’s  goal  for  the  colonies,  "  the  ruling 
merchant,  not  the  ruling  soldier  and  Prussian  official.” 
But  the  East  Africa  Company  was  driven  out  by  the 
natives  in  1888  and  the  control  of  this  and  the  other 


151.  Theac- 
quisition  of 
new  terri¬ 
tories  in 
Africa  and 
the  South 
Seas 


140 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


territories  was  taken  over  within  the  next  decade  by  Gov¬ 
ernment  officials  assisted  by  Government  troops.  The  ac¬ 
quisition  of  all  these  territories  was  a  momentous  step  in 
German  history,  as  the  Empire  thereby  broke  the  bounds 
which  limited  it  to  Europe.  The  time  was  at  hand  when 
Germany  might  enter  upon  its  career  as  a  world  power. 

For  nearly  a  generation  after  the  middle  of  the  nine¬ 
teenth  century  German  literature  presents  hardly  a  name 
of  international  reputation.  Of  the  poets  only  Mbrike  can 
be  compared  with  the  Romantic  lyrists  of  the  first  decades 
of  the  century.  After  Hebbel  the  German  stage  waited 
until  the  end  of  the  eighties  for  the  appearance  of  drama¬ 
tists  with  a  serious  purpose  and  with  notable  power  in 
dramatic  expression.  In  short,  between  1850  and  1888 
only  the  story-teller  commands  the  attention  of  the  modern 
reader.  Keller  and  Reuter,  Heyse  and  Storm,  reveal  in 
their  novels  and,  to  a  greater  degree,  in  their  short  stories, 
genuine  humor  and  pathos,  reality  and  romance,  combined 
with  artistic  form  ;  they  have  enjoyed  wide  recognition  at 
home  and  deserve  a  larger  fame  abroad  than  has  been 
accorded  to  them.  Painting  and  sculpture  reflect  the 
realism  of  the  time,  but  the  Classical  predilections  of  the 
early  nineteenth  century  predominate  in  the  works  of 
the  greatest  painters,  Feuerbach  and  Lenbach,  and  in  the 
sculptures  of  Rietschel  and  Hildebrandt.  The  great  tradi¬ 
tions  of  German  music,  in  song  and  symphony,  were  con¬ 
tinued  by  Brahms  and  Bruch  and  P'ranz.  Opera,  which 
hitherto  had  been  a  jewel  box  of  unconnected  musical 
gems,  not  serious  drama,  was  transformed  by  Wagner  into 
music-drama,  into  an  absolute  union  of  continuous  music 
and  drama.  At  the  same  time,  disillusioned  by  the  politi¬ 
cal  failures  of  1848,  Wagner  gave  immortal  expression  to 
mid-century  pessimism  ;  in  Tristan  and  Isolde  the  pain 


ISO  160  MO  120  100  bO  CO  -10  20 


FROM  1871  TO  THE  FALL  OF  BISMARCK  14 1 


of  living  finds  peace  only  in  death,  in  Parsifal  pity  and 
renunciation  alone  bring  salvation. 

The  eminent  position  which  Germany  holds  in  the  fields 
of  historical  writing  and  natural  science  dates  largely  from 
the  third  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Ranke  was 
then  still  in  his  prime,  and  beside  him  rose  a  brilliant 
group  of  ancient  and  modern  historians,  Mommsen,  Sybel, 
Waitz,  Curtius,  Treitschke,  and  others.  In  natural  science 
the  work  of  Alexander  von  Humboldt  and  the  publica¬ 
tion  of  Darwin’s  theory  of  evolution  combined  to  inspire 
German  investigation  to  a  series  of  famous  achievements, 
to  Liebig’s  organic  chemistry,  Bunsen’s  spectral  analysis, 
Helmholtz’s  application  of  the  law  of  the  conservation  of 
energy,  and  the  studies  by  Virchow  and  Koch  in  pathology 
and  anatomy.  The  study  of  psychology  was  directly  af¬ 
fected  by  the  results  in  natural  science  ;  the  metaphysical 
observations  of  early  psychologists  were  established  on  a 
basis  of  physiology  by  Fechner  and  elaborated  by  Wundt 
and  Lotze.  When  the  hope  of  a  larger  national  life  was 
wrecked  in  the  turmoil  of  1848  and  1849,  Schopenhauer’s 
pessimistic  philosophy  struck  deep  into  German  life.  That 
life  had  no  meaning  or  object,  that  living  was  calamity, 
expressed  the  feeling  of  the  age.  Nietzsche,  however, 
soon  shook  off  the  influence  of  Schopenhauer  and  fought 
pessimism  with  all  his  tremendous  energy  ;  he  saw  the  joy 
of  conflict  in  life.  Learning  from  Darwin  the  evolutionary 
ascent  of  man  to  infinite  strength  and  power,  Nietzsche 
proposed  the  conscious  evolution  of  a  higher  type,  the 
superman,  by  casting  aside  the  Christian  and  socialistic 
principles  of  helping  the  needy  and  by  concentrating  on 
the  development  of  the  strong. 

As  compared  with  the  national  affairs  discussed  in  the 
preceding  paragraphs,  the  affairs  of  individual  German 


153.  German 
historians, 
natural 
scientists, 
and  philoso¬ 
phers 


142 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


154.  State 
affairs.  Gen¬ 
eral  condi¬ 
tions  within 
the  states 


155.  The 
chief  events 
in  Prussia 


states  are  of  slight  importance.  It  is  often  said  that  in 
actual  practice  Germany  is  a  group  of  provinces  under 
one  authority  rather  than  a  federation  of  states.  At  any 
rate  each  new  imperial  law  has  deprived  the  states  of  part 
of  their  authority,  and  almost  all  the  especial  concessions 
which  were  made  to  different  states  at  the  founding  of  the 
Empire  have  been  relinquished  ;  Bavaria’s  independent 
control  of  its  post-office  is  a  survival  of  initial  concessions. 
But  the  states  have  continued  to  control  their  own  educa¬ 
tional  and  religious  affairs,  questions  concerning  land  ten¬ 
ure,  local  government,  the  raising  of  direct  taxes,  and,  in 
Bavaria  and  other  large  states,  the  management  of  railways. 

Prussia  began  a  series  of  internal  reforms  with  a  redi¬ 
vision  of  the  kingdom  into  provinces,  districts,  and  circles, 
whose  officials  are  in  part  appointed  by  the  king,  in  part 
elected  by  the  people ;  a  form  of  local  government  was 
thus  established  (1872-1889)  which  was  first  suggested 
by  Stein  in  1808.  During  the  eighties  Prussia  bought  up 
nearly  all  the  railways  in  the  kingdom  and  made  them 
state  property.  At  the  same  time  canals  were  constructed 
which  connected  the  Rhine  and  the  Ems,  the  Weser  and 
the  Elbe,  and  southern  Silesia  and  Berlin.  Great  discon¬ 
tent  prevailed  in  several  Prussian  provinces  where  people 
had  never  reconciled  themselves  to  their  enforced  Prussian 
citizenship.  The  Poles  in  the  provinces  of  West  Prussia 
and  Posen  desired  the  establishment  of  a  new  Poland  ;  in 
the  province  of  Hanover  the  "  Guelphs,”  so  called  from 
the  family  name  of  the  former  reigning  house,  urged  the 
restoration  of  the  kingdom  of  Hanover ;  the  "  Danes  ”  of 
northern  Schleswig  demanded  the  fulfilment  of  a  promise 
of  the  Peace  of  Prague  (1866),  whereby  a  plebiscite 
should  determine  their  continued  incorporation  in  Prussia 
or  their  reversion  to  the  kingdom  of  Denmark.  Each  of 


FROM  1871  TO  THE  FALL  OF  BISMARCK  143 


these  bodies  of  people  formed  a  political  party  and  sent 
representatives  to  the  Prussian  Legislature  and  to  the 
Reichstag,  where  they  swelled  the  opposition  to  the  Gov¬ 
ernment  ;  the  Poles  returned  as  many  as  eighteen  repre¬ 
sentatives  to  the  Reichstag  in  the  elections  of  1884.  The 
most  repressive  measures  which  Prussia  took  against  these 
parties  of  disintegration  were  those  which  Bismarck  in¬ 
spired  against  the  Poles.  Many  Polish  agitators  were  ex¬ 
pelled  from  West  Prussia  and  Posen  ;  a  large  sum  of 
money  was  appropriated  for  the  purchase  of  Polish  estates 
and  their  colonization  with  German  peasants  ;  the  use  of 
the  Polish  language  was  forbidden  in  all  public  schools. 
These  measures  not  only  failed  ;  they  made  bad  matters 
worse.  The  Poles  remained  a  people  apart  and  cherished 
their  grudges  against  Prussia  with  increased  bitterness. 

Alsace-Lorraine,  the  new  imperial  province,  was  ruled 
at  first  by  a  governor-general  who  had  the  powers  of  a 
dictator.  In  1874,  however,  the  imperial  constitution  went 
into  effect  in  the  province  providing  for  the  election  of 
popular  representatives  to  the  Reichstag.  In  1879  the 
governor-general  was  displaced  by  the  establishment  of  a 
provincial  constitution  which  provided  for  a  viceroy  ap¬ 
pointed  by  the  emperor.  Many  reforms  were  introduced  ; 
taxation  and  banking,  schools  and  railways,  were  greatly 
improved.  But  the  paramount  desire  of  the  people  of  the 
province  was  not  granted  —  an  autonomous  form  of  gov¬ 
ernment  with  representation  in  the  Bundesrat,  such  as 
other  states  of  the  Empire  enjoyed  and  more  or  less 
analogous  to  the  political  freedom  which  Alsace-Lorraine 
had  enjoyed  under  French  domination.  The  friction  pro¬ 
duced  by  constitutional  restrictions  was  aggravated  by  the 
first  viceroy’s  attempt  to  curry  favor  with  the  provincial 
aristocracy  and  by  his  reckless  persecutions  of  newspapers 


156.  In  les¬ 
ser  states. 
Alsace- 
Lorraine 


144 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


Bavaria 


Brunswick 


157-  A  sum¬ 
mary  of  the 
character  of 
William  1 


and  societies.  Even  in  the  wiser  regime  of  Prince 
Hohenlohe,  the  second  viceroy  (1885-1894),  leading  men 
in  Berlin  discussed  the  advisability  of  returning  to  a 
dictatorship  in  Alsace-Lorraine.  The  course  of  events  in 
Bavaria,  Saxony,  and  other  states  of  the  Empire  offers 
nothing  of  great  importance  and  little  of  interest.  Internal 
reforms  of  significance  did  not  begin  until  a  later  time.  In 
Bavaria  Louis  II,  the  son  and  successor  of  Maximilian  II 
(died  1864),  was  declared  insane  in  1886,  and  his  uncle, 
Prince  Leopold,  was  appointed  regent  (1886-1912).  Three 
days  after  the  appointment  of  Leopold,  Louis  drowned  him¬ 
self,  but  the  regency  was  continued  as  Louis’s  brother, 
Otto,  was  also  insane.  After  the  death  of  its  childless 
duke  (1884),  Brunswick  would  naturally  have  passed  to 
Ernest  Augustus,  Duke  of  Cumberland  and  son  of  the 
deposed  king  of  Hanover,  George  V  (died  1878),  but  as 
Ernest  Augustus  would  not  renounce  his  claims  to  Han¬ 
over  —  that  is,  desired  to  impair  the  integrity  of  Prussia,  a 
state  of  the  Empire  —  Brunswick  was  placed  by  a  decision 
of  the  Bundesrat  under  a  regency  elected  by  the  Legislature 
of  the  duchy. 

The  first  head  of  the  modern  German  Empire,  William  I, 
died  in  March  1888.  Though  nearly  ninety-one  years 
old  at  the  time  of  his  death,  William  remained  to  the  last 
in  close  touch  with  the  course  of  events.  But  the  real 
power  of  his  reign  as  king  and  emperor  was  long  since  in 
other  hands.  If  William  had  ruled  in  his  own  strength 
alone,  the  course  of  Prussian  and  German  history  would 
have  been  very  different.  He  alone  could  never  have  risen 
to  the  opportunity  of  his  time,  for  he  lacked  both  the 
divining  power  of  great  statesmanship  and  bold,  quick 
initiative,  the  two  indispensable  qualities  for  the  complica¬ 
tions  of  the  sixties.  William’s  greatest  virtue  lay  in  his 


FROM  1871  TO  THE  FALL  OF  BISMARCK  145 


subordination  of  his  own  will  and  judgment  to  those  of 
men  in  whom  he  had  placed  his  trust.  A  man  of  strong 
character  and  deep  convictions,  he  could  be  reconvinced 
and  he  could  yield.  His  greatest  wisdom  appeared  in  his 
selection  of  his  aides  and  in  his  support  of  them. 

William  I  was  succeeded  by  his  son,  Frederick  III 
(born  1831),  but  Frederick  was  fatally  ill  at  the  time  of 
his  accession  and  died  after  a  reign  of  ninety-nine  days. 
Frederick  was  followed  in  June  1888  by  his  son,  the 
present  emperor,  William  II  (born  1859).  Bismarck  re¬ 
mained  chancellor  for  nearly  two  years  longer,  but  he  soon 
observed  that  William  wanted  to  be  his  own  chancellor  and 
Bismarck  was  accustomed  to  handling  the  reins  himself. 
Their  differences  reached  a  climax  in  March  1890,  when 
Bismarck  refused  to  sanction  a  cabinet  order  whereby  the 
chancellor  would  no  longer  be  the  intermediary  between 
the  emperor  and  the  ministers  of  state.  William  at  once 
demanded  Bismarck’s  resignation,  and  the  Iron  Chancellor 
retired  to  private  life.  Thus  ended  the  public  career  of 
the  man  who  made  modern  Germany.  With  tragic  irony 
the  power  which  he  had  made  supreme  in  Germany  turned 
and  destroyed  him.  Bismarck  had,  however,  reached  his 
zenith  in  1871.  He  afterwards  unified  the  Empire  inter¬ 
nally  by  legislation  as  he  had  unified  it  externally  by  war, 
but  he  failed  signally  in  many  domestic  measures  ;  he  failed 
primarily  because  in  many  cases  sheer  force,  his  favorite 
means  to  the  end  he  desired,  no  longer  availed.  His  iron 
policy  against  the  Catholics,  the  Social- Democrats,  and 
the  Poles  effected  the  opposite  of  that  which  he  intended. 
Bismarck’s  forte  was  his  command  of  international  affairs. 
In  this  regard  his  career,  as  long  as  he  remained  in  active 
life,  is  unrivaled  in  German  history. 


158.  The 
succession  of 
Frederick  III 
and  William 
II,  and  the 
fall  of 
Bismarck 


CHAPTER  XII 


159.  The 
evolution  of 
Germany 
since  iSgo 


160.  Ra¬ 
tional  affairs. 
The  develop¬ 
ment  of 
agriculture 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II 

1890-1914 

The  history  of  Germany  from  1S90  to  the  outbreak  of 
war  in  1914  is  the  story  of  the  evolution  of  a  European 
nation  into  a  world  power.  In  1S90  Germany's  interests 
were  often  not  at  all  involved  in  questions  arising  outside 
of  Europe;  in  the  spring  of  1914  a  conference  of  "the 
powers  "  without  the  participation  of  Germany  was  hardly 
imaginable.  In  other  words,  under  William  II  and  his 
imperial  chancellors  —  Caprivi  (1S90-1S94),  Hohenlohe 
1 1S94-1900),  Biilow  (1900-1909),  and  Bethmann-Hollweg 
( 1 909-  )  —  the  German  Empire  continued  to  fortify  its 
national  strength  and  unit}' ;  it  expanded  its  industrial 
life,  seeking  and  finding  markets  all  over  the  world  for 
the  products  of  its  industries ;  it  acquired  new  colonial 
possessions^  In  virtue  of  this  national  growth  and  strength, 
Germanv  exercised  profound  influence  in  the  decision  of 
questions  arising  far  beyond  the  borders  of  Europe.  This 
evolution  of  Germany,  or  its  progression  from  state  and 
national  strength  to  international  power,  marks  the  lines 
which  may  be  followed  fittingly  in  an  account  of  the  chief 
events  in  German  history  since  1890. 

In  the  earlv  nineties,  when  many  thousands  of  Germans 
were  deserting  the  farms  for  the  cities  in  order  to  take 
part  in  the  new  industrial  progress  and  prosperity,  it  was 
freely  prophesied  in  Germany  that  the  Empire  would  soon 

146 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II 


147 


become  wholly  industrial ;  it  was  said  that  agriculture 
must  soon  limit  itself  to  cattle  raising  and  to  the  cul¬ 
tivation  of  a  few  select  varieties  of  grain.  But  German 
agrarians  resolved  to  make  agriculture  more  productive 
and  profitable  than  ever.  In  the  first  place,  therefore, 
they  formed  (1893)  the  Agrarian  League  and,  through 
their  Conservative  and  other  representatives  in  the  Reichs¬ 
tag,  forced  the  imposition  of  high  import  duties  on 
agricultural  products  ;  they  formed  societies  —  there  were 
over  twenty-six  thousand  of  these  in  1912  — which  aid  small 
farmers  in  various  ways,  as  purchasers  of  raw  materials  and 
selling  agencies,  and  as  savings  and  credit  banks  ;  they  es¬ 
tablished  schools  of  instruction  in  scientific  farming,  listing 
two  hundred  and  twelve  schools  and  nearly  ten  thousand 
pupils  in  19 1 1 .  Above  all,  German  farmers  employed  every 
bit  of  technical  science  that  could  be  applied  to  agriculture  ; 
it  is  said  that  no  other  country  farms  so  scientifically  or 
produces  so  much  per  acre.  Between  1890  and  1912  the 
amount  of  rye  produced  in  Germany  within  a  year  rose  from 
6.8  to  1 1  million  tons,  potatoes  from  29.7  to  44.2  million 
tons  ;  in  the  same  period  cattle  increased  from  about  1 7  to 
20.1  million  head,  pigs  from  12  to  21.8  millions.  On  the 
other  hand,  more  land  was  drawn  into  cultivation  ;  indeed 
the  cultivation  of  crops  on  land  which  was  formerly  used 
for  grazing  entailed  a  reduction  in  head  of  sheep  from 
about  14  to  5.7  millions.  At  the  same  time  the  imports 
of  wheat,  oats,  barley,  and  meat  for  immediate  consump¬ 
tion  exceeded  the  exports  of  the  same  articles  in  1890  by 
1.6  million  tons  and  in  1912  by  5.2  million  tons. 

Germany’s  industrial  and  commercial  progress  from 
1890  to  1914  forms  the  proudest  chapter  in  recent  Ger¬ 
man  history.  German  sense  of  order  and  system  produced 
enormous  organizations  of  capital  and  employees ;  the 


161.  The 
growth  of 
industries 
and  wealth 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


148 

Krupp  steel-casting  company  had  in  1913  a  capital  of 
$60,000,000  and  employed  nearly  fifty  thousand  men. 
German  adjustability  to  foreign  conditions  led  to  the 
production  of  articles  carefully  suited  to  the  needs  and 
tastes  of  buyers  all  over  the  world;  in  1912  the  German 
salesman  found  in  Argentina,  for  example,  a  market 
for  products  valued  at  $170,000,000,  in  Australia  for 
$90,000,000  worth.  The  Germans  were  also  extraor¬ 
dinarily  alert  in  utilizing  new  industrial  opportunities  ;  they 
exported  in  1912  electrical  machinery  and  appliances 
valued  at  nearly  $60,000,000,  products  that  were  unknown 
a  generation  ago.  The  progress  of  German  industrial  and 
commercial  life  was  halted  at  two  or  three  stages  — notably 
in  the  winter  of  1901-1902  and  in  that  of  1907-1908  — 
when  chiefly  overproduction  brought  on  a  stagnation  of 
business  and  the  failure  of  many  firms  ;  but  with  these  ex¬ 
ceptions  the  rise  of  industry  and  commerce  was  constant 
and  amazing.  To  specify  the  progress  of  only  a  few  of 
the  most  important  industries  :  Germany  produced  in  1910 
seven  times  as  much  coal  as  in  1870,  nine  times  as  much 
pig  iron,  twenty-four  times  as  much  steel ;  potash-salt 
mining,  which  did  not  become  a  conspicuous  industry  un¬ 
til  the  eighties,  advanced  within  twenty  years  (1886-1906) 
from  a  yearly  output  of  less  than  one  million  to  over  fifty 
million  tons.  Statistics  such  as  these  might  be  given  of 
other  industries.  Not  long  ago  (1912)  the  gross  value  of 
Germany’s  industrial  productions  within  a  year  was  reckoned 
at  $2,900,000,000  ;  in  this  respect  Germany  yielded  prece¬ 
dence  only  to  England  ($4,100,000,000)  and  to  the  United 
States  ($7,000,000,000).  An  interesting  corollary  of  this 
activity  is  found  in  the  records  of  banks.  At  the  end  of  the 
seventies  German  savings  banks  listed  deposit  accounts 
amounting  to  $500,000,000,  in  19 11  $4,000,000,000. 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II 


149 


The  annual  increase  of  wealth  of  the  nation  was  estimated 
in  1913  at  between  $1,000,000,000  and  $1,500,000,000, 
the  wealth  itself  at  well  over  $300,000,000,000. 

In  order  to  transport  at  least  a  part  of  the  vast  cargoes 
which  went  to  and  fro,  Germany  trebled  its  commercial 
fleet  between  1893  and  1913;  in  1900  it  constructed 
only  about  two  thirds  as  much  tonnage  in  sea-going  vessels 
as  the  United  States,  but  in  19 11  it  constructed  nearly 
twice  as  much.  Germany’s  commercial  fleet  was  then 
second  only  to  England’s.  The  same  ranking  obtained 
in  the  most  significant,  the  most  comprehensive  item  of 
all,  in  foreign  commerce.  Between  1890  and  1914  the 
annual  value  of  Germany's  foreign  commerce,  consisting 
chiefly  of  imports  of  raw  materials  and  unfinished  products 
and  exports  of  finished  manufactures,  rose  from  $1,900,- 
000,000  to  $5,000,000,000,  or  250  per  cent;  Germany 
exported  more  goods  to  England  in  1912  (about  $290,000,- 
000  worth)  than  to  any  other  country  ;  it  imported  most 
from  the  United  States  (nearly  $400,000,000  worth). 
Between  1890  and  1914  Germany  displaced  both  France 
and  the  Linked  States  in  the  comparative  value  of  its 
foreign  commerce  and  thus  rose  from  fourth  to  second 
place  among  the  nations.  England  still  had  a  considerable 
advantage — its  foreign  commerce  was  valued  in  191 1 
at  $6,250,000,000  —  but  England’s  rate  of  increase,  about 
50  per  cent  for  the  decade  from  1901  to  1911,  was  lower 
than  that  of  Germany. 

The  surpassing  growth  and  success  of  German  indus¬ 
trialism  have  raised  up  one  of  the  leading  problems  of 
modern  Germany,  the  conflict  between  agriculture  and  in¬ 
dustrialism.  Attracted  by  the  larger  opportunities  and 
returns  of  industrial  employment,  the  balance  of  popula¬ 
tion  has  shifted  from  the  country  to  the  city.  In  1830 


162.  Ship¬ 
ping  and 
foreign 
commerce 


163.  The 
conflict  be¬ 
tween  agri¬ 
culture  and 
industrialism 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


150 


164.  Effects 
of  industrial 
prosperity  on 
German  life 
and  character 


eighty  per  cent  of  the  German  people  lived  in  towns  of 
five  thousand  inhabitants  or  less;  in  1907  only  32.7  per 
cent.  But  in  spite  of  the  great  preponderance  of  urban  over 
rural  population,  agriculture  has  been  much  more  encour¬ 
aged  and  favored  by  legislation  than  industrialism.  This 
appears  especially  in  the  high  import  duties  which  have 
been  imposed  on  foreign  foodstuffs  and  which  have  enabled 
agriculturists  to  sell  their  products  at  a  high  figure.  These 
duties  have  been  secured  and  maintained  by  appeals  to 
German  patriotism  ;  agriculture  must  be  furthered,  it  has 
been  said,  so  that  Germany,  in  case  of  war,  may  be  able 
to  feed  itself.  Industrialists  have  opposed  these  duties 
bitterly,  because  foreign  nations  have  retaliated  with  high 
import  duties  on  German  manufactures,  and  because  the 
majority  of  the  people  has  been  forced  to  pay  higher 
prices  for  food  in  order  to  benefit  a  diminishing  mi¬ 
nority.  Many  economists  inside  and  outside  of  Germany 
believe  that  the  victory  in  this  struggle  lies  with  the  indus¬ 
trialists,  if  for  no  other  reason,  on  account  of  the  limited 
area  of  Germany.  Only  9.3  per  cent  of  the  soil  is  now 
unproductive  —  as  compared  with  14.3  per  cent  of  French 
soil  and  18.2  per  cent  of  that  in  Great  Britain  and  Ireland 
—  and  a  large  increase  of  the  population  must  force  the 
Empire  into  dependence  on  other  countries  for  a  sufficiency 
of  food.  In  that  case  the  high  import  duties  on  foodstuffs 
will  naturally  fall,  and  Germany  will  become  industrial 
according  to  prophecy. 

German  industrialism,  besides  transforminga  rural  people 
into  residents  of  cities,  has  wrought  other  impressive  changes 
in  German  life  and  character.  It  has  increased  very  largely 
and  generally  the  wealth  and  contentment  of  the  Empire. 
All  classes  have  shared  directly  or  indirectly,  to  a  greater 
or  less  extent,  in  the  material  gain  of  the  time.  Immense 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II 


151 

fortunes  have  been  amassed,  but  the  poor  have  not  become 
actually  or  relatively  poorer.  Many  have  enjoyed  the 
means  to  travel  as  never  before.  And  emigration  from 
Germany  has  virtually  stopped.  The  rate  of  221,000  emi¬ 
grants  per  year  in  the  early  eighties  dropped  by  1900  to 
22,000.  The  number  in  recent  years  is  perhaps  still  lower  ; 
but,  in  any  case,  emigration  at  present  is  probably  balanced 
by  the  immigration  of  various  peoples,  chiefly  of  Poles  and 
other  Slavs  who  come  into  the  eastern  provinces  of  Prussia 
to  work  on  the  farms.  Industrial  prosperity  has,  however, 
not  stopped  with  the  establishment  of  a  justifiable  content¬ 
ment.  It  has  imparted  a  sinister,  materialistic  aspect  to 
German  life.  It  has  not  overthrown  idealism  in  Germany 
altogether.  Idealism  is  apparent  in  science  and  literature  ; 
it  is  conspicuous  in  the  religious  and  philosophical  thought 
of  a  cultured  minority.  But  material  prosperity  has  led  to 
less  and  less  observance  of  the  difference  of  functions 
which  men  perform  in  human  society  and  to  more  and 
more  regard  for  materialistic  differences.  The  old  aristoc¬ 
racy  of  culture  has  given  way  in  considerable  part  to  an 
aristocracy  of  immense  industrial  wealth.  The  workingman, 
desirous  of  sharing  the  affluence  of  his  time  but  despairing 
of  his  own  ability  to  acquire  a  share,  dreams  of  the  evolu¬ 
tion  of  a  state  which  will  make  wealth  common  to  all  men. 
Finally,  industrial  prosperity  has  brought  economic  power 
and  with  this  a  further  veneration  of  power  from  a  new 
point  of  view.  Germany,  with  its  idolization  of  Bismarck,  the 
man  of  might,  has  developed,  in  considerable  part  through 
a  proud  consciousness  of  its  economic,  industrial  strength, 
a  worship  of  power  and  a  "  will  to  power  ”  which  tend  to 
overshadow  every  other  element  of  German  character. 

Four  years  before  the  expiration  of  the  Septennate 
of  1887,  that  is,  in  1890,  the  army  was  increased  by 


152 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


165.  The 
growth  of 
the  army 
and  navy 


nearly  20,000  men,  to  486,983,  including  under-officers. 
Caprivi,  the  imperial  chancellor  at  that  time,  was  not  satis¬ 
fied,  however,  so  in  1893  he  proposed  general  compulsory 
service,  excluding  only  the  absolutely  unfit ;  by  this  scheme 
the  numbers  in  the  army  were  to  increase  automatically  with 
the  growth  of  the  population  and  not  be  set  periodically 
by  the  Reichstag.  To  ensure  the  passage  of  this  proposal, 
Caprivi  offered  to  reduce  the  period  of  service  from  three 
to  two  years.  Eventually,  however,  the  number  was  fixed 
at  479,229,  excluding  under-officers,  for  five  and  a  half 
years  —  the  quinquennate  principle  thus  replaced  the  sep- 
tennate  —  and  the  two-year  provision  was  granted.  As  be¬ 
fore  and  after,  the  Reichstag  set  the  numbers  in  the  army. 
The  German  army  has  therefore  never  been  based  strictly 
on  universal  service  ;  many  able-bodied  Germans  have  been 
excused  because  the  allotted  number  could  be  made  up  of 
men  of  greater  military  fitness.  In  1899,  in  view  of  the 
growth  of  population,  the  army  was  further  enlarged  to 
include  495,500.  By  a  bill  passed  in  1905  the  increase 
was  so  arranged  that  by  1910  the  army  should  number 
505,839.  In  1 9 1 1  it  was  agreed  that  by  1916  the  army 
should  number  515,321,  but  in  the  very  next  year  it  was 
decided  that  this  number  should  be  enrolled  by  October  1, 
1912.  There  followed  in  1913  the  largest  increase  of  all. 
By  the  bill  then  passed,  the  army,  after  October  1,  1913, 
was  to  include  661,478  privates;  these  together  with  the 
officers  and  under-officers  were  to  form  a  standing  army  in 
time  of  peace  of  over  800,000  men.  On  August  1,  1914 
Germany  could  muster  about  7,000,000  men,  of  whom 
3,000,000  were  untrained  and  4,000,000  were  the  most 
thoroughly  drilled  soldiers  in  the  world.  In  1912  the 
army  cost  the  nation  $212,000,000.  By  the  bill  passed  in 
1913  the  annual  expenditure  for  the  army  was  increased 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II 


153 


by  $45,000,000,  and  a  "  contribution  for  national  defense,” 
a  tax  to  be  levied  only  once  on  incomes  and  property,  was 
to  be  collected,  netting  $225,000,000.  Compared  with  the 
army  and  its  origins,  which  may  be  traced  back  to  the  seven¬ 
teenth  century,  the  German  navy  is  a  growth  of  yesterday. 
The  first  important  step  toward  its  creation  was  taken  in 
1889  when  the  army  office  surrendered  its  control  of  naval 
affairs  and  an  imperial  admiralty  was  established.  Even 
then  nine  years  elapsed  before  the  first  navy  bill  was  passed 
(1898)  by  the  Reichstag.  This  bill  provided  for  a  fleet  of 
19  battleships  and  42  cruisers.  Only  two  years  later,  how¬ 
ever,  this  program  seemed  inadequate.  It  was  therefore 
enlarged  to  38  battleships,  14  first-class  cruisers,  38  smaller 
cruisers,  and  96  torpedo  boats  and  destroyers.  In  1908  a 
submarine  flotilla  was  added,  and  the  torpedo  fleet  was  in¬ 
creased  to  144.  When  war  was  declared  in  1914,  Germany 
was  said  to  have  37  battleships,  48  cruisers,  and  a  torpedo 
flotilla  of  189  destroyers  and  torpedo  boats  and  27  subma¬ 
rines  ;  this  display  of  naval  strength  was  second  only  to 
that  of  England.  The  Empire  expended  $118,000,000 
on  the  navy  in  1912. 

The  increase  of  German  armaments  has  been  facilitated 
by  Prussian-German  tradition,  which  favors  a  large  armed 
force,  and  by  reiteration  in  German  books  and  public 
speeches  that  many  events  which  German  history  cherishes 
would  never  have  come  to  pass  without  military  might.  It 
is  true  that  for  a  decade  and  more  after  1871  many  parties 
in  the  Reichstag  favored  a  reduction  in  the  numbers  of 
the  army;  but  in  1913  only  the  representatives  of  the 
Social-Democrats,  the  Poles,  and  Alsace-Lorraine  voted 
against  the  hugest  army  bill  ever  known.  A  majority 
of  the  German  people,  as  they  are  represented  in  the 
Reichstag,  supports  therefore  the  increase  of  armaments. 


166.  Reasons 
for  Ger¬ 
many’s 
armaments 


154 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


Germany  has  justified  its  armaments  chiefly  by  the  argu¬ 
ment  that  they  are  a  defensive  necessity,  for  it  has 
felt  its  territorial  integrity  threatened  constantly,  on  the 
west  by  France  with  its  desire  of  retribution  for  1870  and 
1871,  on  the  east  by  Russia.  Germany  has  also  believed 
its  commercial  progress  to  be  menaced  by  the  jealousy  of 
France  and  especially  of  England.  At  least  in  part  for 
these  reasons  the  Empire  has  prepared,  in  case  of  war,  to 
protect  its  borders  and  industries  at  home  and  its  colonies 
and  commerce  in  far-away  lands  and  on  the  seas.  It  is  not 
unreasonable,  however,  that  Germany  should  have  multi¬ 
plied  its  armaments  with  offensive  as  well  as  defensive  in¬ 
tent.  It  has  been  very  sensitive  to  the  restrictions  of 
its  limited  area  in  Europe  and  to  the  imperfections  of 
its  colonies  for  purposes  of  settlement.  A  nation  growing 
with  extraordinary  speed  and  vigor,  it  has  desired  naturally 
and  most  earnestly  a  larger  area.  It  has  been  jealous  of 
those  nations,  France  and  England  particularly,  which 
secured  enormous  colonial  possessions  in  favorable  cli¬ 
mates  before  Germany  had  been  unified  and  could  claim  a 
share  of  the  new  worlds  opened  by  the  explorations  of  the 
nineteenth  century.  Germany’s  desire  for  as  much  terri¬ 
tory  as  other  European  powers  possess  has  never  been 
concealed.  Its  ambition  to  even  up  the  difference  has 
been  declared  in  the  last  decade  more  and  more  frankly. 
Territorial  as  well  as  commercial  equality  is  what  Ger¬ 
many  has  meant  when  it  has  reiterated  its  desire  and 
ambition  to  enjoy  "  a  place  in  the  sun.”  A  great  armament 
seemed  to  be  the  logical  instrument  whereby  to  ensure 
participation  in  any  territorial  profit-sharing  which  might 
arise  from  new  international  situations.  Outside  of  the 
Empire  the  growth  of  German  armaments  has  been  viewed 
with  rising  odium  and  fear.  It  has  meant  to  other  nations 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II 


155 


the  growth  of  militarism,  which,  subject  to  no  laws  except 
its  own,  does  not  observe  the  rights  of  others,  and  advo¬ 
cates  sheer  physical  force  as  the  means  to  every  end.  To 
other  nations  German  armaments  have  seemed  a  constant 
menace  to  the  peace  of  Europe.  Well  aware  of  the  nu¬ 
merical  and  inherent  strength  of  the  Empire’s  forces,  other 
nations  have  looked  upon  these  forces  as  an  outward  ex¬ 
pression  of  the  German  will  to  power.  They  have  feared 
for  years  that  in  some  moment  of  international  disturbance 
this  will  to  power  would  seize  and  use  an  instrument  so 
ready  and  so  potent. 

The  general  tendency  and  effect  of  the  most  important 
legislation  since  1890  has  been  toward  further  consolida¬ 
tion  of  the  Empire.  The  completion  and  adoption  of  a 
new  Civil  Code,  which  went  into  effect  January  1,  1900, 
added  more  strength  to  German  national  unity  than  any 
other  measure  adopted  since  1871.  This  new  code  put  an 
end  to  the  bewildering  diversity  of  laws  in  the  different 
states  and  established  a  body  of  law  which  regulates  nearly 
all  legal  matters ;  for  example,  indebtedness,  movable 
property,  and  family  and  inheritance  rights.  Financial 
legislation  has  presented  a  much  more  difficult  problem. 
Until  the  turn  of  the  century  the  revenues  of  Bismarck’s 
protective  tariff  more  than  covered  the  expenses  of  the 
Imperial  Government.  But  in  the  meantime  commercial 
treaties  with  other  countries,  entailing  reductions  in  German 
import  duties,  had  diminished  imperial  revenues,  and  the 
expansion  of  the  army  and  the  creation  of  the  navy  had 
caused  huge  outlays,  for  which  provision  had  not  been 
made.  The  Government  was  again  financially  dependent 
upon  the  matricular  contributions  from  the  states  of  the 
Empire  just  as  it  had  been  in  the  seventies.  It  was  there¬ 
fore  agreed  (1904  and  1906)  that  the  states  should  pay 


167.  Leg¬ 
islation  of 
importance 
for  the  devel¬ 
opment  of 
the  Empire 
at  home 


156 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


168.  Social¬ 
istic  legis¬ 
lation 


fixed  matrieula,  which,  it  was  thought,  would  make  up  the 
deficits.  But  the  matrieula  and  other  revenues  were  still 
insufficient,  and  meanwhile  the  national  debt  was  increasing 
enormously  ;  between  1900  and  1907  it  rose  from  $600,- 
000,000  to  $1,000,000,000.  The  financial  legislation  of 
1909  was  far  more  effective  than  that  which  preceded  it. 
By  the  law  of  1909  the  matrieula  were  doubled  ;  a  higher 
tax  was  laid  on  tobacco,  liquor,  coffee,  and  tea ;  and  new 
taxes  were  put,  chiefly,  on  checks,  bills  of  exchange,  divi¬ 
dends  and  interest,  matches  and  means  of  illumination.  The 
annual  imperial  revenues  thus  increased  by  $125,000,000. 
The  addition  in  19 11  of  a  tax  on  unearned  increment 
enlarged  the  revenues  still  further.  But  the  army  bills 
passed  in  recent  years  have  alone  swallowed  up  a  very 
large  part  of  the  increase.  The  national  debt  in  1912  was 
$1,200,000,000,  involving  the  payment  of  interest  to  the 
amount  of  $45,000,000.  The  railways  of  the  Empire 
were  brought  into  closer  cooperation  in  1909,  but  the 
union  of  all  the  railways  in  an  imperial  system  is  still 
incomplete. 

The  socialistic  legislation  which  began  in  the  eighties 
has  been  much  expanded,  chiefly,  however,  in  making 
the  laws  already  passed  more  comprehensive.  The  Empire 
has  spent  many  millions  on  workingmen’s  dwellings,  pub¬ 
lic  baths,  and  other  institutions  for  the  public  good.  A 
movement  is  now  on  foot  to  insure  workingmen  against 
lack  of  work.  The  German  Government  deserves  great 
credit  for  its  solicitude  toward  the  working  classes  ;  no 
other  modern  Government  has  fathered  so  much  legis¬ 
lation  in  their  behalf.  But  it  is  a  question,  as  leading 
German  econoimsts  agree,  if  Germany  has  not  already 
gone  too  far  in  providing  for  the  working  classes.  Many 
fraudulent  cases  of  disablement  and  sickness  have  been 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II 


157 


discovered,  and  theorists  contend  that  the  responsibility 
and  initiative  of  workingmen  are  being  stunted.  German 
socialistic  legislation  has,  moreover,  appeared  in  every  case 
as  a  benefaction  from  above,  not  as  a  gain  of  a  brotherhood 
of  men.  For  this  reason  the  political  representatives  of 
workingmen,  the  Social-Democrats  in  the  Reichstag,  have 
not  furthered  imperial  legislation  intended  solely  for  the 
benefit  of  their  own  constituencies. 

Many  features  of  imperial  legislation  have  added  greatly 
to  the  unification  of  the  Empire  in  form  and  in  spirit. 
This  effect  has  been  heightened  by  many  other  less 
tangible,  but  powerful,  factors  in  every-day  life.  National 
pride  has  been  deeply  stirred  by  Germany’s  brilliant  in¬ 
dustrial  progress  and  by  its  material  prosperity.  It  has 
been  aroused  by  the  creation  of  the  imperial  navy. 
Service  in  the  army  unites  through  common  experience, 
as  well  as  through  pride  in  an  historic  institution,  a  large 
proportion  of  the  men  in  every  state  in  the  Empire. 
Impetus  to  national  pride  has  been  given  deliberately  by 
the  erection  of  countless  memorials  of  German  achieve¬ 
ments,  especially  of  monuments  to  the  Franco-German 
War,  and  by  innumerable  celebrations  of  historical  events. 
As  the  German  people  thus  became  more  unified  in  the 
contemplation  of  their  past  glories  and  their  present  prog¬ 
ress,  so  too  they  were  drawn  together  in  fear  of  danger 
from  their  geographical  situation  and  from  the  jealous 
commercial  rivalry  of  other  nations.  All  these  centripetal 
forces  have  made  the  German  Empire  an  organic  whole 
which  would  have  seemed  visionary  fifty  years  ago.  The 
advantages  of  such  a  union  have  been  patent  to  all.  Ger¬ 
mans  often  wished  in  the  years  just  past  that  some  features 
of  life  in  the  Empire  might  be  altered,  but  they  never 
wished  that  the  Empire  did  not  exist.  For  years  it  has 


169.  Unify¬ 
ing  factors  in 
German  life 


158 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


170.  The 
Reichstag 
from  1890  to 
1900 


Capri  vi 


seemed  very  improbable  that  Germany  would  ever  again 
break  up  into  the  "  Germanies  ”  of  a  former  time. 

From  1890  to  1907  the  Reichstag  was  dominated  by 
the  Catholic  Centre  to  the  extent  that  a  bill  could  rarely 
be  passed  without  the  cooperation  of  the  Centre.  In  1893 
the  Centre  caused  a  dissolution  of  the  Reichstag  by  its 
opposition  to  an  army  bill,  though  the  rejected  bill  was 
passed  by  the  succeeding  Reichstag  when  the  Catholic 
Poles,  usually  allies  of  the  Centre,  cast  their  decisive  votes 
in  favor  of  the  measure.  As  a  rule,  neither  the  parties  of 
the  Right  —  the  Conservatives,  the  German  Imperialists, 
and  the  National  Liberals  —  nor  those  of  the  Left  —  the 
German  Free-thinking  Party,  the  Social-Democrats,  and 
lesser  parties  —  could  form  a  majority,  and  the  gulf  be¬ 
tween  the  Right  and  the  Left  could  seldom  be  bridged. 
As  the  Centre  turned  and  joined  with  the  one  or  the  other, 
legislation  was  effected  or  defeated.  The  tendency  in  Ger¬ 
man  life  toward  the  formation  of  small  independent  groups 
emphasized  the  divergence  of  the  older  parties  and  indeed 
created  new  parties.  The  German  Free-thinking  Party 
divided  in  1893  into  the  Free-thinking  Union  and  the 
Free-thinking  People’s  Party.  The  German  Social  Reform 
Party,  which  usually  voted  with  the  Conservatives,  arose 
on  the  basis  of  anti-Semitism  ;  agrarian  rather  than  in¬ 
dustrial  in  its  sympathies,  it  feared  and  hated  the  Jewish 
financiers  in  the  German  money  markets.  With  the  rise 
of  this  and  other  parties,  the  groups  in  the  Reichstag  rep¬ 
resented  more  and  more  the  interests  of  special  classes 
rather  than  principles ;  they  were  determined  to  protect 
the  especial  interests  of  their  adherents,  and  thus  they 
proved  to  be  a  sequel  of  Bismarck’s  policy  of  protection. 
The  Centre  alone  represented  interests  of  all  classes.  Ca- 
privi,  when  Imperial  Chancellor,  alienated  every  party  in 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II 


159 


turn,  either  by  army  bills  or  by  discouragement  of  colonial 
expansion  or  by  commercial  treaties  with  other  countries. 
He  fell  (1894)  because  he  could  not  hope  to  find  effective 
support  anywhere  in  the  Reichstag.  His  successor,  Hohen- 
lohe,  won  the  Centre’s  cooperation  with  the  Government 
by  making  various  concessions  to  the  Roman  Catholics, 
such  as  permitting  the  Jesuit  Redemptorists  to  settle  in 
Germany.  With  the  aid  of  the  Centre,  Hohenlohe  secured 
the  adoption  of  the  new  Civil  Code  and  the  first  increases 
in  the  navy.  The  Conservatives,  whom  Caprivi  antagonized 
by  the  commercial  treaties  of  his  time,  returned  to  their 
normal  allegiance  to  the  Government  in  response  to  the 
greater  protection  of  agriculture.  Hohenlohe  retired  in 
October  1900  on  account  of  his  advanced  age. 

Biilow,  the  next  chancellor,  continued  the  policy  of  his 
predecessor  ;  he  further  conciliated  the  Centre  by  a  measure 
of  1904  repealing  a  clause  of  the  anti-Jesuit  law  which 
forbade  the  settlement  of  individual  Jesuits  in  Germany. 
The  Centre  responded  by  securing  a  reform  of  imperial 
finances,  the  adoption  of  new  commercial  treaties,  and  a 
further  enlargement  of  the  navy.  But  Biilow  wearied  of 
the  Centre’s  domination  and  the  concessions  to  the  Cath¬ 
olics  which  it  forced  from  him.  In  December  1906,  when 
the  Centre  blocked  the  passage  of  a  bill  involving  increased 
colonial  subsidies,  the  Reichstag  was  immediately  dissolved 
with  the  hope  that  the  power  of  the  Centre  might  be 
destroyed.  But  the  Centre  emerged  from  the  elections  of 
January  1907  as  strong  as  ever.  The  Social-Democrats, 
on  the  other  hand,  although  they  had  increased  their  total 
poll  of  votes  by  nearly  a  quarter  of  a  million,  had  lost 
many  seats,  returning  only  forty-three  representatives  to 
the  Reichstag  instead  of  eighty-one.  The  seats  thus  lost 
were  divided  among  various  parties,  so  that  none  gained 


Hohenlohe 


171.  From 
igoo  to  1909. 
Biilow 


172.  Since 
igog. 

Bethmann- 

Hollweg 


160  GERMANY  SINCE  1740 

much  power  ;  indeed  several  new  parties  —  the  Economic 
Union,  the  Farmers’  League,  the  German  Peasants’  League, 
and  the  Bavarian  Peasants’  League  —  which  represented 
varied  interests  obtained  a  foothold  in  the  Reichstag.  The 
chief  result  of  the  elections  and  the  agitation  which  pre¬ 
ceded  them  lay  in  the  new  allegiance  which  the  Free-think¬ 
ing  parties  now  owned  to  the  measures  of  the  Government. 
Biilow  could  oppose  the  Centre  and  the  Social-Democrats 
and  secure  the  passage  of  measures  by  a  combination  of 
parties  from  the  Right  and  Left,  the  so-called  bloc.  Through 
various  and  numerous  compromises  the  bloc  remained  in¬ 
tact  until  1909,  but  in  that  year  the  Conservatives  voted 
against  an  inheritance  tax,  and  with  the  aid  of  the  Centre 
they  passed  a  financial  reform  bill  which  was  very  different 
from  the  one  which  Billow  had  proposed.  The  bloc  was 
blasted  by  this  defection  of  the  Conservatives  ;  the  Centre 
again  became  all-powerful;  and  Biilow,  rather  than  hence¬ 
forth  seek  the  support  of  the  Centre  for  his  majorities, 
resigned  his  chancellorship  (July  1909). 

The  predominance  of  the  Centre  has  remained  stable 
under  the  next  and  present  chancellor,  Bethmann-Hollweg. 
On  close  votes  the  Government  has  obtained  its  majorities 
usually  by  a  combination  of  the  Conservatives  and  the  Cen¬ 
tre.  The  National  Liberals,  the  builders  of  the  Empire, 
have  no  power  inside  or  outside  the  Reichstag ;  they  vote 
usually  with  the  Conservatives  out  of  fear  of  the  Social- 
Democrats.  The  amalgamation  in  1910  of  the  two  Free- 
thinking  parties  and  the  German  People’s  Party  in  a  group 
known  as  the  Progressive  People’s  Party  has  not  disturbed 
the  balance  of  power  in  the  Reichstag.  Nor  did  the  elec¬ 
tions  of  1912  alter  conditions  materially.  The  Social- 
Democrats  gained  enormously —  1 10  seats  instead  of  43 
—  at  the  greater  or  less  expense  of  every  other  party,  but 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II  161 

the  Social-Democrats  are  powerless  against  the  combina¬ 
tion  of  the  Centre  and  the  parties  of  the  Right.  As  far 
as  power  is  vested  in  the  Reichstag,  the  Centre,  a  party 
based  on  church  confession,  remains  the  arbiter  of  German 
political  life.  A  few  years  ago  an  attempt  to  widen  the 
party  by  admitting  members  of  other  confessions  was  de¬ 
feated  impressively.  The  Centre  favors  now  many  meas¬ 
ures,  military,  naval,  and  colonial,  which  it  once  opposed ; 
it  also  advances  further  consolidation  and  nationalization  of 
the  Empire  ;  but  in  crises  the  final  dictator  of  its  actions 
is  the  Pope  in  Rome.  In  this  power  of  church  over  state 
lies  one  of  the  anachronisms  of  German  parliamentary 
conditions  in  the  twentieth  century. 

The  Law  of  Exceptions,  which  was  passed  against  the 
Social-Democrats  in  1878  and  renewed  in  1884,  lapsed 
permanently  in  1890.  In  the  autumn  of  the  same  year 
the  Social-Democrats  held  with  great  enthusiasm  the  first 
of  their  annual  general  meetings  of  delegates.  Disruptive 
influences  have  appeared  in  all  these  meetings ;  but  the 
party  has  lost  only  individuals,  it  has  never  broken  into 
groups.  No  other  party,  except  the  Centre,  holds  so 
closely  together ;  its  public  gatherings,  its  unions  of  small 
inner  groups,  and  its  popular  entertainments  appeal  to 
varied  interests  and  consolidate  them.  Since  1881  the 
party  has  lost  seats  in  the  Reichstag  in  two  elections,  those 
of  1887  and  1907,  but  the  number  of  votes  it  has  polled 
has  increased  without  a  break,  from  311,961  in  1881  to 
about  4,250,000  in  1912.  The  1 10  seats  which  it  secured 
in  1912  made  it  the  largest  party  in  the  Reichstag.  The 
conciliatory  policy  which  the  Government  adopted  by 
allowing  the  Law  of  Exceptions  to  expire  had  no  visible 
effect  on  the  temper  and  solidarity  of  the  party.  The  Gov¬ 
ernment  therefore  soon  returned  to  repressive  measures, 


173.  The 
Social- 
Democrats. 
Their  in¬ 
creasing 
numbers  and 
solidarity 


i62 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


174.  The 
evolution  of 
Social- 
Democracy 
in  recent 
times 


particularly  in  keeping  a  close  watch  on  Social-Democratic 
gatherings  and  in  haling  speakers  before  the  courts  on  the 
charge  of  seditious  utterances.  The  emperor  has  declared 
repeatedly  that  he  considers  a  Social-Democrat  a  personal 
enemy  of  himself  and  of  the  Empire.  But  the  use  of 
force  and  threats  has  effected,  as  in  the  days  of  Bismarck, 
only  the  opposite  of  the  Government’s  intent ;  the  party 
to-day  is  stronger  than  ever. 

The  Government  and  the  parties  of  the  Right  oppose 
the  Social-Democrats  so  vigorously  because  they  fear  the 
complete  overthrow  of  existing  institutions  if  the  Social- 
Democrats  win  control.  The  reasonableness  of  this  fear 
is  largely  a  matter  of  personal  opinion,  but  it  can  be  met 
with  weighty  arguments.  The  German  workingman,  as 
everybody  else  in  Germany,  has  profited  by  the  prosperity 
of  the  last  decades  ;  he  alone  has  enjoyed  the  gain  of  the 
socialistic  legislation.  The  Social-Democrat  is  therefore 
less  sweeping  in  his  condemnation  of  the  existing  order 
than  he  formerly  was  ;  the  party  tends  more  and  more  to 
take  an  active  part  in  the  making  of  laws,  less  and  less  to  be 
merely  a  party  of  obstruction,  as  under  Bismarck  and  later. 
The  Social-Democratic  party  still  upholds  many  of  the  tenets 
of  its  original  faith  —  for  example,  a  system  of  militia  instead 
of  a  paid  standing  army,  and  the  declaration  of  war  and 
peace  by  the  people  themselves  —  but  the  party  can  hardly 
be  said  to  have  threatened  the  complete  overthrow  of  the  ex¬ 
isting  order,  because  it  has  had  no  rounded  theory  of  govern¬ 
ment  to  offer  as  a  substitute.  It  has,  moreover,  not  appeared 
in  recent  years  as  a  party  of  revolution.  It  has  proved  itself 
in  parliamentary  as  in  every-day  life  to  be  rather  a  party  of 
evolutionary  reform.  What  the  Social- Democrats  most  de¬ 
sire  for  the  immediate  future  is  more,  if  not  complete,  coop¬ 
eration  in  government  on  the  part  of  every  adult  German. 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II  163 

The  Social-Democrats  are  not  alone  in  desiring  real 
cooperation  in  government ;  the  other  parties  of  the  Left 
unite  with  the  Social-Democrats  in  this  desire,  as  well  as 
many  adherents  of  the  Centre  and  the  parties  of  the 
Right.  In  other  words,  the  tide  of  democracy  and  demo¬ 
cratic  government,  which  has  already  risen  and  swept  over 
many  countries,  has  also  been  rising  in  the  German  Empire. 
German  exponents  of  this  movement,  realizing  the  limita¬ 
tions  of  the  present  Reichstag,  see  the  first  step  toward 
a  more  democratic  government  in  a  redivision  of  the 
Empire  into  electoral  districts,  a  leading  question  of  the 
present  time.  A  law  of  1867  divided  the  country  roughly 
into  electoral  districts  of  100,000  inhabitants  each,  appor¬ 
tioning  one  member  of  the  Reichstag  to  each  district. 
This  law  has  never  been  changed.  Since  its  adoption, 
however,  the  population  has  increased  from  40,000,000 
to  65,000,000;  many  thousands  have  removed  from  the 
country  to  the  city.  Former  constituencies  of  100,000, 
rural  for  the  most  part,  have  dwindled  ;  others,  mostly 
urban,  have  increased  three-  and  four-fold.  The  resulting 
inequalities  may  be  emphasized  by  the  fact  that  to-day  one 
district  of  59,000  inhabitants  elects  one  representative, 
and  one  Berlin  district  of  697,000  also  elects  one.  On 
the  basis  of  the  present  population  there  should  be  over 
600  representatives  in  the  Reichstag  instead  of  397.  Ac¬ 
cording  to  the  present  distribution  of  the  people  such  an 
increase  in  representation  would  go  almost  exclusively  to 
the  towns  and  their  industrial  elements.  It  would  go  to 
the  parties  of  the  Left.  These  parties  might  then  be  able 
to  obtain  such  alterations  in  the  form  of  government  as 
would  ensure  a  redivision  of  political  power.  Another  means 
to  democratic  cooperation  in  governmental  affairs  is  parlia¬ 
mentary  government  and  ministerial  responsibility  to  the 


175.  The 
democratic 
movement  in 
Germany  and 
the  obstacles 
to  it 


164 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


176.  The 
opposition  of 
the  Govern¬ 
ment 


representatives  of  the  people,  the  dream  of  the  National 
Liberals  in  the  first  years  of  the  Empire.  Neither  ministe¬ 
rial  responsibility  nor  parliamentary  government  is  possible, 
however,  as  long  as  the  Reichstag  is  made  up  of  so  many 
parties,  each  a  small  minority  in  itself.  Parliamentary  gov¬ 
ernment  is  based  on  the  two-party  principle,  the  party  in 
and  the  party  out  of  power,  or  the  party  which  elects  and 
directs  the  ministers  of  the  Government  —  to  which  they 
are  responsible  —  and  the  party  of  the  Opposition.  Minis¬ 
terial  responsibility  to  a  minority  party  of  the  Reichstag 
would  promote  class  legislation  and  incur  the  overwhelming 
opposition  of  all  the  other  parties. 

The  present  German  Government  is  opposed  both  to  a 
redivision  of  electoral  districts  and  to  the  institution  of 
parliamentary  government.  It  fears  the  alterations  which 
a  combination  of  parties  of  the  Left  might  bring  about.  It 
naturally  prefers  a  Reichstag  divided  against  itself  and  the 
independence  of  individual  parties  which  the  Government 
thereby  enjoys.  It  prefers  that  the  ministers  composing 
the  Government  and  directing  its  policy  should  be  respon¬ 
sible  to  one  man,  the  emperor,  and  subject  to  no  control 
whatever  on  the  part  of  the  people.  These  preferences  the 
present  Government  will  maintain  as  long  as  it  can.  As 
recently  as  January  1914  the  chancellor  declared  in  the 
Reichstag  that  he  would  oppose  any  attempt  to  encroach 
upon  the  emperor’s  constitutional  rights  "  with  all  his 
power.”  Bethmann-Hollweg  meant  by  this  no  recognition 
of  the  democratic  movement  of  the  age.  To  the  world 
at  large  it  seems  incredible  that  a  people,  to  whom  the 
world  owes  so  much  of  its  intellectual  freedom,  should 
have  so  little  cooperative  political  freedom  and  respon¬ 
sibility,  so  little  part  in  governing  themselves,  as  the 
German  people. 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II 


165 


German  colonial  ambition  stood  still  in  the  early  nine¬ 
ties.  Caprivi  was  much  more  interested  in  fortifying 
European  Germany  than  he  was  in  developing  opportuni¬ 
ties  of  colonial  expansion.  He  accordingly  yielded  German 
claims  to  valuable  districts  in  Africa  to  England,  receiving 
in  turn  the  island  of  Heligoland  in  the  North  Sea,  a  tiny 
but  important  base  for  defensive  and  offensive  naval  strat¬ 
egy.  The  next  chancellor,  Hohenlohe,  favored  colonial 
expansion  ;  since  his  time  colonial  problems  have  engaged 
lively  interest  in  Germany.  In  1898  Germany  secured  a 
foothold  in  the  Far  East.  Two  German  missionaries  had 
been  murdered  in  China  in  1897,  and  in  the  following 
year  China  granted  Germany,  as  a  measure  of  redress,  a 
ninety-nine  year  lease  on  the  harbor  of  Kiao-Chau.  Ger¬ 
many  also  strengthened  its  position  in  the  South  Seas 
(1898)  by  buying  the  Caroline  and  Marianne  Islands 
from  Spain  (for  less  than  $4,000,000),  and  by  securing 
in  an  agreement  with  England  and  the  United  States  the 
two  largest  islands  of  the  Samoan  group.  These  various 
tracts  form  with  Kaiser  Wilhelmsland  and  the  Bismarck 
Archipelago  a  fairly  closely  connected  whole.  In  19 11 
Cameroon  was  much  enlarged  by  an  agreement  with 
France.  In  1914  Germany  ruled  over  colonies  in  every 
quarter  of  the  globe,  a  total  colonial  area  five  times  as  large 
as  European  Germany. 

Germany’s  toil  and  trouble  with  its  colonies  resemble 
those  described  in  the  colonial  histories  of  other  nations. 
Officials  have  been  appointed  and  dismissed  in  rapid  succes¬ 
sion  ;  numerous  "  colonial  scandals  ”  have  been  published, 
in  which  officials  were  charged  with  bribery,  inhuman  cruelty 
to  natives,  and  other  crimes  ;  many  insurrections  have  arisen 
among  the  subject  peoples.  Those  of  German  East  Africa 
were  in  rebellion  from  July  1905  to  October  1906  ;  tribes 


177.  Colonial 
acquisitions 
since  1890 


178.  The 
course  of 
affairs  in  the 
colonies 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


179.  State 
affairs. 

The  most 
conspicuous 
public  events 
in  Prussia 


1 66 

in  German  South-West  Africa  fought  against  German 
troops  nearly  three  hundred  times  between  October  1903 
and  March  1907.  Under  the  stress  of  these  experiences,  the 
Imperial  Government  proceeded  to  reorganize  its  colonial 
affairs  and  to  establish  and  maintain  order.  It  elevated  the 
"  colonial  office  ”  into  the  "  imperial  colonial  office,”  an  in¬ 
dependent  department  of  state  ;  it  appointed  an  able  secre¬ 
tary,  laid  a  direct  cable  between  Germany  and  Africa, 
constructed  railways  and  telegraph  lines,  and  quartered 
thousands  of  soldiers  and  officials  in  the  colonies.  By  these 
means  the  Government  gave  uniformity  and  force  to  its 
colonial  policy,  and  it  has  drawn  great  encouragement 
from  the  fact  that  several  of  its  colonies  have  become  self- 
supporting  ;  some  have  even  yielded  revenues  to  the 
Empire.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Government  has  appar¬ 
ently  sought  to  make  little  Germanies  out  of  these  alien 
lands,  with  but  slight  regard  for  climatic  and  racial  differ¬ 
ences  and  with  scarcely  any  respect  for  the  desires  of  the 
natives.  The  wisdom  and  the  ultimate  success  of  this 
method  of  procedure  may  at  least  be  questioned. 

The  internal  affairs  of  Prussia  still  surpass  those  of  other 
German  states  in  relative  interest,  as  Prussian  influence 
continues  to  predominate  in  the  Empire.  The  most  im¬ 
portant  law  adopted  by  the  Prussian  Legislature  since  1 890 
revised  (1895)  the  finances  of  the  kingdom  fundamentally; 
it  did  away  with  double  taxation  and  many  indirect  taxes, 
substituting,  chiefly,  a  tax  on  incomes  and  one  on  indus¬ 
tries.  The  enlargement  of  the  canal  system  was  vigorously 
opposed  by  the  agrarians,  because  it  meant  the  cheaper 
transportation  of  foreign  foodstuffs  through  the  country 
and  a  fall  in  the  price  of  native  farm  products ;  the  agra¬ 
rians  finally  agreed,  however,  to  various  measures,  most 
notably  (1905)  to  the  completion  of  a  waterway  from  the 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II  167 

Rhine  to  Hanover.  A  law  of  1906  established  a  variety 
of  public  schools  in  line  with  differences  of  religious  con¬ 
fession  and  under  the  supervision  of  the  clergy  concerned. 
This  law  seems  a  fateful  recognition  of  church  in  state 
affairs  and  a  perpetuation  of  the  religious  differences  from 
which  Germany  has  suffered  ever  since  the  Reformation  ; 
but  it  was  announced  as  a  merely  provisional  measure.  In 
this  as  in  all  its  other  legislation  of  recent  years  Prussia 
has  remained  true  to  its  traditions.  It  has  continued  to 
keep  its  house  in  order.  Order  is  the  chief  pillar  of  strength 
in  Prussian  life.  No  other  country  is  administered  so  effi¬ 
ciently  or  has  such  honest,  devoted  officials.  But  Prussia 
has  frequently  converted  a  virtue  into  a  fault.  Its  zeal  for 
order  has  at  times  assumed  the  appearance  of  reaction  and 
of  militaristic  use  of  power.  Thus,  in  1894,  the  Prussian 
Legislature  passed  a  bill  controlling  university  instruction 
in  economics,  because  the  doctrines  of  various  lecturers 
threatened  to  disturb  existing  economic  regulations  ;  a 
law  of  1850  was  used  for  a  time  in  dissolving  Social- 
Democratic  organizations  ;  a  Berlin  professor  was  sum¬ 
moned  before  a  disciplinary  court  for  criticizing  Prussia’s 
policy  toward  the  Danes  in  northern  Schleswig. 

The  Prussian  Government  adopted  a  conciliatory  policy 
toward  the  Danes  and  toward  the  Poles  in  the  early  nineties, 
winning  the  support  of  the  Poles  in  the  Reichstag  at  a 
critical  time,  but  the  Government  soon  reverted  to  repres¬ 
sive  measures  because  the  Danes  continued  to  demand 
the  promised  plebiscite  and  the  Poles  their  national  inde¬ 
pendence.  In  1901  the  use  of  the  Polish  language  was 
further  limited  by  requiring  that  religious  instruction  be 
given  thenceforth  only  in  German.  In  1906,  when  many 
thousand  Polish  school  children  struck,  their  parents  were 
fined  and  imprisoned  ;  newspapers  were  confiscated  ;  no 


180.  In  the 
Danish  and 
Polish  prov¬ 
inces  of 
Prussia 


i68 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


181.  The 
need  of  suf¬ 
frage  reform 
in  Prussia 
and  the  oppo¬ 
sition  to  it 


public  meetings  were  permitted  in  which  Polish  was  to  be 
spoken ;  peasants  were  not  allowed  to  build  houses  on  their 
own  land.  The  Expropriation  Law  of  1 907  gave  the  Colo¬ 
nization  Commission  the  power  to  compel  the  sale  of  many 
landholdings,  thus  rendering  it  possible  to  unsettle  a  large 
number  of  Polish  inhabitants  and  practically  to  drive  them 
out  of  the  country  ;  the  Commission  has,  however,  not 
attempted  to  apply  in  any  large  measure  the  great  power 
thus  placed  in  its  hands.  The  Poles  in  eastern  Prussia  and 
the  Danes  in  Schleswig  have  remained  as  discontented 
as  they  ever  were.  Instead  of  winning  their  loyalty, 
Prussia  has  consolidated  them  against  itself  by  its  policy 
of  repression. 

The  most  extreme  phase  of  reaction  in  Prussian  govern¬ 
ment  at  the  present  time  lies  in  the  attitude  of  the  ruling 
powers  toward  the  question  of  suffrage  reform,  the  leading 
problem  in  the  kingdom’s  political  life.  The  three-class 
system  of  suffrage,  established  in  1850,  has  never  been 
essentially  altered.  The  subsequent  depopulation  of  rural 
districts  and  the  congestion  in  the  cities  have  therefore 
produced  a  lamentable  situation.  There  is  actually  a  dis¬ 
trict  in  Berlin  in  which  one  man  constitutes  the  first  class 
and  thus  has  as  much  electoral  power  as  all  the  working¬ 
men  of  the  district  combined.  In  May  1913  the  total 
number  of  men  voting  in  the  first  class  throughout  Prussia 
amounted  to  about  300,000,  that  in  the  second  class  to  about 
1,100,000  ;  the  number  in  the  third  class  was  6,500,000. 
Amendment  of  this  situation  has  been  demanded  over  and 
over  again,  so  that  in  1910  the  Government  proposed  a 
new  law,  but  many  changes  were  made  in  the  bill,  and  the 
Government  withdrew  it.  In  May  1914,  in  response  to  a 
query  concerning  the  prospect  of  suffrage  reform,  the  Prus¬ 
sian  Minister  of  the  Interior  declared  in  the  Legislature 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II 


169 


that  the  Government  would  submit  another  bill  when  it 
saw  fit.  In  spite  of  the  inequalities  of  the  present  suf¬ 
frage,  it  would  be  exceedingly  difficult  to  secure  a  reform. 
The  forces  favored  by  three-class  suffrage,  chiefly  the 
agrarian  Conservatives,  are  so  strong  both  at  court  and  in 
the  Legislature  that  the  constitution  could  hardly  be  altered 
without  their  consent.  It  is  very  doubtful  if  they  would  give 
their  consent  short  of  a  revolutionary  outbreak  of  the 
widespread  discontent  with  the  suffrage  as  it  is.  The 
dominance  of  the  agrarian,  or  Junker  ("  country  squire  ”), 
element  has  gravely  affected  the  unity  of  life  in  Prussia 
by  giving  much  nourishment  to  class  distinctions  and 
class  hatred.  This  dominance  of  an  ultraconservative 
minority  also  tends  to  weaken  the  respect  of  other  states 
for  Prussia  and  their  loyalty  to  Prussian  leadership  ;  it  thus 
tends  to  affect  the  unity  of  life  in  the  German  Empire. 

With  the  exception  of  Prussia  all  the  important  German 
states  have  recently  remodeled  their  suffrage  and  their 
constitutions  in  general  along  more  democratic  lines.  In 
the  case  of  suffrage  Prussia  is  the  most  backward  state  in 
all  Germany  except  the  two  grand-duchies  of  Mecklenburg- 
Schwerin  and  Mecklenburg-Strelitz.  Here,  in  spite  of 
numerous  attempts  to  reform  political  life,  people  are  still 
living  in  an  absolute  monarchy  which  employs  a  modified 
(1755)  feudal  system  of  1523.  The  kingdom  of  Saxony 
tried  three-class  suffrage  unsuccessfully ;  after  thirteen 
years  it  substituted  (1909)  a  plural  system  of  voting,  by 
which  as  many  as  four  votes  may  be  acquired,  through 
greater  wealth,  advancing  age,  and  higher  education.  The 
states  of  South  Germany  are  far  more  democratic  than 
those  in  the  north  ;  for  example,  Social-Democrats  have 
often  been  welcomed  at  southern  courts  as  cordially  as 
members  of  any  other  party.  The  grand-duchy  of  Baden, 


182.  Suf¬ 
frage  reform 
and  other 
events  in 
lesser  states 


Saxony 


170 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


Baden 


Wiirtemberg 


Bavaria 


Brunswick 


183-  Alsace- 
Lorraine 


the  most  democratic  of  all  the  German  states,  "  the  model 
duchy,”  has  had  since  1904  a  suffrage  that  is  direct,  secret, 
and  universal,  and  gives  one  man  one  vote ;  Baden  even 
reserves  the  control  of  the  budget  to  the  lower  of  the  two 
houses  of  the  Legislature.  Wurtemberg  introduced  uni¬ 
versal,  secret  suffrage  in  1906;  in  1910  the  kingdom 
passed  from  the  Protestant  to  the  Roman  Catholic  branch 
of  the  reigning  family.  Bavaria’s  universal  secret  suffrage 
dates  from  1905.  The  prince  regent  of  Bavaria,  Leopold, 
died  in  1912  and  was  succeeded  by  his  son  Louis,  also  as 
regent,  but  in  November  1913,  when  the  insanity  of  the 
king,  Otto,  was  declared  incurable,  Louis  ascended  the 
throne  as  king.  Ernest  Augustus,  eldest  son  of  the  duke 
of  Cumberland  and  grandson  of  the  last  king  of  Hanover, 
promised  in  1913  to  seek  in  no  way  to  impair  the  integrity 
of  Prussian  territory.  The  Bundesrat  received  this  promise 
as  a  renunciation  of  claims  to  the  kingdom  of  Hanover, 
and  therefore  consented  to  the  formal  entry  (November 
1913)  of  Ernest  Augustus  into  Brunswick  as  reigning  duke. 

The  imperial  province  Alsace-Lorraine  received  in  19 11 
a  constitution  together  with  three  votes  in  the  Bundesrat, 
thus,  in  the  words  of  the  imperial  chancellor,  "  raising  its 
people  from  the  status  of  second-class  Germans.”  The 
province  obtained  a  much  more  liberal  suffrage  —  equal, 
direct,  and  secret  —  than  that  in  Prussia,  but  much  objec¬ 
tion  has  arisen  to  various  provisions  of  the  new  constitu¬ 
tion,  among  others,  to  the  power  of  the  emperor  in  the 
province  through  his  appointment  and  control  of  the  vice¬ 
roy.  Conditions  in  Alsace-Lorraine  have  remained  far 
from  satisfactory,  even  to  the  most  optimistic  observers. 
The  population  is  German,  rather  than  French,  by  a  huge 
majority — almost  exactly  (1910)  eight  to  one  — but  pro- 
French  agitation  has  always  been  lively  and  obstreperous. 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II  17 1 

To  counteract  this  influence  the  policy  of  forcible  repres¬ 
sion  has  been  used  almost  exclusively.  Journals  have  been 
suppressed ;  societies  dissolved ;  the  army  has  often  assumed 
civil  authority  without  convincing  warrant.  Nine  of  the 
fifteen  representatives  whom  Alsace-Lorraine  elected  to 
the  Reichstag  in  1912  formed  a  group  whose  bond  of  union 
was  discontent  with  the  existing  order  in  the  province. 
The  possession  of  a  local  constitution  has  furthered  the 
consciousness  of  state  life  in  Alsace-Lorraine  just  as  the 
progress  of  other  states  has  bound  the  individual  peoples 
more  closely  together  in  state  loyalty  and  state  pride.  It  has 
been  said  that  this  loyalty  and  pride  overshadow  national 
consciousness,  that  they  constitute  a  centrifugal  force  which 
menaces  the  permanence  of  the  Empire  as  a  unit ;  but  Ger¬ 
man  states,  both  rulers  and  people,  ascribe  the  possibility 
of  their  great  development  of  recent  decades  to  the  pro¬ 
tection  and  encouragement  afforded  by  national  unity. 
Certainly  no  nation  ever  went  to  war  with  more  conspicuous 
unanimity  than  Germany  in  August  of  1914. 

The  consciousness  of  national  unity  has  given  a  notable 
impulse  to  intellectual  life  along  many  lines.  The  unity 
and  prosperity  of  the  Empire  have  presented  an  opportu¬ 
nity  unknown  in  Germany  hitherto  for  the  genesis  of  new 
intellectual  ambitions  and  for  the  attempt  to  realize  them. 
Since  the  eighties,  German  thinkers,  wLether  engaged  in 
philosophy  or  science  or  literature,  in  music  or  the  fine 
arts,  have  pursued  both  the  ideal  and  the  material ;  they 
have  experimented  with  many  new  forms  and  have  re¬ 
charged  the  old  with  new  vitality ;  they  have  sought,  in 
the  spirit  of  Goethe,  synthetic  assimilation  and  develop¬ 
ment  and  the  beauty  of  harmony.  Philosophers,  such  as 
Bergmann  and  Eucken,  returning  to  Kant,  have  faced 
materialistic  tendencies  of  the  time  with  a  new  idealism. 


State  unity 
and  national 
unity 


184.  The 
chief  phases 
and  leaders 
of  German 
intellectual 
life 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


172 

Religious  and  scientific,  permeated  with  love  of  the  Hel¬ 
lenic  ideal  of  beauty,  modern  idealism  seeks  to  unite  these 
elements  in  a  new  harmonious  whole.  Science  has  been, 
as  always,  idealistic  in  its  search  for  pure  truth ;  in  its  cal¬ 
culations  of  the  applicability  of  science  to  modern  life,  it 
has  also  frequently  been  materialistic,  serving  as  an  accom¬ 
plice  to  will  to  power.  German  literature  is  just  emerging 
from  a  period  of  transition  and  conflict.  In  the  eighties 
the  influence  of  Ibsen  and  Zola  and  Dostoievsky  brought 
forth  many  examples  of  appalling  naturalism.  Beside  these 
there  soon  arose  expressions  of  the  opposite  extreme,  mys¬ 
tic,  often  riddling  symbolism.  For  a  decade  or  more  men 
have  been  seeking  the  mean  between  these  extremes,  a 
realism  inspired  by  a  broader,  serener,  more  Goethean 
outlook  and  clad  in  a  more  restrained  and  beautiful  form. 
The  drama  commands  the  most  attention  in  Germany,  as 
evidenced  by  the  fame  and  success  of  Hauptmann,  the 
greatest  German  man  of  letters  of  the  present ;  but  the 
novels  and  short  stories  of  Sudermann,  Frenssen,  and 
others  are  more  indigenous  and  illustrative  of  German  life 
and  character,  and  the  lyrics  of  Dehmel,  George,  and  other 
poets  are  far  richer  in  new  moods  and  new  ideas.  In 
music  Humperdinck  has  revived  German  romanticism  and 
given  it  the  new  accepted  forms  of  modern  polyphony  ; 
Strauss  has  offended  deeply  by  the  gross  naturalism  of  his 
operas,  but  many  of  his  songs  maintain  by  their  nobility  of 
conception  and  expression  the  highest  traditions  of  German 
lyrical  music.  The  fine  arts  and  architecture  display  less 
idealism  and  more  striving  after  effect,  particularly  the 
effect  of  mass,  than  any  other  expression  of  intellectual 
endeavor.  Statues  and  monuments  of  crudely  colossal  pro¬ 
portions,  such  as  the  Bismarck  statue  in  Hamburg  and 
the  Leipsic  "Monument  to  the  Battle  of  the  Nations,”  the 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II 


173 


impression  of  strain  after  effect  in  Klinger’s  statues  and 
Stuck’s  paintings,  are  apt  to  eclipse  in  memory  the  Clas¬ 
sical  beauty  of  Tuaillon’s  "  Mounted  Amazon,”  the  poetic 
symbolism  of  Uhde’s  paintings,  and  the  refined  native 
romanticism  of  the  town  halls  in  Leipsic  and  Munich. 

German  life  since  1890  may  be  surveyed  from  many  lss.wuiiam 
points  of  view,  and  from  almost  every  one  the  dominant  11 
figure  is  that  of  the  emperor,  William  II.  The  presence 
and  the  influence  of  the  emperor’s  vigorous  personality 
has  been  felt  immediately  and  constantly  throughout  the 
Empire.  William  II  has  thus  fulfilled  in  ample  measure, 
the  conception  of  a  reigning  prince  as  one  who  touches 
the  life  of  his  people  at  every  point,  and  who  strives  with 
all  his  capacity  to  further  every  phase  of  their  welfare. 

The  depth  of  William  II’s  insight  and  the  breadth  of  his 
vision  are  disputable.  From  his  public  speeches  and  acts 
the  outlines  of  his  theory  and  policy  of  government  are, 
however,  fairly  clear.  William  II  believes  in  monarchy 
and  the  mission  of  the  Hohenzollerns  as  devoutly  as  did 
William  I  ;  he  believes  in  the  political  capability  of  the 
common  people  as  little  as  did  Frederick  the  Great.  He 
apparently  sees  the  hope  of  Germany  in  the  development 
of  an  empire  in  which  the  people  will  follow  with  enthu¬ 
siasm  the  leadership  of  the  Hohenzollerns.  He  has  there¬ 
fore  exalted  the  memory  of  his  ancestors  repeatedly,  and 
equally  often  he  has  admonished  his  people  to  follow  duti¬ 
fully  and  confidently  their  appointed  ruler.  The  emperor 
has  not  seen,  or  he  will  not  acknowledge,  the  world-wide 
democratic  movement  of  the  age ;  he  has  seemed  not  to 
know  that  his  people  are  determining  to  control  their  own 
political  life,  that  a  democratic  era  has  already  dawned  within 
the  borders  of  his  own  Empiie.  He  has  therefore  been 
trying  in  vain  to  graft  an  outlived  theory  of  government  on 


174 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


186.  Inter¬ 
national 
affairs. 

From  1890  to 
1900  ;  Ger¬ 
many’s  ap¬ 
pearance  as  a 
world  power 


an  age  of  other  ideals.  Bismarck  recovered  his  later  failures 
at  home  by  his  diplomacy  and  statesmanship  abroad.  In  the 
field  of  foreign  affairs,  where  the  constitution  of  the  Empire 
gives  practically  unlimited  authority  and  responsibility  to  the 
emperor,  William  II  has  made  his  most  fatal  mistakes. 

Before  and  after  his  retirement  Bismarck  urged  the 
renewal  of  the  "  reinsurance  ”  compact  with  Russia,  which 
was  due  to  expire  in  1890.  But  the  emperor  and  Caprivi, 
Bismarck’s  successor  (1890-1894),  preferred  cordial  rela¬ 
tions  with  England,  Russia’s  enemy  for  many  years,  to  an 
agreement  with  Russia.  The  treaty  with  England  (1890), 
in  which  Germany  renounced  its  claims  to  African  terri¬ 
tory  for  the  island  of  Heligoland,  was  therefore  readily 
agreed  upon,  the  "  reinsurance  ”  compact  was  dropped, 
and  the  restoration  of  friendship  with  Russia  was  halted. 
A  subsequent  tariff  war  with  Russia,  lasting  until  1894, 
destroyed  the  remnants  of  cordiality  between  Russia  and 
Germany.  In  the  meantime,  probably  in  1891  and  1892, 
Russia  and  Erance  agreed  in  secret  to  conventions  which 
secured  Russia’s  support  to  France  in  case  of  a  Franco- 
German  war  provided  that  France  was  not  the  aggressor ; 
in  1897  the  union  of  the  two  nations  in  the  "  Dual  Alli¬ 
ance  ”  was  formally  announced.  Thus  Russia  and  France 
made  answer  in  logical  sequence  to  the  Triple  Alliance 
and  the  announcement  of  its  renewal  (1892).  Germany 
first  came  forward  as  a  world  power  in  1895,  soon  after 
the  beginning  of  Hohenlohe’s  chancellorship  (1894-1900). 
China  and  Japan  were  discussing  terms  of  peace  at  the 
close  of  their  war,  and  Germany,  backed  by  other  powers, 
prevailed  upon  the  victor,  Japan,  to  modify  its  demands  on 
China.  Germany  displayed  armed  force  outside  of  Europe 
for  the  first 'time  in  1897,  when  it  seized  Kiao-Chau  and 
established  itself  in  the  Far  East.  In  the  same  year,  in  the 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II 


175 


settlement  of  the  war  between  Turkey  and  Greece,  Ger¬ 
many  sided  with  Turkey,  thereby  acquiring  influence  in 
Constantinople  and  securing  important  concessions  to  Ger¬ 
man  capital ;  the  chief  of  these  gave  a  German  company 
permission  to  construct  the  so-called  "  Bagdad  Railway,” 
about  1500  miles  long,  through  Asia  Minor  to  the  Persian 
Gulf.  The  range  of  German  influence  was  thus  vastly  ex¬ 
tended,  but,  excepting  those  with  Austria  and  Italy,  Ger¬ 
many’s  relations  with  other  world  powers  were  far  from 
satisfactory.  P'rance  and  Russia  were  alienated  definitively, 
and  estrangement  from  England  was  beginning.  Cordiality 
was  manifested  by  both  Germany  and  England  in  the  dis¬ 
tribution  (1898)  of  the  Samoan  islands.  But  England’s 
dealings  with  the  Transvaal  (Boer)  Republic  aroused  much 
criticism  in  Germany,  which  led  to  counter-irritation  in 
England ;  and  the  beginnings  of  commercial  and  naval 
rivalry  were  felt,  if  they  were  not  already  apparent.  Nor 
were  Germany’s  relations  with  the  United  States  cordial  in 
spite  of  the  large  number  of  German-born  American  citi¬ 
zens.  A  tariff  war  between  the  two  countries  and  Germany’s 
strictures  on  the  importation  of  American  meat  and  fruit 
aroused  ill  feeling  in  the  United  States,  and  during  the 
Spanish-American  War  Germany  intensified  this  feeling 
when  it  attempted  to  interfere  with  operations  of  American 
battleships  in  Manila  Bay. 

The  ill  feeling  toward  Germany  which  was  current  in 
many  nations  was  due  in  part  to  jealousy  of  Germany’s 
surpassing  advance  in  prosperity  and  power.  It  was  also 
due  in  part  to  Germany’s  new  imperialistic  attitude  toward 
other  countries  and  to  rising  distrust  of  the  German  Gov¬ 
ernment’s  intentions.  The  origins  of  German  imperialism 
were  manifold  and,  mainly,  quite  defensible  :  the  example  of 
every  other  first-class  nation,  the  limited  area  of  European 


187.  The 
growth  of 
German  im¬ 
perialism 
and  Pan- 
Germanism 


176 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


Germany,  German  ambition  to  equal  in  territory  other 
nations  of  its  class,  the  consciousness  of  German  national 
strength  and  worth,  the  emigration  of  millions  of  Germans 
to  other  quarters  of  the  globe  and  the  desire  to  hold  these 
former  citizens  to  their  native  allegiance.  But  Germany 
seemed  at  times  not  merely  to  be  protecting  its  people  and 
interests  abroad,  but  also  to  be  forcing  opportunities  to 
seize  a  foothold  in  many  regions,  in  South  America,  in  the 
Philippines,  in  Africa,  and  in  Asia.  Each  of  these  moves 
fell  short  for  one  reason  or  another,  but  each  added  to  the 
distrust  of  Germany.  This  distrust  was  further  increased 
by  the  appearance  and  activity  of  a  new  element  in  Ger¬ 
man  life,  Pan-Germanism.  This  movement,  an  outgrowth 
of  German  imperialism,  set  in  shortly  before  the  end  of 
the  nineteenth  century  and  grew  very  rapidly.  It  is  not 
an  organized  union,  however  ;  it  is  an  idea,  which,  roughly 
stated,  conceives  all  Germanic  peoples  as  forming  in  spirit 
one  great  nationality.  All  Pan-Germanists  start  out  from 
this  idea,  but  their  declared  aims  vary  widely.  Some  Pan- 
Germanists  deny  any  political  or  territorial  ambitions  and 
assert  that  they  wish  merely  to  spread  the  knowledge  and 
influence  of  German  culture  throughout  the  world.  Others 
daringly  proclaim  as  an  ultimate  mission  the  German  oc¬ 
cupation  not  only  of  territory  where  German  is  spoken  but 
of  the  whole  globe ;  they  favor,  if  need  be,  the  forcible 
Germanization  of  the  world.  Men  of  high  official  standing 
in  Germany  have  disclaimed  repeatedly  that  the  Govern¬ 
ment  has  ever  taken  part  in  the  Pan-German  movement ; 
they  have  also  asserted  that  the  Pan-Germanists  form  a 
very  small  percentage  of  the  German  people.  But  Pan- 
Germanists  carried  on  their  propaganda  with  great  vigor ; 
they  enlisted  the  aid  of  many  influential  German  news¬ 
papers  ;  they  increased  their  following  at  home  by  large 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II 


1 77 


numbers  every  year  ;  and  they  instigated  the  formation  of 
societies  all  over  the  earth  to  advance  exclusively  German 
ideas  of  culture  and  civilization.  These  ideas  were  threat¬ 
ening,  for  they  promoted  the  most  sinister  elements  of 
German  life  :  increase  of  armaments,  militarism  in  the 
conduct  of  state  and  national  affairs,  magnification  of  Ger¬ 
man  achievements,  and  disparagement  of  non-German  in¬ 
stitutions  and  customs.  In  its  advocacy  of  such  principles 
as  these  and  in  its  tacit  repudiation  of  the  equal  rights  of 
other  nationalities,  Pan-Germanism  in  its  extreme  form 
was  hurling  boomerangs  ;  it  was  making  itself  the  most 
insidious  of  all  the  hostile  forces  rising  up  against  Ger¬ 
many.  Largely  on  account  of  those  things  for  which  ex¬ 
treme  Pan-Germanism  stands,  Germany  became  the  most 
disliked  nation  in  Europe. 

When  Billow  became  Imperial  Chancellor  (1900-1909), 
a  new,  more  conciliatory  spirit  seemed  to  enter  into  German 
diplomacy.  The  German  Government  seemed  earnestly 
to  desire  friendship  with  other  nations.  It  worked  har¬ 
moniously  with  other  powers  to  suppress  the  Boxer  up¬ 
rising  (1900)  in  China,  and  it  readily  agreed  (1901)  with 
England  concerning  the  integrity  of  China.  It  began  also 
to  draw  closer  to  the  United  States  through  an  exchange 
of  gifts,  through  the  visit  (1902)  of  Prince  Henry  to  the 
United  States,  and  through  the  establishment  of  exchange 
professorships.  But  Germany  made  no  progress  with  France 
or  with  Russia,  and  soon  a  contrary  tide  began  to  rise  in 
England.  England  resented  the  lively  sympathy  of  the 
German  people  for  the  Boers  in  the  English-Boer  War 
(1899-1902);  commercial  rivalry  became  very  real;  and 
England  saw  in  the  rapid  growth  of  the  German  navy  a 
direct  menace  to  its  mastery  of  the  sea.  In  1902  England 
entered  into  an  alliance  with  Japan.  In  1904  it  established 


188.  From 
1900  to  1904 


Estrange¬ 
ment  from 
England  and 
the  rise  of 
the  Triple 
Entente 


178 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


189.  From 
1904  to  1909  ; 
the  first  stage 
in  the  Franco- 
German  dis¬ 
pute  over 
Morocco 


the  "  Entente  Cordiale  ”  with  France.  This  was  a  prologue 
to  the  "  Triple  Entente,”  which  soon  after  united  England, 
France,  and  Russia,  and  served  as  a  reenforcement  of  the 
Dual  Alliance  between  Russia  and  France.  The  Triple 
Entente  bound  the  contracting  parties  to  act  together  in 
diplomatic  sympathy ;  it  did  not,  however,  bind  England 
on  the  one  hand  or  France  and  Russia  on  the  other  to 
help  in  case  of  war. 

The  Triple  Alliance  was  renewed  in  1902,  but  in  1904 
a  growing  friendliness  between  France  and  Italy  threatened 
its  integrity.  Germany,  with  only  Austria  as  a  certain  friend, 
found  itself  becoming  more  and  more  isolated.  This  feel¬ 
ing  of  isolation  was  emphasized  by  the  proclamation  of  the 
Triple  Entente  and  by  events  concerning  northern  Africa. 
In  1904  England  and  France  agreed  that  England  should 
have  a  free  hand  in  Egypt,  and  France  in  Morocco.  Ger¬ 
many  was  ignored  in  the  consultations  leading  to  this 
agreement  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  Germany  had  important 
commercial  interests  in  Morocco,  based  in  part  on  a  con¬ 
vention  of  the  powers  in  1880,  in  part  on  a  special  treaty 
with  Morocco  made  in  1890.  Highly  indignant  at  the 
slight,  and  not  improperly,  Germany  insisted  (1905),  with 
the  support  of  Austria,  on  the  territorial  integrity  and  in¬ 
dependence  of  Morocco  and  on  the  "open  door”  to  the 
commerce  of  all  nations.  In  1906  the  powers  approved 
this  demand  at  Algeciras,  Spain.  Germany  took  this  posi¬ 
tion,  probably,  with  a  twofold  purpose,  to  defeat  the  parties 
to  the  Entente  Cordiale  and  thereby  weaken  their  union, 
and  to  exert  an  influence  which  would  force  the  recognition 
of  Germany  thenceforth  as  a  nation  to  be  reckoned  with 
and  consulted.  On  the  other  hand,  Germany  apparently 
stood  on  the  ground  of  a  lofty  morality,  and  it  maintained 
this  ground  triumphantly.  German  diplomacy  seemed  to 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II 


179 


be  regenerated  and  to  be  informed  by  German  idealism. 
A  few  years  later  it  celebrated  another  triumph,  though  a 
more  dubious  one.  The  Berlin  Congress  of  1878  had 
turned  over  the  administration  of  affairs  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  to  Austria ;  thirty  years  later  (1908)  Austria 
annexed  both  states  as  Austrian  provinces.  Russia,  which 
was  looking  to  the  establishment  of  a  Balkan  federation  of 
Slavic  states  under  its  protection,  entered  a  vigorous  pro¬ 
test  against  Austria’s  seizure  of  the  two  states,  but  Russia 
was  still  too  weak  from  its  war  with  Japan  (1904-1905)  to 
venture  upon  a  conflict  of  arms.  When  Germany,  in  return 
for  Austria’s  aid  at  Algeciras,  threw  all  its  influence  on  the 
side  of  Austria,  even  to  the  threat  of  war,  Russia  acquiesced. 
In  1909  the  powers  confirmed  the  Austrian  annexation. 
Germany  was  now  proclaimed  as  the  arbiter  of  Europe. 
Germany  had  prevented  war  when  war  seemed  inevitable, 
but  whereas  at  Algeciras  it  had  won  with  a  display  of 
noble  morality,  it  triumphed  in  1909  with  a  display  of 
its  sword.  This  was  not  forgotten  in  the  chancelleries 
of  Europe. 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  the  imperial  chancellor  of  the  pres¬ 
ent  time,  succeeded  Biilow  in  1909.  For  a  while  it  seemed 
that  Germany,  from  the  vantage  ground  of  1909,  might 
regenerate  its  relations  with  at  least  two  arch-enemies, 
Russia  and  England.  In  1910  Germany  and  Russia  prom¬ 
ised  in  turn  not  to  enter  upon  any  policy  which  might  aim 
aggressively  at  the  other.  In  19 11  Germany  removed  a 
possible  source  of  conflict  with  England  and  English  in¬ 
terests  in  Asia  by  conceding  the  completion  of  the  Bagdad 
Rai  .way  to  an  international  company.  Then  came  the  down¬ 
fall  of  German  diplomacy  of  191 1.  In  the  summej  of  that 
year,  when  French  troops  were  occupying  the  capital  of 
Morocco  in  order  to  preserve  peace,  a  German  cruiser  cast 


Germany 
assists  Aus¬ 
tria  in  the 
annexation 
of  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina 


190-  From 
1909  to  ign 


The  last 
encounter 
over  Morocco, 
the  defeat 
of  Germany 


180  GERMANY  SINCE  1740 

anchor  off  the  town  of  Agadir,  in  southern  Morocco,  in 
order  to  protect  German  merchants  and  to  safeguard  the 
observance  of  the  conventions  of  Algeciras.  In  the  nego¬ 
tiations  which  followed,  Germany  beat  a  lamentable  retreat. 
It  granted  that  in  view  of  France’s  activity  for  the  welfare 
of  Morocco  France  should  be  politically  preeminent  in  the 
sultanate  and  might  establish  a  protectorate  over  it ;  both 
France  and  Germany  endorsed  the  principle  of  equal  com¬ 
mercial  liberty  in  Morocco  to  all  nations ;  and  —  the  most 
significant  feature  of  these  negotiations  from  the  moral 
standpoint  —  France  ceded  to  Germany  106,000  square 
miles  of  African  territory  contiguous  to  Germany’s  province 
of  Cameroon.  Thus  Germany  maintained  the  principle  of 
the  "open  door,”  but  it  yielded  the  independence  of 
Morocco,  and  it  forced  the  cession  to  itself  of  territory 
more  than  half  as  large  as  European  Germany.  At  Alge¬ 
ciras  it  had  appeared  inspired  by  idealistic  motives  and 
wholly  disinterested  in  regard  to  territorial  acquisitions  ;  in 
19 1 1  it  laid  itself  open  to  the  charge  of  having  nourished 
territorial  ambitions  from  the  start.  To  foreign  observers 
the  Franco-German  agreement  of  1911  afforded  convinc¬ 
ing  evidence  of  a  highly  dangerous  spirit  of  aggression  in 
Germany.  This  evidence  was  augmented  by  that  of  the 
reception  which  a  large  portion  of  the  German  people 
gave  to  the  news  of  the  agreement.  Many  Germans,  Pan- 
Germanists  and  others,  were  bitterly  disappointed  that 
Germany  did  not  force  France  to  divide  its  protectorate 
over  Morocco ;  they  have  never  ceased  to  censure  this1 
"  weakness  ”  on  the  part  of  their  Government.  Thus  Ger¬ 
man  diplomacy  lost  heavily  at  home  and  abroad.  Ocher 
nations  were  more  convinced  than  ever  that  militaristic 
aggressiveness  was  the  dominant  note  in  German  diplomacy 
and  German  life. 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II 


1 8 1 


During  1912  and  1913  the  relations  between  the  powers 
remained  essentially  unchanged.  The  reality  of  the  align¬ 
ments  of  the  great  nations  and  of  their  vast,  increasing 
armaments  became,  however,  more  oppressive  constantly. 
On  the  one  hand  stood  the  Triple  Entente  of  England, 
France,  and  Russia,  reenforced  for  England  by  its  alliance 
with  Japan  and  for  France  and  Russia  by  the  more  bind¬ 
ing  terms  of  their  Dual  Alliance.  On  the  other  hand  stood 
the  Triple  Alliance  of  Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy,  which 
was  renewed  in  1912.  The  advantage  of  a  comparison 
lay  with  the  Entente.  The  wealth  and  the  resources  of 
the  parties  to  it,  not  including  the  English  and  French 
colonies,  aggregated  nearly  $4,000,000,000  of  annual 
revenues  and  nearly  8,500,000  trained  soldiers,  whereas 
the  annual  revenues  of  the  Triple  Alliance  slightly  ex¬ 
ceeded  $2,500,000,000  and  its  trained  soldiers  7,000,000. 
The  more  important  comparison  of  the  cohesive  power 
of  the  two  groups  of  nations  likewise  favored  the  Entente. 
Nothing  occurred  in  recent  years  to  mar  at  all  seriously 
the  cordiality  of  the  relations  between  its  members,  and 
no  conflict  of  interests  anywhere  threatened  for  the  im¬ 
mediate  future.  The  stability  of  the  Triple  Alliance  was 
menaced  by  a  rising  conflict  of  interests  between  Austria 
and  Italy,  each  of  whom  was  eager  to  acquire  territory 
along  the  eastern  coast  of  the  Adriatic  Sea.  No  friction 
developed  between  Germany  and  Italy,  but  it  became  in¬ 
creasingly  evident  after  1904  that  the  ties  between  Ger¬ 
many  and  Austria  were  drawn  much  closer  than  those 
between  Germany  and  Italy.  The  close  cooperation  of 
Germany  and  Austria  at  Algeciras  and  again  in  1909 
proved  this  to  the  satisfaction  of  Italy  as  of  every  other 
nation.  Thus  have  the  great  powers  of  Europe  stood  in 
the  most  recent  years.  These  were  the  fruits  of  German 


191.  The 
relations  of 
the  powers 
within  the 
Triple 

Entente  and 
the  Triple 
Alliance  in 
1912  and  1913 


182 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


192.  The 
immediate 
causes  of 
the  war 


diplomacy  since  the  time  of  Bismarck.  When  Bismarck 
retired,  Germany  had  only  one  certain  enemy,  France.  In 
the  spring  of  1914  Germany  had  only  one  certain  friend, 
Austria.  That  friend  was  destined  to  draw  Germany  into 
the  most  calamitous  war  in  history. 

Russia  yielded  to  Austria’s  seizure  of  Bosnia  and  Her¬ 
zegovina,  but  it  neither  forgave  nor  forgot.  On  the  con¬ 
trary,  it  used  Servia  in  stirring  up  all  the  Slavic  elements 
in  both  the  provinces  against  the  rule  of  Austria.  This 
agitation  culminated  on  June  28,  1914,  when  the  Austrian 
heir-presumptive  was  murdered  in  the  capital  of  Bosnia. 
On  July  23,  in  a  formal  ultimatum,  Austria  laid  all  the 
blame  for  the  assassination  at  the  door  of  Servia  and  de¬ 
manded  immediate  investigation  and  retribution.  The  fol¬ 
lowing  day  Austria  rejected  the  joint  request  of  Servia  and 
Russia  for  an  extension  of  time  to  Servia  in  preparing  a 
reply.  On  July  25  Servia  granted  all  the  terms  of  Austria’s 
ultimatum  except  the  participation  of  Austrian  officers  in 
the  investigation  of  conditions  in  Servia.  But  even  with 
this  Austria  was  not  satisfied.  It  therefore  declared  war 
on  Servia  July  28.  Russia,  Germany,  and  France  began 
at  once  to  prepare  for  war,  and  as  Russia  refused  to  cease 
its  mobilization,  Germany  declared  war  on  Russia  August  1 . 
Within  twenty-four  hours  German  troops  invaded  France 
without  waiting  for  a  formal  declaration  of  war,  and  Bel¬ 
gium  appealed  to  England  for  protection  against  the  threat¬ 
ened  invasion  of  its  territory  by  Germany.  As  Germany 
did  invade  Belgium,  in  violation  of  the  neutrality  guaran¬ 
teed  to  Belgium  by  all  the  powers,  England  declared  war 
on  Germany  August  4  ;  on  August  12  England  declared 
war  on  Austria.  In  the  meantime  (August  8)  Montenegro, 
as  an  enemy  of  Austria,  and  Portugal,  as  an  ally  of  Eng¬ 
land,  had  ranged  themselves  on  the  side  of  the  Triple 


GERMANY  UNDER  WILLIAM  II  183 

Entente ;  on  August  23  Japan,  as  an  ally  of  England  and 
still  smarting  from  the  wound  inflicted  by  Germany  in 
1895,  declared  war  on  Germany.  Thus  the  Triple  En¬ 
tente  held  fast  and  attracted  new  allies ;  all  the  eight 
nations  together — England,  Trance,  Russia,  Belgium, 
Portugal,  Servia,  Montenegro,  and  Japan- — could  muster 
at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  nearly  1 1 ,000,000  trained  sol¬ 
diers.  The  Triple  Alliance  did  not  go  to  war.  Italy  de¬ 
clared  its  neutrality  and  reaffirmed  (August  8)  this  position, 
on  the  ground  that  the  terms  of  the  Triple  Alliance  bound 
its  members  to  mutual  support  only  in  case  one  of  them 
were  attacked  by  France  or  Russia,  whereas  Germany  com¬ 
mitted  the  first  act  of  war.  Germany  and  Austria  thus 
entered  upon  the  conflict  alone,  opposing  with  slightly 
more  than  6,000,000  trained  soldiers  the  unparalleled 
hosts  of  their  enemies. 

The  haste  with  which  Germany  plunged  into  war,  ab¬ 
solving  Italy  from  participation  as  a  member  of  the  Triple 
Alliance,  was  only  one  of  the  mistakes  of  German  diplo¬ 
macy  in  the  critical  weeks  and  days  before  the  war.  If,  as 
other  nations  believe,  Germany  was  behind  Austria  through¬ 
out  the  negotiations  with  Servia,  German  diplomacy  made 
in  this  its  gravest,  most  fundamental  mistake ;  it  precipi¬ 
tated  the  war.  For,  in  view  of  the  part  which  Russia  had 
taken  through  Servia  in  the  anti-Austrian  agitation  in  Bos¬ 
nia  and  Herzegovina,  it  was  certain  that  Russia,  having 
recovered  command  of  its  normal  strength  and  resources, 
would  unite  with  Servia  in  a  defensive  war  against  Austria  ; 
Russia  would  not,  as  in  1909,  be  stayed  by  a  display  of 
Germany’s  sword.  France  was  drawn  into  war  by  Ger¬ 
many’s  invasion  of  French  territory,  but  even  now,  when 
Germany  and  Austria  were  arrayed  against  Russia,  France, 
and  Servia,  Germany  might  anticipate  a  victory  in  the 


193.  Mis¬ 
takes  of 
German 
diplomacy 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


184 


194.  The 
ultimate 
causes  of  the 
war  and  the 
blame 


struggle.  Germany  then  repudiated  Prussia’s  written  guar¬ 
antee  of  Belgian  neutrality  as  an  immaterial  "scrap  of 
paper,”  when  advantages  of  war  were  in  the  balance,  and 
proceeded  to  throw  many  thousand  troops  into  Belgium  on 
the  way  to  France.  Germany  thereby  destroyed  the  good 
will  of  many  neutral  nations ;  it  raised  up  new  and  power¬ 
ful  enemies,  England,  Belgium,  and  Japan.  More  undis¬ 
cerning  diplomacy  can  hardly  be  imagined  than  that  of 
Germany  in  the  summer  of  1914. 

Nevertheless,  however  blundering  German  diplomacy 
may  have  been,  and  however  clear  the  immediate  causes 
of  the  war  may  seem  to  be,  the  ultimate  blame  does  not 
lie  with  Germany  alone.  Only  those  whose  vision  is  limited 
to  things  of  to-day  can  charge  all  the  guilt  to  any  one  or 
all  the  evil  forces  at  work  in  Germany.  From  the  German 
point  of  view  it  is  a  war  of  national  defense  against  the  in¬ 
roads  of  the  Slavs  and  the  jealousy  of  England  and  France. 
Germany’s  enemies  are  fighting  German  militarism  and 
overweening  ambition.  It  is  the  shame  of  Europe  that 
Germany  and  its  enemies  can  cite  in  turn  historical  proof 
of  charges  which  they  bring  against  each  other.  Greed  and 
jealousy,  therefore,  alliances  and  ententes,  armaments  and 
militarism,  each  and  all  are  responsible  for  the  collapse  of 
civilization  on  the  noblest  continent  of  the  globe. 


f 


STATES  COMPOSING  THE  GERMAN  EMPIRE 


The  States 

Area  in 
Square 
Miles 
(in  Round 
Numbers) 

Population 
December 
1,  1910 
(in  Round 
Numbers) 

Number 
of  Mem¬ 
bers  IN  THE 

Bundesrat 

Number 
of  Repre¬ 
sentatives 

IN  THE 

Reichstag 

Kingdoms  : 

Prussia . 

134,000 

40,000,000 

!7 

236 

Bavaria . 

29,200 

7,000,000 

6 

48 

Saxony  . 

5,700 

5,000,000 

4 

23 

Wurtemberg . 

7,50° 

2,500,000 

4 

17 

Grand-duchies  : 

Baden  . 

5,800 

2,000,000 

3 

H 

Hesse . 

2,900 

1 ,000,000 

3 

9 

Mecklenburg-Schwerin  .  . 

5,000 

600,000 

2 

6 

Mecklenburg- Strelitz  .  .  . 

1,100 

100,000 

I 

I 

Oldenburg . 

2,400 

500,000 

1 

3 

Saxe- Weimar . 

i>3°° 

400,000 

I 

3 

Duchies  : 

Anhalt . 

800 

300,000 

I 

2 

Brunswick . 

1,400 

500,000 

2 

3 

Saxe-Altenburg . 

500 

200,000 

I 

I 

Saxe-Coburg-Gotha  .... 

700 

2  50,000 

I 

2 

Saxe-Meiningen . 

900 

300,000 

I 

2 

Principalities  : 

I.ippe . 

400 

I  50,000 

I 

I 

Reuss,  younger  branch  .  . 

100 

75,000 

I 

I 

Reuss,  older  branch  .  .  . 

3°° 

I  50,000 

I 

I 

Schaumburg- Lippe  .... 

100 

50,000 

I 

I 

Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt  .  . 

300 

100,000 

1 

I 

Schwarzburg-Sondershausen 

3°° 

90,000 

I 

1 

Waldeck . 

400 

60,000 

I 

I 

Free  Cities  : 

Bremen . 

99 

300,000 

I 

1 

Hamburg . 

150 

1 ,000,000 

I 

3 

Liibeck . 

IOO 

100,000 

I 

I 

Imperial  Territory: 

Alsace-Lorraine . 

5,600 

2,000,000 

3* 

PS 

208,000 

65,000,000 

6l 

397 

*  Not  counted  if  Prussia,  by  means  of  them,  should  secure  a  majority  for  the 
measure  on  which  the  Bundesrat  is  voting. 


GENEALOGIES  OF  LEADING  GERMAN 
RULERS 


A.  Hohenzollern  Rulers  since  1640. 

Frederick  William,  "  the  Great  Elector”  of  Brandenburg,  1640- 
1688. 

Frederick  III,  son  of  the  Great  Elector;  Elector  of  Brandenburg, 
1688-1713;  as  Frederick  I,  King  in  Prussia,  1701-1713. 

Frederick  William  I,  son  of  Frederick  I ;  King  in  Prussia,  1713- 
1740. 

Frederick  II,  "the  Great,”  son  of  Frederick  William  I ;  King  of 
Prussia,  1740-1786. 

Frederick  William  II,  nephew  of  Frederick  the  Great;  King  of 
Prussia,  1786-1797. 

Frederick  William  III,  son  of  Frederick  William  II ;  King  of 
Prussia,  1797-1840. 

Frederick  William  IV,  son  of  Frederick  William  III ;  King  of 
Prussia,  1840-1861. 

William  I,  son  of  Frederick  William  III ;  regent,  1857-1861  ; 
King  of  Prussia,  1861-1888;  German  Emperor,  1871-1888. 

Frederick  III,  son  of  William  I ;  King  of  Prussia  and  German 
Emperor,  March-June,  1888. 

William  II,  son  of  Frederick  III ;  King  of  Prussia  and  German 
Emperor,  1888- 

B.  Hapsburg  Rulers  since  1740. 

Maria  Theresa,  daughter  of  Charles  VI ;  Archduchess  of  Austria, 
1740-1780;  wife  of  the  Emperor  of  the  Floly  Roman  Empire, 
Francis  I,  1745-1765. 

Joseph  II,  son  of  Maria  Theresa  and  Francis  I;  Archduke  of 
Austria  and  Emperor  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  1765-1790. 

Leopold  II,  son  of  Maria  Theresa  and  Francis  I ;  Archduke  of 
Austria  and  Emperor  of  the  Holy  Roman  Empire,  1790-1792. 

Francis  II,  son  of  Leopold  II ;  Archduke  of  Austria,  1792-1804; 
Emperor  of  Austria  as  Francis  I,  1804-1835;  Emperor  of  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire,  1792-1806. 

Ferdinand  I,  son  of  Francis  I ;  Emperor  of  Austria,  1835-1848. 

Francis  Joseph,  nephew  of  Ferdinand  I;  Emperor  of  Austria, 
1848- 


186 


GENEALOGIES  OF  GERMAN  RULERS  187 


C.  Wittelsbach  Rulers  of  Bavaria  since  1726. 

Charles  Albert,  Elector  of  Bavaria,  1726-1745;  Emperor  of  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire  as  Charles  VII,  1742-1745. 

Maximilian  III,  son  of  Charles  Albert;  Elector  of  Bavaria,  1745- 
1 777- 

Charles  Theodore,  a  distant  relative  and  heir  of  Maximilian  III ; 
Elector  of  Bavaria,  1777-1799. 

Maximilian  IV,  a  distant  relative  and  heir  of  Charles  Theodore ; 
Elector  of  Bavaria,  1799-1806;  King  of  Bavaria  as  Maximilian 
I,  1806-1825. 

Louis  I,  son  of  Maximilian  I  ;  King  of  Bavaria,  1825-1848. 

Maximilian  II,  son  of  Louis  I ;  King  of  Bavaria,  1848-1864. 

Louis  II,  son  of  Maximilian  II;  King  of  Bavaria,  1864-June  13, 
1886. 

Leopold,  brother  of  Maximilian  II ;  regent,  June  10,  1886-1912. 

Otto,  son  of  Maximilian  II ;  King  of  Bavaria,  June  13,  1886-1913. 

Louis,  son  of  Leopold;  regent,  1912-1913;  King  of  Bavaria  as 
Louis  III,  1913- 

D.  House  of  Hanover  since  1692. 

Ernest  Augustus  I,  Elector  of  Hanover,  1692-1698. 

George  I,  son  of  Ernest  Augustus;  Elector  of  Hanover,  1698- 
1727;  King  of  England,  1714-1727. 

George  II,  son  of  George  I  ;  Elector  of  Hanover  and  King  of 
England,  1727-1760. 

George  III,  nephew  of  George  II ;  Elector  of  Hanover,  1760-181 5  ; 
King  of  Hanover,  1815-1820;  King  of  England,  1760-1820. 

George  IV,  son  of  George  III ;  King  of  Hanover  and  King  of 
England,  1820-1830. 

William,  son  of  George  III ;  King  of  Hanover,  1830-1837  ;  King 
of  England  as  William  IV,  1830-1837. 

Ernest  Augustus,  son  of  George  III;  Duke  of  Cumberland;  as 
Ernest  Augustus  I,  King  of  Hanover,  1837-1851. 

George  V,  son  of  Ernest  Augustus  I ;  Duke  of  Cumberland;  King 
of  Hanover,  1851-1866;  died  1878. 

Ernest  Augustus,  son  of  George  V ;  Duke  of  Cumberland ;  heir 
of  William,  Duke  of  Brunswick  (died  1884). 

Ernest  Augustus,  son  of  Ernest  Augustus ;  Duke  of  Brunswick, 
I9U- 


A  SELECTED  BIBLIOGRAPHY  OF  ENGLISH 
BOOKS  ON  GERMAN  HISTORY 


Atkinson,  C.  T.  A  History  of  Germany,  1715-1815.  London,  1908. 
The  most  useful  book  on  Germany  in  the  eighteenth  century. 

Bernhardi,  F.  von.  Germany  and  the  Next  War.  Translated  from 
the  German.  London,  1 9 1 1  ;  a  cheap  edition,  London,  1914.  A  char¬ 
acteristic  specimen  of  extreme  Pan-Germanism. 


Bismarck,  Otto  von.  Reflections  and  Reminiscences.  Translated 
from  the  German.  London,  1898.  In  effect  a  defense  of  many  of  Bis¬ 
marck’s  most  important  acts,  though  not  published  as  such  ;  not  proof 
against  the  charge  of  inaccuracy. 

Bright,  J.  F.  Maria  Theresa,  London,  1897  ;  and  Joseph  II,  London, 
1897.  Two  small  substantial  biographies. 


Bryce,  James.  The  Holy  Roman  Empire.  New  York,  1904.  A  mas¬ 
terpiece  on  the  origin  and  development  of  the  theories  underlying  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire  and  the  institutions  governing  it. 

Bulow,  Bernhard  von,  Imperial  Chancellor,  1900-1909.  Imperial 
Germany.  Translated  from  the  German.  New  York,  1914.  Germany’s 
foreign  and  domestic  policies  between  1888  and  1913  from  the  Govern¬ 
ment’s  point  of  view. 

Cambridge  Modern  History.  Valuable  chapters  on  Germany  since 
1740  beginning  withVpkime  VI;  excellent  bibliographies  at  the  end  of 
each  volume. 

Carlyle,  Thomas.  History  of  Friedrich  the  Second,  called  Frederick 
the  Great.  Published  first  in  1858-1865.  Called  by  Emerson  the  wittiest 
book  ever  written.  Especially  entertaining  on  Frederick’s  private  life  ; 
still  reliable  as  well  as  vivid  on  battles  and  campaigns. 

Cramb,  J.  A.  Germany  and  England.  American  Edition.  New  York, 
1914.  An  Englishman’s  view  of  Germany  and  the  European  situation 
in  the  most  recent  years,  affording  lively  comparisons  with  Bernhardi. 


Dawson,  W.  H.  The  Evolution  of  Modern  Germany.  London, 
1908.  One  of  several  able  books  on  the  Empire,  especially  good  on 
the  economic  side,  by  a  well-informed  author. 

188 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


189 


Encyclopaedia  Britannica.  Eleventh  Edition.  Admirable  articles 
under  "Frederick  II,”  "Seven  Years’  War,”  and  other  captions. 

Francke,  Kuno.  A  History  of  German  Literature  as  determined 
by  Social  Forces.  Fourth  Edition.  New  York,  1901.  A  masterly  treat¬ 
ment  of  the  subject  and  an  excellent  bridge  from  the  study  of  German 
history  to  that  of  German  literature. 

Fullerton,  W.  M.  Problems  of  Power.  New  York,  1913.  A  keen 
analysis,  from  a  Parisian  point  of  view,  of  Germany’s  foreign  policy 
since  1866. 

Fyffe,  C.  A.  History  of  Modern  Europe.  3  vols.  New  York, 
1881-1887. 

Hazen,  C.  D.  Europe  since  1815.  New  York,  1910.  This  and  the 
foregoing  book  are  standard  works  with  chapters  on  Germany  and  its 
relations  with  other  European  powers ;  good  bibliographies. 

Headlam,  J.  W.  Bismarck  and  the  Foundation  of  the  German  Em¬ 
pire.  New  York,  1909.  A  sympathetic  treatment  of  Bismarck’s  ideals 
and  achievements. 

✓ 

Henderson,  E.  F.  A  Short  History  of  Germany.  2  vols.  New  York, 
1902.  A  history  of  Germany  from  the  earliest  times  down  to  1871,  the 
most  commendable  account  for  the  general  reader. 

Henderson,  E.  F.  Bliicher  and  the  Uprising  of  Prussia  against 
Napoleon,  1806-1815.  New  York,  1911.  An  attractive,  handy  narrative 
of  Bliicher’s  life  and  the  period. 

Hohenlohe-Schillingsfurst,  Chlodwig  von,  Imperial  Chancel¬ 
lor,  1894-1900.  Memoirs.  Translated  from  the  German.  2  vols.  New 
York,  1906.  Largely  gossip  and  personalities,  but  thus  far  the  frankest 
revelations  of  inside  German  history  during  the  reign  of  William  II. 

Howard,  B.  E.  The  German  Empire.  New  York,  1913.  A  good 
juristic  analysis  of  the  constitution  of  the  Empire. 

Hurd,  Archibald,  and  Castle,  Henry.  German  Sea  Power.  Its 
Rise,  Progress,  and  Economic  Basis.  New  York,  1913.  A  sympathetic 
and  discerning  statement  of  the  growth  of  the  German  navy. 

Leger,  Louis.  History  of  Austro-Hungary.  Translated  from  the 
French.  London,  1889.  The  best  book  in  English  on  its  subject. 

Lichtenberger,  Henri.  Germany  and  its  Evolution  in  Modern 
Times.  Translated  from  the  French.  New  York,  1913.  A  philosoph¬ 
ical  discussion  of  modern  Germany  in  many  phases  by  a  cultured, 
scholarly  Frenchman. 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


190 


Lowell,  A.  L.  Governments  and  Parties  in  Continental  Europe. 
2  vols.  Boston,  1896.  Vol.  I,  pp.  286-377  ;  Vol.  II,  pp.  1-67.  An  able 
and  entertaining  discussion  of  the  Imperial  Constitution  and  German 
parliamentary  life,  unfortunately  closing  with  the  year  1S94. 

Metternich,  Clemens  Lothar,  Prime  Minister  of  Austria,  1809- 
184S.  Memoirs.  Translated  from  the  German.  4  vols.  London,  1880- 
1882.  Carefully  edited,  eloquent  recollections  of  an  astute  diplomatist. 

Reddaway,  W.  F.  Frederick  the  Great  and  the  Rise  of  Prussia. 
New  York,  1904.  A  biography  of  Frederick  that  largely  displaces 
Carlyle’s  with  the  general  reader  on  account  of  its  comparative  brevity 
and  use  of  recent  historical  research. 


Richard,  Ernst.  History  of  German  Civilization.  New  York,  1911. 
A  book  that  is  uneven  in  style  and  treatment,  but  throws  many  interest¬ 
ing  sidelights  on  German  history. 

Schurz,  Carl.  Reminiscences.  3  vols.  New  York,  1907.  The  first 
volume  narrates  events  preceding  and  attending  the  revolutionary 
movement  of  1848  and  the  following  years.  A  book  of  great  popular 
interest  by  a  man  of  noble  ideals. 

Seeley,  J.  R.  Life  and  Times  of  Stein,  or  Germany  and  Prussia  in 
the  Napoleonic  Age.  American  Edition.  2  vols.  Boston,  1879.  An  excel¬ 
lent,  detailed  account  of  the  most  stimulating  period  in  Prussian  history. 


Seignobos,  Charles.  A  Political  History  of  Europe  since  1814. 
Translated  from  the  French.  New  York,  1907.  A  learned  book  with 
chapters  on  the  relations  of  Germany  and  other  European  powers ; 
sometimes  dry,  but  always  profitable. 

Smith,  Munroe.  Bismarck  and  German  Unity.  New  York,  1898. 
A  capital  summary. 

Usher,  R.  G.  Pan-Germanism.  Boston,  1913.  A  lively  discussion  of 
Germany’s  foreign  policy. 


INDEX 


(Directions  contained  in  parentheses  indicate  geographical  location  on  one  of 
the  maps;  for  example,  "  Aix-la-Chapelle  (I  D  3)”  refers  the  reader  to  Map  1, 
longitude  D,  latitude  3) 


Africa,  German  colonies  in  (IV 
200  N.  lat.-20°  S.  lat.,  o°-40°  E. 
long.),  139.  165  sq. 

Agadir,  180 
Agrarian  League,  147 
Agriculture,  German,  146  sq., 
149  sq. 

Aix-la-Chapelle  (I  D  3),  14 
Alexander  I,  of  Russia,  47,  52,  61, 
63,  66,  72 
Algeciras,  178 
Alsace  (I  D  4-5),  74,  119 
Alsace-Lorraine  (III  C  4-5),  120, 
143  sq.,  1  33,  170  sq.,  185 
Anhalt  (III  E-F  3-2),  185 
Architecture,  German, 9, 90,  t72sq. 
Armaments,  German,  151  sqq. 
Arndt,  Ernst  Moritz,  64,  84,  93 
Aspern  (I  J  4),  59 
Auerstadt  (I  F  3),  51 
Austerlitz  (I  J  4),  47 
Austria  (I  G-H-J  4-5;  Archduchy 
-1804  ;  Empire  1804-  ), 

in  the  Holy  Roman  Empire, 
5  sq. ;  in  the  Silesian  Wars, 
11  sqq.;  in  the  Seven  Years’ 
War,  17  sqq.;  from  1763  to 
1790,  26  sq. ;  in  the  Partitions 
of  Poland,  32,  37  ;  32  sq. ;  in  the 
wars  with  France  and  Napoleon, 
38-43'  47,  58  sq->  6l>  67-72;  in 
the  German  Confederation,  76- 
81,  83  sq.,  86  sq.;  in  the  struggle 
for  constitutional  liberty,  94  sq., 
101  ;  in  the  conflict  with  Prussia 
for  the  hegemony  of  Germany, 
98-100,  105  sq.,  108-112;  rela¬ 
tions  with  Germany  since  1871, 


125,  126,  175,  178,  179,  18 1,  182, 
183;  186,  189 

Austrian  Netherlands  (I  B~C-D 
3-4),  5,  14,  16,  39,  40,  42 
Austrian  Succession,  War  of  the, 
1 2  sqq. 

Austro-Prussian  War  ( 1866),  1 1 1  sq. 

Baden  (I  D-E  5-4;  Margraviate 
-1806;  Electorate;  Grand- 
duchy  1806-  ),  6,  44,  46;  in 

the  wars  with  Napoleon,  47  sq., 
60 ;  in  the  struggle  for  constitu¬ 
tional  liberty,  79,  83,  88,  95  ;  in 
the  Austro-Prussian  War,  112; 
169  sq.,  185 

Bagdad  Railway,  175,  179 

Bamberg  (I  F  4),  50 

Basel  (I  D  5),  Peace  of,  40  sq.,  43 

Battle  of  the  Nations,  70 

Bautzen  (I  H  3),  67 

Bavaria  (I  F-G  4-5  ;  Duchy 

1805;  Electorate;  Kingdom 
1805-  ),  5,  6;  in  the  Silesian 

Wars  and  the  Seven  Years’ War, 
10,12,15,20;  1763-1786,  27,  28, 
32  sq. ;  in  the  Napoleonic  era,  44, 
48,  59,  60,  69  ;  in  the  struggle 
for  constitutional  liberty,  79,  83, 
84,  88,  91,  102;  in  the  Austro- 
Prussian  War,  in,  1 1 2  ;  in  the 
Franco-German  War,  114,  119; 
since  1871,  128.  142,  144,  170, 
185  ;  rulers  of,  see  table,  p.  187 
Bavarian  Succession,  War  of  the, 
32  sq. 

Becker,  Nikolaus,  89  sq. 
Beethoven,  90 


192 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


Belgium  (II  A  4),  5,  74,  182,  183, 
184 

Belle  Alliance  (I  C  3),  73 
Beresina,  62 
Bergmann,  Julius,  17 1 
Berlin  (I  G  2),  7,  26,  50,  51,  60,  64, 
go,  92  ;  Academy,  57  ;  Univer¬ 
sity  of,  57  ;  Congress  of,  125  sq. 
Bernadotte,  68,  70,  72 
Bethmann-Hollweg, Imperial  Chan¬ 
cellor,  146,  160,  164,  179 
Bismarck,  Otto  von  (Prime  Min¬ 
ister  of  Prussia  1862-1890;  Im¬ 
perial  Chancellor  1871-1890), 
105  ;  dealings  with  Austria  con¬ 
cerning  Schleswig  and  Holstein, 
toSsq.;  afterthe  Austro-Prussian 
War,  H2sq.;before  the  Franco- 
German  War,  1 14  sq. ;  his  states¬ 
manship,  1 22;  foreign  diplomacy 
after  1871,  125  sqq. ;  dealings 
with  the  Social-Democrats, 
132  sq. ;  with  the  Reichstag, 

13s  sqq- ;  G8-  J39>  143  ;  his  dis¬ 
missal,  145;  1 51,  174;  188,  189, 
190 

Bismarck  Archipelago  (IV  S.  of 
o°  lat.,  E.  of  140°  E.  long.),  139, 
165 

Bloc,  160 

Bliicher,  51  sq.,  56  sq.,  65,  68  sq., 
70,  71,  72  sq.,  189 
Bohemia  (I  G~H  3-4),  5,  x  1 ,  17, 
33,  hi 

Bonn  (I  D  3),  84 
Borne,  Ludwig,  89 
Borodino,  61 

Bosnia  (II  G-H  7),  126,  179,  182, 

i83 

Brahms,  140 

Brandenburg  (I  F-G-H  2;  Mar- 
graviate  ;  Electorate),  7  ;  merged 
into  the  Kingdom  of  Prussia,  8  ; 

186 

Bremen  (III  D  2),  120,  185 
Breslau  (I  J  3),  12,  18,  63 
Bruch,  Max,  140 

Brunswick  (II  C~D  3-4 ;  Duchy 
with  capital  of  same  name),  28, 
52,  60,  71,  84,  144,  170,  185, 

187 

Brussels  (I  C  3),  40,  72 


Biilow,  Bernhard  von,  Imperial 
Chancellor,  146,  15939.,  177,  188 
Biilow,  Friedrich  Wilhelm  von, 
General  in  the  War  of  Libera¬ 
tion,  68,  69 

Bundesrat,  120,  133,  144,  170,  185 
Bunsen,  Robert,  141 
Burschenschaft,  82,  83 

Cameroon  (Kamerun,  IV  N.  of 
o°  lat.,  E.  of  o°  long.),  139,  165, 
180 

Campo  Formio  (I  G  5),  Treaty  of, 
42 

Caprivi,  Imperial  Chancellor,  146, 
152,  158  sq.,  165,  174 
Carl  August,  of  Saxe- Weimar,  28, 
39-  79 

Carlsbad  (II  E  4)  Resolutions,  83, 

84 

Carlsruhe  (II  C  5),  95,  1 1 6 
Caroline  Islands  (IV  N.  of  o°  lat., 
E.  of  140°  E.  long.),  165 
Cartel,  137 
Cassel  (I  E  3),  53 
Centre,  Party  of  the,  128,  135, 
136  sq.,  158  sqq. 

Chalons-sur-Marne  (II  A  5),  117 
Charles,  Archduke  of  Austria,  41, 
42,  58 

Charles,  Duke  of  Brunswick,  39, 

5°.  51 

Charles  VI,  of  Austria,  10,  186 
Charles  VII,  of  Bavaria,  12,  13,  1S7 
Charles  Theodore,  Elector  of 
Bavaria,  187 

China,  relations  of,  with  Germany, 
165,  174,  177 

Coalitions  against  France  and  Na¬ 
poleon  :  First,  40 ;  Second, 
42  sq. ;  Third,  47  ;  Fourth,  50  ; 
Fifth,  68 

Coblenz  (II  B  4),  116 
Code  Napoleon,  53 
Colberg  (I  I-I  1),  51 
Cologne  (I  D  3),  5,  90 
Colonial  Union,  139 
Colonies,  German,  139  sq.,  165  sq. 
Commerce,  German  foreign,  149 
Conservative  Party,  in  the  Prussian 
Legislature,  104  sq.,  113,  169; 
in  the  Diet  of  the  North  German 


INDEX 


193 


Federation,  1 1 4  ;  in  the  Reichs¬ 
tag,  135.  '36>  !37i  158-  *59.  160 
Constitutional  conflict  in  Prussia, 
104  sq. 

Continental  System,  53,  60,  61 
Crimean  War,  100 
Cumberland,  House  of,  144,  170, 

187 

Curtius,  Ernst,  141 
Ciistrin  (I  H  2),  51 

Danes  in  Schleswig,  107  sq.,  142 
sq.,  167,  168 
Dantzic  (I  K  1),  36,  37 
Danube  (I  E-K  4-6),  47 
Darwin,  Charles,  141 
Dehmel,  Richard,  172 
Denmark,  107  sqq. 

Dennewitz  (I  G  3),  69 
Dollinger,  Ignaz  von,  93 
Dresden  (I  G3),  14,  66,  69,  95 
Dual  Alliance,  174,  178 

Economic  Union,  160 
Eichendorff,  Joseph  von,  89 
Eisenach  (II  D  4),  82 
Elba  (II  D  8),  72 
Elbe  (I  H-E  3—2),  52 
Elizabeth,  of  Russia,  16,  20 
Ems  (III  D~C  3-2),  142 
Enghien,  duke  of,  46 
England,  relations  with  Ilanover, 
6,88;  in  the  wars  of  1740-1763, 
12-20;  against  France  and  Na¬ 
poleon,  40,  42  sq.,  46,  47,  53,  68, 
72,  74 ;  diplomatic  relations  with 
Germany  since  1871,  126  sq., 
165,  174,  175,  177  sq.,  179,  182, 
183,  184 

Entente  Cordiale,  178 
Erfurt  (I  F  3),  54,  99 
Ernest  Augustus  I,  Elector  of 
Hanover,  187 

Ernest  Augustus  I,  King  of  Han¬ 
over,  88  sq.,  187 

Ernest  Augustus,  Duke  of  Bruns¬ 
wick,  170,  187 

Ernest  Augustus,  Duke  of  Cum¬ 
berland,  144,  187 
Eucken,  Rudolf,  17 1 
Exceptions,  Law  of,  132,  161 
Expropriation  Law,  168 


Farmers’  League,  160 
Fechner,  Gustav  Theodor,  141 
Federal  Act,  76  sq.,  79 
Ferdinand  I,  of  Austria,  87,  91, 95, 
186 

Feuerbach,  Anselm  von,  140 
Fichte,  Johann  Gottlieb,  57,  65 
Final  Act,  76,  77  sq. 

France,  in  the  wars  of  1740-1763, 

10,  12,  14,  16,  20;  during  the 
Revolution,  37  sqq. ;  under  Na¬ 
poleon  I,  43,  46  sqq.,  58  sqq.,  61, 
66,  72  ;  the  July  Revolution,  84  ; 
demands  on  Germany  in  1840, 
87  ;  attitude  toward  the  Austro- 
Prussian  War,  1  10,  114;  be¬ 
fore  the  Franco-German  War, 
1 1 4  sqq. ;  relations  with  Germany 
since  1871,  125,  127,  165,  174, 
178,  180,  182,  183 

Francis  I,  head  of  the  Holy  Roman 
Empire,  14,  21,  26,  186 
Francis  II  (as  head  of  the  Holy 
Roman  Empire  1792-1806 ; 
Francis  I  as  Emperor  of  Austria 
1804-1835),  39,  40,  47,  48,  67, 
86,  186 

Francis  Joseph,  of  Austria,  95, 
186 

Franco-German  War,  1 16  sqq. 
P'rankfort-on-the-Main  (II  C  4), 
61,  71,  78,  92,  99,  100,  1 12,  1 19 
Frankfort  Parliament,  92  sqq.,  96 
Franz,  Robert,  140 
Frederick  I,  of  Prussia,  8,  n,  1S6 
Frederick  II  (the  Great),  of  Prus¬ 
sia,  in  war,  1 1-22  ;  in  peace,  23- 
26,  31-34;  186,  188,  189,  190 
Frederick  III,  as  Crown  Prince 
of  Prussia,  1 1 1  ;  German  Em¬ 
peror,  145,  186 

Frederick  Augustus,  of  Saxony, 

66 

Frederick  William,  "  the  Great 
Elector”  of  Brandenburg,  7  sq., 

11,  15,  186 

Frederick  William  I,  of  Prussia, 
8,  15,  186 

Frederick  William  II,  of  Prussia, 
35’  36’  39’  40,  186 
Frederick  William  III,  of  Prussia, 
in  the  Napoleonic  era,  42  sq.,  47, 


194 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


49  sq.,  52,  55,  62,  63  sq.,  66,  72  ; 
in  the  struggle  for  constitutional 
liberty,  81  sq.,  87  ;  186 
Frederick  William  IV,  of  Prussia, 
87,  91  sq.,  93  sq.,  97,  98  sq.,  103, 

186 

Free  corps,  63  ;  Liitzow’s,  64 
Free-thinking  People’s  Party,  158, 
160 

Free-thinking  Union,  158,  160 
Freiligrath,  Ferdinand,  89 
French  Revolution,  37  sq. ;  its  in¬ 
fluence  in  Germany,  38,  45, 
74  sq.,  79,  80,  82 
Frenssen,  Gustav,  172 
Frey  tag,  Gustav,  102 
Friedland  (I  L  1),  52 
Furstenbund,  33  sq.,  35,  36 

Galicia  (I  K~N  4),  59 
Gastein  (II  E  6),  109 
George  I,  Elector  of  Hanover  and 
King  of  England,  187 
George  II,  Elector  of  Hanover 
and  King  of  England,  16,  187 
George  III,  Elector,  King,  of 
Hanover  and  King  of  England, 

187 

George  IV,  King  of  Planover  and 
King  of  England,  187 
George  V,  King  of  Hanover,  144, 
187 

George,  Stefan,  172 
German  Confederation,  organiza¬ 
tion  of,  76,  77  sq. ;  attempts  to 
reconstruct,  87,  103;  downfall 
of,  1 1 3 

German  East  Africa  (IV  S.  of  o° 
lat.,  W.  of  40°  E.  long.),  139, 
165  ;  German  East  Africa  Com¬ 
pany,  139 

German  Empire,  established  in 
1871, 1 19;  constitution  of,  i2osq., 
133  sq.,  189,  190;  changes 

wrought  by  founding  of,  122  sq. ; 
foreign  relations  of,  125  sqq., 
174  sqq. ;  centralization  of  gov¬ 
ernment  of,  I29sqq.,  136,  155  sq.; 
financial  and  economic  policies 
of,  129,  130,  155  sq.;  army  of, 
137  sq.,  1 51  sqq.;  relation  of 
constituent  states  to  central 


authority  of,  142;  agriculture 
and  industries  of,  128  sq.,  147  sq.; 
navy  of,  153,  189;  national  debt 
of,  156;  states  composing,  185 
German  Free-thinking  Party,  136, 
137,  158 

German  Imperial  Party,  114,  135, 
i36.  137.  15s 

German  People’s  Party,  160 
German  Social  Reform  Party,  158 
German  South-West  Africa  (IV 
200  S.  lat.,  200  E.  long.),  139, 
166 

Germany,  see  Holy  Roman  Em¬ 
pire,  German  Confederation, 
North  German  Federation,  and 
German  Empire 
Gervinus,  Georg,  93 
Gneisenau,  56,  65 
Goethe,  31,  39,  45,  54,  89,  171 
Graudenz  (I  K  2),  51 
Gravelotte  (II  B  5),  117 
Great  Elector,  see  Frederick 
William 

Grimm,  Jacob  and  Wilhelm,  90, 93 
Grossbeeren,  a  suburb  of  Berlin,  68 
Guelphs,  142 
Gutzkow,  Karl,  89 

Hambach  (II  C  5),  84 
Hamburg  (I  E  2),  66,  71,  120,  172, 
185 

I-Ianau  (I  E  3),  71 
Hanover  (I  E~F  2;  Duchy- 
1815;  Electorate;  Kingdom 
1815-1866;  province  of  Prussia 
1866-  ),  5,  6;  in  the  Seven 

Years’  War,  16,  17,  19;  33;  in  the 
Napoleonic  era,  46,  49  sq.,  52  ; 
76  sq. ;  in  the  struggle  for  con¬ 
stitutional  liberty,  79,  88  sq.,  98, 
102 ;  in  the  Austro-Prussian 
War,  hi  ;  absorbed  by  Prussia, 
1 12  ;  142,  170  ;  187 
Hapsburg  family,  5,  10,  27,  67  ;  see 
also  table,  p.  186 

Hardenberg,  Karl  August  von,  56, 

63 

Hauptmann,  Gerhart,  172 
Hebbel,  Friedrich,  89 
Plegel,  90 
Heine,  89 


INDEX 


195 


Heligoland  (III  C  1),  165,  174 
Helmholtz,  Hermann  von,  141 
Herder,  31 

Herzegovina  (II  G~H  8),  126,  179, 

183 

Hesse  (-Darmstadt  III  D  3-4), 
185 

Ilesse-Cassel (I  E3;  Landgraviate 
-1866;  Electorate;  absorbed 
by  Prussia  1866),  28,  44,  52;  in 
the  struggle  for  constitutional 
liberty,  79,  84,  100,  103;  in  the 
Austro-Prussian  War,  ill  ;  112 
Hesse-Homburg  (II  C  4),  112 
Heyse,  Paul,  140 
Hildebrandt,  Adolf,  140 
Hofer,  Andreas,  59  sq. 

Hoffmann  von  Fallersleben,  89 
Ilohenfriedberg  (I  J  3),  13 
Ilohenlinden  (I  G  4),  43 
Hohenlohe,  Chlodwig  von,  Impe¬ 
rial  Chancellor,  144,  146,  159, 
165,  174,  189 

Hohenzollern  family,  7,11,  25,  87, 
103,  1 15,  173;  see  also  table, 
p.  186 

Holland,  12,  13,  36 
Holstein  (II  C~D  2-3),  107  sqq., 
1 12 

Holy  Alliance,  79 
Holy  Roman  Empire,  founding 
and  organization  of,  1-5  ;  elec¬ 
tors  of,  5,  44 ;  heads  of,  after 
1740,  12,  14,  26,  36,  39;  gradual 
disintegration  of,  25,  28,  33,  38, 
42,  44,  46  sq.;  attempt  to  pre¬ 
serve,  34 ;  final  dissolution  of, 
48;  186,  187,  1S8 
Ilubertusburg  (I  G  3),  21 
Humboldt,  Alexander  von,  90, 
141 

Humboldt,  Wilhelm  von,  81 
Humperdinck,  Engelbert,  172 
Hungary  (I  J-M  6-4),  5,  94,  95, 
101 

Idealism,  German,  30,  31,  57,  65, 
90,  93,  101,  102,  123,  151,  171  sq. 
Imperialism,  German,  175  sq. 
Industries  and  industrialism,  Ger¬ 
man,  86,  128  sq.,  147  sq.,  149  sqq. 
Iron  Cross,  Order  of  the,  63 


Italy,  Austria  in,  5,  14,  42,  101  ;  in 
the  wars  with  Napoleon,  41,  43  ; 
in  the  Austro-Prussian  War,  109, 
no,  hi,  1 12;  relations  with 
Germany  since  1871,  126,  175, 
178,  181,  183 

Jahn,  Friedrich  Ludwig,  57 
Japan,  relations  with  Germany, 
174,  183,  184 

Jena  (I  F  3),  50  sq.,  54,  82,  84 
Jerome  Bonaparte,  53 
Joseph  II,  of  Austria,  21,  26  sq., 
32  sqq.,  186,  188 

Kaiser  Wilhelmsland,  139,  165 
Kalisz  (I  K  3),  63 
Kant,  30,  38,  57,  65,  171 
Katzbach  (I  J  3),  Battle  on  the, 
68  sq. 

Keller,  Gottfried,  140 
Kiao-Chau  (IV  S.  of  40°  N.  lat., 
1200  E.  long.),  165,  174 
Kleist,  Friedrich,  Prussian  gen¬ 
eral,  69 

Klenze,  Leo  von,  90 
Klinger,  Max,  173 
Klopstock,  30,  38,  64 
Koch,  Robert,  141 
Koniggratz  (II  F  4),  in 
Konigsberg  (I  L  1),  8,  52,  58 
Korner,  Theodor,  64 
Kosciusko,  37 
Kossuth,  95 

Kotzebue,  August  von,  82  sq. 
Krupp  steel-casting  company,  148 
Kulturkampf,  127  sq.;  see  also  159 
Kunersdorf  (I  H  2),  19 

Landsturm,  138 
Landwehr,  56,68,  69,  104,  138 
League  of  Three  Kings,  98  sq. 
Leipsic  (I  G  3),  17,  66,  172,  173; 

Battle  of,  69  sqq.,  82 
Lenbach,  Franz  von,  140 
Leopold  II,  of  Austria,  36,  39,  186 
Leopold,  of  Bavaria,  144,  170,  187 
Lessing,  30  sq. 

Leuthen  (I  J  3),  18 

Liebig,  Justus,  141 

Ligny  (I  C  3),  73 

Lippe  (-Detmold,  IIID  2-3),  185 


196 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


Literature,  German,  9,  22,  30  sq., 
45>  5°>  57.  64,  84,  S9  sq.,  102, 
140,  172,  189 
London  Protocol,  10S 
Lorraine  (II  B  5),  74,  119 
Lotze,  Hermann,  141 
Louis  I,  of  Bavaria,  88,  91,  187 
Louis  II,  of  Bavaria,  144,  187 
Louis  III,  of  Bavaria,  170,  187 
Louis  XV,  of  France,  16 
Louis  XVI,  of  France,  37,  38,  39, 
40 

Louis  XVIII,  of  France,  72,  74 
Louis  Philippe,  of  France,  84,  91 
Louise,  Queen  of  Prussia,  49,  52, 

58,  63 

Liibeck  (I  F  2),  52,  120,  185 
Ludwig,  Otto,  89 

Luneville  (I  D  4),  Treaty  of,  43, 
44 

Luther,  1 

Liitzen  (I  G  3),  66,  67 

Magdeburg  (I  F  2),  51,  68 
Mainz  (I  E  4),  5,  28,  39,  40,  71 
Mannheim  (II  C  5),  82 
Mantua  (II  D  7),  41,  60 
"  March  ”  Revolutions,  91,  95 
Marengo  (II  C  7),  43 
Marianne  Islands,  165 
Maria  Theresa,  of  Austria,  10;  in 
the  wars  of  1740-1763,  12,  14, 
16,  17  ;  26  sq.,  186,  188 
Marie  Antoinette,  38 
Marie  Louise,  of  Austria,  59 
Marshall  Islands  (IV  S.  of  20°  N. 

lat.,  E.  of  1600  E.  long.),  139 
Materialism,  German,  151 
Matricula,  130,  155  sq. 

Maximilian  II,  of  Bavaria,  91,  187 
Maximilian  III,  Elector  of  Bavaria, 
187 

Maximilian  IV,  Elector  of  Bavaria; 
King  of  Bavaria  as  Maximilian 
I,  187 

May  laws,  128 

Mecklenburg-Schwerin  (III  E-F 
2),  169,  185 

Mecklenburg-Strelitz  (III  F  2),  49, 
169,  185 

Metternich,  in  the  Napoleonic  era, 

59,  61,  67  ;  in  the  struggle  for 


constitutional  liberty,  80  sq.,  83, 
84,  86,  87,  91  ;  190 
Metz  (II  B  5),  1 17,  1 18,  119 
Milan  (I  E  6),  41,  43 
Militarism,  German,  155 
Mirabeau,  38 

Moltke,  Hellmuth  von,  111,  116 
Mommsen,  Theodor,  141 
Montenegro,  182,  183 
Morike,  Eduard,  140 
Morocco,  178,  179  sq. 

Moscow,  61  sq. 

Moselle  (I  D  4-3),  71 
Muller,  Wilhelm,  84 
Munich  (II  D  5),  88,  90,  173 
Music,  German,  9,  90,  140  sq.,  172 

Napoleon  Bonaparte  (Napoleon 
I),  wars  with  Austria,  41  sq., 
42  sq.,  47  sq.,  58  sq. ;  war  with 
Prussia,  49  sqq. ;  relations  with 
states  along  the  Rhine  and  in 
South  Germany,  48,  53,  60  sq. ; 
War  of  Liberation,  66^-74;  Ger¬ 
many’s  gainfrom  the  Napoleonic 
era,  74  sq. 

Napoleon  III,  no,  1 1 4,  1 18 
Nassau  (II  B-C  4),  112 
National  Liberals,  1 14,  I35sq.,  137, 
158,  160 

Neisse,  raging  (I  J  3),  68 
Netherlands  (I  C~D  3-2),  72 
New  Britain  Archipelago,  German 
colonies  in,  139 

New  Guinea,  German  colonies  in 
(IV  S.  of  o°  lat.,  140°  E.  long.), 
139;  New  Guinea  Company, 
r39 

Niebuhr,  Barthold,  90 
Nietzsche,  Friedrich,  141 
North  German  Federation,  estab¬ 
lished,  H2sq.  ;  superseded  by 
the  German  Empire,  1 19 
Nuremberg  (I  F  4),  7,  53 

Oldenburg  (I  D~E  2),  61,  71,  185 

Olmiitz  (II  G  5),  100 

Otto,  of  Bavaria,  144,  170,  187 

Painting,  German,  140,  172  sq. 
Palatinate  of  the  Rhine  (I  D~E  4), 
5,  20 


INDEX 


197 


Palm,  Johannes,  53 
Pan-Germanism,  176  sq.,  188,  190 
Panic  of  1873,  I29>  1 3 1 
Paris  (I  B  4),  38,  46,  72,  74,  89,  91, 
1 18  sq. ;  First  Peace  of,  72  ; 
Second  Peace  of,  74 
Peasants’  League,  Bavarian,  160 
Peasants’  League,  German,  160 
Pessimism,  German,  83,  96,  140, 
141 

Peter  III,  of  Russia,  20 
Philosophy,  German,  30,  57,  65, 
90,  141,  17 1  sq. 

Pietism,  9,  29 

Poland  (I  J-N  1-3),  Partitions  of, 
31  sq.,  37;  re-created,  52;  re¬ 
divided,  76 

Poles  in  Prussia,  142  sq.,  151,  153, 
167  sq. ;  in  the  Reichstag,  143, 

!S8 

Pomerania  (I  H-J  2-1),  17,  20 
Pompadour,  Madame  de,  16 
Poniatowski,  Stanislaus,  32 
Portugal,  182,  183 
Posen  (III  G-J  2-3),  37,  76,  142, 
143 

"  Potato  War,”  33 
Potsdam  (I  G  2),  26,  47 
Prague  (I  H  3),  12,  13,  17  ;  Peace 
of,  1 1 2,  142 

Pressburg  (I  J  4),  Treaty  of,  47,  48 
Probstheida  (I  G  3),  70 
Progressive  Party,  104  sq.,  113, 

1 14.  135-  J36 

Progressive  People’s  Party,  160 
Prussia  (I  K-M  2-1 ;  III  B-L3-1), 
origins  of,  7  sq. ;  increase  (and 
decrease)  in  territory  and  popu¬ 
lation  of,  7,  15,  24,  32,  37,  41,  44, 

49  sq.,  52,  76,  1 1 2,  120;  wars  of, 
12-14,  17-21.  32  sq.,  36,  39  sq., 

50  sqq.,  66-74,  108  sq.,  m  sq., 
1 16  sqq.;  army  of,  7,  8,  16,  24, 
36,  49,  56,  63,  64,  103  sq.,  1 16, 
138;  internal  government  of, 

7  sq-.  23sqq->35sq->  49. 55.81  sq- 

87  sq.,  104  sq.,  1 14,  128,  142  sqq., 
i66sqq.,  184;  uprising  of,  against 
Napoleon,  57  sq.,  62,  63  sqq.,  66- 
74,  189,  190;  in  the  struggle 
for  constitutional  liberty,  80,  81 
sq.,  83  sq.,  87  sq.,  91  sq.,  95; 


constitution  of,  97  sq. ;  rise  of,  to 
the  hegemony  of  Germany,  15, 
34,  64  sq.,  77,  86,  93  sq.,  (conflict 
with  Austria)  98  sqq.,  102,  104, 
105,  109  sqq.,  (conflict  with 

France)  1 14  sqq. ;  place  of,  in 
the  German  Empire,  119  sqq., 
185;  186 

Prussia,  East  (III  J-L  2-1),  7,  17, 

61 

Prussia,  West  (III  G~J  2-1),  142, 
H3 

Quadruple  Alliance,  13 
Quatre-Bras  (I  C  3),  73 

Ranke,  Leopold  von,  90,  141 
Rationalism,  9,  29 
Ratisbon  (I  G  4),  58 
Rauch,  Christian,  90 
Raumer,  Friedrich  von,  93 
Reichstag,  120  sq.,  133  sqq.,  138, 
T39.  i52>  153.  i58  sqq-  l8Si  dis¬ 
solutions  of  the,  132,  137,  158, 
159 

Reuss,  younger  and  older  branch 
(III  E-F  3),  185 
Reuter,  Fritz,  84,  102,  140 
Rhine  (I  E-C  5-2),  14,  39,  40,  41, 
42.  43.  53-  71 

Rhine,  Confederation  of  the,  48, 
5°,  33,  58,  60,  61,  65,  66,  69,  71 
Riesengebirge  (I  H_J  3),  13,  67 
Rietschel,  Ernst,  140 
Romanticism,  31,  45,  89 
Roon,  Albrecht  von,  no,  116 
Rossbach  (I  F  3),  18 
Russia,  in  the  wars  of  1740-1763, 
12,  14,  t6,  17,  20;  in  the  Parti¬ 
tions  of  Poland,  31  sq.,  37;  allied 
with  German  states  against  Na¬ 
poleon,  42  sq.,  47,  (Napoleon’s 
campaign  in  Russia,  61  sq.),  66- 
74;  Holy  Alliance  with  Austria 
and  Prussia,  79 ;  aids  Austria, 
95;  offended  by  Austria,  101  ; 
relations  with  Germany  since 
1871,  125  sq.,  127,  174,  179,  182, 

183 

Saale  (I  F  3-2),  51 
Sadowa  (II  F  4),  in 


198 


GERMANY  SINCE  1740 


St.  Helena  (IV  N.  of  20°  S.  lat., 
W.  of  o°  long.),  74 
Salzburg  (I  F  5),  42 
Samoan  Islands  (IV  S.  of  o°  lat., 
W.  of  1600  W.  long.),  139,  165 
Sand,  Karl,  82 
Sans  Souci,  26,  34 
Sardinia,  12,  13,  14,  40 
Savigny,  Friedrich  Karl  von,  90 
Saxe-Altenburg  (III  E-F  3),  185 
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha  (III  E  3),  185 
Saxe-Meiningen  (III  E  3),  185 
Saxe-Weimar  (III  D-E  3  ;  Duchy 
-1815;  Grand-duchy  18 1 5— 
),  28,  39,  50,  79,  185 
Saxony  (I  G_H  3;  Duchy  - 
1807;  Electorate;  Kingdom 
1807-  ),  6;  in  the  wars  of 

1740-1763,  10,  12-14,  !7>  19-21 ; 
28,  32,  33,  50,  52;  in  the  War 
of  Liberation,  66,  70 ;  76 ;  in  the 
struggle  for  constitutional  lib¬ 
erty,  84,  88,  95,  98,  102;  in  the 
Austro-Prussian  War,  in  ;  169, 
185 

Schadow,  Gottfried,  90 
Scharnhorst,  Gerhard  von,  56,  65, 
68 

Schaumburg-Lippe  (III  D  2),  185 
Scheffel,  Viktor  von,  102 
Schenkendorf,  Max  von,  64 
Schill,  Ferdinand  von,  60 
Schiller,  31,  45,  50,  57,  102 
Schinkel,  Karl  Friedrich,  90 
Schlegel,  Friedrich,  58 
Schleiermacher,  Friedrich,  90 
Schleswig  (II  C  2),  107  sqq.,  112, 
142 

Schneckenburger,  Max,  90 
Schopenhauer,  141 
Schubert,  90 
Schurz,  Carl,  96,  190 
Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt  (III  E  3), 

185 

Schwarzburg-Sondershausen  (III 
E  3),  185 

Schwarzenberg,  Karl  Philipp  von, 
Austrian  general,  68,  71 
Science,  German,  90,  141,  172 
Sculpture,  German,  9,  90,  140, 
172  sq. 

Sedan  (II  A  5),  1 18 


Sentimentalism,  German,  29 
Septennate,  138,  1 5 1 ,  152 
Servia,  182,  183 
Seven  Years’  War,  17-21,  189 
Shipping,  German,  149 
Sicily,  42 

Silesia  (I  II-K  2-4),  claims  to,  1 1 ; 

wars  for,  12-14,  18-21  ;  23,66,67 
Social-Democrats,  131  sqq.,  153, 
158,  159,  160,  161  sq. 

Social  life,  German,  8,  27  sq.,  36, 
45,  57,  64,  83,  89  sq.,  96,  101  sq., 
123,  150  sq. 

Socialistic  legislation,  German, 
132  sq.,  156  sq. 

South  Seas,  German  colonies  in, 
139.  !6S 

Spain,  in  the  War  of  the  Austrian 
Succession,  12,  14;  40,  115,  165 
Spandau  (I  G  2),  51 
Spires  (II  C  5),  90 
Stein,  Karl,  Baron  vom,  55  sq.,  63, 
65,  71,  81,  83  sq.,  142,  190 
Stettin  (I  IP  2),  16 
Storm,  Theodor,  140 
Stralsund  (I  G  1),  60 
Strassburg  (II  B  5),  116,  1 1 8 
Strauss,  Richard,  172 
Stuck,  Franz  von,  173 
Sudermann,  Hermann,  172 
Suffrage,  in  the  German  Confeder¬ 
ation,  92  ;  in  the  German  Em¬ 
pire,  120  sq. ;  in  Prussia,  98, 
168  sq. ;  in  other  states  of  the 
Empire,  169  sq. 

Swabia,  7 

Sweden,  in  the  wars  of  1740-1763, 
12,  16,  17,  20;  in  the  War  of 
Liberation,  68,  70 
Sybel,  Heinrich  von,  141 

Talleyrand,  Charles  Maurice  de,  44 
Tauroggen  (I  M  1),  62 
Teutonic  Order,  7 
Thirty  Years’  War,  1,8 
Thorn  (I  K  2),  36,  37 
Tilsit  (I  L  1),  Peace  of,  52 
Togoland  (Togo,  IV  o°  long.,  N. 

of  o°  lat.),  139 
Torgau  (I  G  3),  19  sq. 

Treitschke,  Heinrich  von,  141 
Trier  (I  D  4-3),  5,  28 


INDEX 


199 


Triple  Alliance,  126,  127,  174,  178, 
181,  183 

Triple  Entente,  178,  181,  183 
Tuaillon,  Louis,  173 
Tugendbund,  57  sq. 

Turkey,  relations  with  Germany, 
175 

Tyrol  (I  F-G  5),  47,  59  sq.,  76 

Uhde,  Fritz  von,  173 
Uhland,  Ludwig,  89,  93 
United  States,  38 ;  relations  with 
Germany  since  1871,  165,  175, 
J77 

Unity,  German  national,  in  the 
Holy  Roman  Empire,  1,  3,  4, 
21  sq.,  27,  28,  33,  34,  38,  41,  42, 
44  sq.,  47,  48  ;  63,  65,  75  ;  in  the 
German  Confederation,  77,  78, 
80,  82,  85,  86,  87,  91,  93  sq.,  96, 
99,  101  sqq. ;  in  the  North  Ger¬ 
man  Federation,  113;  in  the 
German  Empire,  119,  122  sq., 
129  sqq.,  157  sq. 

Venice  (II  E  7),  47,  76,  112 

Verdun  (II  A  5),  1 17 

Verona  (I  F  6),  41 

Versailles  (I  A  4),  1 19 

Vienna  (I  J  4),  47,  59,  94,  m  ; 

Congress  of,  72,  76  sqq. 
Vincennes,  a  suburb  of  Paris,  46 
Vionville  (II  A  5),  1 1 7 
Virchow,  Rudolf,  14 1 
Vistula  (I  K-M-K  4-1),  63 
Volkerschlacht,  70 
Voltaire,  26 

Wagner,  Richard,  140 
Wagram  (I  J  4),  59 


Waitz,  Georg,  141 
Waldeck  (III  D  3),  120,  185 
War  of  Liberation,  66-75 
Warsaw  (I  L  2),  37,  52 
IVateh  on  the  Rhine ,  The,  90,  118 
Waterloo  (I  C  3),  73  sq. 

Weber,  Karl  Maria  von,  90 
Weimar  (I  F  3),  28,  50,  51 
Wellington,  68,  72  sq. 

Weser  (II  C  4-3),  77 
Westphalia  (I  D-E  3),  53,  60,  71, 
76;  Treaty  of,  1  sq. 

William  I,  as  a  prince  of  Prussia, 
92,  95;  as  King  of  Prussia,  103, 
104,  105,  1 1 5;  as  German  Em¬ 
peror,  1 19,  132;  144  sq.,  186 
William  II,  King  of  Prussia  and 
German  Emperor,  145,  146, 

173  sq.,  186 

William,  Duke  of  Brunswick,  187 
William,  King  of  Hanover  and 
King  of  England,  187 
Wittelsbach  family,  33 ;  see  also 
table,  p.  187 
Wundt,  Wilhelm,  14 1 
Wtirtemberg  (I  E  4;  Duchy  - 
1805;  Electorate;  Kingdom 
1805-  ),  6,  27,  28;  in  the 

Napoleonic  era,  44,  47,  48,  60, 
70  ;  in  the  struggle  for  constitu¬ 
tional  liberty,  79,  83,  84,  88,  95; 
in  the  Austro-Prussian  War,  1 1 1, 
1 12  ;  170,  185 
Wurzburg  (I  E-F  3-4),  76 

Yorck  von  Wartenburg,  56,  62  sq., 
70 

"Young  Germany,”  89 
Zollverein,  85  sq.,  100,  109,  128 


/ 


This  Book  : 


c  t>  - 


PS49 


